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Abstract 
 
For the last thirty years a quiet revolution has been taking place in political 
theory. Starting in theology and philosophy, and making its way through 
history and sociology to politics, policy and practice, this disparate movement 
has slowly adopted the title of post-liberalism. Although difficult to encapsulate 
in a single argument, the central idea of post-liberalism is that political theory 
has, over the course of the last four centuries, slowly but surely become 
dominated by liberalism, neglecting ideas of the good in favour of an abstract 
respect for plurality. This theory has apparently infiltrated politics, policy and 
practice, leaving these unable to inspire feelings of solidarity or collective 
action.   
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore these ideas both theoretically and 
empirically. Theoretically, it places post-liberal ideas into dialogue with 
anthropologies and sociologies of religion, of the state, and of capitalism, with 
special attention to research engaged with how these categories influence 
ideas of the good. Empirically, it undertakes a multiple case-study 
ethnography of civic action groups working in London. The cases are chosen 
on the basis of their representing key policy paradigms for social solidarity in 
the post-war era: Christian, secular, multi-faith and post-secular.  
 
The thesis concludes by offering an alternative framework, in which religion 
sits as a subset, for developing shared ideas of the good deliberatively and 
inclusively, so as to not only respect but thrive on plurality.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
For the last thirty years a quiet revolution has been taking place in political 
theory. Starting in theology and philosophy, and making its way through 
history and sociology to politics, policy and practice, this disparate movement 
has slowly adopted the title of post-liberalism. Although difficult to encapsulate 
in a single argument, the central idea of post-liberalism is that political theory 
has, over the course of the last four centuries, slowly but surely become 
dominated by liberalism, neglecting ideas of the good in favour of an abstract 
respect for plurality. This theory has apparently infiltrated politics, policy and 
practice, leaving these unable to inspire feelings of solidarity or collective 
action.  What is perceived as public has slowly reduced as notions of political 
and social responsibility are increasingly regarded as private matters. Two 
monolithic conceptual mechanisms have arisen to fill the vacuum, to redirect 
private citizens towards public duty: the state and the market, each with their 
own contractual logic. So prevalent has this binary become that it is almost 
impossible to conceive of a reduction in one without an increase in the other. 
By way of resolving this stalemate, post-liberals propose to return to the 
theoretical moment at which ideas of the good were undermined, and to 
slowly work from theory through to politics, policy and practice, reawakening 
our sense of solidarity, and reinvigorating collective action.  
 
Post-liberalism sits well with broader shifts in society and economics and, 
partly as a result, has had a significant and growing impact on politics, policy 
and practice. It has been suggested, for instance, that the UK, Europe and 
Australia are becoming post-secular (Habermas 2008). This return of religion 
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ostensibly seems conducive to the reinvigoration of ideas of the good. Once 
having been perceived as in decline, religion has a renewed visibility, 
requiring of a reimagining of the public sphere (Habermas 2006; Dinham 
2014). A similarly significant shift has been seen in social and economic 
policy, with the post-war socially democratic consensus giving way to a 
neoliberal consensus, with rhetoric concerning the importance of public 
services giving way to rhetoric concerning individual property (Judt 2010). 
This shift has been reinforced by policy interest in localism and empowered 
communities. Against this backdrop, in the UK, post-liberalism has influenced 
the rise of two cross-dressing political movements perceived as eschewing 
left-right, state-market dichotomies: Red Tory and Blue Labour. Post-
liberalism has had a significant impact on policy through the work of think-
tanks Respublica, Demos and IPPR. And post-liberalism is slowly finding its 
way into community development, through the work of Maurice Glasman at 
Queen Mary, University of London and at London Citizens, and through the 
work of Together for the Common Good.  
 
Notwithstanding this apparent timeliness, a number of problems arise from 
post-liberalism’s emergent impact. First, what is meant by “ideas of the good”, 
indeed whether this phrase means anything at all in the contemporary 
context, is deeply contentious. It needs to be recalled that the moment in 
history post-liberals hark back to is a time of Christian hegemony. It is 
questionable whether this ideal has any relevance in contexts that are 
simultaneously Christian, secular and religiously plural (Weller 2006). Not only 
is it contentious to suggest that Christianity has anything unique to contribute 
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to secular contexts, which may exhibit their own ideals, hopes and aspirations 
that inspire public duty (Woodhead 2012); but it is also problematic to suggest 
that Christianity can frame religiously plural contexts. 
 
Despite its apparent equivalence to the post-liberal, nor does the post-secular 
necessarily present a shift back to older ways of thinking. Instead, as I 
suggest in more detail further along in the introduction, the post-secular, if it is 
a useful category at all, might be nothing more than an increased awareness 
of religion on account of the rise of radical Islam, and the potential contribution 
of particular religions to public service delivery (Weller 2006; Beckford 2012). 
Any new settlement is thus unlikely to result in a fundamental upheaval of 
secular assumptions, and far more likely to result in a secular public sphere’s 
improving its religious literacy so as to better accommodate religious diversity. 
If ideas of the good are to be revived, they will also have to be reimagined in a 
way that respects this complexity.  
 
The second issue is that depending on what we mean by ideas of the good, 
whether or not they are in decline, or even relevant, is deeply contentious. 
Coming from a theological position, post-liberalism offers a particular 
understanding of what is missing, with a deep emphasis on moral narratives 
and voluntary commitment, which might not be recognised by everybody. The 
good, especially understood as the common good, is a widely used phrase 
outside of theological contexts, and may refer to nothing more than the 
seeking of common interests in diverse communities (Gilbert 2012). 
Moreover, sociologists often call into question whether ideas of the good 
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represent anything other than delusional justifications for actions that have 
been predetermined by the structures within which they find themselves: 
religion, class, gender (Laidlaw 2013). Meanwhile, evolutionary biologists and 
economists have been developing theories of rational choice that 
controversially suggest all actions are determined by a cost-benefit analysis. If 
ideas of the good are to be revived, they will have to demonstrate their added 
value in this altered context.  
 
All this contention is extremely problematic, since it suggests that politics, 
policy and practice might be formulated on the basis of ideas that potentially 
do not resonate with the wider public, and which fail to accurately reflect what 
is out there to resource politics, policies and practices to make them viable. At 
worst, the result will be a new cultural hegemony, in which people are forced 
to participate in institutions from which they are ideologically alienated, if they 
wish to be involved in constructing ideas of the good. Less dramatically, it 
may lead to the further alienation of large swathes of the population, to whom 
ideas of the good do not make sense. Huge amounts of time and money 
could be wasted trying to understand why it is that politics, policies and 
practices are not gaining any traction. Perhaps least dramatically of all, the 
result may simply be that post-liberalism only appeals to a particular type of 
Christian. It would be inappropriate, as well as a shame, if such an effective 
analysis of our current situation could not be opened up to generate renewal 
outside of the Christian context, to society as a whole.    
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So the key questions of this thesis emerge: what role, if any, do ideas of the 
good play in cultivating social solidarity in pluralist settings? How are these 
ideas reified through rituals and practices that transform senses of political 
and social responsibility? And within these are many smaller questions: Does 
it differ from religious to nonreligious people? Does it differ between religious 
identities? If ideas do play an important role, what kind of ideas would they 
have to be in pluralist settings?  
 
The thesis opens with a comprehensive and critical review of post-liberalism: 
first, as it emerges in theology and philosophy; then, as it is reified through 
politics, policy and practice. The thesis then turns to scrutinise the key 
questions against two criteria: First, it theoretically dissects post-liberalism in 
terms of its components. Second, it undertakes a multiple case study 
ethnography of four organisations seeking to develop social solidarity in a 
context of all faiths and none, with the aim of understanding the complex ways 
in which theology, ideology, and material factors combine to bring about social 
action between people of apparently very different beliefs. Each organisation 
is situated in London, widely regarded as one of the most diverse cities in the 
world.  
 
In Chapter 2, the discussion of post-liberalism seeks to establish a framework 
that can be theoretically and empirically explored. Developing such a 
framework is an extraordinarily difficult task, indeed almost the work of a 
doctoral thesis in itself, since on the one hand, post-liberalism has not at all 
emerged as a movement, but rather as an ex post facto label to apply to a 
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number of disparate and conflicting ideas; and on the other hand, post-liberal 
theory tends to be written as genealogy, and so is not easy to translate into 
theories for exploration. The result is that the framework provided can only 
ever be general, and there will always be exceptions. Even taking the small 
set of thinkers that I will explore in detail, Charles Taylor, Alisdair MacIntyre 
and John Milbank, there are a number of important conflicts. Still, a cut off has 
to be made somewhere in the process of rendering ideas amenable to 
empirical study. It next seeks to give that framework practical reality, by 
demonstrating how it has influenced particular politics, policy and practice. Of 
particular importance in developing this framework is the post-liberal stress on 
ideas of the good, which are deemed to designate but also be constructed by 
a community. I develop a post-liberal idea of community which designates a 
group of people bound through shared narratives and associated practices, 
and who engage in the process of performing these narratives and practices 
for their own sake, rather than doings so on account of instrumental factors 
such as the calculation that what is good for the community is good for them 
as individuals.  
 
Having thus outlined post-liberalism in terms of its theological and 
philosophical roots and in terms of how its ideas are beginning to play out in 
politics, policy and practice, the literature review turns to outline and critically 
assess the fundamental meanings and mechanisms by which the post-liberal 
vision appears to be undermined.  
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Chapter 3 challenges post-liberalism at its most fundamental level; namely, its 
contention that the loss of ideas of the good causes the demise of social 
solidarity. It questions whether ideas of the good have really been lost with 
secularisation. It questions whether ideas of the good are even required to 
establish social solidarity. And it questions whether new ideas are not anyway 
on the horizon, which avoid the implication in some of the literature that 
recovering the good depends upon a revalorisation of Christianity – a 
standpoint which, as already suggested, would likely be inappropriate and 
unworkable in any religiously plural context. It will do all of this by putting post-
liberalism into dialogue with anthropological and sociological studies of 
religion and its influence on ideas of the good. 
 
My review of the literature on social theory reveals a dichotomy between 
idealism and materialism. Idealism sees ideas as fundamental in shaping 
history and human action, whereas materialism sees material factors such as 
wealth and power as primary. Revealing this dichotomy, and noting the shift 
from the former to the latter, provides support for the post-liberal view. Yet in 
reality of course, the dichotomy is false, and people tend to be motivated by a 
number of intertwining factors, thus the post-liberal view is also challenged.  
 
This challenge might be complicated by the possibility that post-liberalism is 
idealism with a twist. It often seems to assert not that ideas are what motivate 
people, but that they are what ought to motivate people. From this 
perspective, it is of little consequence to suggest that people are primarily 
motivated by material factors. Post-liberals are making a normative claim that 
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things ought to be different. Yet this point notwithstanding, calling for people 
to be motivated by ideas of the good is senseless if that call does not reflect 
what is ontologically possible, or socially useful.  
 
The post-liberal claim that the loss of ideas of the good has led to a decline in 
social solidarity is also challenged against developments in the anthropology 
and sociology of religion. While much of this research recognises the 
important role that religion plays in cultivating social solidarity (Durkheim 
1915/2008; Bellah 1967; Alexander 2006; Lynch 2012; Baker 2013). But 
some of this theory regards this function as transferable to other, perhaps 
secular framings, while still other theory confirms this possibility, suggesting 
that ideas of the good never really went away, but rather changed; from 
Christian to secular, and subsequently to being both these and religiously 
plural simultaneously (Woodhead 2012; Weller 2006). As these shifts play out 
in politics, policy and practice, a complicated picture is offered whereby a 
reformed secular state remains as arbitrator and commissioner of religious 
and nonreligious ideas and practices of social solidarity (Dinham 2009; 
Dinham et al. 2009).  
 
When it comes to religion, the politics, policy and practice landscape is 
particularly muddled regarding the idealism-materialism dichotomy. On the 
one hand politicians and policy makers develop grand narratives such as 
multi-culturalism and multi-faithism, or inter-culturalism and inter-faithism, 
which they seek to reify through institutions. And practitioners such as those 
associated with David Ford’s Cambridge Interfaith Programme or the 
	 17	
Christian Muslim Forum advocate scriptural reasoning as a process of 
developing relationships across difference. On the other hand, actors 
operating within these grand narratives provided by politics and policy, such 
as David Barclay, place much greater stress on actions and relationships 
(Barclay 2013).  But again, suggesting there is a dichotomy can be 
misleading, as empirical work will show, and Paulo Freire has suggested that 
the point is not to eschew ideas of the good altogether, but rather to ensure 
that such ideas are formed inductively and at the grassroots. 
 
An alternative way of theorising the renewed visibility of religion in secular 
contexts is the post-secular (Beckford 2012). Post-secular theory has a lot of 
traction at the moment, because of a two-part principle. On the one hand, the 
secular idea of principled distance from any particular idea of the good 
appears to be the only viable model in an increasingly religiously plural 
landscape. But on the other hand, notwithstanding this caveat, as a result of 
events like 9/11 and 7/7, as well as the obvious role that religion has to play in 
the public sphere, most obviously in terms of welfare service delivery and 
cohesion, but also in terms of greater spiritual and moral awareness, religion 
is unavoidably back on the agenda (Dinham 2009; Dinham and Francis 2015). 
 
Yet the post-secular is also problematic. Notwithstanding the implicit 
agreement between post-liberalism and post-secular theory, since the latter 
seems to revalorise the place of ideas of the good in establishing social 
solidarity, it might be suggested that there is a post-secular paradox: Taking a 
secular perspective, post-secularists nonetheless recognises the role that 
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religion plays in the public sphere. I explain this paradox by distinguishing 
between the post-secular and post-secularism.  
 
Finally, I move on to discuss ideas such as sacred sociology, religious literacy 
and interstitial space theory, which are presented as a kind of synthesis 
between post-liberalism and secular and post-secular social theories. These 
ideas begin to pave the way towards reconciling the importance of ideas of 
the good in developing social solidarity, with the significantly changing 
landscape of belief.  
 
So I discuss in turn secular, post-secular and sacred social theory. The 
discussion will demonstrate that in fact, post-liberalism can find significant and 
wide-ranging support for its analysis, but with a number of caveats: from 
opening up the theology to include alternative discourses, to being aware of 
the advantages of secular and materialist approaches.  
  
Chapter 4 focuses on statism. Post-liberalism suggests that the turn from 
religious ideas of the good to secular ideas, from idealist to materialist, 
created a vacuum which needed to be filled by the state. Through legislation, 
the state creates a rigid social contract. And through incentive, punishment, 
and welfare, the state manipulates us to act in the interests of this social 
contract. 
 
Post-liberals suggest that a situation in which communities and organisations 
act in the interest of solidarity voluntarily, without being forced to, and without 
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requiring state support, is intrinsically more desirable than other options. 
Voluntarism is more desirable than legislation, since it reflects moral actions 
undertaken for moral reasons, rather than because they are to our advantage 
(Taylor 1992: 60; MacIntyre 1981/2007: 156, 188, 236; Milbank 2009). 
Communities looking after themselves is considered more desirable than 
taxation and welfare, since it avoids the alienation of gift exchange and 
charity, disparages dependency, and tends to promote mutual support and 
strong relationships (Pally 2011: 24). This idea of community will be explored 
in relation to anthropological and sociological invocations of community, which 
suggest a slightly different framing.  
 
Post-liberals moreover suggest that when organisations are co-opted into the 
state, they are corrupted and or destroyed by the neglect of intrinsic goods in 
favour of external goods (MacIntyre in Knight 2005: 267). This view has some 
support amongst political economists (Polanyi 1944/2001; Scraton 1985). 
Since the state tends to collude with the market, it will always undermine 
solidarity, both on account of the aims and targets it imposes, and because of 
the alienation of workers.  
 
Yet there is plenty of other theory to suggest that the state at its very inception 
is not the enemy of solidarity, but its embodiment (Dinham 2014). This 
appears to be reinforced by the public sentiment that the state should do 
certain things because local people are either unable or should not have to do 
so. There is equally support in discourse amongst the public regarding the 
privatisation of public services, which suggests that public ownership inspires 
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solidarity, since only in public ownership can services have a chance of being 
for the good of all, focused on the intrinsic good of a practice, rather than on 
profit, and in the service equally of all, irrespective of wealth, age, race, 
religion or belief, location, or disability (Titmuss 1971/1997). Moreover, it 
might be suggested that by paying taxes, we are consciously performing 
solidarity. Similarly, the idea of the state funding or commissioning certain 
programmes or organisations, may be perceived as developing solidarity in 
local institutions, as well as being fundamental to sustaining those institutions 
(Giddens 1998; Skopcol 1996).   
 
Chapter 5 focuses on capitalism. While it is more popular amongst 
contemporary social theorists to focus on neoliberalism, the focus of this 
thesis remains the deeper theory associated with capitalism. Partly, this is for 
the obvious reason that post-liberal theorists themselves designate capitalism 
as the key area to address. But more deeply, the choice of post-liberals 
themselves is based on the suggestion that it is necessary to return to the 
ideological inception of our current problems. From the post-liberal 
perspective, liberalism and capitalism are the key areas to address, the 
energy behind the waves as it were, of which neoliberalism is merely the 
latest manifestation, the white foam of the waves as they crash onto the 
seashore. Although it acknowledges the idea that capitalism is intended to 
distribute to each a according to desert, post-liberalism takes on both Marxist 
and neo-Marxist guises, showing concern not only with how capitalism 
creates material inequality, but also with how it cultivates acquisitiveness, and 
corrodes relationships. Post-liberalism is concerned with how the state and 
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the market collude, such that legislation and policy are beholden to business 
interests, and public goods are submitted to market logic. Its concern with 
market logic has some roots in concern with inequality, but also rests heavily 
on its focus on relationships: the relationship of managers to workers, 
specifically, the alienation of workers from their labour; the relation of 
individuals to the wider public, specifically, the use of self-interest as a 
mechanism for increasing productivity; and the relationship between each 
party in the gift relationship, specifically, the intervention of money. 
 
Chapter 6 commences the second strand through which post-liberal theory is 
scrutinised, by exploring the methodological challenges associated with 
moving from theological and philosophical theory, into empirical research. It 
places special emphasis on the difficulty of moving from normative analyses 
to research engaged with lived realities in religiously diverse settings. It 
suggests that this move is complicated, since normative statements may not 
be considered subject to empirical scrutiny, and any evidence that a 
normative statement does not realistically reflect people’s opinion on the 
ground, may simply be taken as evidence of how far from the truth people 
have strayed.  
 
The methodology closes with a short introduction to the structure and format 
of the findings case studies. Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10 look at each case study 
in turn: Christians on the Left, Hackney Council for Voluntary Service, the 
Faith-based Regeneration Network, and London Citizens.  
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Chapter 11 offers discussion points. It takes the reader systematically through 
the questions arising from chapters 2 to 5, and explains what the findings 
offered from chapters 7 to 10 can contribute by way of an answer.  
 
Chapter 12 concludes the thesis, by offering a framework for thinking about 
social solidarity in a pluralist age.  
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Chapter 2: Post-liberalism  
 
This section introduces post-liberalism, and provides a framework for 
analysing its understanding of ideas of the good. It also demonstrates how 
post-liberalism is made manifest in particular politics, policies and practices. I 
should begin with the disclaimer that this task is made tough not only because 
each thinker I associate with the trend has a slightly different perspective, but 
also because its meaning as it plays out in practice inevitably shifts with time. 
What I therefore do is to begin by stating the basic argument, then go far 
wider and deeper, only to return, in the next chapter, to the basic argument, 
so as to have a shorthand for critique. The intention is that this shorthand will 
carry with it much baggage, and that the reader, once having taken in this 
chapter, will be able to also carry that baggage, so as we can move together 
through the critique.   
 
The basic argument of post-liberalism can be framed quite simply: there was 
once a clear idea of the good. This idea has been undermined by the rise of 
liberalism, which is taken as responsible for both statism and capitalism. 
Liberalism introduces the possibility that on the one hand, there is no single 
idea of the good, and on the other, even if there were, it would not be possible 
to agree on it without descending into violence. Liberalism suggests that all 
must be free to pursue their own idea of the good, and that any public good 
can only be defined in terms of material improvements spread as widely as 
possible. I will just refer to this as common wealth for shorthand. Statism acts 
as a mechanism for simultaneously protecting the individual’s right to pursue 
her own idea of the good, and underwriting common wealth. Capitalism 
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provides a new mechanism, a hidden hand, which redirects self-interest 
towards common wealth. 
 
The longer argument is far more complex. Since post-liberalism began in 
theology, and since its origin impacts on its evolution into other fields, I will 
begin by offering an account of this origin. This account will remain brief, 
however, since my key interest is the adoption of post-liberalism into political 
theology.  
 
Post-liberal theology first emerged through the work of Hans Willhelm Frei 
and George Lindbeck at Yale Divinity School. Both scholars critiqued the 
colonising of theology by a liberal ideology rooted in the enlightenment, which 
insisted on the possibility of a tradition-independent rationality based on logic 
and empirical evidence, and the relegation to a matter of individual preference 
anything that could not be so evidenced (Hunsinger 2003: 51; Michener 2013: 
2). With the spread of this ideology into theology, the latter had largely fallen 
into two camps: what Hunsinger characterises as the evangelical and the 
liberal - although proponents of each might beg to differ at this 
characterisation (Hunsinger 2003: 44). With the broad use of the term 
evangelical, Hunsinger intends those that take a literalist approach to 
theology, often justifying ‘faith commitments and propositions using the 
methods and suppositions of the rational and empirical’ (Michener 2013: 2). 
By liberals, he intends those that seek to identify a universal religious 
experience grounded in psychological or sociological processes, of which 
Christianity is just one manifestation.  From this perspective, scripture is to be 
	 25	
read metaphorically. Against both of these positions, post-liberal theologians 
cast Christianity as an internally coherent narrative or set of narratives that 
cannot be interpreted but only undermined by methods grounded in different 
ontologies. The Christian narrative is unique, and the interpretation of this 
narrative must be situated in terms of the needs and struggles of a particular 
community as it evolves through time, providing a basis for holding one 
another to account and undertaking shared action (Hauerwas 1984). 
 
Given its focus on internally coherent narrative, and community-based 
interpretation, much of post-liberal thought is aimed at changing either 
theological thinking generally, or else particular churches (Hauerwas 1984). 
But a few thinkers within the post-liberal school aim to speak beyond theology 
and the church to society as a whole. These authors critique the dominance of 
supposedly tradition-independent rational discourses, of empiricism and 
individualism in secular societies, and press instead for a revalorisation of 
narrative generally, and of a Christian narrative in particular, which is seen as 
key to social solidarity. 
 
To provide further context for understanding these thinkers, it is useful to 
touch upon political theology, the discipline in which their work sits. In 
particular, it is useful to distinguish political theology from secular political 
theory. Put simply, political theology is the discipline that works out theological 
ideas into political ideas, and, in so doing, provides theological justifications 
and critiques for certain types of politics. In some sense then, we would 
expect political theology to become less worthwhile as theological concepts 
	 26	
lose their social relevance. But the reality is slightly more complicated than 
this.  
 
In his Political Theology (1922/2006: 36), Carl Schmitt argued that ‘all 
significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularised 
theological concepts’. What Schmitt meant by this is disputed, but we can 
simplistically say that God is replaced by the state, and the most significant 
question for humanity then becomes how to be reconciled to one another 
through the state. Examples of this may include the divine right of kings, 
whereby theology is used directly to justify political power, or the ideas of 
socialist thinkers such as Rousseau (Schmitt 1922/2006: 39; 46; 48). Because 
of this connection, all politics implicitly involves political theology, as the 
leading thinkers of the Frankfurt School were so keen to point out (Mendieta 
2005). Politics is deeply implicated in deciding on and participating in which 
objects, ideas and practices are venerated, and which are not. Because of 
this, theology proper is important not only as a source of analogous wisdom, 
as a technical discipline for conceptualising our political situation, but also as 
a way of offering an alternative by which we are reconciled to one another. So 
for Schmitt secular political theory is distinct only inasmuch as it is reflexively 
naive.   
 
With these two accounts in mind, it becomes easier to understand post-liberal 
political theology as a critique of how pretensions to tradition-independent 
rationality and the prioritisation of the individual have become reified through 
the political process. Its key response is the revalorisation of ideas of the 
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good. While a number of thinkers perhaps justifiably characterised as post-
liberal political theologians have come to the fore in recent years (see 
Bretherton 2015; Turnbull forthcoming 2016), this thesis primarily explores 
Charles Taylor, Alisdair MacIntyre and John Milbank. Partly, I explore these 
thinkers because they have the widest academic influence, and so many of 
my analyses of their work will have implications for other thinkers. More 
importantly, I explore them because their work has the most significant 
political and policy influence, as will become clear towards the end of this 
chapter.  
 
Finally, it is useful to note that the three thinkers can be regarded as sitting on 
a spectrum from ideationally liberal to ideationally exclusive: On one side sits 
Charles Taylor, who comes across as rather hopeful that ideas of the good 
can be rediscovered in a world of all religions and none; next comes Alisdair 
MacIntyre, who, despite regarding the contemporary world as particularly 
corrupt, nonetheless, in his reliance on antique thought, sees the possibility of 
rediscovering ideas of the good in diverse settings; finally comes Milbank, for 
whom Christianity offers the only idea of the good capable of redeeming 
society. 
 
But what are these ideas of the good? What are their meanings and 
mechanisms? I begin by trying to outline this. I then detail how these have 
supposedly been undermined by liberalism. The following subsections then 
trace the argument into statism and capitalism. 
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Religion lost: from ideas of the good to social contracts 
 
Contra Schmitt, for Charles Taylor secular political theory is conceptually 
distinct. In his A Secular Age (2007), Taylor has said that the chief difference 
between political theology and secular political theory is that for political 
theology, that which ‘makes [a] group of people as they continue over time a 
common agent…is something which transcends the realm of those common 
actions this agency engages in’, whereas for secular political theory, ‘the 
constituting factor [of common agency] is nothing other than such common 
action – whether the founding acts have already occurred in the past, or are 
now coming about is immaterial’ (Taylor 2007: 194).  
 
So political theology is just any theory that locates the constituting factor of 
common agency as prior to and as the reason for common action. Considered 
in this way, political theology potentially encapsulates, and at the very least is 
significant in understanding a whole range of political theory, since the 
constituting factor of common agency could be any number of ideas: God’s 
will; an abstract notion of utopia or human purpose; an ideal such as Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity; a biological understanding of function; or whatever. This 
could include the Platonic notion of eidos, the Aristotelian notion of telos, or 
purpose; the Christian notion of eschaton, or the day of judgement; the 
broadly religious notion of millenarianism (Cohn 1957/1993; Worsley 1987); 
the first Christian and later socialist idea of utopia (Kumar 1991; Sargisson 
2004); the Hegelian idea of synthesis (Shanks 1991); Bloch’s principle of 
hope (1954/1995); ideology (Eagleton 1991); Durkheim’s notion of the sacred 
and collective effervesence (Durkheim 1915/2008; Lynch 2012); and most 
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recently, Scott Atran’s notion of Sacred Value Theory as a way of predicting 
religiously and ideologically motivated action (Atran 2011).   
 
It may be debated whether political theology may include the Badiousian 
event (Badiou 2006). An example of the event could be May ’68, the French 
Revolution, or Christ’s resurrection; it is an occurrence that transcends and 
subverts any categorisation – indeed it is dissolved in categorisation. The 
perceiver of the event is inspired to ask how to remain faithful to it. In this 
sense, the event may be a mythologised understanding of past common 
action that transcends and informs present and future common action.  
 
Political theology is distinct from secular political theory, which instead places 
social contracts, agreements and common actions as the foundation of 
common agency. Examples of this might include things as big and abstract as 
obeying the law, paying tax, or contributing to the capitalist system, or 
something as local and tangible as joining in a protest or strike, or digging up 
a garden. 
 
This particular way of framing post-liberalism offers interesting analytical 
potential, showing potential disadvantages, and advantages of post-liberalism. 
In practice, political theology is potentially dangerous. If something 
transcendent confers belonging to a group, then it may follow that 
demonstrating allegiance to this norm might become a prerequisite of 
citizenship, as was the case in the middle ages, when only Christians were 
considered full citizens. It is exactly this sort of situation that liberalism arises 
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to avoid. In contrast to this, secular political theory holds that partaking in 
certain actions confers belonging. It does not matter whether I am a Christian, 
a Jew a Muslim or whatever – so long as I abide by the law or pay tax.  
 
But political theology may also have its advantages. First, for Taylor  
 
‘democratic societies need a sense of common bonding, common 
purpose, around certain basic goals, around certain basic 
principles…Once you get a certain part of the population beginning to 
believe that when, over there, they’re talking about what’s best, they’re 
not thinking of us, then you’re getting a situation in which the legitimacy 
of the society is being called into question’ (Taylor 2011) 
 
So political theology is important for the legitimacy of the state.  
 
Second, if something transcendent confers belonging, then failure to perform 
certain acts will not automatically exclude an individual or group. For example, 
we might take the contemporary situation in Britain, where some politicians 
and newspapers suggest that the failure to contribute to the capitalist system 
removes certain individuals and groups of the right to receive benefits.  
 
MacIntyre offers a slightly different analysis. For MacIntyre, we have moved 
along two parallel lines, one philosophical, and the other social. 
Philosophically we have moved from tradition to universal morality, socially we 
have moved from collective to individual self-understandings.   
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MacIntyre explains that:  
 
The moral scheme which forms the historical background to [classical] 
thought had…a structure which required three elements: untutored 
human nature, man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos and the 
moral precepts which enable him to pass from one state to the other. But 
the joint effect of the secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic 
theology and the scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism 
was to eliminate any notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-
telos. Since the whole point of ethics – both as a theoretical and a 
practical discipline – is to enable man to pass from his present state to 
his true end, the elimination of any notion of essential human nature and 
with it the abandonment of any notion of a telos leaves behind a moral 
scheme composed of two remaining elements whose relationship 
becomes quite unclear (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 54). 
 
So MacIntyre sees the distinguishing philosophical shift as being from a 
tripartite model of 1) humans as they are, moving, via 2) ethics, to 3) humans 
as they can be; to a bipartite model in which there is supposed to be some 
relationship between humans as they are naturally observed and the ethical, 
or what becomes the universal moral, way to live. The Ancient Greek model 
relies on tradition to describe the most practical ways to move from the first 
stage to the second. The second relies on calculation of what humans are 
capable. The result is utter disagreement and the collapse of ethical inquiry 
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altogether: hence, the social transition from collective to individual self-
understandings, which will be touched on in more detail later on.  
 
This notion of a move from tradition to universalism is similar to Taylor’s 
notion of transcendence, and perhaps can be described as deepening that 
concept, but with two caveats. The first is that 
 
Aristotle takes the telos of human life to be a certain kind of life; the telos 
is not something to be achieved at some future point, but in the way our 
whole life is constructed (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 175). 
 
Yet this point itself is complicated. The telos remains a transcendent guiding 
principle, even if it is immanent in the sense of being recognisable and 
realisable. For MacIntyre ‘this scheme is complicated and added to, but not 
essentially altered, when it is placed within a framework of theistic beliefs’ 
(MacIntyre 1981/2007: 53). All that changes is that ‘the precepts of ethics now 
have to be understood not only as teleological injunctions, but also as 
expressions of a divinely ordained law’; and, specifically for Christianity via 
Augustine, the notion of the flawed will is introduced (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 
53; 175). The telos remains the same, but humans are less able to achieve it. 
 
The second caveat is that the universal morals that take the place of 
transcendence, are to some extent themselves a kind of transcendence. This 
may be called the paradox of secularisation. MacIntyre explains that tradition 
is replaced by  
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the project of constructing valid arguments which will move from 
premises concerning human nature as they understand it to be to 
conclusions about the authority of moral rules and precepts (MacIntyre 
1981/2007: 52). 
 
Yet these precepts may themselves become transcendent notions towards 
which we are directed but are flawed in achieving, in which case all that is 
missing is an ethics of how to get there – it is the second stage, not the third, 
that is missing.  It is suggested that modernity lacks a sense of 
transcendence, and therefore of becoming. This point will become more 
significant further down, as I begin to discuss research in the anthropology 
and sociology of religion.  
 
The distinction MacIntyre would draw between classical transcendence and 
modern transcendence is threefold: first, because classical ideas of the good 
are rooted in our function as human beings, they serve as their own 
motivation: 'man' stands to 'good man' as 'watch' stands to 'good watch' or 
'farmer' to 'good farmer within the classical tradition’ (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 
58). What this means is that to do good is to perform one’s function correctly 
as a human being. This is why, for Aristotle, ‘the virtues are precisely those 
qualities the possession of which will enable an individual to achieve 
eudaimonia and the lack of which will frustrate his movement toward that 
telos’ (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 148). Whether we translate eudaimonia as 
‘blessedness, happiness, prosperity’ or whatever, the point is that there is a 
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sense of achievement about being a good person (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 
148). 
  
Second, classical transcendence is grounded in a social role. What it takes to 
be a good man is rooted in ones place within a social system, and tends to be 
related to contribution (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 133). Universal moral precepts, 
on the other hand, are unrelated to one’s role within a system. Following this 
analysis, rather than moving from transcendence to immanence, it may be 
suggested that we have moved from immanence to transcendence. We have 
moved from a world in which we are guided by our social function, to one in 
which we are guided by universal precepts, irrespective of role.  
 
The third difference is to do with a distinction between revelation and reason, 
and is best left until after we have discussed Milbank.  
 
Milbank offers a slightly different analysis still. The major distinction between 
political theology and secular political theory is one of ontology. Whereas 
political theology is based on an ontology of goodness or peace, secular 
political theory is based on an ontology of evil or violence (Milbank 1990/2006: 
279-280). Criticising MacIntyre, Milbank says 
 
There emerges to view a hidden thread of continuity between antique 
reason and modern, secular reason. This thread of continuity is the 
theme of ‘original violence’. Antique thought and politics assumes some 
naturally given element of chaotic conflict which must be tamed by the 
	 35	
stability and self-identity of reason. Modern thought and politics (most 
clearly articulated by Nietzsche) assumes that there is only this chaos, 
which cannot be tamed by an opposing transcendent principle, but can 
be immanently controlled by subjecting it to rules and giving irresistible 
power to those rules in the form of market economies and sovereign 
politics. If one tries, like MacIntyre, to oppose antique thought to modern 
thought, then the attempt will fail because antique thought – as Plato 
already saw in The Sophist – is deconstructible into ‘modern’ thought: a 
cosmos including both chaos and reason implies an ultimate principle, 
the ‘difference’ between the two, which is more than reason, and 
enshrines a permanent conflict. 
 
Christianity, however, recognizes no original violence. It construes the 
infinite not as chaos, but as a harmonic peace which is yet beyond the 
circumscribing power of any totalizing reason. Peace no longer depends 
upon the reduction to the self-identical, but is the sociality of harmonious 
difference (Milbank 1990/2006: 5).  
 
What this means is that political theology holds people to be fundamentally 
good and therefore capable of achieving solidarity without descending into 
violence. There is an element of trust in people. Secular political theory on the 
other hand, is based on the notion that, left to their own devices, people would 
descend into violence. It follows that people must be restrained and 
manipulated so as to bring the best out of them (Milbank 2013).   
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There are clear comparisons between Taylor, MacIntyre and Milbank. This is 
for two reasons. First, the ontology of peace may be understood as an aspect 
of the idea that confers belonging. Believing in the goodness of people might 
be what defines us as a group. Yet also, in a more complicated but also more 
significant way, possessing an ontology of peace may be seen as a 
prerequisite for believing in the possibility of people coming to agreement over 
the nature of that transcendent something by which they are defined as a 
group – over what it is. It is exactly the lack of such an ontology, or rather the 
possession of its polar opposite, an ontology of violence, that supposedly 
makes the use of transcendent ideas impossible.  
 
What is most interesting to note in Milbank is that his distinction is not merely 
between a classical or medieval model, which stresses transcendence or 
tradition, and a modern secular model, which stresses common action, 
perhaps underpinned by universal moral precepts. Instead, by suggesting that 
we have moved from an ontology of peace to an ontology of violence, Milbank 
is indicating that underpinning both models is an irrational element: a belief in 
the goodness or badness of mankind. This helps us to understand a third 
distinction then, between classical and secular transcendence. It also 
deepens the paradox of secularisation, since following Milbank’s logic, not 
only has the secular world merely replaced one transcendence with another, 
but it has not even replaced irrationality with rationality – just one set of beliefs 
with another. In this case, the only difference between classical and medieval 
and modern secular self-understandings is that the former was more aware of 
the beliefs by which it was guided.  
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It is this stress on the fundamental irrationality at the heart of our ontological 
self-understanding, which, as the foregoing has suggested, impacts so 
substantially on our social self-understanding and ability to act, that places 
Milbank as a neo-Thomist. Reason can only take us so far; the rest is faith. 
This turns us to a discussion of whether we can and, if so, how to choose 
transcendence. Perhaps the ideas that guide us are so ingrained that they are 
a skin rather than a sweater (Furlong and Marsh 2002). If this is true, the 
prospects for philosophy and theology are alarming, though we might draw a 
distinction between choice and conversion. 
 
Before moving on it is worth presenting a challenge to all of the above. All are 
lacking any empirical grounding. Even to the extent that they study history, 
they are really only studying the history of (some elite’s) ideas. Taylor at least 
attempts to ground his thinking in social realities. Not only is he convinced that 
ideas and material factors complexly intertwine to make up history, but his 
work is focused not simply on ideas but on their impact on the lives of ordinary 
people (Taylor 2007: 212). But it is just this value that should lead one to 
consider empirical exploration key.  
 
On the contrary, MacIntyre, expresses the importance of historical idealism 
quite readily. His whole point is that  
 
The roots of some of the problems which now engage the specialised 
attention of academic philosophers and the roots of some of the 
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problems central to our everyday social and practical lives are one and 
the same (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 36). 
 
Milbank vocalises the same principles as Taylor, seeing his task as ‘reading 
theories in the light of their practical tendencies’ (Milbank: 2014: 1). But he 
renders this task implausible by asserting that  
 
‘it is possible to take a short cut to locating this isomorphism [between 
theory and practice] by looking at specifically ‘political philosophy’ or 
‘political theory’…political thought is taken to be a level of writing that 
begins to disclose a concealed , more ultimate ‘context’ that is itself 
theoretical as much as practical (Milbank: 2014: 2-3). 
 
Milbank is here advocating a kind of textual analysis whereby political 
philosophy is treated as a primary source for understanding something even 
deeper; namely, the hidden ontology that shapes the writing. This is no doubt 
a valid task, and there is no reason to dismiss Milbank’s work on this basis. 
But two points are worth making. First, if the aim is to “disclose a concealed, 
more ultimate ‘context’” of politics, why is there no systematic engagement 
with the latter? Instead, the work can only be said to be uncovering a context 
that post-liberals have read into the wider atmospheric shift in literature. 
Second, there is quite a leap from the critique of political philosophy, to an 
attempt at real politics and policy, with no exploration of whether and how the 
ideas he either criticises or advocates play out on the ground. It is critically 
	 39	
filling this gap that this thesis advocates and makes an exploratory first 
attempt at.  
 
Taylor, MacIntyre and Milbank seek to show that at the heart of our social and 
political problems are deeper philosophical problems that can be traced back 
hundreds of years. The next step is to take this back in the reverse direction, 
seeking to understand whether and how those philosophical problems play 
out in the real social and political world, as well as whether their solutions 
make sense to that world.  
 
Which transcendence? Who decides? 
 
The foregoing suggested that Taylor’s model was useful for distinguishing 
classical and Christian social self-understandings from modern secular self-
understandings, the one valorising shared notions of transcendence as 
conferring group status, the other giving up on the possibility of such notions, 
and focusing on immanent mechanisms. But it also challenged this model, by 
suggesting that there nonetheless appeared to be an overriding similarity 
between the two self-understandings, since both were guided by a kind of 
transcendence.  
  
In some sense, there is always transcendence, since there must be some pre-
political grounds on which we legitimise politics and policy decisions. This 
point is extremely problematic, given, as has been suggested and as will be 
discussed more in the next chapter, that the modern withdrawal from 
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transcendence as a means of common agency is in large part derived from 
transcendence’s tendency to ideologically exclude certain groups and people 
in the face of differing perspectives; that is, in the face of diversity. With these 
points established, it becomes possible to draw a slightly different distinction 
between classical and modern secular social self-understandings, namely, 
whether, and if so, how, we can choose between different notions of 
transcendence. Are they chosen or thrust upon us? If they are chosen, how 
are they chosen? The question is especially pressing if we consider the idea 
that we are always doing the choosing in diverse settings, which, due to the 
simple sociological, or even biological fact of diversity, are always themselves 
thrust upon us. These questions are so important because they impinge on 
what we take to be the role of religious language, or of deep commitments 
more generally, in the public sphere. Again, each thinker develops his ideas in 
contradistinction to liberal theory.    
 
Guido Vanheeswijck has explained that Taylor holds that ‘fundamental 
conceptions of the self, other, and world are necessary and unavoidable for 
an adequately reflective discussion on ethical and political life’ (Vanheeswijck 
2014: 5). In this sense, there can be no choosing between the transcendent 
ideas that guide us, since this would assume some other realm that 
transcends this, in which we can stand as neutral arbiters. But this fact does 
not render difference between commitments interminable. For Taylor, the 
correct approach is  
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‘to be aware that [our deep commitments] always remain contestable 
and liable to revision…In other words, Taylor rejects any form of ‘strong 
ontology’ in favour of what Stephen K. White, defines as ‘weak 
ontology’(Vanheeswijck 2014: 5). 
 
This idea of weak ontology is important because, if we can be aware of our 
own commitments being just one option among many, there is no need to 
choose one transcendence over another, or to stand outside of 
transcendences. Instead, we simply seek, through pragmatic discussion, a 
Rawlsian overlapping consensus of ideals, the justification of which depends 
on different arguments for different people: 
 
A Christian or Muslim, for example, may justify fundamental rights by 
invoking the idea that every human being is a child of God, a Kantian 
rationalist that each individual is a rational being, a utilitarian that 
everyone is entitled to the highest form of happiness, etc. (Vanheeswijck 
2014: 3-4). 
 
As Taylor himself acknowledges, the weak ontology, or to put it simply, the 
magnanimity, required for one to accept that only those commitments that fit 
within the overlapping consensus are legitimate, is itself dependent on living 
within what Taylor calls the modern moral order (Taylor 2011: 46). In this 
order, cosmic-religious legitimacy is replaced by the idea of society ‘as 
existing for the protection and mutual benefit of its (equal) members’ (Taylor 
2011: 46). Here Taylor seems to go against his earlier distinction between 
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political theology and secular political theory, suggesting that for moderns 
there are ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity that confer common agency: 
‘democratic societies are organised not necessarily around a “civil 
religion,”…but certainly around a strong philosophy of civility’ (Taylor 2011: 
46).  
 
But perhaps Taylor is not going back on himself. Instead, it can be suggested 
that Taylor sees the current difference between political theology and secular 
political theory as one whereby the former uses cosmic-religious notions to 
underpin politics, whereas the latter has no such deeper grounding. But, as a 
supporter of secularity’s openness to other positions, he is offering a way for 
the latter to learn from political theology without undermining, and indeed 
actually bolstering, its core ideals.  It is not that secular political theory is 
inherently incapable of developing a deeper grounding, just that it has tended 
to neglect such a grounding.  
 
Milbank takes exception with Taylor here. He suggests that Taylor proclaims 
‘“the end of religious history”’, based on ‘an irreducible religious pluralism 
stretching into the long-term future’ (Milbank 2013b: 81). Conversely, Milbank 
thinks it conceivable that  
 
If Christian catholicity collapsed because of an entirely contingent 
deconvivialisation of its character in the Latin West (the Illich thesis), 
then how can one be sure a recovery of conviviality does not have the 
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power to restore a lost universalism of Christian belief and practice? 
(Milbank 2013b: 81) 
 
I will explain the preferred solution of Milbank in a moment. Before this, it is 
useful to elucidate MacItnyre’s position, which again seems to sit between 
Taylor and Milbank. Like Taylor, MacItnyre offers ways of engaging with other 
traditions. When seeking to engage with another tradition, one must learn it 
well enough to translate it; that is, like the anthropologist, one must  
 
Come to understand what it is to think in the terms prescribed by that 
particular rival tradition, to learn how to think as if one were a convinced 
adherent of that rival tradition. To do this requires the exercise of a 
capacity for philosophical imagination that is often lacking (MacIntyre 
1981/2007: xiii). 
 
Whereas Taylor suggests that one need not understand another tradition in 
order to achieve agreement, but rather have enough magnanimity to discover 
an overlapping consensus justified differently by different traditions, MacIntyre 
indicates the reality will be more challenging than this, requiring complex 
debate and perhaps a component of multilingualism. And he offers 
anthropology as the best way to understand and critique another tradition. 
Again, like Taylor, this implies that a kind of magnanimity is required to 
recognise that another tradition is worth engaging with.  
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But like Milbank, MacIntyre seems to think it is possible, even desirable, for 
one tradition to win. As he has put it himself: 
 
I see no value in community as such – many types of community are 
nastily oppressive…the best type of human life, that in which the 
tradition of the virtues is most adequately embodied, is lived by those 
engaged in constructing and sustaining forms of community directed 
towards the achievement of those common goods without which the 
ultimate human good cannot be achieved (MacIntyre 1981/2007: xiv). 
 
Now, this becomes complicated when we scrutinise the means by which one 
tradition may win over another. MacIntyre explains that 
 
When the adherents of a tradition are able through such acts of 
imagination and questioning to interrogate some particular rival tradition, 
it is always possible that they may be able to conclude, indeed that they 
may be compelled to conclude, that it is only from the standpoint of their 
own tradition that the difficulties of that rival tradition can be adequately 
understood and overcome. It is only if the central theses of their own 
tradition are true and its arguments sound, that this rival tradition can be 
expected to encounter just those difficulties that it has encountered and 
that its lack of conceptual, normative, and other resources to deal with 
these difficulties can be explained. So it is possible for one such tradition 
to defeat another in respect of the adequacy of its claims to truth and to 
rational justification, even though there are no neutral standards 
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available by appeal to which any rational agent whatsoever could 
determine which tradition is superior to which. (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 
xiii) 
 
So we recognise, by anthropologically entering another tradition, that its 
resources are not apt to respond to particular ethical or political problems. 
And this recognition is pragmatic. We see the failures of one tradition against 
the successes of another, rather than judging each against some neutral 
standards. But Milbank nonetheless takes issue with MacIntyre for 
fundamentally suggesting that ‘tradition-governed inquiry in general is rational’ 
(Milbank 1990/2006: 262).  
 
Inherent to MacIntyre’s description of how traditions learn from and win over 
one another, is a dialectical notion of progress. Conversely, for Milbank, ‘the 
only possible response to nihilism is to affirm one’s allegiance to a particular 
tradition, and derive an ontology from the implicit assumptions of its narrative 
forms’ (Milbank 1990/2006: 262). 
 
As already mentioned, Milbank is a neo-Thomist, meaning revelation, or what 
those unfamiliar with Christian theology might prefer to call irrational 
commitments or creativity or inspiration, always underscores rational 
argument, which is merely the means by which such commitments are made 
intelligible and applicable. What this means then is that although Milbank 
asserts Christianity provides the best narrative, he by no means thinks there 
is a rational standard by which to irrefutably justify this decision, indeed, he 
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does not even think we can choose which narrative we adopt. For Milbank, 
there is only conversion.  
 
What all this stands against is a rationalist position of the likes of Rawls or 
Habermas. Although at different levels within the public sphere, Rawls and 
Habermas both require of us the ability to distinguish between commitments, 
and to make arguments on purely rational grounds, that is, to adopt 
arguments that are conceivably acceptable by anyone. But this point implies 
two things: first, secular argument is not itself rooted in some irrational 
commitments – a point which Milbank makes it his life work to refute; second, 
that it is plausible for people to leave their transcendent ideals to one side.  
 
It is not the place of the literature review to demonstrate the viability of one 
theory over any of the others. But, once again, it is possible to provide a 
critique of all of the above on the basis of their idealism. Simply by theorising 
the best formula for deciding on transcendence, the rest of the work is merely 
to inspire or coerce people to adopt these practices. The theory has little or no 
grounding in empirical realities of how people act on the ground. Are they 
capable of Taylor-esque weak ontology? Is there any sense in which we can 
really know our ontological commitments well enough to be pragmatic about 
them, or, is it the case that the concepts that fundamentally dictate the way 
we understand the world, because they are so fundamental, cannot be 
analysed? Are people capable of MacIntyre’s translation? Or, as Milbank 
suggests, is it really plausible or fair to imagine one narrative winning over all 
the others? Perhaps Rawls and Habermas are right after all, and it is possible 
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to simply leave one’s faith at the door? Does Vanantwerpen have the right 
idea, in seeking to create interstitial places in which people feel the pull of the 
open space? Or perhaps we need the kind of religious literacy put forward by 
Dinham? Asking these questions empirically is a key point of this thesis.  
 
Of course, this task is especially difficult given the interdisciplinary approach I 
am taking. Theologians, especially those with an eye for history, are liable to 
say that whatever I find should in no way mitigate their positions, since theirs 
is a theory of what should be, not what is, and this attitude will be bolstered by 
an insistence that things once upon a time were as they insist they should 
now be. Social scientists on the other hand, will claim that I am providing a 
literature review that verges on the theological, and which is too broad to be 
explored in any complexity in the qualitative manner I am going to. They will 
challenge whether my questions can be operationalized, my findings 
generalised. Ultimately I must reject both positions. To theologians, I say that 
unless their theory can be made relevant for a particular people at a particular 
time, even if only as ideals towards which real people feel themselves 
directed, they are worthless. To social scientists, I say that I do not wish to 
treat my findings as generalisable. One may explore the meanings and 
mechanisms attributed to ideas of the good in Chicago or Mumbai, one 
hundred years ago or today, and the results will be completely different. For 
reasons already offered in the introduction, I am interested in the UK, and 
specifically London, in the contemporary context.  What I do hope is that my 
findings can be generalised to theories, which themselves can be explored 
further in other settings. 
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Religion regained: Post-liberal transcendence 
 
Post-liberalism holds some idea of transcendence key. Each thinker has a 
slightly different way in which to advance their particular idea of 
transcendence, and how to put it into dialogue with other ideas. But what, in 
particular, is their idea? By way of answering this question, the following 
section will draw on earlier discussion to provide a theoretical conclusion. It 
will then critically assess how the theory plays out in politics, policy and 
practice.  
 
Charles Taylor’s idea is broad and inclusive. Taylor divides the world into ‘the 
acknowledgers of transcendence’ and ‘secular humanists’, and further divides 
the former into inclusivists and reactionaries (Taylor 1999: 29). For Taylor, as 
an inclusivist, we require transcendence in order to avoid descent into a 
purely human idea of success, which often deifies particular qualities. But this 
transcendence must fundamentally be based on liberty and equality. Again, 
Taylor calls for a strong philosophy of civility.  
 
As has already been indicated above, MacIntyre’s idea of transcendence is 
rooted in the abstract idea of the good life, where ‘the good life…is the life 
spent in seeking for the good life’ (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 219) What this 
actually means in practice is best broken into three concepts: the virtues, the 
unity of a human life, and the concept of a tradition.  
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Although the virtues ultimately aim at the telos, since the telos is not 
something to be achieved at some future point, but rather is to be 
realized in the way that we live, so the virtues are not ‘good works’, 
which, when built up over time, grant us the right to the telos. Instead, 
the acting out of the virtues is, to some extent, the achievement of the 
telos (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 149).  
 
MacIntyre speaks of an ‘attempt to envisage each human life as a whole, as a 
unity, whose character provides the virtues with an adequate telos’ (MacIntyre 
1981/2007: 204). What MacIntyre means is that a whole life must be 
considered, both in order to emphasise that virtues are not particular to 
certain types of practice, but rather should be applied throughout life, and in 
fact are often to the detriment of success in a particular practice; and to 
emphasise the idea of life as a journey in which virtues are developed. This 
journey is not merely personal: 
 
We place the agent’s intentions, I have suggested, in causal and 
temporal order with reference to their role in his or her history; and we 
also place them with reference to their role in the history of the setting or 
settings to which they belong (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 208).  
 
So the virtue of somebody’s actions are to be judged with reference to their 
place within the overall intention of that person’s life, itself to be judged with 
reference to its place within the overall history of the setting(s) to which that 
person belongs.  
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MacIntyre asserts that life is always conceived in narrative form, hence all 
ideas of the good life must be told in terms of narrative (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 
216). The key then, to this unity of a life, is narrative, or the narratives that 
constitute our tradition: the stories we tell of our own lives, within a 
community, within a history.  
 
There perhaps seems something internally problematic about MacIntyre’s 
position: he explains that he sees no value in community as such, but only in 
a community that is directed towards the good life. But it turns out that the 
good life is nothing other than the search for this life within a community. Yet 
MacIntyre’s argument is that his idea is very different from the contemporary 
use of the term community, which may refer merely to a geographical space 
in which multifarious individuals living unreflective and distinct lives reside 
(MacIntyre 1981/2007: 156).  
 
Of course, for Milbank, MacItnrye’s distinction is not enough. MacIntyre’s 
reliance on antique thought, with its opposition between reason and chaos, 
ultimately allows for a descent into chaos. In terms of community, the search 
for a good over against individual wills, will eventually descend into 
recognition of the latter alone. Instead, Milbank wants to positively promote an 
idea of community that is grounded in life experience.  
 
To explain, it helps to return to the question of transcendence and 
immanence. What Milbank suggests is that whereas other axial religions, and 
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to some extent Platonism is included, clearly subordinated the personal and 
immanent to the impersonal transcendent, Christianity rendered the immanent 
itself transcendent: ‘As Ivan Illich pointed out, the New Testament does not 
say “love strangers” but “render all as kin”’ (Milbank 2013b: 69). Love 
becomes the transcendent grounds of common agency, cutting across all 
other difference. And this idea will turn out to have a deeply practical 
significance for Milbank and his followers, in their discussion of cooperation 
between conflicting stakeholders.  
 
Post-liberal politics, policy and practice 
 
The last section introduced what a post-liberal idea of transcendence might 
look like, and it concluded by pointing to the practical implications, suggesting 
that each of the thinkers stressed the importance of the community of shared 
ideas, language and practice. The point of this section is to explore how these 
ideas have in fact played out in reality, in terms of politics, policy and practice. 
This will be scrutinised in terms of statism, individualism and capitalism.  
 
Once again, Taylor and Milbank provide two ends of a post-liberal spectrum, 
with MacIntyre sitting quite neatly between them. In conversation with Taylor, 
he has suggested to me that his thought cannot be easily extended in to a 
general view of politics, since how the ideas play out will depend on the 
setting (Taylor 2014). This point notwithstanding, it is possible to draw out 
general themes. 
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Post-liberals regard the shift from shared ideas of transcendence to social 
contracts as made manifest in, but also extended by the concepts of statism, 
individualism and capitalism. The specific story told by each thinker differs 
slightly, but the general picture is that, in the wake of the European Wars of 
Religion, a pessimistic mood develops in which it is considered no longer 
possible to have shared ideas of the good. Instead, the good is characterised 
by irreducible plurality. The result is that other mechanisms need to be 
harnessed in order to inculcate solidarity.  
 
Charles Taylor’s reading of secularisation stresses the shift in our collective 
self-understanding from shared ideas of the good to social contracts. In this 
process, his worry is that these artificial mechanisms regarded as inculcating 
solidarity may tend towards instrumental reason that crowds out the intrinsic 
value of inclusive politics. The most important thinkers for Taylor are Grotius 
and Locke, for whom natural laws must be rationally worked out and applied. 
Why? 
 
They needed a firm underpinning for an agreed public order. [This 
philosophy] was born in the midst of bitter and violent inter-confessional 
strife. One of the most important things it was meant to offer was a basis 
for rational agreement on the foundations of political life, beyond and in 
spite of confessional differences (Taylor 2007: 127). 
 
It soon followed that a state must be required to uphold these natural laws.  
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Grotius followed Lipsius, developing a full theory not only of obedience 
to the state, but of international law, which was meant to be valid across 
the confessional divide (Taylor 2007: 127). 
 
So the shift is very quick from rooting collective self-understanding in 
Natural Law, to social contract underwritten by the state. This idea extends 
further under Rousseau, for whom the love of self must be harmonised with 
the love of society. This harmonisation has to be enforced by the state, and 
‘the egoist becomes identified as traitor’ (Taylor 2007: 204).  
 
Taylor recognises the evolution of state as harmoniser. He also suggests that 
once shared ideas of the good no longer define the scope of politics, 
instrumental reason follows: ‘Once society no longer has a sacred structure, 
once social arrangements and modes of action are no longer grounded in the 
order of things or the will of God, they are in a sense up for grabs’ (Taylor 
1992: 5). The result is that ‘a bureaucrat, in spite of his personal insight, may 
be forced by the rules under which he operates to make a decision he knows 
to be against humanity and good sense’ (sic.) (Taylor 1992: 7).   
Finally, because of this roll of the state as harmoniser and instrumentaliser, 
Taylor suggests, in line with Tocqueville, that people lose democratic control: 
 
The danger is not actual despotic control but fragmentation - that is, a 
people increasingly less capable of forming a common purpose and 
carrying it out. Fragmentation arises when people come to see 
themselves more and more atomistically, otherwise put, as less and less 
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bound to their fellow citizens in common projects and allegiances. They 
may indeed feel linked in common projects with some others, but these 
come more to be partial groupings rather than the whole society: for 
instance, a local community, an ethnic minority, the adherents of some 
religion or ideology, the promoters of some special interest (Taylor 1992: 
112-113).  
 
As shall be discussed in chapter 4, this idea connects with theories of the 
post-political, whereby people no longer see the worth of engaging with 
ideologies through conventional political structures, but rather seek 
consensus at the local level.   
 
Like the other thinkers, Taylor tends to regard individualism as arising earlier 
than statism. For Taylor Descartes marks the beginning of a new self-
understanding. Descartes is seen as providing the theoretical framework for 
the ‘buffered self’, for whom ‘the possibility exists of taking a distance from, 
disengaging from everything outside the mind’, which includes other people, 
institutions, and cultural and religious influences (Taylor 2007: 38; see also 
Taylor 1989: 143-158). As a result of this ability to mute external influences, 
this buffered self also has ‘confidence in its own powers of moral ordering’ 
(Taylor 2007: 27). 
 
Taylor recognises the importance of this achievement: 
 
individualism also names what many people consider the finest 
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achievement of modern civilization. We live in a world where people 
have a right to choose for themselves their own pattern of life, to decide 
in conscience what convictions to espouse, to determine the shape of 
their lives in a whole host of ways that their ancestors couldn't control. 
And these rights are generally defended by our legal systems. In 
principle, people are no longer sacrificed to the demands of supposedly 
sacred orders that transcend them (Taylor 1992: 2).  
 
Yet Taylor also sees a number of worrying developments. The first is that 
already mentioned, namely, the undermining of the common good. Linked 
to this is the difficulty of criticizing certain behaviours, especially selfish 
behaviours: ‘everyone has the right to develop their own form of life, 
grounded on their own sense of what is really important or of value.’ (Taylor 
2001: 14). The result of this relativism may well involve ‘a shutting out, or 
even unawareness, of the greater issues or concerns that transcend the 
self’ (Taylor 1992: 14).  
 
So what Taylor wants to balance is on the one hand the promise of modernity 
which finds greatest expression in Romanticism and Nietzschean philosophy, 
that everyone has the right, if not the duty, to be true to themselves; and on 
the other hand, the political worry that people ‘will prefer to stay at home and 
enjoy the satisfactions of private life, as long as the government of the day 
produces the means to these satisfactions and distributes them widely’ 
(Taylor 1992: 9). 
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Partly Taylor adopts a neo-Aristotelian stance here; he is against both statism 
and individualism for the same reason, namely, that he sees public 
engagement as an end in itself (Taylor 1992: 109-122). But Taylor also sees 
public engagement as an important means of responding to the gross 
inequalities of capitalism.  
 
As with the rise of the state, Taylor in a sense sees capitalism as an inevitable 
consequence of secularization, since with the loss of the possibility of shared 
ideas, some kind of mechanism is required for harmonizing individual and 
collective interest. What is interesting about capitalism, however, is that 
whereas the state is an artificial mechanism for inculcating harmony, 
capitalism is based in the idea that ‘harmony is…already there’ (Taylor 2007: 
130). According to this view ‘human life is designed so as to produce mutual 
benefit’ (Taylor 2007: 177). Taylor sees this view as exemplified in Adam 
Smith’s work, both in the notion of the hidden hand, and in the conjecture that 
inequality inspires aspiration in the disadvantaged.   
 
An early essay by Taylor, still as a burgeoning young scholar at Oxford, 
displays a distinct antipathy towards this way of thinking. In What’s Wrong 
with Capitalism?, Taylor decries ‘the inhuman priorities’ of capitalism 
evidenced in its failure to uphold public goods (Taylor 1960: 11).  
 
For many readers, his aversion to capitalism would seem to put Taylor in an 
odd place, since he is against both the state and the market. Yet this aversion 
to both left liberal (the state) and right liberal (the market) solutions is the 
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defining characteristic of post-liberalism, which instead promotes the common 
good. For Taylor this attitude is already clear in What’s Wrong with 
Capitalism?, in which he states:  
 
The only way that we can really get our priorities right is to do away with 
the dominating influence of the profit system, and to put in its place a 
system primarily based on common ownership…Certainly it is true that, 
given common ownership (not state monopoly), we shall have to 
experiment with different forms of control, so as to draw upon the social 
responsibilities of people…We do not want to replace capitalism by yet 
another form of paternal bureaucracy. … But before us stand the 
inhuman priorities of capitalism: the only political question is how we can 
understand and change them in order to achieve an enlargement of 
freedom and responsibility, and a greater control by people over the 
society in which they live (Taylor 1960: 11).  
 
In later life, Taylor urges that simply attacking the state, individualism, or 
capitalism, is helpless.  
 
Some people have wanted to draw from these analyses the conclusion 
that we are utterly helpless in the face of such forces, or at least helpless 
unless we totally dismantle the institutional structures under which we 
have been operating for the last centuries - that is, the market and the 
state. This aspiration seems so unrealizable today that it amounts to 
declaring us helpless (Taylor 1992: 8).   
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Indeed, Taylor makes clear that he is not even against statism, individualism 
or capitalism per se, not against, that is, their influence in certain areas. 
 
Governing a contemporary society is continually recreating a balance 
between requirements that tend to undercut each other, constantly 
finding creative new solutions as the old equilibria become stultifying. 
There can never be in the nature of the case a definitive solution. (Taylor 
1992: 111). 
 
This ambivalence is what makes Taylor’s work so engaging, yet also what 
makes him most susceptible to accusations that his work is susceptible to 
political manipulation. As with all post-liberals, the question becomes one 
of where the philosophy actually lands in politics, policy and practice. 
Would Taylor be satisfied with an Anthony Giddens and British New Labour 
style ‘Third Way’? What about the Conservative-led Coalition’s Big 
Society? Answering questions like these becomes the focus of chapter 4.  
 
Although MacIntyre does not have direct impact on politics or policy, Kelvin 
Knight, a world-leading expert on MacIntyre, has demonstrated that 
MacItnyre’s philosophy is both anti-statist and anti-market. Central to 
MacIntyre’s philosophy is the notion of a practice directed towards intrinsic 
goods.  
 
The danger posed by state and corporate institutions is that they will 
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`corrupt' practices by reducing them to the position of means to the end 
of accumulating power and wealth. Such is the status of practices and 
practitioners under capitalism. So subordinated, individuals are denied 
opportunities to cooperatively pursue and sustain goods of excellence, 
subjected to institutionalized demoralization, and encouraged to believe 
that social interaction can comprise nothing other than a competitive 
struggle over zero-sum, external goods (Knight 2005: 264). 
 
MacIntyre is against the state because it actually tends to collude with the 
international market, seeking to create a skilled but dispensable labour force. 
This is why, says MacIntyre, by cooperating with the social democratic 
project, the trade unions were doomed to fail:  
 
If trade unions made it their only goal to work for betterment within the 
confines imposed by capitalism and parliamentary democracy, the 
outcome would be a movement towards first the domestication and then 
the destruction of effective trade union power (MacIntyre in Knight 2005: 
267). 
 
Because of his opposition to individualism, it could be argued that the kind of 
vision MacIntyre has outlined for politics is brought to completion in the 
welfare state. Yet MacIntyre insists that such a state supports the interests 
‘not of workers, but of managers’ (MacIntyre in Knight 2005: 267). MacIntyre 
similarly claims that a ‘commitment to a way of life structured by a free market 
economy is a commitment to an individualism as corrosive as that of 
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liberalism’ (MacIntyre 1981/2007: xv). 
 
MacIntyre cannot imagine a macro-politics capable of embodying his ideals in 
the contemporary world as it currently stands: 
 
It is always dangerous to draw too precise parallels between one 
historical period and another; and among the most misleading of such 
parallels are those which have been drawn between our own age in 
Europe and North America and the epoch in which the Roman empire 
declined into the Dark Ages. Nonetheless certain parallels there are. A 
crucial turning point in that earlier history occurred when men and 
women of good will turned aside from the task of shoring up the Roman 
imperium and ceased to identify the continuation of civility and moral 
community with the maintenance of that imperium. What they set 
themselves to achieve instead- often not recognizing fully what they 
were doing- was the construction of new forms of community within 
which the moral life could be sustained so that both morality and civility 
might survive the coming ages of barbarism and darkness. If my account 
of our moral condition is correct, we ought also to conclude that for some 
time now we too have reached that turning point. What matters at this 
stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility 
and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark 
ages which are already upon us. And if the tradition of the virtues was 
able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are not entirely 
without grounds for hope. This time however the barbarians are not 
	 61	
waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for 
quite some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of this that 
constitutes pan of our predicament (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 263).  
 
The kind of politics MacIntyre promotes is best reflected in communities of 
practice, that, in the modern world of state and market dominance, often 
become communities of resistance. In terms of the UK, good examples are 
the Luddites of the 19th century and the miners of the 1980s. MacIntyre 
does have visions of universal education also, since he believes that the 
education of all would inevitably lead to the overthrow of the current 
system. It is best to remember that his focus on small communities is a 
product of his time: 
 
What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of 
community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be 
sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us 
(MacIntyre 1981/2007: 263). 
 
Macro-politics is so far from recognising MacIntyre’s ideals that it is best to 
focus on cultivating them in local communities.  
 
Milbank sounds quite similar to MacIntyre. Speaking of Augustine he says: 
 
Through his new definition of a populus and his denial that the political, 
coercive community truly realizes a res publica, Augustine allows us to 
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see many forms of ‘the social’ beyond the political, and also implies that 
the political is necessarily imperfectly social, because it contains 
elements of compulsion and of mere compromise. True society implies 
consensus, agreement in desire and harmony amongst its members 
(Milbank 1990/2006: 406).  
 
Yet he more radically grounds this ideal in the church, continuing: ‘and this is 
exactly (as Augustine reiterates again and again) what the Church begins to 
provide, and that in which salvation, the restoration of being, consists’ 
(Milbank 1990/2006: 406). 
 
Whereas Taylor, perhaps in spite of his Christianity, his liberal and open 
outlook, and MacIntyre, perhaps despite his Christianity, are not willing to 
openly advocate the church, Milbank sees it as fundamental.  
 
John Milbank’s work has an impact in a number of forms, not least via the 
Red Tory movement – specifically in the form of Respublica, of which Milbank 
is the Chair of Trustees, and whose director, Phillip Blonde is a former student 
of John Milbank, and which states that it is ‘founded on the principles of a 
post-liberal vision of the future which moves beyond the traditional political 
dichotomies of left and right, and which prioritise the need to recover the 
language and practice of the common good’ (Respublica 2014).  
 
Another key impact of post-liberalism is on the Blue Labour movement, whose 
progenitor Maurice Glasman is a former colleague of Alisdair MacIntyre, as 
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well as also being a former student of John Milbank. Glasman is thought to 
have the ear of a number of key thinkers in the Labour Party, not least Jon 
Cruddas MP, Director of the Labour Policy Review for the 2015 election. 
Glasman is currently overseeing the development of a new “think-and-do” 
tank known as the Common Good Foundation, which develops projects in 
which multiple stakeholders with different interests come together to develop 
a common enterprise.  
 
As suggested in the introduction, despite its impact, post-liberalism has little 
grounding in empirical research. This deficiency has arguably been carried 
over into the research of post-liberal think-tanks too. Although their appears to 
be an instinctive recognition amongst the think-tanks, that using theology will 
be exclusive and will make for bad press, this recognition actually seems to 
intensify rather than assuage the problem, since although theology takes a 
backseat, no significant attention is paid to the meanings and mechanisms 
that will take its place (See Stacey forthcoming 2016).  
 
To some extent, his very involvement with institutions that interact with the 
mechanisms of national politics and policy would suggest that Milbank 
appreciates dialogue with the state. Moreover, Milbank’s stress on loving all 
as kin might be conceived as supporting the creation of the welfare state. In 
line with the vision of William Temple, who coined the term ‘welfare state’, it 
could be suggested that the transfer of care from the church to the state is the 
best way to ensure the universalisation of love, by guaranteeing that all get an 
equal service irrespective of geographical location, gender, race, religion, or 
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disability. This would be in line with my earlier suggestion that transcendence 
could provide a more materially inclusive politics. 
 
In fact, Milbank tends to work with the state only to open up policy to less 
statist tendencies. He sees the state as dehumanising welfare, in some sense 
alienating it from its natural grounding in personal acts of charity. Moreover, 
post-liberals have tended to call for a turn towards contribution-based welfare. 
This concept suggests that people’s duty to contribute is contingent on their 
seeing others do the same. It also suggests, in line with neo-liberal thinking, 
that individuals should be responsible for themselves.  
 
In terms of Red Tory and Blue Labour, there is a clear emphasis on the 
dismantling of the state in favour of pursuits that rely on, and, in so doing, 
cultivate  the common good. Red Tory, insofar as it is manifest in the works of 
Respublica, for instance, has advocated opening up the state in the form of its 
support for the Sustainable Communities Act 2010, and the Localism Act 
2011, the Social Value Act 2013, each of which seeks to hand powers to 
communities, ensuring that they have the space for and the power to work for 
a common good. But the question arises, is the simple provision of space and 
power for the common good enough? What meanings and mechanisms are 
required to inspire people to act in the name of the common good? 
Respublica has itself questioned why there was not more enthusiasm for the 
Localism Act, and this disappointment is evidenced in articles such as The 
Localism Act: One Year On and One Year On: Registered providers’ 
response to localism, and subsequent research such as Acting On Localism 
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(Blonde 2012; Respublica 2013; Respublica 2013b).  
 
In the face of a receding state, it is hoped that individuals will rise to the 
challenge – be drawn out of their self-referential spheres and into their 
communities. Starting with Housing Associations as the best response, the 
most recent focus from ResPublica is on the Church of England (Noyes and 
Julian 2014). This latter response is particularly worrying, since it is 
questionable whether the church has either the ideological or the material 
resources to cultivate stronger communities. Not only do we now live in a 
world that is complexly Christian, plural and secular, but also the church has 
little money and a dwindling register of support consisting primarily of old 
women. As Adam Dinham puts it, it is questionable enough whether 
Christianity is really relevant for people today, ‘even if the old ladies could live 
forever’ (Dinham 2014).  
 
Glasman instead stresses the role of community organisations such as 
London Citizens, Movement for Change and faith groups around the country. 
His hope is that such organisations can bring people into their communities by 
demonstrating the strength of relational power.  
 
Milbank is equally critical of the market, though he would be at pains to stress 
an opposition not to markets per se, but to capitalism.  
 
Adam Smith’s economist contemporaries in Naples and Milan tried to 
revive the civil economy and they thought that when you bought meat 
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from your butcher you did do so partly out of benevolence, because he 
was you’re your friend and you needed his shop still to be there (Milbank 
2014b). 
 
Inspired by Marcel Mauss, Milbank pushes for a gift economy. What this 
means in practice is difficult to pin down, however. Both Blonde and Glasman 
want to ‘remoralise the economy’ (Glasman 2010). But the approaches are 
very different. Blonde wants to do this by extending capital to everybody, in 
some sense reversing Marx’s alienation effect by turning workers into owners, 
by encouraging businesses to adopt mutual-ownership models (Julian 2013). 
Blonde seeks to encourage take up of these ideas by economic argument, tax 
incentives, and sheer impact. He still relies on market forces. Glasman, on the 
other hand, fundamentally mistrusts states and markets, and wishes to use 
civic pressure to push for higher wages for workers. In this sense, he wishes 
to push for the common good not only in outcome, but also in method. But 
Glasman also sees the state as stepping in where civic pressure fails.  
 
Perhaps the best way to regard the work of Blonde and Glasman, is not as 
fundamentally rejecting market and state, but as seeing the institutions as 
instrumentally valuable in bringing about the common good, as opposed to 
treating the common good as worthwhile only insofar as it is good for the 
market or the good as defined by the state.  But the problem remains that 
both thinkers try to move directly from theory to politics and policy, without 
considering empirically what meanings and mechanisms can actually inspire 
people to collectively explore and work in the interests of the common good in 
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diverse settings. 
 
Post-liberalism provides an appealing dream of an ideal community, in which 
people are fundamentally good, despite their many faults, and are capable of 
collectively exploring and working towards the common good. These people 
do not need to be manipulated by legislation from the state, or by self-interest. 
Indeed, such interventions actually tend to undermine the idea of community. 
Instead, grounded in the insights of ancient philosophy and theology, people 
can work together. This dream seems especially appealing given the 
alternative that has been painted, of disparate and selfish individuals 
cooperating only because they are bound by a social contract, which is 
reinforced by state legislation and market incentive. As soon as the social 
contract breaks down, so will the common good. This philosophy appears 
especially relevant today, as we hear arguments from politicians and the 
media to make welfare more contribution based, and to make the NHS 
subscription based. But it is questionable whether these really are the 
dominant views of our time, and, even if they are, whether this results from a 
decline in our philosophical-theological heritage, and even if it does, whether 
that same heritage can be simplistically revalorised in today’s very different 
context. The following chapters will explore this critique in more detail.  
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Chapter 3: Religion lost? Ideological transformation of 
the public sphere or democratisation of self-
understanding? 
 
Chapter 2 put forward three rival but intertwining ideas of post-liberalism, from 
theology to politics, policy and practice. It placed secularisation at the heart of 
post-liberal thinking. Although three varying views of secularisation were 
provided, for the purpose of this chapter it will suffice to describe 
secularisation as the process whereby people lost confidence in the possibility 
of a shared idea of the good, a purpose by which politics was underpinned 
and towards which it was guided. Instead, shared purpose is replaced by 
social contract. There is no common goal, but only a common set of rules 
within which we each pursue our own good. Unless and until this ideological 
shift is reversed, the common good can only be enacted in peculiar 
communities. This chapter will question whether there has really been a 
decline in shared ideas of the good, whether it matters, and what other 
responses there have been.   
 
The ideological transformation of the public sphere 
 
I will not rehearse the arguments for the ideological transformation of the 
public sphere presented by post-liberal theorists. Ample attention is paid to 
this in their own works, and in the previous chapter, and any short summary 
would not do it justice. Instead, what I will do here is to explore whether and 
how their genealogy can be said to have correlates in the world of politics, 
policy and practice.   
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To start with, it is clear that at a certain point in European history, shared 
ideas of the good were fundamental to political self-understanding, and that 
engaging in these ideas was a prerequisite of belonging in the community.  
 
In ancient Athens, where the axial revolution took place in the form of the 
polis, ideas of the good and the communities from which they arose were 
entirely integrated (Jaspers 1953/2010). H.D.F. Kitto has explained that in 
translating polis, we run into difficulty. It has often been described as city-
state, despite being neither big enough to be a city, nor impersonal enough to 
be a state. In Greek literature, polis is used to refer both to the government of 
a particular area, and to the people of that area. The government and the 
people are, in some sense, one thing: ‘Polis’…may mean as much as ‘the 
whole communal life of the people, political, cultural, moral – even economic’ 
(Kitto 1951/1991: 75). The Athenian polis in particular stood out as 
exceptional, since its government was particularly synonymous with its people 
via the notion of democracy: they were directly implicated in its formation. It is 
in the context of such a polis, that Aristotle suggests that life outside of the 
polis is not a fully human life.  
 
There are problems with this vision, both in theory and in practice. 
Theoretically speaking, only certain people can become fully involved in the 
polis. For Plato this is severely limited to those that undergo a rigorous 
education. For Aristotle it is limited to free men.  
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In practice it is worth asking just how strong the sense of solidarity was, why it 
was so, and whether it can or should be emulated today.  Kitto has suggested 
that the sense of solidarity was so strong in Ancient Athens that people simply 
did not understand themselves as individuals. Those who did not take part in 
public life were regarded as oddities (Kitto 1951/1991: 72-73): 
 
In the winning of his livelihood he was essentially individualist: in the 
filling of his life he was essentially ‘communist’. Religion, art, games, the 
discussion of things – all these were needs of life that could be fully 
satisfied only through the polis – not, as with us, through voluntary 
associations of like-minded people, or through entrepreneurs appealing 
to individuals (this partly explains the difference between greek drama 
and the modern cinema)…Moreover he wanted to play his own part in 
running the affairs of the community (Kitto 1951/1991: 78). 
 
Why it should be that the Greeks were so prone to collectivity is hard to 
imagine. In some sense, Kitto seems to suggest that there is something 
about the Greek personality that made Greeks prone to collectivity.  
 
But there are also specific factors that seem to contribute to notions of 
collectivity: religion, self-understanding, and population size. In terms of 
religion, Kitto has suggested that gods were depicted as keeping order by 
punishing those that wrong the polis (Kitto 1951/1991: 75). In terms of self-
understanding, the Greeks saw themselves as part of an extended family: ‘the 
polis was a living community, based on kinship, real or assumed – a kind of 
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extended family, turning as much as possible of life into family life’ (Kitto 
1951/1991: 78). In terms of population size, the Greeks kept their polis 
deliberately small so that everybody could be involved: 
 
We may perhaps record an imaginary conversation between an ancient 
greek and a member of the atheniaum [an exclusive London club]. The 
member regrets the lack of political sense shown by the greeks. The 
greek replies ‘how many clubs are there in London?’ the member, as a 
guess, says about five hundred. The greek then says, ‘now if all these 
combined, what splendid premises they could build. They could have a 
club-house as big as hyde park’. ‘but’, says the member, ‘that would no 
longer be a club’. ‘precisely’, says the greek, ‘and a polis as big as yours 
is no longer a polis’. (Kitto 1951/1991: 79) 
 
With the rise of Rome things changed. The idea of religion underpinning the 
polis as a space in which wrongs are punished remains, as does the desire 
for the polis to be an extended family. But Richter has shown that the idea of 
the polis is also hugely expanded to incorporate people across multiple 
religions and ethnicities: 
 
“’Roman’ is not the name of a city but of a common kin group…-and this 
kin group is not one among many, but a compensation…for all the 
others…[as though] the whole inhabited world…had become a single 
city (Aristides in Richter 2011: 3).  
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The idea being invoked is one of a universal community – ‘a unified, 
homogenous whole composed of a diversity of parts’ (Richter 2011: 4). This 
aspect is important since it begins to open up the idea of the polis to include 
more people.  
 
It is well known that this universalism was carried into Christendom, wherein 
Christianity, with its centre in Rome, was to dominate European culture: 
providing the ideas and practices by which people should be judged.  
 
In Athens, Rome and Christendom, there was a clear idea of the good. Kitto 
provides a clear explanation of why this is important to recover: 
 
The Greeks thought of the polis as an active, formative thing, training the 
minds and characters of the citizens; we think of it as a piece of 
machinery for the production of safety and convenience. The training in 
virtue, which the medieval state left to the church, and which the polis 
made its own concern, the modern state leaves to god knows what (Kitto 
1951/1991: 75).  
 
Kitto here is pointing to the question that defines social theory: if not by the 
polis, or the church, how shall our society be conceived and structured, and 
how will its citizens be formed?  
 
R.W Southern has said that… 
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The identification of the church with the whole of organized society is the 
fundamental feature which distinguishes the middle ages from earlier 
and later periods of history. At its widest limits it is a feature of European 
history from the fourth to the eighteenth century – from Constantine to 
Voltaire. In theory, during the whole of this period only orthodox and 
obedient believers could enjoy the full rights of citizenship. (Southern 
1970: 16)  
 
Theory is the point of course, for in practice ‘the medieval church was…less 
than a state because the forces of coercion were not ultimately within its 
control  (Ibid: 21). Still, legal coercion enforced by secular rulers was the chief 
method by which religious and ideological unity was ensured. This mode of 
conduct, carried as it was throughout the Middle Ages, was still present, and 
because still present, very much under challenge, in the late 18th century.  
 
Taylor has shown that missionary zeal associated with the period was a 
matter of ensuring collective salvation. Much like the missionaries associated 
with colonization, clerics of the early Middle Ages sought to bring the true 
religion to European peasants. Unity was enforced through law, punishment 
and education (Taylor 2007).  
 
The first change for this model was the Reformation, which ostensibly allowed 
people to practice their own faith in their own way. Prior to the Reformation 
and even more so after, small allowances began to be made in law, in 
education and everyday life. But neither the confessional split, nor the later 
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Enlightenment, which deemed to place a burden of scientific proof upon 
religion, as well as to sow the seeds of self-autonomy, were to change the 
manner by which successive political regimes cultivated solidarity. Well after 
Locke had insisted on religious freedom and Kant had preached on the 
means to break free from tutelage, the French and Russian revolutions were 
to use murderous systems of law and punishment, complemented by 
aggressive attempts at public education. ‘They accepted’, Alexander has said, 
‘as a historical inevitability that these struggles depended upon coercion and 
violence’; their goal was to replace an oppressive form of state power with 
one directed toward a different end that makes use of similar means 
(Alexander 2006: 214). Though the ideas and the people changed, the 
manner by which ideas were disseminated remained largely the same. 
 
The second shift is the move from the countryside to towns. Ferdinand 
Tonnies distinguished two types of social arrangement, Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft loosely translates to community, that is, ‘small-
scale, kinship and neighbourhood-based’ social arrangements; and 
Gesellschaft to civil society, or large-scale, competitive, market ‘societies’’ 
(Harris 2001: i). Tonnies believed that community was organic, characterised 
by instinctive bonds, whereas civil society was mechanical, characterised by 
contract and rational calculation. Notwithstanding exceptions to the rule, he 
associated the former with children, women and rural settings, and the latter 
with adults, men in particular, and urban settings. It was therefore the case, in 
Tonnies opinion, that community had slowly declined with the rise of 
modernity, especially with the rise of capitalism, and was somewhat difficult to 
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stop, as towns grew ever larger in population.      
 
Yet Brint suggests that Tonnies is too dogmatic in his articulation of 
community:  
 
Tonnies’ tendency was to see community relations as highly focused on 
members of the community itself and as thoroughly noninstrumental in 
character. These assumptions seem unrealistic and unhelpful in an age 
of mass transportation and communication, geographic and social 
mobility, and cross-cutting social worlds…my definition requires only that 
these relations be based primarily on affect, loyalty, shared values, or 
personal involvement (Brint 2015: 9)  
 
It is possible to amend Brint’s critique: the problem is not over-idealising 
community, but rather failing to see opportunities for its flourishing in 
modernity. The problem is that Tonnies fixes his idea too much in specific 
settings, the Greek polis, medieval city-states and rural communities, 
suggesting that as we move into more complex, urban societies, a sense of 
solidarity cannot be maintained. Essentially, Tonnies seems atavistic. Joan 
Aldous has shown that this is the basis of the critique offered by Durkheim 
(Aldous et al. 1972).  
 
A further criticism is offered by Brint (2015). Having suggested Tonnies is too 
idealistic, Brint later implies that Tonnies own attempts to realise community in 
the modern context, by organising labour, would themselves have failed to 
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meet his theoretical standards, since organised labour is ultimately based on 
the self-interest of multifarious individuals. Tonnies was apparently too 
idealistic in theory, and not idealistic enough in practice. For those seeking 
such idealism, this latter criticism seems problematic.   
 
An important lesson from Tonnies is that the subtraction story of a shift from 
shared ideas to social contracts is perhaps too simplistic. There are a couple 
of key countervailing ideas. The first is Benedict Anderson’s theorisation of 
imagined communities constructed with the rise of the nation-state. The 
implication of this study is twofold: that there is an implicit recognition that 
contract on its own is insufficient, and it is possible to respond to this fact with 
an idea of community more appropriate to the modern world (Anderson 
1983/2006). This idea continues to be invoked in various settings today 
(Bellah 1967; Lynch 2012). In the UK context, this has centred around the 
monarchy and the flag. This point will be explored further in the section on 
statism. The second countervailing idea comes from the recent work of Susan 
McKinnon and Fenella Cannell (2013), who have demonstrated that ideas of 
kinship, for instance, whether real or perceived, may still today influence 
community, and even macro political and economic structures.  
 
The importance of ideas 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, an important premise of post-liberal 
theory is that ideas about association have lost a richness over the centuries. 
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For Taylor, there is a loss of a deeper grounding; for MacIntyre, the loss of an 
ethical journey; and for Milbank, the loss of faith in one another.  
 
The last section established that although some of this richness has indeed 
been lost in favour of individual autonomy, different forms of bond may have 
emerged. This section explores how important this loss really is, while 
continuing to highlight new and different ideas of community. Social theorists 
have from early on regarded a religious grounding as fundamental, and have 
tried to understand the unique contribution of these structures so as to protect 
them. The loss of religion, and the question of what will take its place, might 
be considered the impetus for much of the early anthropological and 
sociological studies of religion, dominating the thought of all of its founding 
figures: Comte, Durkheim, Weber, Parsons.  
 
This fascination resulted in a striking ambivalence. Comte, at the same time 
as celebrating the end of a theological grounding of politics, nonetheless felt it 
important to replace what had been lost: 
 
Comte claimed that society had moved from a theological stage, to a 
metaphysical stage, and in his time was passing into a positivist, or 
scientific stage, wherein social scientific facts would dictate policy. Yet 
Comte also imagined a religion of humanity, whereby priests would be 
replaced by social scientists. Comte’s later interest in a religion of 
humanity suggests that he was worried about the possibility of a secular 
society’s losing the kinds of cohesive function associated with the church 
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(Stacey forthcoming 2016).  
 
Durkheim similarly stressed that religion provided a central cohesive function 
in society, but nonetheless felt that this function could be replaced. Durkheim 
distinguishes between the religious and the sacred. He suggests that religion 
is “a set of rituals and practices with respect to sacred things”, where “sacred 
things” are non-negotiable categories opposed to the profane (Durkheim 
1915/2008: 37). By distinguishing between these Durkheim paves the way to 
the idea that while religion may decline, sacred forms will nonetheless survive 
to provide a social glue. The sacred is inextricably bound up with the social for 
Durkheim. He develops a process known as collective effervescence, 
whereby one’s presence in a crowd lifts one out of oneself, subsuming one’s 
identity into that of the crowd. Phillip Mellor and Chris Shilling have said of 
collective effervescence that it “is the very essence of the sacred and of 
society itself” such that “society would die along with the sacred” and 
“individuals would succumb to an egoistic absorption, if this effervescent 
sociality was not experienced” (Mellor and Shilling 1997: 53). Olaveson has 
suggested that a similar idea to collective effervescence finds expression in 
Victor Turner’s notion of communitas (Olaveson 2001; Turner 1974; 1979). 
Referencing Turner, Olaveson (2001: 104) has summarised communitas as  
 
“human beings stripped of status role characteristics – people ‘just as 
they are,’ getting through to each other...” The experience of 
communitas is also usually a “deep” or intense one, and belongs in the 
intuitive or emotional realm, as opposed to the rational one. 
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Collective effervescence and communitas are the means by which the 
individual becomes emotionally connected with and dissolved into the group.  
 
Yet by designating communitas as ‘human beings stripped of status role’, 
Olaveson suggests that Turner is offering a complicated picture of 
communitas, whereby rather than simplistically supporting structural 
elements, communitas is taken as simultaneously reinforcing and challenging 
structure, providing the emotional energy that underscores solidarity, but also 
being rooted in anti-structural sentiments. The result is that while 
organisations can seek to harness communitas, they do so at the risk of 
undermining hierarchy (Olaveson 2001: 104). Olaveson further stresses that 
Turner’s communitas is at its strongest when it is spontaneous, thus the very 
attempt to harness or construct communitas can only ever produce a diluted 
equivalent (Olaveson 2001: 105).    
 
Secular social theory has thus always had an ambivalent relationship with 
religion. John Milbank’s fundamental criticism of such theory is that it tends to 
reduce the religious to the social. What is held sacred is no longer of any 
particular importance – only that it strengthens social bonds. The reduction of 
the sacred to the social is ethically precarious, since it does not matter what 
ideas are used to promote solidarity; these might be anything from the idea of 
a master race, to the principle of equality; to the notion of self-responsibility. 
Milbank also finds the focus on the individual as uniquely problematic: in this 
case the good “is no more than the universal abstraction of all the individual 
particular wills, who merely will their own freedom of life and property” 
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(Milbank 1990/2006: 163).  One might suggest that a community cannot be 
authentic if it suppresses self-autonomous expression, yet Milbank would 
suggest that he is not against self-autonomy – just against it as the sole aim 
of society.  
 
Notwithstanding the unfortunate way in which it is made manifest, Durkheim’s 
reading of the sacred would seem to lend support to the post-liberal call for 
shared ideas of the good. The importance of sacred ideas in providing social 
glue and enabling collective action has remained a key theme in social theory 
long after Durkheim, being explored in numerous ways. This trend has been 
divided into “right” and “left”, and “pure” and “impure”, but given the ambiguity 
of the first two categories, and the vagueness of the latter two, it is perhaps 
better to use “conservative-constructive” and “rebellious-subversive” 
(Richman 2002: 114; Lynch 2012: 19).   The first trend includes Weber, Eliad, 
Parsons, Bellah, Alexander, and Bloch. In this trend either the sacred, 
ideology or value are deemed to play a role in binding society together. The 
second trend includes thinkers such as Bataille and Caillois, and focuses on 
the role of the sacred in subverting hegemony.  
 
Within the first trend, Maurice Bloch’s work is worthy of special attention, 
since it supports much of the post-liberal analysis. Bloch develops a 
distinction between the transcendental and transactional social. The 
transcendental social is the sphere in which idealized social roles and virtues 
are imagined. The transactional social is the sphere of biological fact and self-
interested, rational action. The transcendental social develops as a deliberate 
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negation of the world as it is, making roles extend over time, and postulating 
ideal behaviours, rituals and relationships. By negating the world in this way, 
the transcendental social provides people with the possibility of imagining a 
different world, and of transforming the world as it is (Bloch 2010). Bloch 
suggests that in moments in history where the transcendental social is 
separated from the political, it springs up in the form of religion, and 
competition ensues for the control of behaviour. Building on this distinction in 
a recent lecture series, Bloch began to develop a critique of secularism, as a 
system which denies the ontological status of the transcendental social. The 
result is not only competition between various religions and the state for the 
control of behaviour, but also of a state that fails to acknowledge its own 
imaginative function. Rather than thereby ridding itself of the transcendental 
social, the state exercises its control of behaviour in arbitrary and instrumental 
ways. This critique is extended to capitalism, wherein, it might be suggested, 
the transcendental social and the transactional social converge, such that the 
imagined future is none other than one in which self-interested, rational actors 
compete over finite resources (Bloch 2013). 
 
We might also include in the first tradition Anderson’s notion of imagined 
communities. For Anderson, imagined communities can be constructed 
around the idea of nation that creates a sense of solidarity between people 
even if they never meet in person: ‘in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion” (Anderson 1983/2006: 6). Marj Mayo has discussed how 
this same idea can develop around race (Mayo 2000: 39), while Tiryakian has 
spoken of the religious dimension of imagined communities (Tiryakian 2011). 
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Kenneth Wald, Adam Silverman and Kevin Fridy (2005) have drawn on 
Weber to stress that all social action takes place within a value-structure. 
Scott Atran (2011) has demonstrated that sacred beliefs can, and do, subvert 
and defy rational calculation. Chris Baker focuses on religion, revealing its 
ability to develop a strong sense of belonging and becoming (Baker 2013: 
357-361). The prevalence of studies of this kind lends support to MacIntyre’s 
suggestion that modernity is characterised by the loss of telos, and thereby a 
sense of a better way of living towards which we people are aiming. 
 
Chris Baker’s research is particularly illuminating in this regard. Drawing on 
the theory of both Durkheim and Putnam and Campbell, Baker’s emphasis is 
on exploring how theologies spread across a group and from though into 
action. Baker pinpoints three categories for study: belonging, becoming and 
participation.  
 
Baker subdivides belonging into three further categories:  
 
sociality (shared social and religious events); feelings of bondedness 
(empathy); structures of support that are particularly effective when 
people are going through stressful or difficult times (solidarity). (Baker 
2013: 357) 
 
 The sense of belonging derived from membership of a religious organisation 
is shown to encourage members through a process of becoming. The 
particular nature of becoming depends on the religion in question. Amongst 
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Buddhists, Baker observes ‘internal discipline that sees the acquiring of 
virtues, such as compassion, patience, and openness, as a long and 
dedicated process of spiritual and physical “denial”’ (Baker 2013: 360). 
Amongst Muslims, Baker observes the external demands of the Koran, and 
the expectation to live up to those demands. Amongst Christians, he observes 
the energy derived from worship and liturgy (Baker 2013: 361). 
  
Together, belonging and becoming provide the impetus for participation in 
public life, whereby religious actors carry out their values for the benefit of the 
wider public.  
 
Perhaps fitting slightly better with the second trend, Christian Smith focuses 
on sacred transcendence to reveal a similar notion of becoming. He suggests 
that sacred transcendence is powerful because humans are “meaning-craving 
creatures” for whom “meaning is not automatically and immediately available” 
(Smith 1996: 5). Smith lists a number of categories that make sacred 
transcendence a powerful social force: 
 
• Legitimation for protest rooted in the ultimate or sacred 
• Moral imperatives for love, justice, peace, freedom, equity 
• Powerfully motivating icons, rituals, songs, testimonies, oratory 
• Ideologies demanding self-discipline, sacrifice, altruism 
•  Legitimation of organisational and strategic-tactical flexibility  
(Smith 1996: 9-12) 
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Thus far, the literature on the sacred would appear to fit quite neatly within a 
broader, secular political paradigm. To recognise the force of sacred ideas as 
they manifest themselves in political behaviours is not to recognise their 
transformative potential for our broader political self-understanding. Even 
where sacred ideas can be seen to operate in a secular outlook, still to 
recognise the sacred as an analytic lens for understanding our ideals is not 
necessarily to challenge those ideals. Over the last five years however, 
research into the post-secular has suggested that religious ideas can be 
drawn on to regenerate contemporary politics. Jürgen Habermas (2010) has 
suggested that liberal democracies need to reconnect with religious wisdom in 
order to rediscover deeper ideas of what politics is for, and to challenge the 
dominance of state and market. Adam Dinham (2014) has extended this idea, 
suggesting that religions can provide ‘alternative logics’ that reawaken politics 
and reengage citizens.  
 
These points notwithstanding, research into the post-secular does not by any 
means unproblematically endorse post-liberalism. As the foremost thinker on 
the subject, it is worth noting that Habermas’ work is particularly ambivalent. 
Habermas’ earlier work has widely been interpreted as advocating an 
exclusionary idea of the public sphere that casts religion as irrational and 
potentially subversive (Mendieta 2002: 11). Although this reading is somewhat 
narrow given Habermas’ deep reflection on Durkheim regarding the role of 
religion in underscoring public morality, still he claims that in a secularised 
society ‘only a universalistic morality can retain its obligatory character’ 
(Habermas 1987: 49-80; 90). This universalistic morality is developed by 
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means of a methodological atheism that prioritises rational argument and 
empirical evidence, with religious arguments only justified insofar as they are 
themselves rationalised (Habermas 1987: 89; Mendieta 2002: 12). This 
approach can be seen to carry over into his later work, such that despite his 
reflections on the post-secular, despite even his ‘awareness’ that something is 
‘missing’ from an exclusively secular public sphere, still his solution always 
amounts to the same ideal of a universal, rational language (Habermas 2008; 
Habermas 2010). In this light, the only real difference between the older and 
later Habermas is that his later work shrinks the realm to which his ideal 
applies. Guido Vanheeswijck observes in the later Habermas a distinguishing 
between a formal and informal public sphere, with the former applying solely 
to law-making, and the latter encompassing welfare provision and civil 
society, and suggests that Habermas is an exclusivist regarding the formal 
public sphere, but an inclusivist regarding the informal public sphere. From 
this perspective, research into the post-secular can be said to represent a 
post-secular paradox, aiming merely to, from a secular perspective, 
acknowledge religions’ role in society. This perspective offers no space for 
reimagining the public sphere, but only for recolonising religions into a 
predefined ideology. 
 
Although he does not point to this paradox himself, it goes some way to 
explaining It is perhaps Jim Beckford’s dissatisfaction with the post-secular, 
which he insists connotes nothing new. For Beckford, the renewed interest in 
religion is less to do with recognising alternative ideas of the public sphere, 
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and more to do with radical Islam and the potential contribution of particular 
religions to public service delivery (Beckford 2012).   
 
This public policy interest in religion points to another key problem with the 
post-secular from a post-liberal perspective: since the former does not 
fundamentally challenge the secular, nor can it challenge the dominance of 
state and market as means of inculcating solidarity. Instead, this renewed 
interest can be read in light of a neoliberal shift away from the state and 
towards the market. Religions are to become key players in the mixed 
economy of welfare. Religions, Dinham explains, are understood ‘as 
“containers” of staff, buildings, volunteers, networks, values and skills which 
can be “harnessed” in key community domains’ (Dinham 2011: 526). 
 
There are other uses of the post-secular, however, which seem to fit far more 
neatly with the post-liberal agenda. A few researchers are beginning to use 
the term post-secular rapprochement to identify collaborative efforts between 
religious and nonreligious civic actors (Beaumont & Baker 2011; Cloke & 
Beaumont 2013; Williams 2015). Although these authors tend to draw on 
Habermas’ more recent writing, they also draw on the thought of post-liberal 
thinkers such as Milbank and Blond, employing theory in interesting ways that 
open up new avenues for understanding the role of religion. Cloke and 
Beaumont in particular draw on Habermas’ idea of ‘crossover narratives’ to 
indicate spaces in which religious and secular narratives converge, and 
suggest that spaces are emerging for ‘reflexive openness to religious 
narrative’ (Cloke & Beaumont 2013: 19). Williams’ work shows that religious 
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and nonreligious actors are equally capable of creatively adopting one 
another’s discourses, as well as embracing the contribution of those 
discourses. By acknowledging that ‘different ethical precepts performatively 
elicit distinct affective registers’ religious and nonreligious actors are able to 
‘recognise the salience of beliefs-in-action’ (Williams 2015: 199).  I suggest 
that this new way of interpreting the post-secular can be used to take 
Habermas beyond Habermas, demonstrating that a universal, rational 
language is not only unnecessary but also unhelpful, in that it forecloses the 
imaginative contribution provided by different religious and nonreligious 
perspectives.  
 
This same body of research has equally emphasised the role of post-secular 
attitudes in challenging neoliberal discourses. Williams (2015) explores how 
religious motivations have been used to challenge neoliberal forms of 
governance in drug rehabilitation programmes, pointing out that the Christian 
notion of caritas, for example, had been employed to keep shelters open for 
longer than funding would otherwise permit, to understand patients as people, 
and to recognise that individual self-responsibility alone could not account for 
the path to addiction.   
 
This second trend in post-secular thinking thus seems to lend support to the 
post-liberal perspective. Yet the concept of the post-liberal may still stand out 
for two reasons. The first, somewhat ironic given its strong Christian legacy, is 
that using the term post-liberal may provide ways of reimagining the public 
sphere that move beyond religion/secular binaries. The second is that it offers 
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the reimagining a clear normative agenda, rendering it less susceptible to the 
whims of particular researchers: it asserts the possibility of shared ideas of 
the good over the liberal claim of irreducible plurality; and it uses this claim to 
specifically challenge the dominance of state and market. 
 
With reference to the first point, post-liberalism still has much to learn from the 
anthropology and sociology of religion. Most important of these is the trend 
away from the study of religious dogma, and towards the study of identity. As I 
have explained elsewhere: 
 
Since we last paid attention to religion, much has changed, and even if 
Christendom once were ideal, which is very doubtful, once that mould 
has been lifted, the clay unavoidably takes on a very different shape, so 
that seeking to bring the same mould back down potentially cuts of 
entire archipelagos of beautiful thought.  
 
In terms of Christian belief, research suggests a number of significant 
changes. Grace Davie tells us that contemporary belief can be defined 
as belief without belonging, so that we may call ourselves Christian, but 
we no longer attend church. Daniele Hervieu-Leger twists this idea, 
suggesting that instead we belong without believing: we identify with 
Christianity but we do not believe in God. Abby Day observes a socially 
performative “belief in belonging”, whereby people do not have faith in 
any particular dogma, but in one another, and so perform a shared 
identity.  
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In each of these the literature appears to point towards a Durkheimian 
faith, devoid of any constructed or predictable ideas or practices. 
Perhaps a more challenging concept still comes from Linda Woodhead 
and Paul Heelas, who predict a trend away from dogmatic, homogenous 
forms of religious practice, and towards more spiritual and introspective 
ideas. In this sense, religion might only serve to inspire social action if 
doing so corresponds with a sense of self-actualization (Stacey 
forthcoming 2016). 
 
And this is to look at Christian belief alone. It ignores the decline in that 
belief, and the rise, mainly due to immigration, of other religions. If post-
liberals are to celebrate the increased awareness of the importance of 
religion, they must do so with the caveat that religion has significantly 
changed since we last paid attention.  
 
Different kinds of ideas 
 
One manner in which post-liberalism can begin to engage with the diversity of 
current religious and ideological belief is by engaging with other sociological 
and policy perspectives that have developed to provide an appropriate 
metanarrative for a diverse context. In the following I summarise these 
positions briefly. I should concede that my summary tends to simplify and 
compartmentalise a history that in fact has far more overlaps than there is the 
space to do justice to here. 
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Actually, until very recently, far more recently than many recognise, the 
overarching narrative for UK politics, policy and practice was still Christian. 
Looking at the work of Prochaska (2006) and Bowpitt (2007), Dinham (2012: 
274; 2014) has suggested that even as the welfare state nationalised welfare 
in the post-war era, it was nonetheless Christian principles that guided them in 
their mission, and Christian discourses that were used to convince the church 
to hand over resources. 
 
But by the late 60s, the changed academic understanding and public 
perception begins to catch up with the policy, and Dinham observes a 
‘deliberate marginalisation of religious socialization’, with, for example, the 
consolidation of ‘social work as a competitor to faith-based philanthropy’ 
(Dinham 2012: 273; 274). The Christian paradigm seems to be replaced by a 
secular paradigm. 
 
In the 1980s, in a neoliberal context of a shrinking state and the need to 
cultivate a mixed economy of welfare, interest in religion returns. In this 
context “faith groups” are seen ‘as “containers” of staff, buildings, volunteers, 
networks, values and skills which can be “harnessed” in key community 
domains” (Dinham 2011: 1).  
 
This theme continues into the 90s and 00s, with the emergence in particular 
of the multi-cultural and multi-faith paradigms. Yet following the Oldham riots 
of 2001, these paradigms were criticised for facilitating the emergence of 
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areas with multiple, conflicting and untrusting communities, or what the 
subsequent Cantle Report called “parallel lives” (Cantle 2001).   
 
In response to the perceived fragmentary nature of the multi-faith approach, 
an interfaith paradigm emerged: ‘something more committed to a stronger 
sense of the whole, in terms of such things as societal cohesion and national 
citizenship’ (Cantle 2012: 38).   Yet, as Adam Dinham has made clear, both 
multi-faith and interfaith fail to recognise another issue; namely, that there is 
and can be no multi-faith or interfaith theology, meaning that the faith aspect 
is lost.  
 
Given the frustration with finding a new paradigm, David Barclay has 
suggested that a metanarrative approach should be dropped altogether. 
Although contemporary approaches demonstrate an authentic desire to build 
unity across diversity, Barclay has said that they rely on 
 
‘trickle down’ theory of social change in which the only people whose 
thinking or practice is worth altering are those intellectual and political 
elites with the power to alter funding patterns or decisions about different 
kinds of representation. (Barclay 2013: 17)  
 
According to Barclay, rather than orthodoxy, we need to think about 
orthopraxy, right doing.  
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Barclay’s intervention is reminiscent of my critique of post-liberalism towards 
the end of chapter 2. The problem with this approach is that it ignores the 
importance of specific value structures as ways of inspiring action and 
resisting liberal hegemony. This point is implicitly recognised by British Prime 
Minister David Cameron, who, in 2011, claimed “state multiculturalism” had 
“allowed the weakening of our collective identity” (Cameron 2011). Cameron 
has addressed this lack of collective identity by asserting that Britain is a 
Christian country and adding, “we should not be afraid to say so” (Cameron 
2014). Yet conversely, the risk of this approach can be seen in the Near 
Neighbours programme, which funds the Church of England to engage in 
interfaith community development. The Church of England is treated de facto 
as the arbiter of good community activism.  
 
It is important to recognise that since we last paid attention, the religious 
landscape has irrevocably changed, and narratives that might have inspired 
social solidarity in the 1950s may not do the same job today. It is important to 
recognise that any metanarrative may be exclusive. Yet to give up on 
metanarrative altogether is to suggest that traditional structures do not play a 
role in imparting and distributing social justice.  
 
Paulo Freire suggests that rather than eschewing ideas of the good 
altogether, the point is to ensure that these ideas are developed inclusively at 
the grassroots. According to Freire, all revolutions heretofore, despite having 
the emancipation of the people as a key objective, have always focused on 
taking the means of control first, and educating the people second. But this is 
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only to mirror hierarchical oppression. Instead, claims Friere, the only way to 
influence a true revolution is to educate people from the bottom up. Through a 
process of what Freire calls conscientisation, it is held that individuals can 
come to critically engage with the world of their own accord (1996).    
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored post-liberalism’s lament of a lost religion in terms of 
historical developments, sociological relevance, and policy approaches. It 
concluded, respectively, that while perhaps ideas of the good had been lost, 
sporadic ideas of shared value could still be seen to influence some areas of 
politics and economy, and that where it did not have such influence, there 
nonetheless appeared to be evidence of the potential for such influence; that 
while ideas of the good were important, it was not possible to simply recover 
the same beliefs and practices around which people were once united; and 
that other approaches had suffered a failure of imagination in responding.    
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Chapter 4: Statism 
 
As chapter 2 explains, the post-liberal argument goes that with the loss of 
shared ideas of the good, it becomes necessary to inculcate a strong state 
that keeps the peace and ensures the welfare of its citizens. Both of these 
tendencies undermine the idea of humans as inherently political. The latter 
especially requires raising taxes to provide services. Post-liberals regard such 
redistribution as alienating the benefactor from the act of giving, thus 
undermining public duty, as well as acting as an unnecessary crutch to the 
receiver. This chapter explores these points historically, sociologically, and in 
terms of policy.  
 
The rise of leviathan and the fall of humanity 
 
The primary question to ask historically is whether and why the church is 
overtaken by the state as the primary institution through which people are 
reconciled to one another. Related to this is the question of whether local 
forms of decision making more generally give way to centralised decisions.  
 
Post-liberals argue that during the European Wars of Religion, in response to 
interminable conflict, a philosophy emerges that assumes not only is there no 
idea of the good, but that anyway people cannot collectively agree on the 
good without descending into violence. In its place, a rationally calculated 
social contract emerges, which prioritises the individual pursuit of material 
advantages, and which gives supreme authority to the state in the protection 
of this priority. Hence it is said that the state holds a monopoly on violence 
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(Weber 1919/2005). What is important to question is whether this emergent 
philosophy has any parallel in political reality. Monica Toft et al. demonstrate 
this parallel. They claim that ‘premodern relationships between religious and 
political actors tended to involve significant mutual dependence for the sake of 
overall social order’ with religious actors providing the ideological legitimacy, 
and political actors the financial and military strength (Toft et al. 2012: 52; 54). 
In the early-modern period, however, ‘power shifted decisively in the direction 
of the state’, much encouraged by the rise of political philosophies extolling 
the importance of security (Toft et al. 2012: 58-60). Most significantly, the 
Treaty of Westphalia made religion an issue of national sovereignty (Toft et al. 
2012: 63). From the late 18th to early 19th centuries, relying on literature often 
expressed ‘in biblical and orthodox terms’, the religious authority was 
increasingly subordinated to political authority, a trend that was consolidated 
in the 20th century (Toft et al. 2012: 65).  
 
Eventually this takeover is extended to the provision of services. Frank 
Prochaska shows that in the 19th century the majority of social services were 
provided by the churches or by friendship societies, underscored by, and 
promulgating a shared spirit of association (Prochaska 2006: 9). But in the 
context of Fabianism, an extension of social scientific positivism, which 
suggested social scientific bureaucracy could solve social ills, and of wartime 
planning from 1939-45, charity came to be seen as outmoded (Prochaska 
2006: 152). According to Prochaska, the dominance of the state continued 
even into the neoliberalism of Margaret Thatcher:  
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While British governments of both right and left enlist the citizen 
volunteer when it suits them, they have rarely had much regard for 
charitable independence, in part because voluntary campaigners openly 
criticise government policy (Prochaska 2006: 163).  
 
Prochaska adds that even where more recent emphasis on voluntary 
association has been authentic, because the rise of the state undermined 
religious and voluntary organisations, there was no spirit of association left 
from which to draw:  
 
The New Right, with its reversion to the language of the minimal state 
and the need for voluntary endeavour, echoed sentiments that had been 
little commended since the heyday of Victorian liberalism.47 But such 
sentiments were being voiced in a world that had lost its Christian 
underpinnings. Thatcher’s millionaires, unlike the Colmans, Rathbones, 
or Cadburys of the past, had other things to spend their money on than 
their fellow citizens (Prochaska 2006: 161). 
 
Indeed, Prochaska claims that by the late 1940s, ‘with collectivism in the 
ascendant, the payment of taxes had become the primary civic duty’ 
(Prochaska 2006: 149).  
 
The post-liberal story of a rising leviathan then, seems to have real 
purchase in sociological studies of the relationship between the state and 
ideas of the good. The state first displaces religion by establishing its own 
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legitimacy on contractual grounds. It then challenges the legitimacy of 
religious activities in the civil sphere, which it first supplements, then either 
replaces or co-opts. In the process, religion loses its social significance, 
and its cultural capacity to motivate social action. The result is that even 
where bureaucrats now awaken to the idea of social action as integral to 
human flourishing, if the state is removed, it may be confronted by a lack of 
appetite.   
 
Yet the picture of the state being portrayed is one of a monolith 
undermining what it means to be human must be balanced against views of 
the state as building a shared spirit of association. Such a discussion 
provides the focus of the next section. 
 
The importance of the state 
 
The last section demonstrated that there has been a clear rise in the state. 
This section will explore whether the rise of the state should be considered as 
undermining a shared spirit of association, or if in fact the state can be seen 
as embodying this ideal.  
 
Perhaps the best theoretical defence of the state can be found in Hegel. 
Hegelian dialectics, though very much disputed as to their form, are 
universally acknowledged as a system wherein ideas shape history. A form of 
dialectic can be perceived in Hegel’s understanding of the relationship 
between the individual, family, civil society and the state. The individual’s 
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relation to the family is one of selflessness and solidarity: ‘In the family the 
particularity of each individual tends to be absorbed into the social unit’ 
(Redding 2014: 51). But the individual’s relation to others in the market place 
is one of selfishness and competition. The role of the state is to create a 
synthesis of the two positions; that is, to have selfishness and solidarity at 
once, helping the individual to be absorbed into the social unit. He imagines 
this will happen through state regulation, law and punishment, and the 
institution of organised labour. The harmonious ideal that results, Hegel calls 
the Sittlichkeit, or “ethical life”.  
 
Hegel seems to offer a fair challenge to the state as undermining community. 
Yet John Milbank has said that since he concedes the naturalness and 
inevitability of selfishness, and, as a result, the necessity of an overbearing 
state, Hegel’s can only ever be ‘a pseudo-Sittlichkeit’ (Milbank 1990/2006: 
168). This is because any pretension of genuine reconciliation is always 
undergirded by self-interest:  
 
Personal striving is really in the interest of collective purpose, and yet 
Hegel defines this collective purpose precisely in terms of the making to 
coincide of public and private interest (Milbank 1990/2006: 171) 
 
In other words, although one’s own individual work is directed towards the 
interest of the collective, this is at the very best self-deception, since the only 
way one could have been persuaded to act in the collective interest, was to be 
convinced that so doing was ultimately in ones self-interest. Hegel ‘traces the 
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origins of human society to individual self-seeking, which eventually gives rise 
to laws which merely protect established power’ (Milbank 1990/2006: 170). 
This reading of Hegel is confirmed by Kanykey Jailobaeva, and by Krishan 
Kumar: ‘the individual comes to understand that ‘he wills his ends only in 
willing universal ends’’ (Kumar in Jailobaeva 2007: 5). Because human self-
interest is ultimately unavoidable, because self-deception can never be 
complete, the true Sittlichkeit can never be achieved, and so instead one 
requires the over-bearing regulation of the state, hence, Hegel’s stress on law 
and punishment. One might argue then, that Hegel does see the inherent 
value of community – only he does not believe it to be achievable. Yet for 
Milbank the point is that due to Hegel’s pessimistic view of human nature, his 
idea of community is always already undermined. If ideas do shape 
behaviour, then the reification of Hegelianism risks undermining community 
from within, by treating it as an enterprise for serving self-interest.      
 
It is worth noting however, that the critique of Hegel is reliant on perceiving 
the state as enforcer. This attitude perhaps changes if we regard the state 
from the perspective of Richard Titmuss, for whom taxation and redistribution 
is a beautiful and efficient means through which a whole nation can enter into 
a process of gift exchange (Titmuss 1971/1997). Yet Alisdair MacIntyre has 
denigrated this position as legitmating the interests ‘not of workers, but of 
managers and technocrats’ (MacIntyre in Knight 2005: 267). Still, Titmuss 
favourably draws on MacIntyre’s work, and thus was presumably aware of his 
reservations (Titmuss 1971/1997: 261). Seeking to avoid a crude 
endorsement of statist utilitarianism, Titmuss advocates a symbiotic 
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relationship between the state as administrator and individuals as voluntary 
suppliers. MacIntyre’s point holds however, since there is little regard for the 
empowering of people. Prochaska can help to elaborate this point:  
 
As Max Weber pointed out, ‘bureaucracy inevitably accompanies 
modern mass democracy in contrast to the democratic self-government 
of small homogeneous units’. In compensation for the decline of rival 
sources of democracy, politicians and social commentators sought to 
replace the sense of community, which people had built up in the past 
out of family life and self-governing local institutions, with a sense of 
national community, built out of central bureaucratic structures and party 
politics. In passing social legislation, government acted in the name of 
freedom, progress, and social justice. The beauty of such abstractions 
perhaps blinded the public to the dangers of overburdening the state. 
Despite the warnings of the liberal economist Frederick Hayek and 
others, there was relatively little public debate over the insensitivity of 
central government to the periphery. It was not a strong current in 
political discourse to argue that effective social reform might come from 
below, from local institutions that derived their energy and legitimacy 
from openness to the immediate needs of individuals and communities. 
The more the government expanded its role into areas that were 
formerly the responsibility of families and voluntary institutions, the more 
it reduced the scope for individual service and social interaction 
(Prochaska 2006: 163). 
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As the bureaucratic state expands and co-opts, it slowly undermines social 
action. Yet at this point it is important that post-liberals do not undermine their 
own project. Aggression against the state, especially in the absence of 
particular ideologies or institutions to support as an alternative, might easily 
be read in line with the neoliberal critique of political institutions on the 
grounds that they inhibit freedom.  
 
Moreover, even if this point is addressed, three fundamental points remain. 
The first is concern regarding what is known as the postcode lottery. The 
welfare state was initially set up in response to enormous gaps in welfare 
provision, in terms of both quantity and quality. The second concern is that in 
a globalised world, in which companies may have more wealth than states, it 
is nonetheless only states, and collections of states, that have the power to 
confront such companies and to stand up for social justice. The third concern 
is research suggesting that the state plays a key role in founding, sustaining 
and supporting social action. Research from Theda Skopcol in the US has 
argued that ‘organized civil society in the United States has never flourished 
apart from active government’, which ‘nurtured and rewarded voluntary 
associations’ (Skopcol 1996).  
 
The state is constantly in danger of co-opting and undermining social action. 
But it is also the only institution big enough to provide universal services, 
stand up to big companies, and support struggling voluntary associations.   
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Different states  
 
While the preceding sections have traced the rise of an ostensibly monolithic 
state, unaware of or uninterested in the importance of social action, there 
have actually been a number of key initiatives from UK government over the 
last fifty years which grapple with deep ideas of human flourishing. It is 
important that post-liberals engage with these projects, since although they 
have had many problems, or perhaps because they have, they are able to 
contribute vital information as to how to take the project forwards. In the 
following I shall summarise a number of such projects during the post-war, big 
state period. 
 
The late 1960s and 1970s was a time of reawakening to the shortcomings of 
the state. 1968 was a year of “revolt, rebellion and reaction throughout the 
world” (Popple in Ledwith 2005: 11). Although such rebellion was often more 
focused on race, capitalism and war than on statism, it may have influenced 
self-reflection on the part of the establishment as a whole. 1968 also saw the 
publication of the Gulbenkian Report, which recognised that “participation in 
decision-making about every aspect of life is of fundamental importance to 
human flourishing” (Dinham 2014). 1969 saw the introduction of the 
Community Development Projects (CPD) “amidst the emergent crisis in social 
democracy and the perceived threat of disaffection and dissent” (Shaw 2003: 
362). Although these projects drew on the a-structural “cycle of transmitted 
deprivation” theory with the intention of lifting families and areas out of 
poverty, project workers were given enough freedom to “reject this reactionary 
theory in favour of radical/structural Marxist analyses of discrimination” 
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(Ledwith 2005: 11). This shift was best observed in the publication of Gilding 
the Ghetto (CDP 1977) and In and Against the State (London Edinburgh 
Weekend Return Group 1979), which claimed that the government ignored 
the structural causes of deprivation such as “bad housing conditions, 
redundancies, lay-offs, and low wages” and that “state welfare workers were 
locked into a set of social relations that operated against working class 
interests by ‘protecting capital from our strength’” (CDP 1977: 4; Shaw 2003: 
363). With government unable to control the narrative of CPDs, funding was 
withdrawn.  
 
Dinham suggests that this cycle was repeated in the 1990s and 2000s with 
New Labour’s New Deal for Communities (NDC). In an indicative article 
entitled Empowered or Over-powered?, Dinham  suggests that NDC placed 
too many constraints on communities:  
 
the prescription of general floor targets and the speed of development 
required is undermining the community development commitment to 
empowerment at local people’s pace and causing a sense of exclusion 
amongst local people from the programme (Dinham 2005: 309). 
 
Again, even the best-intentioned policy can struggle to hand over the kind of 
power local people require for a sense of ownership.  
 
Similarly, the Big Society agenda, which was introduced by the Conservative 
part of the Coalition government, suggested a renewed interest in the ability of 
	 104	
local people to take control of their own lives. Yet not only has the Big Society 
failed to produce organisations willing to make structural criticisms, but also it 
has been perceived as a cover for structural changes in terms of reduced 
social spending.  
 
A major outcome of the Big Society was the commissioning of a community 
organisation to develop local capacity. While this commission was widely 
expected to be secured by London Citizens, it went to a new umbrella 
organization named Locality. Bunyan explains that: 
 
over the course of the tendering process and since the decision was 
made about the organization deemed best equipped to spearhead the 
community organizing initiative, there would appear to have been a 
significant shift in emphasis in terms of the style and approach that is to 
be adopted (Bunyan 2013: 129). 
 
He suggests that 
 
there is a danger that the initiative as currently conceived will perpetuate 
unhelpful narratives and assumptions about the nature of poor and 
disadvantaged communities and fail to politicize such communities in 
building collective power capable of challenging the existing order 
(Bunyan 2013: 131). 
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Each of these attempts to cede power from government to local communities 
has led to a recoiling. What states often fail to grasp is the paradox at the 
heart of how community development workers often wish to operate: in and 
against the state. By co-opting voluntary activities, states fail to appreciate the 
importance of self-determination in the process of social action.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter opened with a discussion of the post-liberal idea of the state as 
arising out of a lack of confidence in people to negotiate ideas of the good 
peacefully, resulting in a material idea of wellbeing protected by the state, 
which has a monopoly on violence. It explored sociological literature, and 
found that both mistrust and materialism could be traced into the decline of 
religion and the rise of the state as the primary deliverer of welfare. The final 
section demonstrated that there had been numerous post-war policy attempts 
to empower communities, but that measures had always been somewhat 
perfunctory, with dwindling attention to developing a shared spirit of 
association.  
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Chapter 5: Capitalism 
 
This chapter focuses on capitalism. Although it acknowledges the idea that 
capitalism is intended to distribute to each a according to desert, post-
liberalism takes on both Marxist and neo-Marxist guises, showing concern 
with how capitalism creates inequality, cultivates acquisitiveness, and 
corrodes relationships. Post-liberalism is concerned with how the state and 
the market collude, such that legislation and policy are beholden to business 
interests, and public goods are submitted to market logic. Its concern with 
market logic has some roots in concern with inequality, but also rests heavily 
on its focus on relationships: the relationship of managers to workers, 
specifically, the alienation of workers from their labour; the relation of 
individuals to the wider public, specifically, the use of self-interest as a 
mechanism for increasing productivity; and the relationship between each 
party in the gift relationship, specifically, the intervention of money. 
 
The post-liberal argument treats the rise of the state and of capitalism as two 
sides of the same coin; left and right liberalism. Just as the loss of ideas of the 
good leads left liberals to argue for a strong state to reconcile people to one 
another, so it encourages right liberals to argue that people can only be 
reconciled to one another through the market. These philosophies also 
collude. As explained in the chapter 2, in the absence of ideas of the good, 
the good life becomes materialist: it is about self-preservation. This leads the 
way to equate the good life with economic growth.  Finally, the argument 
emerges that by all acting in their own economic interest, each tends to 
promote the good of others. Since both left and right liberalism are concerned 
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with the protection of the wellbeing of individuals, it follows that the state must 
protect the property rights of individuals. But since certain individuals do not 
merely produce enough for their survival, but wish to flourish, it follows that 
they must seek to make a profit from their activity, which is good, because it 
encourages economic growth. So greed is good. And since in order to make a 
profit, individuals must sell their property, it follows that others must be 
encouraged to purchase that property. So acquisitiveness is good. And finally, 
because competition between producers for the loyalty of consumers tends to 
drive up quality and drive down prices, competition is good.  
 
Post-liberals are thus concerned not only with the structural inequality that 
capitalism creates, but with the self-interested behaviours it encourages, since 
each of these tend to undermine solidarity. On top of all of this, post-liberals 
are concerned with the argument that each of these qualities is natural; hence 
when they are legislated against or prohibited, it is the human’s natural 
freedom that is being undermined. 
 
This chapter asks whether capitalism has indeed produced these effects, 
whether it matters, and what kinds of responses are appropriate.  
 
The rise of capitalism 
 
The purpose of this section is to explore whether and how religion is replaced 
by the market as the means by which people are reconciled to one another, 
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especially exploring whether and how market logics infiltrate beyond the 
market itself into other spheres.  
 
Karl Polanyi and Marcel Mauss have both suggested that pre-modern and 
non-western economies are hard for the modern westerner to understand: 
 
It is on this one negative point that modern ethnographers agree: the 
absence of the motive of gain; the absence of the principle of laboring 
for remuneration; the absence of the principle of least effort; and, 
especially, the absence of any separate and distinct institution based on 
economic motives. But how, then, is order in production and distribution 
ensured?  
 
The answer is provided in the main by two principles of behavior not 
primarily associated with economics: reciprocity and redistribution 
(Polanyi 1944/2001: 47) 
 
Whereas pre-modern economies were, and non-western economies continue 
to be, predominantly organised by reciprocity, modern, capitalist societies are 
dominated by the profit-motive. Pre-modern and non-western societies thus 
demonstrate that reciprocity is no less natural than greed, acquisitiveness and 
competitiveness. Contra Polanyi, actually debate continues in anthropology as 
to whether or not non-Western economies are in fact grounded in self-interest. 
(Parry 1986). Yet what these debates demonstrate is that economy and 
society may be grounded in a very different idea of self-interest, in which 
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reward is not based merely on profit, nor necessarily even on material 
improvement, but also on spiritual improvement. These debates moreover 
show that ideology has determinative impact on the kinds of reward and 
return people expect for their actions (Parry 1986: 467). In this sense, no 
economic theory can claim authority over what is natural. 
 
Given the importance of ideology, less disputed is Polanyi’s contention that a 
market economy cannot exist of its own accord. Rather, a market economy 
requires a culture that can support it:  
 
Once the economic system is organized in separate institutions, based 
on specific motives and conferring a special status, society must be 
shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function according 
to its own laws. This is the meaning of the familiar assertion that a 
market economy can function only in a market society (Polanyi 
1944/2001: 57). 
 
The process Polanyi is describing is that of hegemony: the dominant system 
requires a culture that sustains it. This culture must be inculcated.  
 
Polanyi was reflecting on the 19th and early 20th century, making the case for 
a more collectivist society. As suggested in chapter 3, Polanyi’s was a popular 
stance in the post-war period. But from 1979 onwards, under successive 
Thatcherite and New Labour governments, the market economy and society 
spread exponentially.  
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Margaret Thatcher dramatically decreased the top rate of income tax, 
weakened trade unions, privatised state-owned industries, renounced the aim 
for full employment, and sold social houses to their tenants. John Major 
privatised the railway industry. In the 1990s, this philosophy crossed party 
divides, with Tony Blair bringing privatisation into the NHS. Moreover, within 
sectors that seemed impervious to full-scale privatisation, Major and Blair 
instituted managerial reforms: 
 
Out of a perception that public services remained inflexible, bureaucratic 
and often of poor quality, the aim was to drive up productivity. In the 
development in the 1990s of “quasi-markets” in health, for example, with 
purchaser/provider splits, and compulsory competitive tendering, the 
state in effect became the sponsor and champion of market activity in 
public services (Mayo & Moore 2002: 1). 
  
As Polanyi foresaw, economics alone were not enough. For Thatcher, 
‘economics are the method; the object is to change the soul.’ Thatcher was 
seeking to change culture, creating a more independent, self-responsible 
society or, as she put it, ‘there is no such thing as society, only individual men 
and women’ (Thatcher 1987).  
 
The capitalist logic has spread to all places and all spheres in recent years. In 
the context of the US and UK, Michael Sandel (2012) explains how we have 
moved beyond a market economy to a market society, in which everything is 
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up for sale. Sandel, explains that beliefs in goods held to have some deeper, 
public value are underwritten by egalitarian practices. But in a market society, 
such goods are undermined by their commodification. Sandel takes the 
example of the right, in the US and UK, to attend parliamentary hearings, free 
of charge on first come, first served basis. He traces how this principle has 
been corrupted by the emergence of paid queuing services, whereby those 
with enough money can pay somebody else to queue for them. Sandel 
explains that not only does this logic ignore that some are unable to pay, but 
also the principle of paying itself undermines the good by turning it into a 
commodity.  
 
While older societies have demonstrated that economies can be underwritten 
by principles of reciprocity, it would seem that capitalist logic has come to 
dominate not only the Western economy but also Western society. Yet there 
are a number of issues to be explored. 
 
First, it is important to deal with post-liberals’ claim that both the state and the 
market have got stronger over the last few centuries. In the context of the 
foregoing, it would seem that the market gets stronger at the expense of the 
state. Looking at this from the other way round, the state has often been 
fundamental in taming the market. Yet the post-liberal point is that the state 
and the market collude to provide a binary hegemony: we are forced to 
choose one or the other. Moreover, under Thatcher the state became more 
centralised than it ever had been. Thatcher undermined everything in between 
the state and the individual.  
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Second, it should be acknowledged that Thatcher’s rhetoric, derived from 
Hayek, had a number of similarities with that of post-liberals. The drastic 
nature of her methods aside, a key difference lies in the intended outcome: 
whereas Thatcher’s aim was absolute autonomy, the post-liberal aim is 
solidarity.   
 
Finally, McKinnon and Cannell (2013), and Skeggs (2014) suggest that the 
principle of reciprocity continues to exist at present, even as capitalist logic 
appears to have spread across the globe and into all spheres. However, while 
McKinnon and Cannell and Skeggs offer some much needed ethnographic 
work into the way that alternative beliefs and practices are employed to resist 
the spread of capitalist logic, a humble aim shared by this thesis, their data 
cannot be used to suggest that capitalist logic is not dominant, only that small 
pockets of resistance remain.  
 
What’s wrong with capitalism? 
 
The last section established that capitalist logic had spread beyond the 
economy proper into a number of other institutions and settings. This section 
explores whether it matters that capitalist logic should have spread in this 
way. Special attention is given to asking whether this development includes 
the socialisation of people towards greed, acquisitiveness and competition. 
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As with statism, one can imagine a Hegelian argument for capitalism along 
dialectical lines. Again, we look at the relationship between the individual and 
certain institutions; this time the family, civil society and the capitalist hidden 
hand. The relationship of the individual to the family is one of selflessness and 
solidarity; that to the market place is one of selfishness and competition. But 
the hidden hand guides this selfish, competitive behaviour towards the benefit 
of all. So to work hard in one’s own interest is an act of solidarity. It is this kind 
of logic that underwrites the rhetoric about the “productive classes” or what 
Bev Skeggs calls the “subject of value”; that is, one that contributes as a cog 
within the capitalist system, building GDP (Skeggs 2014).  
 
This kind of argument forms the basis of Durkheim’s argument in favour of 
markets. This is perhaps best seen in his reversed vocabulary with respect to 
Tonnies. For Tonnies, medieval and rural communities are organic, and urban 
communities mechanical, whereas for Durkheim it is the other way round. 
Tonnies sees the use of ideas, symbols and practices to represent and unite a 
community as organic, but Durkheim sees them as mechanical. Aldous has 
revealed that this is no accident; rather, the young Durkheim read and 
reviewed Tonnies Gemeinschaft und Gesselschaft, and deliberately switched 
labels in his own Division of Labour in Society (Aldous et al. 1972). Yet 
Durkheim thinks the division of labour can go too far, creating excessive self-
interest, competition and corruption. In the preface to the second edition of his 
Division of Labour in Society, he says that because the division of labour can 
tend towards corruption, certain rules and regulations are required in the 
economy so as to ensure that behaviour is geared towards the collective 
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interest: 
 
Neither political society, in its entirety, nor the State can take over this 
function; economic life, because it is specialized and grows more 
specialized every day, escapes their competence and their action. An 
occupational activity can be efficaciously regulated only by a group 
intimate enough with it to know its functioning, feel all its needs, and able 
to follow all their variations. The only one that could answer all these 
conditions is the one formed by all the agents of the same industry, 
united and organized into a single body. This is what is called the 
corporation or occupational group. (Durkheim 1893/2014: 5) 
 
Essentially, Durkheim calls for organised labour in the form of guilds and 
regulatory bodies. What is not clear is whether Durkheim’s notion of the 
occupational group is conceived as the fulfilment of, or as a response to the 
shortcomings of his so-called organic solidarity.  
 
As with Hegel’s argument for the state this system assumes that selfishness 
is unavoidable, inherent to human nature, and so harnessing such behaviour 
towards the benefit of all is the only way to conceive of solidarity. Yet the 
history offered in the previous section suggests that selfishness and 
competition have only been integral to economy and society for a relatively 
short period of time, and so might be reversed in just the way a market society 
has been instilled.  
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The previous section demonstrated how the capitalist logic undermines public 
goods. Here I want to focus on how it undermines certain behavioural traits 
important for maintaining social order. In terms of how harnessing self-interest 
undermines social order, John Milbank explains that even in a totally capitalist 
society, solidarity is required at some level: 
 
It turns out that even capitalism needed more cooperation and 
reciprocity than liberals thought. If you don’t trust your colleagues even 
within your own firm or bank, then a kind of anarchy ensues. To contain 
that anarchy in private and public corporations – including universities – 
we get increased top-down impersonal management of individuals. But 
that kills co-operation, tacit interactive process and creativity. And 
disgruntled individuals try to exploit the bodies they work for (Milbank 
2012: 4).  
 
Richard Titmuss explored this point sociologically, demonstrating the 
inefficiency and corruption of the American paid blood-donor system, as 
compared with the British gift-based system (Titmuss 1971/1997). Richard 
Sennett goes further, demonstrating how the new culture of capitalism 
undermines long-term virtues such as reciprocity and loyalty (Sennett 1998: 
28) 
 
Yet while recognising that acquisitive behaviour is contingent, Deirdre 
McCloskey nonetheless sees such behaviour as integral to a society 
interested in substantial growth. While such growth does not necessarily 
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inculcate solidarity, it creates abundance, which in turn alleviates poverty. As 
McCloskey explains, she is less interested in inequality than she is in poverty 
(McCloskey forthcoming 2016). So for McCloskey, some virtues are worth 
sacrificing in the name of growth. 
 
Notwithstanding McCloskey’s point, Robert and Edward Skidelsky (2012) 
remind us that we have become obsessed with growth. The Skidelskys start 
by reflecting on John Meynard Keynes’s Economic Possibilities for our 
Grandchildren (1930), which suggested that in the not too distant future, 
around about the period in which we currently find ourselves perhaps, due to 
developments in technology and productivity, people would be working ‘three-
hour shifts or a fifteen-hour week’  (Keynes 1930: 5). What went wrong? The 
Skidelsy’s claim that Keynes had not accounted for the natural castigation of 
the good life in favour of a competitive acquisitiveness: we always want as 
much, or more, than those around us. So while the acquisitiveness 
begrudgingly accepted by McCloskey may be useful, it can also stifle thoughts 
about the good life – or the reason we make money in the first place.  
 
Perhaps a more pressing critique is offered by Paul Zak’s edited volume 
(2008), which demonstrates that a capitalist, profit-driven society does not 
have to be a greedy one. Casebeer’s chapter in particular argues that since 
cooperation has evolved as a socially useful tactic, although free markets do 
produce greedy, acquisitive and competitive individuals, they just as often 
produce cooperative individuals. Not only this, but being placed in a free 
environment, in which one is likely to encounter a capitalist predator, will tend 
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to incentivise others to band together and cooperate. Perhaps most 
importantly of all, Casebeer suggests that a market must be free, operating 
outside the sphere of legislation, in order for individuals to practice virtuous 
behaviour. This point is important not only from a normative perspective, that 
is, if an action is not freely undertaken, it cannot be described as moral; but 
also from a practical perspective: no bureaucracy can ever be so perfect as to 
preside over all spaces of economy and society. At some point, we must rely 
on the morality of people. 
 
The foregoing discussion suggests that a balance is required, either shared 
between society as a whole or within each individual, between the desire to 
produce enough and having the headspace to recognise that growth is always 
growth for something, for a certain way of life – not an end in itself.   It also 
makes clear that a capitalist society is not necessarily antipathetic to this 
balanced outcome.  
 
Different capitalisms 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of the foregoing critiques of capitalism, it is 
worth pointing out that these critiques do not necessarily apply in all 
recognisably capitalist situations. What is monolithically described as 
capitalism has actually emerged in numerous ways in different places.  
 
Perhaps the foremost work on the diversity within recognisably capitalist 
nations is Hall and Soskice’s edited volume Varieties of Capitalism (2001), 
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which explains that there are vast differences between the way an economy 
like that of Germany works, a coordinated market economy, and the way that 
of the UK works, a liberal market economy. The clearest example of this 
difference is given in Culpepper’s chapter on professional development. In 
Germany a sense of loyalty on the part of the worker for a particular company 
means that a lot of money can be invested in professional development. In the 
UK however, rather than developing staff, companies will tend to create 
redundancies and employ new staff. Culpepper suggests that this shift is 
largely down to a culture of cooperation reinforced through trade unions.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis Hall and Soskice’s work demonstrates that 
capitalism on its own does not necessarily undermine solidarity. Rather, a 
culture of profit seeking, short-term self-interest and mistrust are the deciding 
factors. Solidarity may be undermined by certain economic circumstances and 
industrial relations, but equally, developing a culture of solidarity may be a 
necessary prerequisite of bringing about more favourable economic 
circumstances. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter opened by exploring post-liberal ideas of capitalism as arising 
out of the need for a mechanism by which self-interested people could be 
reconciled towards the creation of common wealth. Post-liberals suggested 
that this logic in fact further undermined a shared spirit of association.  The 
chapter went on to see how anthropologists and sociologists of capitalism had 
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traced the rise of capitalist logic to dominate not only economic but also social 
thinking. It moreover explored literature that revealed the ways in which 
capitalist logic could undermine reciprocity, the inherent good of an object or 
ritual, long-term thinking, and loyalty. But the chapter also explored literature 
that suggested a capitalist society is merely a free society, and that while 
some choose competition, others choose cooperation, in the form of trade 
unions. It went on to suggest that there are varieties of capitalism, and that 
while some forms may undermine a shared spirit of association, others my 
very much rely on this spirit. It closed with a question, asking whether it was 
possible to turn economic thinking on its head, so that rather than economic 
conditions influencing levels of association, cultivating a shared spirit of 
association might be the first step to implementing regulation. 
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Chapter 6: Methodology 
 
This thesis opened by introducing post-liberalism, which focuses on ideas of 
the good as conceptually prior to common agency, and suggests that focus on 
ideas of the good has been lost with the rise of liberal democracy, which has 
instead focused on hegemonic systems of reconciliation, namely, the state 
and the market. My central research questions became, what role, if any, do 
ideas of the good play in cultivating solidarity and collective action in pluralist 
settings? How are these ideas reified through particular rituals and practices? 
Chapter 2 introduces post-liberalism in detail, from theory to politics, policy 
and practice. Chapter 3 begins the engagement of post-liberalism with 
research engaged with lived realities. It demonstrates that while shared ideas 
of the good are a useful component for civic engagement, what these ideas 
might look like in a pluralist society is problematic. Chapters 4 and 5 
questioned whether the rise of the state and the market was really such a bad 
thing for civic engagement. This section explores and maps out the 
methodological criteria for engaging with these questions empirically.  
 
I begin by exploring ontology and epistemology. This is deemed an important 
place to start because there are deep divisions between theology and 
philosophy, especially those aspects I am concerned with, and research 
engaged with lived realities. I then go through a number of steps designed to 
resolve this tension, with the aim of carrying out research that is at once 
respectful of the insights of theology and philosophy, and engages with lived 
realities.  
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Theology through lived realities: ontology and epistemology 
 
It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now 
has consisted of – namely, the confession of its author, and a kind of 
involuntary and unconscious memoir (Nietzsche 1868/2000: §6) 
 
All preconceptions must be eradicated (Durkheim 1893/2014: 31). 
 
The two quotes above are indicative of a central conflict between theology 
and philosophy, especially those strands engaged with in this thesis, and 
social science, which is steeped in a different ontological understanding of the 
world. In the following I will introduce a range of ideas elucidating this point 
across a spectrum from those that deem ontological differences irreconcilable, 
to those that see an issue that may be overcome. Although my own approach 
is not social scientific, this tension is important to explore since the critics of 
social science I discuss often intend their critique to encompass any research 
engaged with lived realities.  
 
At the first extreme is Michel Henry, for whom the truth of life is not revealed 
in any form of theoretical, let alone empirical investigation, since the truth of 
life is that which is revealed to us through first-person living, whereas the truth 
of Western theory generally, and of scientific thinking in particular, is that of 
spatially and behaviourally defined objects. For Henry, we understand less 
and less about life the more we understand and focus on observable 
phenomena (Henry 2002: 36-42). According to Henry’s account, the first-
person, confessional disclosure of experience can be the only one that has 
	 122	
any relevance to life. Any other method ends up instrumentalising life in terms 
of something else.  
 
Milbank sees a similar conflict as having undermined theology:  
 
Theology has frequently sought to borrow from elsewhere a fundamental 
account of society or history, and then to see what theological insights 
will cohere with it. But it has been shown that no such fundamental 
account, in the sense of something neutral, rational and universal, is 
really available. It is theology itself that will have to provide its own 
account of the final causes at work in human history, on the basis of its 
own particular, and historically specific faith (Milbank 1990/2006: 382). 
 
Taking a postmodern approach, Milbank suggests that although social 
science regards itself as a “neutral, rational, universal” account of the world, in 
fact, like all accounts, it is shaped by a particular ontological perspective. 
Every rationality is steeped in some tradition, and theology is as good a 
tradition as any other.  
 
David Ford disagrees with Milbank’s stark conflict between theology and 
social science, editing a volume in which a chapter describes Milbank’s 
approach as ‘despairing postmodern quasi-fundamentalism’ (Ford 2013: 711). 
But Ford nonetheless expresses similar reservations of his own.     
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It might equally be suggested that different rationalities reside in different 
moral traditions. Some arguments may express normative ideals that are not 
necessarily amenable to proof or disproof. The question arises as to whether 
we can support or refute moral ideas on the grounds that they are not 
observed. How do we decide what is good? Is it the aggregation of 
multifarious individual desires?  
 
Charles Taylor explains that theology and social science display very different 
models of truth (2014). He distinguishes between the Hobbes-Locke-Contiac, 
or instrumental-designative model of truth, and the Hamann-Herder-
Humboldt, or expressive-enactive model of truth – what might be more 
broadly considered the correspondence and creative models. The first model 
is that which leads to Frege and logical positivism, consisting of a literalist, 
scientific language in which all words and truths correspond to either a logical 
or an empirically observable reality. The second model is a metaphorical, 
poetic model that is aware of the constitutive power of language: language 
can intervene to change reality. Language is constitutive of reality and shapes 
the world it describes. So for example, it would make a difference whether 
policy makers emphasised “community” or “social capital” when 
commissioning services.   
 
Finally, at the other end of this spectrum, Grace Davie has suggested that 
amongst a number of social scientists “religion is still perceived as a 
‘problem’”, which, “in order to be better managed…must be thoroughly 
researched” (Davie 2015: 233). This is an idea I have developed elsewhere, 
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in which I demonstrate that much of this research succumbs to a postsecular 
paradox, whereby religion is recognised as having returned, or perhaps as 
having never left, and as having a crucial role to play in the public sphere, but 
yet is not understood on its own terms (Stacey forthcoming 2016).   
 
Davie explains at length from whence these problems arose: 
 
The answer all too often lies in a persistent – and at times damaging – 
reluctance on the part of sociology and other social sciences to admit 
that to be seriously religious is indeed compatible with being fully 
modern.  Despite everything, the combination remains a sticking point.  
In many ways this is hardly surprising:  most of the disciplines in 
question have emerged more or less directly from the European 
Enlightenment, implying that they are underpinned by a markedly 
secular philosophy of social science.  As Jürgen Habermas and Hans 
Joas inferred, from the nineteenth century onwards it was simply 
assumed that modernization would bring about secularization.   The fact, 
moreover, that these disciplines expanded exponentially in the 1960s is 
no coincidence (see p. 32):  social science thrived on the secular 
assumptions of this decade and is reluctant to give them up.  Unpicking 
connections as deep-seated as these will not be easy.  It will require the 
disciplines in question to rethink the foundations of their respective fields 
of study, in order to accommodate fully the implications of religion and 
religious issues in their analyses of modern societies.  This, moreover, 
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means accepting religion as it is, not as we would like it to be (Davie 
2015: 234). 
 
Davie goes on to suggest that anthropologists, and implicitly ethnographers, 
are perhaps less subject to this prejudice than other social scientists because 
“researchers who ‘live’ in the field (in whatever capacity and in whatever kind 
of society) are more likely to display a respect for their subjects and the 
lifestyles they embrace” (Davie 2015: 233).  
 
Whichever end of the spectrum we start at, each of these ideas points to a 
fallacy at the heart of exploring theological ideas through social science. The 
first is quite comfortable modelling itself on a truth of revelation, of faith or of 
confession. Here truth, and the language through which it is conveyed, is 
seen as something creative that intervenes in the world to provide an 
ontological rupture. The latter regards itself as putting faith and confession to 
one side in order to develop a body of evidence. Language is not creative but 
rather corresponds to facts in the world.  
 
Ethnographical political theology: research strategy and design 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of this conflict set up between theology and 
social science, it is important to note that it relies partly on an out-dated 
construction of the latter. While it is true that for Durkheim, preconceptions 
had to be eradicated, the second half of the last century saw researchers 
engaged with lived realities become aware that preconceptions are 
	 126	
unavoidable (Geertz 1973; Winch 1958). Not only are ontologies implicit in the 
way that we relate to the world, forming a habitus, but values are central to 
one’s entire research project (Du Bois 1979; Flyvbjerg 2001: pp.53-65; 
Longino 1990). In the following, I explain this trajectory, before offering my 
own resolution: by becoming what I call ethnographic political theology. 
 
The kind of social scientific thinking critiqued in the previous section sounds 
very close to objectivism, which suggests that ‘there is or must be some 
permanent, a historical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal 
in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or 
rightness’ (Bernstein 1983: 8). In the world of natural science, objectivism is 
not all that controversial; most of us accept that there is a physical world of 
molecules which can be said to exist independently of the people perceiving 
those molecules, even if 20th century science has shown that the behaviour of 
molecules can alter according to the way they are perceived. But for the social 
sciences, objectivism claims that social facts such as belief exist 
independently of social actors. What this might mean for my purposes is that 
ideas of the good are always independently operating in some form or 
another, shaping the way that people carry out their lives irrespective of 
whether or not they are aware.  
 
Ontological objectivism often lends to empirical realism, a position based on 
the idea that something can only be said to exist if it can be directly observed; 
and these two ontological positions combined lend to epistemological 
positivism, which, though diverse (Halfpenny 2015: 11-12), can be 
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summarised as claiming that social facts can be identified and measured 
without reference to how those facts are perceived by social actors. Taking 
belief as an example, renowned positivist Richard Dawkins recently gauged 
how many self-ascribed Christians could in fact be called “Christian” when 
scrutinised in terms of observable verbal responses to questions of dogma 
(Dawkins 2011). Dawkins’ study was controversial because plenty of people 
consider themselves Christian today without reference to dogma (Day 2011; 
Woodhead 2012). Even to say one “has faith” or “believes” may mean entirely 
different things to two different people. Abby Day has shown that faith may 
even have nothing to do with propositional belief whereby something is 
posited as existing, and to pose questions in this way is to impose a Christian 
framework that participants feel forced to accept or reject without being 
afforded the possibility of nuance (Day 2011).  
 
The astute reader will have noticed a potential pitfall for my own research 
here. For since post-liberal arguments, given their deep historical, 
philosophical and theological background, even in the form of “ideas of the 
good”, are difficult to convey, I may have to seek more accessible proxies to 
explore with my respondents. But ultimately this course of action risks 
assuming that the notion “ideas of the good” has a reality of which my 
respondents need not be aware and against which their actions can be 
scrutinised. I risk giving “ideas of the good” what Lynch calls ontological 
status, or what in terms of the foregoing might better be called objective 
status, or independent reality, and subsequently seeking for the ways these 
become manifest. Lynch distinguishes between ontological theories and 
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cultural sociological theories. He suggests that Durkheim gives the sacred 
ontological status, imbuing it with a reality that must be reckoned with. If the 
sacred exists as a mode through which humans perceive their relationship to 
the world and each other, then it must be explored and even cultivated. Lynch 
himself suggests that giving the sacred ontological status creates 
unnecessary controversy. He prefers to treat the sacred as an analytic lens 
for understanding the way that certain forces gain non-negotiable status in 
society. Lynch suggests that while in any given time and place, the sacred 
may appear as a non-negotiable category through which the world is made 
meaningful, in reality sacred things are always historically contingent (Lynch 
2012: 25). Lynch’s strategy does not necessitate a neutral attitude towards 
the sacred. He still sees it as a fecund and functionally important way of 
focusing shared purpose. I will follow Lynch since I have no need to prove or 
disprove the ontological reality of ideas of the good in order to explore their 
relevance as a category. 
 
Thus far, the post-liberal concern with social science seems to hold. Yet since 
the early days of social science, an entirely different approach known loosely 
as constructionism has emerged. Constructionism holds that ‘our knowledge 
of the world…is not derived from the nature of the world as it really is’ but 
‘through the daily interactions between people in the course of social 
life…especially language’ (Burr 2015: 4-5). Constructionists pay attention to 
the way that realities change over time according to the way that they are 
interpreted by social actors. Constructionism is typically adopted by those 
seeking to explore the way realities are constructed: in literature, magazines 
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or in speeches and conversations. Ontological constructionism lends to 
interpretivism, which argues that in any given social action, ‘external forces 
that have no meaning for those involved in that social action’ are far less 
important than the ideas and understandings the social actors themselves put 
forward (Bryman 2004: 13). This would suggest that rather than putting ideas 
of the good into more accessible proxies, I should be avoiding ideas of the 
good altogether, instead seeing what social actors themselves put forward. 
This too creates difficulties, however, because ideas of the good have been 
theoretically important in framing the problems I have discussed. To deny this 
framing would be to deny the relevance of a theological critique out of hand. 
There must be a compromise. 
 
Constructionism also lends to phenomenology, which in the world of social 
research might be described as the study of the way people come to terms 
with their own existence. The famous motto of phenomenology passed on 
from Husserl is ‘back to the things themselves’. But how this is to be done is 
complicated and the cause of great disagreement. There are two strands 
primarily in this debate. The first, Husserlian strand, which might be called the 
epoche or bracketing strand, criticises the amount of preconceptions that 
remain in scientific investigation and seeks ways of systematically uncovering 
the way we perceive things in order to better bracket out preconceptions and 
thereby study the things themselves with a greater level of value neutrality. In 
essence, the standard of value neutrality is good, but science has not yet lived 
up to its own standard. The other, Heideggarian strand sees preconceptions 
as inescapable and instead seeks to describe what it is like to be embodied in 
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a world with certain preconceptions, of which values are one such 
preconception. Ultimately, this latter strand seeks to understand what can be 
known to exist and the limits of knowledge given certain preconceptions. So in 
terms of the current discussion, rather than seeking a greater level of value 
neutrality, it seeks a greater understanding of values. It is this latter strand 
which makes its way via Alfred Schutz into social science: 
 
The world of nature as explored by the natural scientist does not ‘mean’ 
anything to molecules, atoms, and electrons. But the observational field 
of the social scientist—social reality—has a specific meaning and 
relevance structure for the beings living, acting, and thinking within it. By 
a series of common-sense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-
interpreted this world which they experience as the reality of their daily 
lives. It is these thought objects of theirs which determine their behaviour 
by motivating it. The thought objects constructed by the social scientist, 
in order to grasp this social reality, have to be founded upon the thought 
objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men [sic], living 
their daily life within the social world. (Schutz 1962: 59) 
 
As human beings we are constantly constructing meanings. The point of 
social science is to understand and give voice to those meanings. This idea is 
so useful to me because while I have found in post-liberalism a useful way of 
describing a problem, I do not wish to test for post-liberalism’s relevance. 
Rather, post-liberalism provides a useful theoretical way of discussing the 
kind of meanings I am looking for.  
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Phenomenology is also relevant because by insisting that it is impossible to 
simply bracket out our values, it encourages us to explore avenues for being 
honest about our values, as well as considering whether or not we are 
imposing our values upon our respondents. Bryman explains that values can 
infringe upon every aspect of research: 
 
• choice of research area; 
• formulation of research question; 
• choice of method; 
• formulation of research design and data collection techniques; 
• implementation of data collection; 
• analysis of data; 
• conclusions 
(Bryman 2004: 21-22) 
 
So values cannot be overcome. The trick instead, continues Bryman, is to be 
‘prepared to forewarn readers of their biases and assumptions and how these 
may have influenced the subsequent findings’ (Bryman 2004: 22) So we learn 
from phenomenology a dual process: first, of being aware of the importance of 
the self-articulated conceptions of our respondents; second of how our own 
preconceptions will influence the way that we interpret what our respondents 
say. As shall be discussed in more detail later, this latter point affects not only 
how honest the researcher must be with her readers, but also how honest she 
must be with her respondents. 
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So while I am not happy with the idea of imposing my critique upon 
respondents, since I do believe they have new information to offer, I 
nonetheless hold that there may be theoretical ideas, or the absence of such 
ideas, that underpin people’s actions that they may not be aware of or may 
not articulate in the same way themselves, and these theoretical ideas can be 
placed into dialogue with the meanings people themselves offer in order to 
provide a fuller understanding of their actions. One framework that is useful 
for taking this ontological and epistemological position into a practice is critical 
realism.  
 
Critical realism developed as discipline through the theoretical works of Roy 
Bhaskar (1979, 1986; for an overview see Gorski 2013). Beginning with the 
natural sciences, Bhaskar’s aim was to simultaneously challenge both 
positivism and constructionism. Bhaskar suggested that positivists take too 
simplistic a view of cause and effect, with the result that they assume they can 
make predictions about the future. By contrast, Bhaskar contends that causal 
mechanisms in the natural world occur in open systems, meaning that they 
are constantly interacting with other ‘countervailing (and sometimes 
complementary) mechanisms’, with the result that rather than predicting 
outcomes, we can only ever observe tendencies (Houston 2001: 850). On the 
other hand, Bhaskar equally criticises reactions against positivism in the form. 
Too often theorists commit an epistemic fallacy, whereby epistemology and 
ontology are conflated: put simply, for Bhaskar, just because there is no 
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objectively predictable reality, does not mean there is no such thing as an 
objective, perception-independent reality. 
 
Bhaskar’s criticisms become even more prominent in the social sciences. 
Houston explains that ‘society, even more than the natural world, comprises a 
range of systems, “in which there are many structures operating 
simultaneously, some reinforcing and some contradicting each other”’ (Porter 
in Houston 2001: 851).  Yet notwithstanding the unpredictability of these 
multiple systems, Bhaskar remains hesitant regarding constructionism, which 
he suggests neglects systems altogether in its excessive prioritisation of 
discourse. Rees and Gatenby (2014: 136) propose that ‘human action is 
conceived as both enabled and constrained by social structures, but [that] this 
action in turn reproduces or transforms those structures’.  
 
What Bhaskar envisages then, is a dialogue between the explanatory theories 
provided by the researcher, and the lived experience provided by the research 
participant. According to Bryman… 
 
…Critical realists accept that the categories they employ to understand 
reality are likely to be provisional…that there is a distinction between the 
objects that are the focus of their enquiries and the terms they use to 
describe, account for and understand it. Secondly, by implication, critical 
realists unlike positivists are perfectly content to admit into their 
explanations theoretical terms that are not directly amenable to 
observation…For critical realists it is acceptable that generative 
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mechanisms are not directly observable since they are admissible on the 
grounds that their effects are observable (Bryman 2004: 12).  
 
So what makes critical realism critical is the idea that although a generative 
mechanism, in my case ideas of the good or their lack, may be admissible on 
the grounds I observe its effects, still I accept “ideas of the good” is a 
provisional concept and seek to give as much weight as possible to the 
explanations of respondents, even to the extent that they confound ideas of 
the good altogether. 
 
I want to add to this a few thoughts on the hermeneutic approach. 
Hermeneutics is ancient Greek for ‘interpret’. It began as a discipline in 
theology as a way of interpreting Biblical text. Today social scientists often 
take a wide berth to their understanding of ‘text’, allowing it to include pictures, 
events and people (Ricoeur 1991). Hermeneutics has three broad strands. 
The first is that of Dilthey, which claims that in order to understand a text it is 
necessary to understand the political, social and economic circumstances in 
which it was written (Dilthey 1989: 82). The second is that of Derrida, for 
whom ‘what we get when we read a text is not an objective account 
of logos or even what the author really meant, but our present interpretation or 
understanding of the text itself’  (Derrida quoted in Ozmon and Craver 2007: 
368). The third stance is between these two; the central idea is that the reader 
and text inform one another. It is the last strand that is of particular 
significance to my research. I am using a generative mechanism, namely 
ideas of the good, which is very much associated with the Platonic, if not the 
	 135	
Christian specifically. But exploring as I do in a nuanced religious and non-
religious setting, my respondents are of a number of different religious 
backgrounds, or of no religion at all, and all the spaces in between. It is 
therefore important that I allow my framework to inform but also be informed 
by my respondents.  
 
In this way I begin to answer Taylor’s epistemological concerns. The framing 
of my research is not just tested for correspondence, but the ideas 
themselves become interventions. I pose the framings to people and seek to 
gauge their reaction. In turn, their answers shape my framing.  
 
As Davie recommends, I bring all of this to life through ethnography. I 
immerse myself in the ontology and the practices of those I am exploring with 
the intention of providing a confessional account that is true to their 
experiences, incorporates my own perspectives as an outsider engaged 
reflexively, and engages with lived realities. Special emphasis is placed on the 
theoretical and experiential learning processes I go through in order to take on 
the ontology, and these are conveyed to the reader. 
 
It also needs to be remembered that the importance of an ethnographic 
approach, especially when one is seeking to get inside an ontological 
framework to reveal the understandings of those within it, is that most of the 
time as human beings we are acting on a first-order level: we act instinctively 
and routinely rather than reflexively. What this means is that people can give 
unreliable accounts of the acts that are most meaningful to them. They may 
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even forget to recount them to researchers, let alone to explain why they do 
them. “Because I always have” and “not sure” can be disappointing responses 
for researchers dealing with only interviews or questionnaires, whereas for 
ethnographers they are only the beginning. Beyond this, we may not even 
know what questions to ask unless and until we have shared experiences with 
participants (Westby 1990).  
 
The ethnographic focus is vital to drawing on phenomenological and 
hermeneutic insights. The most important point here is that ethnography can 
accept and move beyond the limitations of observation. Ethnography can 
accept that some components of life can only be revealed through the self-
revelation of living. It is only by becoming a participant, and allowing things to 
be revealed to me as a living person, that I can begin to understand what it is 
like to be involved in the organisations I study (Madden 2010: 136; Turner 
2001: 52). 
 
I use a multiple case-study ethnography design, which combines a standard 
case-study design with a comparative design. When choosing a case-study 
approach, it is important to be sure of why one is choosing a case. One may 
for instance choose cases on the basis that they present challenges, 
contradictions or new information. Because I have an initial generative 
mechanism which I challenge and build on, I chose to seek exemplifying 
cases, which are chosen… 
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…not because they are extreme or unusual in some way but because 
they will provide a suitable context for certain research questions to be 
answered. (Bryman 2004: 51) 
 
I chose to work with organisations that exemplify the key post-war policy 
paradigms for solidarity discussed in Chapter 2: Christian, secular, multi-faith 
and post-secular. Each case acts as a theoretical sample of the paradigms I 
have paid theoretical attention to (Eisenhardt 1989: 537). While the 
organisations I chose did not perfectly cohere to these categories, which 
anyway themselves are blurred and overlap, using these paradigmatic 
categories provided a useful starting place for discussion. 
 
One of the most interesting aspects of exploring multiple groups in their 
attempt to navigate plurality is that I myself was forced through such a 
process of navigation, not only within each group, but also in moving from one 
group to the next. Based on the idea introduced in the previous section of 
immersing myself in the ontology of the groups that I explore, the practices of 
the participants, I attempted to straddle multiple positions, seeking to give 
equal respect and understanding to all.  
 
My own movements from one group to the next challenged various 
frameworks: should I seek to remain aloof and neutral? This seems 
impossible given my aim of becoming immersed in the ontology and practices. 
Perhaps I would have to practice what VanAntwerpen calls “interstitiality”, 
living in the space between various ontologies, allowing myself to fluidly move 
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from one to the other (VanAntwerpen 2014). One might even suggest that all 
of this research is reliant on my own position as someone who is in search of 
meaning, yet unable to cross an imagined threshold from nonfaith to faith.   
 
The research strategy also involves a consideration of reliability and validity. 
There are a number of approaches to reliability and validity in qualitative 
research, two broad interpretations of which I shall briefly discuss before 
confirming my own position. I take these positions from Bryman (2004: 273-
280). The first interpretation seeks to adapt the understanding of reliability and 
validity in quantitative research. This means accepting the ideas of external 
and internal reliability, as well as external and internal validity.  
 
External reliability is to do with the extent to which a piece of research can be 
replicated. This is an especially difficult criterion in qualitative research for two 
reasons. First, in qualitative research, rather than creating contained 
experiments in which variables can be controlled, we are studying real people 
in the real world which inevitably changes according to time and place. 
Second, because qualitative research heavily involves the biases and 
personality of the researcher, replicability is limited to the extent that biases 
and personality can be replicated.  
 
Internal validity is also to do with whether the researcher’s observations are 
valid indicators of the theory he or she produces. LeCompte and Goetz argue 
that internal validity is actually a strength in qualitative research since ‘the 
prolonged participation in the social life of a group over a long period of time 
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allows the researcher to ensure a high level of congruence between concepts 
and observations’ (Bryman 2004: 273).  
 
One way of understanding internal validity is to do with there being agreement 
between two researchers involved in the same project. Although this criterion 
is slightly less problematic, still, since qualitative research is grounded in the 
belief that all realities are at least in part constructions of the beholders, any 
amount of agreement between researchers will be socially constructed. For 
example, in other research undertaken as part of a team, upon writing up 
interviews and undertaking a coding process, it is necessary agree on the 
categories that are most important. Sometimes this is a process of expanding 
meanings so that differing codes can be brought together. At other times one 
of the researchers will have to compromise and accept that their code does 
not work. While one tries to be as generous as possible, often the process 
becomes one of conflict management with clear winners and losers.   
 
External validity is to do with the extent to which findings can be generalised 
to a wider setting. LeCompte and Goetz argue that external validity presents 
real problems for qualitative researchers ‘because of their tendency to employ 
case studies and small samples’ (Bryman 2004: 273). Dinham on the other 
hand says that it is possible to generalise ‘not to populations but to theories’ 
(Dinham 2000: 169). I will explain further down how Dinham’s view has 
influenced my own.  
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The second approach I will discuss is one in which reliability and validity are 
dropped in favour of credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability 
and authenticity (Scott in Bryman 2004: 273).  
 
Ensuring the credibility of research is to do with feeding back results to 
participants. This can be especially difficult from my own critical realist 
position since, as an academic, even in the world of politics one can receive 
an aura of irrefutability in terms of the concepts one employs. The important 
idea then is feeding back results in a way that is accessible to respondents. 
This fits well with the phenomenological hermeneutic approach outlined 
above, according to which I am participating in experiences, and subsequently 
triangulating my experiences and understandings with my participants, and 
engaging in an ongoing dialogue. Another way of ensuring credibility is to 
triangulate findings. As will be discussed in more detail below, as well as 
examining points across multiple cases, I will be simultaneously using 
document analysis, field notes and interviews. 
 
Transferability is to do with whether findings can be transferred to other 
milieux. Because my research is designed as a multiple-case study, I was 
able to evaluate transferability as I moved from one case to another.  
 
Dependability is to do with whether or not appropriate steps have been taken 
in the formulation of a question, the choice of methods and the choice of 
respondents. It is common when research involves a number of respondents 
for each respondent to test another’s dependability. In the case of my 
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research I have tried to use my methodology to detail a journey from 
immature and unstructured empirical explorations around general research 
questions to the formulation of a specific research question with a clearly 
constructed methodology. It is therefore each reader that evaluates 
dependability. 
 
Because qualitative research recognises and even explicitly rejects objectivity, 
it is nonetheless important to have a means of ensuring the researcher is not 
imposing his or her view upon respondents, hence we discuss confirmability 
instead. It is again for each reader to judge confirmability.  
 
The final criteria is authenticity. It is worth mentioning that authenticity 
originates out of the phenomenological movement. In part it is do with 
deconstructing one’s received biases and understandings so as to unleash 
one’s deepest self. But it is also to do with deconstructing one’s received 
biases and understandings so as to explore others without imposing one’s 
viewpoint. Bryman divides authenticity into five criteria: Fairness, which is to 
do with representing a wide array of viewpoints within the setting one studies. 
This helps to avoid both championing those respondents whose beliefs 
correspond with those of the researcher and the over-representation of the 
loudest voice. Ontological authenticity is concerned with helping respondents 
arrive at a better self-understanding. Educative authenticity is to do with 
improving understanding between respondents. Catalytic and tactical 
authenticity require that the research leads to action on the part of 
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respondents; and that the research empowers respondents to take such 
action.  
 
My own research will try to integrate all criteria. I will treat the quantitative 
measures of evaluation as a means of considering the use of my research to 
other researchers, while taking the qualitative measures as a means of 
ensuring that my research is true to those I research.    
 
Hanging round: access, role, exploratory sampling 
 
I have said that my research is going to be based on multiple cases. Partly 
because I already have quite a specific research question, and partly because 
the number of cases I wish to explore means I was constrained by time, I 
undertook what is known as a micro, focused or short-term ethnography in 
which I combine documentary analysis, participant observation and interviews 
to provide an abundance of data in a relatively short period of time 
(Knoblauch 2005; Pink & Morgan 2013). Ethnography is originally derived 
from anthropology, whereby one becomes totally immersed in a culture over a 
period of many years, making sense of respondents’ practices in terms of 
their social and linguistic milieu. One may enter into the society with little or no 
questions, instead taking various notes and only years later bringing those 
notes together into a piece of research (Hannerz 2003: 202). Micro-
ethnography instead is the practice of immersing oneself in a culture or 
organisation in order to answer a question that has already been wholly or in 
part formulated. The researcher will already tend to have noticed that a 
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particular culture or organisation seems to exhibit behaviour that may provide 
an interesting response to her research question or a resolution to her 
research problem. Micro ethnography also has implications for method, since 
‘the ethnographer seeks to implicate her or himself at the center of the action, 
right from the start, and engages participants in the project with this intention 
clearly stated’ (Pink & Morgan 2013: 355). As suggested in the previous 
section with reference to ethnography generally, it is also particularly 
important in micro-ethnography that the researcher triangulates between her 
own experiences and those of participants. As micro ethnographers we 
must…  
 
…make correspondences between the experiences of research 
participants and our own (see the study of Okely 1994). In doing so the 
technique of drawing from past experiences to understand the 
principles of what participants are seeking to achieve offers a means of 
creating bridges between their and the ethnographer’s experiences 
(Pink and Morgan 2013: 356). 
 
Although micro-ethnography is not as time-consuming as ethnography proper, 
it nonetheless shares a lot of problems, as well as raising a few of its own. In 
the following I shall discuss problems of access, role and sampling.  
 
Access is a problem for all ethnographers. Being welcomed into a group or 
organisation that is relevant to one’s research problem can be extremely 
difficult. Especially when one is exploring controversial questions of religion or 
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ideology, some groups may either not wish to be of service or may not want to 
share their views for fear of being reflected in a negative light. It is partly for 
this reason that I have to substitute talk of secularisation and of ideas of the 
good for proxies.  
 
One way of avoiding issues of initial access is to be covert. Yet covert 
research is widely regarded as unethical today (Spicker 2011). Despite 
potential problems associated with being overt, there are some real practical 
advantages. For one thing, if one is overt then one will have the freedom to 
take notes without rendering respondents excessively suspicious. Secondly, 
one may be able to rely on respondents to assist in the research process, 
especially in finding key informants and in deliberately showing the researcher 
what they find important. This ability to involve respondents in the research is 
not simply of practical advantage. In fact it speaks to the main methodological 
and ethical reason I try to be as overt as I conveniently can be without 
undermining my research agenda. The methodological reason is that as a 
critical realist, I am putting forward a generative mechanism which will not 
necessarily be directly amenable to observation, but nonetheless want that 
mechanism to be challenged and explored by my respondents. By being overt 
I can be clear about my agenda and its limitations. The ethical point is rooted 
in the authenticity of my research. Understanding and finding a resolution to 
my research problem is what I want to do with my life. And since the problem 
is deeply rooted in the lack of belonging that results from liberalism, a lack of 
belonging of which I am myself aware, a response can only be through 
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building a shared vision with those I work. The means must match the 
intended end. 
 
My role as a researcher was as a complete participant with two caveats. The 
first is that I could only be as immersed as organisations allowed me to be. 
One issue that I saw arising was that respondents may not wish me to be fully 
integrated because they might lose control of what I had access to. Another 
was that knowing my position as a researcher, respondents may never be 
fully capable of relating to me as a colleague: and this not only because they 
might want to avoid saying certain things, but also because they might try to 
gain productivity out of me as a researcher. The other caveat is that I would 
have to avoid ‘going native’, which is when a researcher becomes so 
immersed in their social setting that they begin to adopt the ideas and 
practices of those around them. The chief risk of going native is that ‘the 
ethnographer can lose sight of his or her position as a researcher’ and 
therefore lose the ability to make balanced judgements (Bryman 2004: 302). 
Going native is an especial risk for me because a) in seeking to be a complete 
participant I will aim to be as immersed as possible and b) on a more personal 
level, because my research problem is authentically linked to a problem that I 
wish to solve, the organisations I will be studying will often end up being 
organisations with which I am interested in working in the future. I will have to 
put this to one side in order to reliably explore the advantages and 
disadvantages of these organisations. A related problem to going native is 
losing the ability to describe an organisation as if from the outside. In order 
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not to lose the outsider’s perspective I I kept journal entries from the outset, 
observing how my language and understanding changed over time.  
 
So my role was between complete participant and participant observer. An 
issue that arose out of this role is to what extent I would be an active and to 
what extent a passive researcher. Clearly not only the organisations but I 
myself want to take an active part. I have already said that when working with 
private and community organisations, it is likely that managers will feel their 
time is being wasted if they are not getting work out of me, whether as a 
researcher or consultant or simply as an odd-body assistant. In order to gain 
access it was therefore important to take on an active role. But I have also 
said that since these organisations are responding to my research problem, 
and since that research problem is what I am deeply passionate about, it was 
only natural that I would be inspired to take an active role. It was therefore 
important that I balanced this enthusiasm with the need to maintain a 
balanced approach. 
 
As to choosing organisations to work with, this has been a long and arduous 
process that the reader can only be introduced to. My approach involved a 
rudimentary form of theoretical sampling that I call exploratory theoretical 
sampling whereby my research problem itself took shape in the course of 
undertaking voluntary work with a number of organisations that seemed to be 
responding to the wider problems I discuss.  The form this model took is 
perhaps best explained in Figure 1. 
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The way that this exploratory theoretical sampling worked was by starting 
from my initial research problem, and looking out for organisations and people 
that were responding to the same or similar problems in the real world. Upon 
working with and speaking to these organisations and people, I returned to 
the research problem, trying to refine the problem in light of what I have 
learnt. Bev Skeggs has called this “hanging around”; it is a process whereby 
my problem becomes refined as I slowly begin to understand more about 
what is out there in the real world, what kind of problems are articulated and 
what kind of responses are provided (Skeggs 1997: 22). It is also a process 
whereby my hanging round, my presence, creates a sense of familiarity, and 
so groups and people become comfortable enough to allow me in as a 
researcher and, hopefully and eventually, stop thinking of me only as a 
researcher but as a friend and confidante.  
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I began by explaining my research to academics, politicians and political 
activists, and asking around whether these people knew of other groups or 
people: a rather simple process of snowballing. I soon heard of a couple of 
groups that might be worth paying attention to. 
 
This rudimentary exploratory process eventually led me to a more advanced 
form of theoretical sampling and research methods. I sought exemplary cases 
from each one of these trends. I looked at groups seeking to cultivate civic 
engagement representing the four key paradigms of the post-war period: 
Christian, secular, multi-faith and post-secular. This way I involved cases that 
both exemplify and challenge my assumptions. Equally, I wanted these 
groups to have mixed practices with regard to conventional and 
nonconventional politics, and various attitudes towards capitalism. I chose to 
work with the Christian Socialist Movement, Hackney Council for Voluntary 
Service, the Faith-based Regeneration Network and London Citizens. Of 
course no group will sit perfectly within the typological trend I have set out. 
But each fits closely enough to the category to produce interesting findings. 
Working with these movements will allow me to explore whether, and how, 
ideas of the good are used to cultivate civic engagement in pluralist settings.  
 
I combine document analysis with participant observation, and a particular 
style of interview to understand the values that motivate leaders and 
volunteers to undertake particular practices, as well as the methods they use 
to include and engage the wider public.  
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I opted to work with the following groups: The Christian Socialist Movement 
(CSM), a think-tank situated within Labour Party Headquarters and 
comprising a membership of 41 Members of Parliament and almost two 
thousand members of the public; Hackney Council for Voluntary Service 
(HCVS), an intermediary organization between government and grassroots 
activists with no religious affiliation. The Faith-based Regeneration Network 
(FbRN), a multi-faith intermediary organization between government and 
grassroots faith-based acitivsts; and London Citizens (LC), a broad-based 
community organisation with a membership of over one hundred institutions 
across London.  
 
For CSM, the process was relatively simple. It was clear that we shared 
similar aims. This was great because the parity in values meant that I would 
be able to explore how minds steeped in similar theory outworked that theory 
into political practice in a pluralist setting. I presented my research and asked 
“what can I do for you so that you will let me follow you around and 
understand your methods?” This was also a great way of ensuring that my 
research remained relevant. I was told that in return for research work for 
CSM, I could record their methods and practices as well as interviewing 
members where I saw fit. My work with CSM got me quite a bit of attention in 
the closed but small world of Westminster politics and gave me quid pro quo 
method of access to be quite appealing for other organizations.  
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I got to know HCVS when discussing my research with an academic and 
community activist colleague. I expressed my frustration concerning my 
inability to find a group that could not be considered religious or nonreligious 
in any sense of the word: not mono-faith, not multi-faith, not implicitly 
religious, and not secular. I wanted a group that made no reference to religion 
in what they did, and which on the surface displayed no quasi-religious 
activities. My colleague being just such a person that had no understanding 
whatsoever of why religion could possibly be involved in social action, 
provided a number of organisations that he worked with. I settled on Councils 
of Voluntary Service, because they seemed to fit best with my research 
problem. I got in touch with a few organisations. HCVS seemed most 
welcoming, having hosted researchers in the past, although they were 
confused and concerned about the obvious religious angle of my research. In 
a word, they were perfect.  
 
Although there were other options, FbRN was the only organisation which had 
from the outset been focused on drawing on the strength of multiple faith 
groups to bring about social change. I started work with FbRN suggesting that 
I would write short case studies of affiliated faith groups while I slowly got to 
know the work of the organisation.  
 
My strategy of offering research services did not help me with LC, who were 
far more interested in what they called relational power, the ability to bring the 
money of an institution, the passion of mobilising more institutions, and a 
volume of people substantial enough to fill events. I contacted LC who 
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requested my help in getting my own institution, Goldsmiths, to become a 
pledging member. I was sent to organizing training in the hope that I could 
make this happen. This distressed me greatly. Not only is Goldsmiths an hour 
from where I live by train, but I also felt used as a go-between without being 
given any point of reference with which to understand what I was doing or why 
I was doing it. As a busy person, I felt my needs had not been considered. I 
believed in the goals of LC but felt alienated from getting a route in. Then it 
occurred to me; partly what I should be doing is documenting my struggle to 
be involved.  
 
Summer 2011 passed with riots beginning in my local area and spreading 
throughout the UK. Again government “cuts” but also disillusionment with 
conventional politics played big in the media. London Citizens advertised for a 
position leading a listening campaign focusing on Tottenham where the riots 
began. I applied, got the position and explained my intentions: I wanted to do 
their research in return for the possibility of understanding and recording their 
methods and motives.  
 
During this six month campaign my understanding of methods emerged. As 
well as getting first-hand experience of methods planning, data gathering, 
coding and analysis, and one-to-ones, I realized that the best way to 
understand how various intermediary groups operated was to work with them, 
record my thoughts and to interview key players whenever I failed to 
understand certain actions.  
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Listening to others’ stories: the practice of research 
 
I spent four to six months with each group (for details see Appendix 1), 
depending on a combination of the time required to become trusted and for 
data saturation. I also returned to each group intermittently to assist in the 
process of comparison. Document analysis was triangulated with participant 
observation and interviews. I kept detailed field notes of what I myself and 
those around me were doing. Since I was aiming to be between a complete 
participant and a participant observer, there were difficulties in taking detailed 
notes without interrupting work. I therefore found brief moments to take myself 
away and scribble notes, whilst using lunch breaks and the end of the working 
day to record what happened in more detail. Field notes sought to involve 
deep reflections on the extent to which I am motivated by the values and 
practices the leaders put forward, as well as how comfortable I felt being 
involved in work ‘rituals’, especially where those ‘rituals’ are informed by 
religious and/or ideological beliefs. Other notes were based on more in-the-
moment descriptions of how respondents react to the values and practices put 
forward by their leaders. 
 
Mine is a form of participant observation that recognises the inability to create 
the kind of value neutrality required for social distance. David Downes and 
Paul Rock have said that those interested in participant observation believe 
that ‘social behaviour cannot be understood unless it is personally 
experienced’ (Downes & Rock 2003: 30). A real advantage of participant 
observation then, is that I adopted the practices and listened to the 
justifications of those I studied. 
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My research took a leaf out of both Community Development and Community 
Organising. I integrated these into a model of participant observation that 
enabled me to understand my respondents and their motivations in depth. 
 
 From Community Development, I draw on the involvement of respondents in 
researching themselves, providing me with deep theoretical answers to their 
situations so that I do not have to impose my own framework onto their 
situation. I clearly have a theological and ideological position: I believe that we 
need to reengage with teleological questions about where we are from and 
where we are going in order to overcome instrumentalism. But this does not 
mean I need to impose my own solutions upon the respondent. So long as I 
am open about my feelings, I hope that respondents will be open about theirs.  
 
Involving respondents in researching themselves is also a matter of social 
justice. Since part of my critique of liberalism is its imposing agendas upon 
people as opposed to providing them with the critical tools to bring about 
solutions to their own problems, it was important that I involved people in the 
conclusions I reached. This made for interesting research since more than 
merely asking probing questions, I was challenging people to face up to the 
constraining theoretical ideas I have theoretically explored. 
 
From Community Organising I took the notion of one-to-ones. One-to ones 
are “an exercise in hearing each other’s stories, and finding out what we each 
care about” and are so important as a tool in research seeking to overcome 
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instrumentalism since “because contemporary society does not allow people 
time to listen to others’ stories, their hopes and fears – at least not outside a 
narrow circle of friends and family - we have lost the habit that would have 
been natural to previous generations” (Iveriegh 2010: 57).  
 
Simply, the idea is that one sits opposite the person that they want to involve 
in their research and asks them deep, probing questions about why they do 
what they do. According to the rules of one-to-ones, abstract answers about 
the importance of what they do for wider society are not acceptable, The 
challenge is to understand the individual suffering and hope that brought the 
respondent to where they are. This particular aspect is precarious for me as a 
researcher, since ignoring moral justifications is to take a Nietzschean or 
Foucauldian stance to one’s participants, thus foregoing conclusions about 
motivations. What I did instead then, was to ensure that I gave my own story 
in terms of both moral and personal motivation, but left participants open to 
offer their own responses. In this way I hope to create a safe space that was 
welcoming to, but not demanding of personal stories.   
 
According to one-to-ones, the best way to open respondents up is to open 
oneself up to one’s respondents. This part of the research is important in its 
own right since it builds a relationship of trust between the researcher and the 
participant, draws them onto an equal footing.  
 
The aim of interviews with leaders was to see if their behaviour is 
corroborated by their words, and to gauge where within my typological 
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framework leaders’ values and life experiences place them and whether they 
see themselves as overcoming the same problems I have identified. I also 
sought to understand what primarily they believe to motivate their own 
volunteers and clients to be involved in their work. But notwithstanding the 
importance of the relatively unstructured nature of one-to-ones, because my 
research design is multiple-case study, it was important that there was at least 
a rudimentary structure to my interviews in order to allow ‘cross-case 
comparability’ (Bryman 2004: 324). What I therefore did was have a list of 
areas I wanted to cover. 
 
In practice my interviews took place as follows: 
 
• Explain my research topic in detail 
• Ask how the respondent ended up in this organisation. 
• Ask the respondent what kind of vision or set of values they are trying 
to implement. 
• Ask what problems they see themselves as responding to. 
• Ask what gets in the way of doing a good job. 
• Ask how they encourage others to get involved. 
 
So the research is a threefold process whereby I use document analysis to 
explore where the organisation sits in relation to my research question. I then 
audit the organisaiton, exploring the extent to which shared ideas of the good 
play a role in cultivating civic engagement, and whether those ideas or their 
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absence are practicable and inclusive. Alongside this, I interview staff in depth 
to explore how their behaviour fits, or fails to fit, with their words. 
 
Analysing Data 
 
In terms of document analysis, J. Scott has set out four criteria assessing the 
quality of documents: Authenticity (is the evidence genuine?), credibility (is 
the evidence free from error?), representativeness (is the evidence typical?), 
and meaning (is the evidence comprehensible?) (Bryman 2004: 381). I 
considered these criteria when reviewing documents to ask whether leaders’ 
values translate into their documents. In the findings chapters, documents 
used for analysis are referenced formally.  
 
With field notes I took a much deeper and more rigorous approach. I 
interrogated my own experiences and my take on them. One way that I 
evaluated the dependability of these entries was to discuss them with 
colleagues to see if they chimed with their own experiences. So journal 
entries themselves provided the basis for the production of more data through 
informal chats. Field notes are referenced as such.  
 
Although I allowed for their own stories to have some influence on the 
process, interviews with volunteers and clients were primarily coded 
according to the categories that arose out of interviews with organisational 
leaders. Interviewees are given pseudonyms. I do not give their real names 
because I promised anonymity in the hope of getting honest and open 
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answers. I decided to give them pseudonyms rather than codes because I 
wanted to bring them to life for the reader. 
 
In sum, the type of data I analysed were documents, field notes and 
interviews. I always begin by analysing documents. These provided a broad 
history and context. I then discuss field notes and interviews together. This 
allows me to bring the field to life, demonstrate my observations as they 
unfolded, and how these were critically developed in interviews.  
 
In order to evaluate interviews, I inputted them to Nvivo, and combined a 
narrative approach with coding. Since my approach is critically realist I 
already had some level of coding in place based on the preliminary framework 
discussed in Chapters 2 to 5. I explored whether people used political 
theology or secular political theory, conventionally or unconventionally political 
and instrumental or non-instrumental discourses. With so much stress on the 
notion that the way people tell their life-story can express their values, it was 
also important that I allowed these stories to shape the categories I used to 
code. Yet the coding process was also iterative, responding to differences that 
arise between case studies, and to the ways in which discourses confounded 
my categorisation.  
 
During the conducting and analysing of interviews, I quickly became aware of 
how important it was to have a keen awareness of theory. I realised that 
people from different religious and nonreligious backgrounds could use 
entirely different discourses for talking about very similar things. In particular, 
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participants appeared to employ common ideational frameworks, as I will 
elucidate in the discussion of findings. 
 
Analysing interviews was also complicated by the extent to which I involved 
myself as either a neutral observer or an active partner in the construction of 
answers. Since I took a critical realist approach, seeking to introduce terms 
that can be difficult to convey, it was essential that I recognised the important 
role social construction plays not only in the wording of questions, which I had 
to alter according to the respondent’s knowledge, but also according to the 
flow of conversation. It was therefore extremely important to be aware, while 
listening to interviews, of the extent to which I was leading respondents to 
their answers. 
 
Ethics 
 
I have indicated that it was difficult to gain access to the organisations I 
wanted to study without an aspect of quid pro quo. Groups that occupy the 
space between politics and civil society tend to be poorly funded, gaining 
most funds from either large-scale private donors or small-scale broad-based 
fundraising. So in order to gain access I had to offer services in return, 
whether odd jobs or consultancy advice. I have also indicated that the 
research is as much a journey for myself as it is a disinterestedly construed 
research question. These two points provide the axis around which questions 
of ethics revolve. In this subsection I will discuss theoretical difficulties, 
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leaving detailed discussion of the research tools I will use to overcome these 
difficulties for the next section.  
 
If being asked to provide services were the only factor, there would be less of 
a problem. The difficulty arose from the fact that I was being asked to provide 
my services in a field of work that I was passionate about. I had to undertake 
jobs in which my own opinion had a significant impact on the way that that 
work took shape. At other times I was asked into meetings specifically 
because of the value my opinion as a researcher in this field might add to 
those meetings. The result is that it became difficult to know when I was 
wearing my researcher’s hat and when my passionate volunteer’s hat. This is 
problematic both because I may risk excessively influencing the field I am 
studying; and because I will lose the distance required to reliably and 
authentically record what is happening.  
 
Methods 
 
The problem of maintaining distance described above is compounded when 
one considers just how unpredictable participant observation can be. Although 
one plans certain scenarios such as interviews, partly the point of participant 
observation is to record conduct under the widest range of possible settings, 
and so it is only natural that situations will arise for which one has little or no 
preconceived framework by which to ensure researcher integrity. So there is a 
lot of guesswork involved. Still, the construction of a robust set of methods 
can help to ensure that one has the necessary tools to think on one’s feet and 
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maintain researcher integrity. Here I describe the specific research tools I 
used for those scenarios I will facilitate: document analysis, field notes and 
interviews. I then discuss methods for maintaining reliability, validity credibility, 
transferability, dependability, confirmability and authenticity in situations that I 
guessed might arise. Finally, I discuss protocols and attitudes that helped to 
maintain researcher integrity in unexpected situations. 
 
Gaining access to each organisation involved both informal and formal 
measures. The informal measures were entirely relational and dependent on 
the tact and charisma of me as a person. Although I had specific 
organisations in mind with which I hoped to work, I was also very aware of the 
closed nature of these organisations and as a result of my need to be always 
building relational networks, using the members of one organisation to put me 
in touch with those of another.  
 
But upon gaining access it was equally important to formalise the research 
process. I handed to the leaders of each organisation a research contract 
explaining exactly what I intended to do and how. The research contract is 
essentially a summarised version of the methodology. As well as ensuring 
that respondents are aware of and therefore not put out by my actions as a 
researcher, the research contract helps to formalise the process of research. 
This was especially important in my case because it helped me to keep a 
researcher’s distance.  
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Upon gaining access to each organisation, the intention was to interview 
leaders to ascertain what kind values, structure they were seeking to work 
with and what problems they were seeking to overcome. I gained written 
consent for these interviews and used a digital voice recorder to record them. 
The style of the interviews was as relational as possible. Although I used 
private rooms, I decided it was important to allow each person to decide how 
they wanted furniture arranged, whether sitting opposite one another across a 
table, sitting adjacent one another at the corner of a table, or whether doing 
away with the table altogether. There was always water, tea and coffee and 
these were collected in as natural a manner as possible. The format of the 
interview has already been discussed above. I began by explaining the 
theoretical and emotional story behind my research in the hope of drawing a 
similar relational and biographical approach to answering from the 
respondent.  
 
After the documentary analysis and interviews with leaders, I moved on to 
audit: filling in the gaps of what the documents and interviews with leaders 
had left out; corroborating what had been said; and assessing how well 
leader’s values and practical intentions transfer into the organisation.  I used 
interviews with workers and volunteers, extensive informal discussions with 
clients, and my own field notes to do this. Interviews with workers and 
volunteers were planned and organised in exactly the same way as those with 
leaders. Informal discussions with clients were slightly different, since I was 
not always able to get written carried a pen and paper with me to record what 
had been said as accurately as possible after the event.  
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How much time I was able to spend undertaking research is one of many 
factors that differed from one organisation to another. CSM was incredibly 
useful and relaxed about when I could come in. Formally, I sought to go into 
their offices one to two days a week as well as attending any events that 
arose. It was important to be relaxed in this approach because I wanted to 
see the organisation at as many different times and in as many different 
situations as possible. HCVS and FbRN, since their intention is more to do 
with lending guidance and networks to grassroots movements, provided a 
relaxed environment. LC was more demanding. They asked me to take on the 
role of a part-time organiser and stressed that this required two or three days 
a week as well as evenings. 
 
There were also predictable scenarios with each different organisation. The 
aim of CSM is to get Christians interested in grassroots social action to be 
equally interested in local and national politics, to get them involved in politics 
if possible and to support them once they do get involved. Scenarios I could 
therefore expect were formal teaching and conference attendance, with all the 
informal networking conversations that these involve, as well as ongoing 
relational meetings with numerous clients at all stages from the grassroots to 
the political. In the past I have been asked to speak at formal events, as well 
as to lend my thoughts and ideas to meetings. Inevitably, this creates conflict 
for me as a researcher. I aimed to overcome this conflict in two ways. First, by 
introducing myself and my research according to the same format offered 
during interview and explaining that I would be writing up what I observed, as 
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well as reflecting on my own experience; second, by writing up diary entries 
that reflected on my position, seeking to improve my authenticity and integrity 
as a researcher. It was assumed that work with HCVS and FbRN would be 
relatively similar. 
 
With LC the challenge was slightly different. I was myself trained according to 
the principles of community organising and asked to build relationships with 
people, undertaking one-to-ones in which I asked what motivated participants 
and what troubled them, with a mind to organising the community around an 
issue. In these situations, it was impossible to initially introduce myself as a 
researcher. The core of maintaining researcher integrity then, was reflexive 
practice, using diary entries to consider the implications of various 
conversations, and asking for consent down the line if I wished to directly 
quote particular respondents. Of course there also arose the ethical issue that 
I was only organising for the sake of research as opposed to doing so for the 
sake of the common good. But since my research was aimed at finding the 
best theoretical ideas and practical techniques for building a common good, 
this should not be all that problematic. I expect work with Locality to be 
similar. 
 
As to protocols for unexpected situations, I came up with a list of ideas: I 
should always offer a written research contract to leaders of organisations; I 
should always gain written consent for planned interviews. I should always 
reveal my role as a researcher just as soon as there is enough rapport not to 
compromise the relationship; I should always get written consent to directly 
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quote respondents; I should use diary entries as a way of interrogating my 
authenticity and integrity as a researcher. With these protocols in mind, I 
move to introduce my findings before, in the next four chapters, discussing the 
findings from each organisation in detail. 
 
From theory to findings 
 
The first part of the thesis puts insights from political theology into dialogue 
with research engaged with lived realities in order to produce operationalised 
ideas that can be empirically explored. This chapter details how these ideas 
might be explored methodologically. This section reveals how the findings will 
be discussed. In order to facilitate critical reading of the findings, I recap the 
insights from political theology, and detail each in turn in terms of its dialogue 
with research engaged with lived realities, and the contribution of my 
approach. 
 
The insights are that contemporary politics has lost an articulation of shared 
ideas of the good through which we understand who we are and towards 
which we are collectively working, with the result that politics is nothing more 
than the administration of a social contract; that in the absence of these 
shared ideas of the good, the state or the market must step in to reconcile 
people to one another; and that individuals have finally imbibed this ontology, 
themselves deferring to the state and using the discourse of the market.  
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Social theory is ambivalent on ideas of the good. This ambivalence is best 
articulated by Habermas, who on the one hand regards the maintenance of a 
space for rational-critical debate as fundamental to democracy (Habermas 
2006; Habermas 2010, 24), but on the other notices that 
 
practical reason fails to fulfill its own vocation when it no longer has 
sufficient strength to awaken, and to keep awake, in the minds of secular 
subjects, an awareness of the violations of solidarity throughout the 
world, an awareness of what is missing, of what cries out to heaven 
(Habermas 2010: 19). 
 
And this in contrast to the energy and vigour of religious groups in the public 
sphere (Habermas 2010, 24). This deep conflict finds expression in two 
separate strands of research. The first is the empirical exploration of the role 
of religious and secular arguments and rituals in the public sphere (Taylor 
2007; Habermas 2010; Lynch 2012). The second strand explores the special 
contribution of religious groups, seeking to understand their vitality. This has 
been explored in terms of the discourses they use (Dinham 2012) and in 
terms of the conceptual and social constructs they employ (Wood 2002; Smith 
1996; Atran 2011; Baker 2013). Finally, it has been explored whether these 
contributions are unique to religious groups, or if in fact they can be observed 
in other forms of value-based belonging and action (Francis and Knott 2015; 
Lynch 2012; Baker 2008; Engelke 2014). This final field of study opens the 
discussion to ideas outside of the study of religion altogether, such as 
Benedict Anderson’s idea of imagined community (Anderson 1983/2006). Of 
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course these two fields feed into one another, since best practice in the public 
sphere inevitably impinges on the kind of groups that are supported or 
sanctioned in civil society; and conversely, if religious or more broadly value-
based ways of belonging and acting prove important, then this challenges the 
practicability of a neutral public sphere.  
 
What I felt this study could uniquely contribute to this debate, is an exploration 
of the way in which political groups construct solidarity in pluralist settings, 
and whether and how this differs between religious and secular groups. I felt it 
was important to spend time with the groups, which inevitably limited my 
ability to sample and generalise. I suggested that this was a sacrifice worth 
making, since what was lacking from the research was an interrogation of the 
social construction of ideas in relation to observed practices. While Chris 
Baker (2013) has asked this question in focus groups, I wanted to see first 
hand what, if any, difference certain articulations made to belonging and 
action. 
 
With reference to these observed practices, the second insight is to do with 
how, in the absence of solidarity, the state or the market become important 
means of reconciling people to one another. Both of these mechanisms act as 
poor substitutes for a solidarity that forms the basis of collective identity and 
action, since they actually undermine these further. I take each of these ideas 
in turn. In terms of the state, it is suggested that it undermines a sense of 
collective responsibility. The literature review suggests that while the state has 
played an important role in the articulation of shared identity and struggle, and 
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while the state’s role has in the past been articulated as bureaucratic enforcer 
of the general will, the state has also been considered to embody the 
principles of the common good. While the postwar state in the UK coopted a 
number of social services, this was done in the name of a Christian common 
good, and so the state could be seen as embodying an imagined community 
(Dinham 2014). Prochaska suggests, nonetheless, that this Christian 
underpinning was soon lost. Dinham and Jackson point out that the 
disadvantages of a cooptive state have been recognised in policy on 
numerous occasions throughout the postwar period (Dinham & Jackson 
2012). But Prochaska suggests this recognition was “voiced in a world that 
had lost its Christian underpinnings” and therefore did not have the vitality for 
social action (Prochaska 2006: 161). Hence the question becomes “how to 
articulate the values found in a culturally Christian West in a newly post-
religious, post-secular, plural context in which Christianity would not be 
appropriate – at least, not on its own (Dinham 2014).  
 
This study explores the articulations of solidarity, and interprets it with 
reference to the articulated and observed relationship to the state. Does the 
absence of a clearly articulated sense of solidarity lead to reliance on the 
state? If so, does this reliance indicate a failure of imagination, or a failure to 
galvanise belonging and action? Or can articulation of solidarity be 
coextensive with an articulation of the state as embodying this solidarity? Can 
anything identifiable or tangible really be said to be lacking from such an 
articulation? 
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In terms of the market, the literature review suggests that it at worst corrodes 
collective identity, and at best creates a pseudo-sittlichkeit whereby it is 
recognised that one’s self-interest is best served as part of the collective 
(Milbank 1990/2006: 167). Worse, there are suggestions that capitalism 
places an iron cage of rationality around pursuits that are articulated well in 
terms of transcendence, traditions and values, but which are harder to justify 
in terms of a cost-benefit analysis (Weber 1919/2005: 182). But worse still, 
being that this theory is reified into real processes, through literature, though 
discourses of disadvantage, and through policy formation and funding 
guidelines, the encroachment of this kind of analysis tends to generate ideas 
of the person, and thereby the kinds of people, that do frame their lives in 
terms of the pursuit of financial and social capital (Skeggs 2011: 505). The 
result is supposedly that other, transcendent and relational values, whether 
these be ideas of what God wants or ideas of equality, are subordinated, and 
the sense of imagined community, and in its turn real communities and 
relationships, suffer. 
 
Yet there were other suggestions that capitalist societies are simply open 
societies, reflecting the will of those that reside within them (Zak et al. 2008). 
While such societies do produce self-interest and greed, they also produce 
reactions against these, in the form of cooperatives, trade unions and the like 
(Durkheim 1893/2014: 5; Aldous et al. 1972). What is more, these more 
cooperative, long-termist, and virtuous strategies can often be more 
economically advantageous, as John Lewis’s ability to ride the storm of the 
recession revealed.  
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This study will finally interpret the articulation of the common good in relation 
to the market: does the absence of clearly articulated common good lead to a 
reliance on the market? Again, if so, does this reliance indicate a failure or 
imagination, or a failure to galvanise belonging and action? Or can articulation 
of the common good be coextensive with an articulation of the market? Can 
anything identifiable or tangible really be said to be lacking from such an 
articulation? 
 
These three sets of questions act as the lens through which I observe the 
actions of each of the groups theoretically.  
 
On top of this theoretical lens, this chapter explains, there is also a more 
practical lens impinging on my observations, derived from the sociology of 
religion in the UK. Two are worth recapping here. The first is a development of 
Paul Weller’s expression of contemporary society as simultaneously Christian, 
secular and religiously plural, adding that society can now also be observed 
as being postsecular (Weller 2006: 6). The second is Linda Woodhead’s 
analysis of the way people relate to both religion and politics, and how this 
has changed over the last sixty years. According to Woodhead, religion and 
politics are looking less like states and more like markets, with people looking 
less like citizens with loyalties to particular beliefs, ideologies and dogma, and 
more like consumers with complex needs, and willing to shop around to fulfil 
those needs (Woodhead 2014). Without wanting to impose categories upon 
the groups I observe, the methodology explains that I selected groups 
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deliberately in order to reflect different positions on this trend. My 
observations thus begin with the CSM, now Christians on the Left, since this 
group is best suited to the older idea of religion and politics. I then look at 
HCVS, a far more secular, but nonetheless statist model, followed by FbRN, 
which is both multi-faith and more oriented towards empowering distinct 
communities. Finally, I observe LC, which most closely conforms to a world 
which is both postsecular and market orientated. These categories will turn 
out to be somewhat crude as the observations unfold, but I have to start from 
somewhere. 
 
  
	 171	
Chapter 7: Case Study I: The Christian Socialist 
Movement 
 
The Christian Socialist Movement (CSM), today called Christians on the Left 
(CTL), makes an interesting case to explore because its intellectual heritage 
is coextensive with that of post-liberalism. By tracing the way it works, we can 
gain a sense of one way a post-liberal political theology might be lived out in 
the contemporary UK; the way that it is articulated by real people working on 
the frontline to bring about change, the kind of pressures that it faces, and the 
compromises it has to make.  
 
But a few important caveats. The first is that it would be a mistake to treat 
either post-liberalism or Christian Socialism as an internally coherent tradition. 
Second, as will become clear in the forthcoming discussion, there a number of 
important distinctions. Finally, being that this is an ethnographic study, the 
intention is not to suggest that it is representative of how Christian Socialism 
necessarily or generally reveals itself in the world. Rather, it is intended that 
exploring in depth how one group has lived out these ideas will contribute to 
an understanding of how they might be lived out generally.  
 
I begin with a brief context. I then look at the three lens outlined in the 
introduction, namely, the constituting factors of common agency, political 
structures of common agency, and economic structures of common agency. 
 
Context 
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Christian Socialism originated in the middle of the 19th century. The most 
fundamental point to make regarding Christian Socialists is that they have 
almost irreconcilable differences. But we can find some commonality. Edward 
Norman (1987: 16) has said of the Victorian Christian Socialists that the one 
thread uniting them all is an aversion to competition. There is also a positive 
connection; namely, that they all promote social goals such as human dignity, 
friendship, reciprocity and empowerment. The Victorian Christian Socialists 
tended to be more interested in changing the way people lived their lives than 
in policy. 
 
Former leader and member Andrew Bradstock has explained that whereas 
the commitments of Victorian Christian Socialism were diverse and 
incoherent, the founding of the CSM had clear and guiding principles. In 
1960… 
 
…A new constitution committed CSM members to pray, give and work 
for Christian unity, international reconciliation, redistribution of wealth, a 
classless society, world peace with nuclear and general disarmament 
and ‘the common ownership and democratic control of the productive 
resources of the earth’. Support of these positions placed the movement 
to the left of mainstream Labour Party thinking, and affiliation to the 
Party, though discussed, was rejected in favour of ‘independence’ 
(Bradstock 2013). 
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In 1988, the CSM became an affiliate of the Labour Party, which was later 
consolidated by the taking up of desk space in Labour Party Headquarters. 
 
The movement also sought to broaden its base, moving from being (as 
one of its documents put it) ‘an association of people who accept the 
fairly precise description of Christian Socialism set out in its statement of 
aims’ to a ‘forum for the Christian left’. The new emphasis was to be 
more on engaging in debate and ‘helping Labour to regain the ethical 
ground’ rather than promoting individual policies (Bradstock 2013). 
In the 1990s and 2000s the party slowly increased its membership from about 
five hundred to about two thousand, and the number of MPs affiliated with the 
movement, from a handful to forty-four, or a tenth of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party. Yet the broadening of its base to a loosely defined forum does not 
seem to have helped its influence. The CSM ‘vigorously opposed’ the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, but although a CSM MP tabled an amendment that the case 
for war had not been made, only eight CSM MPs voted for the amendment 
(Bradstock 2013). The result was that some CSM members suggested 
disaffiliating, while a number resigned altogether.  
In 2006, the CSM sought to reaffirm its values for a 21st century context. The 
result was the affirmation of the following values: 
• We believe that Christian teaching should be reflected in laws 
and institutions and that the Kingdom of God finds its political 
expression in democratic socialist policies. 
• We believe that all people are created in the image of God. We 
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all have equal worth and deserve equal opportunities to fulfil our 
God-given potential whilst exercising personal responsibility. 
• We believe in personal freedom, exercised in community with 
others and embracing civil, social and economic freedom. 
• We believe in social justice and that the institutional causes of 
poverty in, and between, rich and poor countries should be 
abolished. 
• We believe all people are called to common stewardship of the 
Earth, including its natural resources 
(CSM 2006) 
 
In 2013, after a long process of debate, the CSM changed its name to 
Christians on the Left (CTL), reflecting the broadening of its base. 
This short context provides a background for understanding the ideas of CTL. 
Starting out as an organization with a clear aim to bring the means of 
production into the control of labourers, the organization has now become an 
open forum for Christians with a vaguely left-wing agenda. The process has 
enabled the organization to increase its following, and to be given office space 
within Labour Party HQ, though has perhaps made its aims harder to define, 
and its influence on particular MPs and members less predictable.  
Constituting factor of common agency 
 
I finished the last section by suggesting that CTL’s aims had become harder 
to define, and its influence less predictable. In this section I seek to 
understand how the aims are articulated and how these relate to actions. I 
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begin by explore the role of theology: how it shapes group membership, how it 
shapes actions, how it shapes politics, and the various strategies engaged for 
expanding common agency, from value-generalisation, to frame-bridging, to 
democratic participation in the framing processes. I then discuss the 
possibility that the role of common agency is not what it first appears to be.  
 
The reconciliation of all things to the Creator, where people feel they can 
belong 
 
On my first visit to CTL, sat in the lobby of the UK Labour Party headquarters, 
dressed in suit trousers, I felt as though I was awaiting a job interview. A 
sense of ambition, mixed with schoolboy humour pervaded the faces of the 
suited men and women passing from the street, through the revolving doors, 
to the lift. When Paul came down to greet me I got a very different impression. 
He was wearing shabby suit trousers and an apparently un-ironed shirt. He 
was smiling warmly. It felt like an odd juxtaposition. Going upstairs, we walked 
into a modern office space. Windows substitute for walls, wrapping around the 
entire building, and there are television screens every few meters playing 
BBC News 24 on loop. A small portion of the desk space in this dynamic 
office is allotted to the CTL team. The whole setting seemed to epitomise the 
professionalization of politics. It seemed obvious how CTL inspired interest: 
they were part of the machine. But this assumption did not sit well with Paul’s 
aura. He seemed to exude kindness. This juxtaposition came out in interview:    
 
Paul 
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…what’s the underpinning of why you’re calling people to 
involvement…? 
 
…Pretty simply the underpinning of it is…is…eh…is a theological 
underpinning actually…and it is a belief that ummm the Christian call is 
to be a partner in in in the big picture, the mission of God the missio 
dei, as people write about, that, you know, actually our call is to be part 
of His mission, which I believe is seeing the restoration, redemption 
and reconciliation of all things in creation to the creator 
 
Despite being in the centre of political power, this “call” to the “reconciliation of 
all things in creation to the creator” has a distinct influence on the kind of 
politics CTL practices. Paul continues: 
 
What I desire it to be is a movement – certainly not a club. Certainly not 
a political party. But a movement. A support to each other and a space 
or resource where people can actually grapple with political issues from 
a theological perspective: so as a support and a resource for Christians 
who are actually getting involved in the political process… 
 
…[there is] a definite desire to create a sense of belonging. So that’s 
intention in the way that we do our events with the kind of relational 
space that we try and create in our events, it’s the, it’s why we try to do 
the regular emailing, it’s also why a lot of my time is spent just having 
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meetings with people, having coffee, having lunch with people, ummm 
trying to connect people who I think should meet with each other, a lot of 
it is absolutely about building that space where people can feel they 
belong. Often…the usual joke is that it’s often quite hard for a Christian 
to come out, a Christian in a local church to come out and say “yeah I’m 
a lefty”…but it’s also quite hard for a Christian in their local Labour party 
to come out and say “yeah I’m a Christian”. [Laughing] You know so it’s 
like, actually sometimes some of the people involved with us can be, you 
know experiencing the worst of both worlds 
 
…there is a dynamic that happens when you’re campaigning together, 
when you’re working together with a common cause, a lot of bonds are 
formed… that are, just deeper and more profound than those that would 
be formed just because we’ve decided to meet and sit round a table 
together…that sense of common cause – we all know that from sports 
teams, or from going on a kind of foreign aid trip or something like that 
we’ve gone to a foreign country, we’ve displaced ourselves slightly so 
we’re in that more liminal space so we’re kind of slightly in need of each 
other that little bit more…it’s the difference between community and 
communitas…communitas which is a community that is formed ergh 
where people have a common purpose and a common goal that they’re 
working towards (Interview). 
 
It is worth noting that Paul’s theology is reflexively aware: he is not only aware 
of what he believes in and how those beliefs should play out, but also of how 
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belief per se functions. Paul distinguishes CTL from political parties in that it is 
supposed to behave as a “resource” which provides members with a “sense 
of belonging”. This belonging is distinctive in that it is “formed” around a 
“common purpose”. While Paul’s use of the term “communitas” perhaps does 
not fit with the academic formulation of the term offered by Turner and 
Olaveson, as discussed in chapter 3, since it fails to recognise the ambivalent 
relationship between structure and communitas, it does seem to correspond 
to the notion of community or sittlichkeit envisaged by John Milbank in his 
critique of Hegel, as well as the notion of gemeinschaft touted by Tonnies. In 
the following I explore whether and how this ideal plays out in practice. 
 
On the surface at least, Paul’s ideal had clear and practical outworkings. I 
observed how the majority of CTL time was devoted to providing pastoral care 
to lonely Christian MPs by “having coffee, having lunch”, to prayer, and to 
missional community. If a particular member is troubled for whatever reason, 
small prayer sessions will be held in groups of two or three, in which they pray 
for the alleviation of one another’s individual concerns. Again, on that very first 
day, Paul opened up to me about something very personal that his colleague 
Dave was going through. I was struck by how much was being shared with 
me, given I had never met Dave. My compassion was assumed. I was trusted 
implicitly. Later that day, once I was comfortable, Paul and Dave took time out 
to pray. Taking time out in this way is a regular occurrence.   
 
I later got to observe how the juxtaposition Paul and Dave embody is part of 
their theological mission. Paul can often be found sitting around the buildings 
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of Westminster, holding a guitar and quietly chatting with an MP. He has a 
calming presence. The group also holds monthly prayer meetings. Particular 
themes come up time and again: not expecting God to demonstrate His 
power; rejoicing in the signs of heaven that can already be seen in the good 
works of people; asking for the strength to be selfless and compassionate 
(Field notes). The prayers mix older psalms with new stories and poems from 
online sources. The contents of these prayers are also posted online, so that 
members unable to attend prayer meetings in Westminster can join in from 
wherever they are.  
 
A strong sense of missional community emerges in these prayer sessions. 
Meetings are held in the heart of British political life, often in Portcullis House 
in Westminster. Opened as an extension of the Palace of Westminster in 
2001, Portcullis House provides offices to over 200 MPs. When I first walked 
in as a young researcher, through the police barrier, explaining I had a 
meeting with an MP, I felt the aura of power, as if I deserved esteem. It did not 
matter that I was only there as a researcher; I was taken in by my auspicious 
surroundings, and the sense that somehow I could influence the levers of 
power. I could read the same aura in those I chatted with; there is a sense of 
buoyancy, a hunger for influence, and a concomitant tendency to bully those 
deemed unworthy of power (Field notes). Portcullis House is a space in which 
I have been privy to numerous backhanded remarks about the intelligence of 
certain MPs. I have attended numerous policy meetings in which young 
researchers jostle for the attention of senior researchers and MPs. Yet this 
very space is also where Paul can be found sitting around in his shabby suit, 
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saying only encouraging things and holding his guitar, and also where CTL 
prayer meetings are often held. In this way Paul and CTL live out a 
contradiction that pulls on the heartstrings of overworked Christian MPs. Not 
being Christian myself, I have nonetheless felt the power of this prophetic, 
countercultural presence, divulging very personal information. In the very 
heart of a culture of fear and mistrust, especially in relation to personal 
information, Paul provides a space in which people can be human, even if 
only very briefly. It is against this backdrop that prayer meetings are held. 
Participants feel drawn to one another through their shared humanity. 
  
Members gather and discuss their ideas, their frustrations with what is 
becoming of the world, and they strategise about ways of overcoming these 
problems. This sense of missional community is reinforced by, or perhaps 
only becomes missional in, lunches, pub trips and speaking events. It is 
through these informal chatting processes that participants develop theology, 
discuss what is wrong with the world, and strategise about solutions (Field 
notes). An intangible sense of community unfolds into practical action. What 
emerges theologically is simultaneously a sense of breaking beyond the 
power struggle by getting to know one another as an end in itself, creating a 
sense of interdependence, but also from this basis, developing a shared 
responsibility to act in the world. 
 
There is a pressing and an urging of one another resulting in plans for 
practical action. In my time at CTL I was struck by a form of friendship that I 
could not recognise anywhere else: with neither basis in a pre-existing 
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friendship, nor motivation that could be understood through the notion of 
rational choice, people offered one another their time and energy for personal 
projects. When I said to one member, Katie, what a strange notion of 
friendship I had come across, where people offered their time for actions but 
did not have drinks or dinner together, rather than offering up an explanation 
as to where her kindness had come from, she replied “come over for dinner” 
(Field notes). This touches upon Chris Baker’s ideas of belonging and 
becoming as modes of moral freighting (Baker 2013: 359-363). Members feel 
supported by their membership of the group, and that worshipful reflection 
helps them turn inwards, as well as obliging them to turn outwards and 
behave responsibly in the world. “One’s life is shaped by those with whom you 
share your religious and spiritual practices on a regular basis” (Baker 2013: 
262). I got a strong feeling of this myself in the time I was participating in the 
work of CTL. I felt inclined to offer my support wherever I could – often far 
more than I could reasonably manage.  This created a cycle of inspiration 
followed by guilt each time I recalled that my first duty was to the research 
itself. 
 
Part of this inspiration and guilt was derived not from theological engagement 
but from a kind of lived evangelism that dropped theology altogether. Dave 
explained to me that he felt the mission of the organisation could change 
behaviour indirectly. He explained how, by living a distinctly Christian life, he 
hoped he could change how others behaved: 
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We're called ummm I don't wanna get into kind of theology with you too 
much but we're called in the Bible by, I think it's Peter, I think it's 1 Peter, 
to to to be distinctively Christian. 
 
…Ummm...you know we're called to be...for example I live in London so 
I'm not called to be a Londoner, I'm called to be a Christian in 
London...and to live out that life, to live out that example, so I would 
hope that in my workplace, in my home life, in my community, I live a life 
where I'm living a distinctively Christian life and people will kind of see 
that I'm living in a different way 
 
…And then think, start to think well...you know...why is he living in that 
w[ay]...or n, you know, is that an example to follow? They don't 
necessarily have to um then go "Oh, he's living that way because he 
believes errr Jesus is the Messiah and I should go to church and read 
into that" ...it's more about actually - how are you living, and can I follow 
that example? Can I be, kind of, more welcoming to people, more kinda, 
you know, be more approachable and open. Can I be more friendly, can 
I be more thoughtful...and just kind of leading that, leading by example. 
 
For Dave this calling to be Christian serves as a kind of lived evangelism, 
through his behaviour calling others to a certain way of life.  
 
These two forms of theology, the discursive and the lived, behave in a similar 
way to Baker’s understanding of role modelling: they facilitate the shift from 
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“talking about morals and principles toward an obligation to live out one’s 
public life in accordance with those principles” (Baker 2013). But more 
importantly for a group trying to galvanise political change, evangelism is the 
process of becoming a role model. Paul and Dave see themselves as called 
to live out a life that will influence others to change. One also sees elements 
of Bloch’s idea of the transcendental social: an imaginary which negates the 
everyday world is deliberately constructed in order to transform it (Bloch 2010: 
8-10). 
 
On one level the notion of reconciling all things to the creator creates a sense 
of higher purpose, and allows for calm amidst the jostle of Westminster. Yet 
equally, without having the same beliefs as my participants, I too felt the call 
to belong to a group who lived out something higher, deeper or set apart from 
the power struggle around us. As far as I was concerned at least, one did not 
require belief in the specific good held by the group. But it did require of 
course, that something had to be held higher, deeper or set apart: an idea of a 
life lived in a certain way. Propositional belief in God is not a necessary 
prerequisite of belief in a particular idea of the good, nor of a mutual belief 
between the community and the participant, a belief in belonging, as Day puts 
it (Day 2012). This recognition led to an odd conversation after an event. I 
explained to Dave that I was beginning to feel more Christian, but could not 
call myself one because I did not believe in a God that could intervene in the 
world. Dave replied: “do you believe that the stories of Jesus Christ can be 
transformative?” This utterly struck a chord with me. “Yes” I said, almost 
reverently. “Well isn’t that divine intervention?” (Field notes). 
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Clearly for my part, as someone that did not assent to their propositional 
beliefs, I was nonetheless able to draw from the same sense of belonging and 
becoming. But why had it been so easy for me, why had it felt so right that the 
stories of Jesus Christ could be transformative? Was I inspired by the 
theology or the actions? I lingered on this question for days, then weeks, then 
months and now years. I had heard the theology, and I had seen it transform 
the people at CTL. In my time at the organisation, I had slowly started 
connecting the two, the theology and the actions together. I had been taken in 
by the lived evangelism. There was something inspiring about the authenticity.  
 
The fact that Dave and I were speaking in this way after an event is worth 
noting in itself. I have already said that these informal conversations are 
where the theology develops. I had become part of the theological process.  
 
Ideas of the good clearly play an important role in inspiring CTL. Equally these 
ideas of the good played a role in inspiring me. But the beliefs on their own 
were neither necessary nor sufficient. It was first of all seeing these beliefs 
authentically lived out in terms of policy and lifestyle that gave them 
transformative power. But a secondary component, of equal importance was 
the inclusive way in which those beliefs appeared to be constructed. No 
matter what any particular member’s belief position, they were equally 
welcome to events and discussion – to shaping a shared theology. This 
openness notwithstanding, the work of Weller and Dinham already mentioned 
would suggest that a Christian message alone is impractical for reviving a 
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shared spirit of association. Partly, perhaps, my openness to the theology was 
down to my position as an ethnographer, deliberately open to the sway of 
different ontological perspectives. That it appeals to me does not mean it 
could appeal to everybody. As chapter 9 well attest, let alone Christianity, 
others are instantly turned off even by the mention of religion.   
 
A holistic kingdom theology, where heaven is not an escape-pod  
 
At first, the emphasis on “reconciling all things to the creator” and of missional 
community appears to indicate an abstract kind of belonging without any 
tangible focus on social change. At this point, one recalls the Marxist idea of 
religion as being an opiate, a distraction from this-worldly justice. In Marx’s 
own terms: 
 
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the 
demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions 
about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that 
requires illusions (Marx 1844/2009: 131). 
 
Yet CTL directly contradicts this statement through its actions. The strong 
sense of mission discussed in the previous subsection is directed towards 
social justice. As will be discussed in more detail in the next section, the 
nature of these actions are complicated. On all issues, CTL seeks to 
simultaneously promote the use of parliament to implement structural change, 
and to promote changes in lifestyle. This explains why the idea of religion as 
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merely illusory is perhaps the main issue Paul sees himself as confronting. He 
suggests that his is 
 
a kind of holistic kingdom theology that…where heaven is not an escape 
pod, where heaven is not this kind of floaty, disembodied place in the 
sky but actually ummm…the concept of the fusion of heaven and earth 
into what revelation in scripture calls “the new heavens” and “the new 
earth” where actually we might describe the sphere, people talk about 
the sphere of, of, of heaven and the sphere of earth – earth being where 
ummm things are not perfect as yet and heaven being the place where 
things are perfect but there being this, at the moment there is kind of, if 
you imagine a ven-diagram from your maths classes you know the one 
where there’s this kind of sphere of heaven and the sphere of earth and 
the space where they do intersect and there’s this beautiful little 
intersection where there is love and joy and compassion and justice and 
mercy and you see kind of, you know, we might call it little bits of heaven 
or what ever you might call it in moments that happen in and out of every 
day that it’s nice to see them and the belief that there will be a day when 
those two spheres are actually fused and that is, you know this place of 
perfection, and that is what we are working towards and we can’t claim 
to be the soul creators of and Christians talk about demonstrating the 
kingdom, demonstrating that perfection in the way that we live now and 
living in expectation of it, living in hope of it. And actually I see that vision 
motivating people to get involved in a way that maybe an older theology 
of escape and escapist kind of dispensationalist way of looking at 
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theology where the kind of, the faith is primarily about buying that 
escape ticket…er…to get to that other place that disembodied place and 
that actually the physical place where we dwell now is just gonna burn 
up, is gonna disintegrate and we need to escape and fly off, which 
actually doesn’t provide any motivation to be involved in the environment 
in poverty because actually any time spent doing that, number one, the 
matter here is going to disintegrate anyway right but number two, ummm 
any time spent doing that would be time you’re not spending giving 
people their escape ticket for heaven so ummm so, it’s a belief in the 
kind of transformation of every dimension of human life so…  
 
Paul talks of “demonstrating the kingdom, demonstrating that perfection in the 
way that we live now and living in expectation of it, living in hope of it”. His 
voice sounds at its most reverent, deep and emotional when using this 
language, as though demonstrating the kingdom is his lifeblood. He speaks as 
an alluring preacher, and pulls on the strings of what little Christian sentiments 
I have.  
 
One can read in Paul’s language a kind of post-Marxist theology that regards 
involvement in bringing about material change as a key part of being 
Christian. Paul’s ideas almost perfectly replicate MacIntyre’s understanding of 
telos. For MacIntyre, while “it is true that the good life which is the telos 
culminates in contemplation of the divine and that therefore…the good life 
moves to a climax”, nonetheless “the telos is not something to be achieved at 
some future point, but in the way our whole life is constructed” (MacIntyre 
	 188	
1981/2007: 175). Alongside this, one might again consider the way that 
Maurice Bloch describes the transcendental social as a self-consciously 
irrational imaginary of how the world could be, that negates and thereby 
transforms the way that we relate to the world (Bloch 2010: 8-10). By 
constructing a “sphere of heaven” and “sphere of earth”, Paul is able to see 
“little bits of heaven” in earth, which in turn help him to believe in “a day when 
those two spheres are actually fused”: he develops “a negation of everyday 
understanding in order to construct an alternative reality” (Bloch 2010: 9). 
 
Dave has a similar position. He discusses the difficult task of challenging 
those who believe 
 
that the main focus of their church should be on kingdom, should be on, 
you know, the second coming, the return. And they should be saving as 
many Christians as possible so therefore they should be focusing on 
evangelising, sharing the gospel, being out in the world doing that and 
they don’t want to…shift their focus or spread their focus into other areas 
(Interview). 
 
CTL are very aware that heaven can be treated as an escape pod. Indeed, it 
would seem this awareness drives them to convince others to change: “we 
spend a lot of our time talking to Christians about politics and why they should 
be involved in politics and we believe politics to be missional”. 
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A key part of CTL’s work is teaching other Christians ways in which the Bible 
could be interpreted to call for political engagement. Using resources such as 
The Poverty and Justice Bible, an edition of the Bible in which all mentions of 
social justice have been highlighted, and The Bible and Politics, a bullet-point 
list of all the Biblical calls to engage with politics, the group offers guest 
lectures at seminaries, encouraging seminarians to engage with politics, and 
particularly focusing on seminaries known to be ambivalent towards political 
engagement.  
 
Of special note is the Salvation Army. I was taken along to a regular guest 
lecture at the seminary, in which Paul and Dave seek to convince training 
“officers” that involvement in politics is not just acceptable, but missional. 
While the students were attentive, they were nonetheless ambivalent towards 
the idea of political engagement. One student mentioned, to the murmuring 
agreement of a number of others, that Christians should “render unto Caesar 
the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s” (Field 
notes). This touches on the role of a shared narrative also. As discussion 
unfolded, the two sides of the debate were holding each other to account, 
drawing from and re-enacting a shared narrative. What was striking about this 
was that having a shared narrative did not require agreement; it only required 
that both sides understood the context. As the conversation continued, I felt 
myself being drawn in, weighing up the different sides, drawing on my own 
personal stories. Then another thing struck me: once again, without having a 
propositional belief in God or in Jesus as His son, I was comfortably able to 
participate in the narrative. As already stated, narrative does not need to be 
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monolithic or propositionally believed in to provide a shared framework for 
discussion.  
 
This discursive evangelism is also matched by the lived evangelism 
previously discussed. This lived evangelism is found in the devotion Paul and 
Dave offer to their work, while nonetheless finding the time and energy to be 
committed to loved ones. Despite the glitzy surroundings of Labour Party 
Headquarters, the work itself barely provides enough income to live on. In a 
frank conversation with Dave one day, I had the chance to discuss the 
difficulties of living on a low, part-time salary. He said that one often had to 
find ways to supplement income (Field notes). Other than these salaries, the 
organisation is dependent on the hard work of volunteers: from those in 
official roles, to interns. Alongside this devotion to the work, Paul and Dave 
devote much of their leisure time to supporting MPs on the campaign trail. 
“You can’t measure how much it uplifts them” says Paul on the way to one 
such visit (Field notes). And alongside this, they still seem to create the time 
to devote to loved ones.   
 
While it is clearly a sweeping generalisation to suggest that religion is a 
distraction from social justice, it is also clear that religion on its own does not 
provide an impetus for action. The strategies employed by Paul and Dave 
show that in fact, theology can be a useful tool in galvanising action, but at the 
same time, the ambivalence of their audience shows how theology can just as 
easily turn people away from action. Yet in both positions, it is a particular 
idea of the good that acts as a guide for action or inaction.  
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You don’t have to have Christian values, but we all have faiths 
 
The foregoing suggests that CTL have a clear sense of common agency that 
inspires belonging and is assertive in its stress on action. Yet one of the most 
striking things about Paul and Dave is that while their sense of theology is 
strong, they appear very liberal in their expectations of other people. I have 
already discussed how this liberality plays out in terms of my inclusion in the 
group. In this section, I demonstrate that this liberality is not incidental but 
reflexively constructed. Paul thinks that their ideas, or something similar to 
them, can be shared by people of all faiths and none:  
 
I think absolutely no you don’t have to have Christian values but then 
also that I don’t believe in the phrase you have no beliefs whatsoever, I 
think we all have beliefs, I think we all have faiths… for folks to say that 
they’re not, that we’re not operating out of a belief system, just because 
they’re not operating according to what we might call a more recognised 
belief system like Christianity you know or Islam that to be put in a 
separate category to someone whose belief system that’s been cobbled 
together from different things they’ve been exposed to…and I think that 
those are both equally belief systems that form their thinking and so I 
think absolutely you can come to a lot of the same conclusions having 
come from you know from some quite different roots…(Interview). 
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There is a clear theological view of seeking to realise moments of heaven on 
earth by drawing Christians into politics. But people of all faiths and none can 
share this view. Again Paul is demonstrating a reflexive awareness of his own 
faith relative to that of others and comfortably broadens the meaning of faith. 
 
The liberality extends beyond religion to political ideas and behaviours too. So 
for Dave 
 
I personally couldn't be a Christian and a...a...a Tory...I don't think the 
two...you know ergh...but that's my, that's me personally...I think there's 
an argument to be said that...that you put kingdom before partisanship 
and stuff...and that's fine...but me personally...I think those two...the 
two...the party values and the Christian values are so closely, so similar, 
that being a Christian socialist is just a very kind of natural progression 
for me...it makes sense. 
 
Dave was very clear that for him being Christian and socialist was very 
natural, but that he respected others’ right to follow different political 
programmes; an imagined Christian community is invoked that transcends 
party politics. This idea extends to the practices of CTL too, with a number of 
public events being organised jointly with the Conservative Christian 
Fellowship and the Liberal Democrat Christian Forum. And this liberality even 
extends into the core of CTL’s work: people’s involvement in politics. When I 
asked Paul if it was a duty to be involved in politics, he said… 
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I mean I’m not sure I’ll ever go as far as to say it’s your duty…I’m not 
gunna claim to know that about somebody but you do get an inkling 
about how somebody is gifted (Interview). 
  
Here the idea of duty, an ethical claim, appears to be dissolved into the idea 
of gift, a personal, spiritual claim, with the result being that duty cannot be 
questioned, since it is derived from one’s personal relationship with God.  
 
For CTL, the criteria for involvement are very loose. Yet they are perhaps only 
comfortable in so being because this liberality is offered in the same breath as 
a wider framing of everyone as having some sort of faith. This idea that “we all 
have faiths” punctuates the discussion. The imagined community is 
broadened but the difference of the other is also narrowed. CTL members are 
suggesting that their identity is already shared by everyone. 
 
Alongside this broader framing, however, is a deliberate challenging of the 
Habermasian distinction between religious and rational argument. For Paul 
we all have faiths on which we are acting, and so no discursive mode 
deserves priority over any other. For Paul, it is not the case that ideas of the 
good have faded in liberal secular societies, just that they have been excluded 
from, or at least devalued within the public sphere in a way that does not 
make sense. Moreover, contrary to Taylor, this assertion appears to break 
through the immanent frame, drawing on a transcendent frame: faith is not 
one option amongst many; we all have faiths, it is just a question of which 
one. 
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This devaluation speaks to another component of the “we all have faiths” 
assertion; namely, that the difference between religious and nonreligious 
people is not categorical but reflexive: “for folks to say that they’re not 
operating out of a belief system, just because they’re not operating according 
to what we might call a more recognised belief system” is wrong because in 
fact they are operating out of a “belief system that’s been cobbled together 
from different things they’ve been exposed to”, only perhaps without 
recognising this.  
 
Being upfront and saying that’s where you’re coming from 
 
Because faith of some kind is ubiquitous, rather than excluding faith from the 
public sphere, it is deemed important to critically understand, and to be open 
about one’s faith, since to do so makes one accountable to others.  
 
I think…I think…I think what’s helpful about having a kind of a formed 
established set of thinking that actually that Christian roots can bring 
means that there’s kind of…because you’re kind of being upfront and 
saying that’s where you’re coming from, there’s a bit of 
er….accountability about it. I see that other folks who share those roots 
can go “oh interesting, you’re coming from there but you think this…well 
I think this” (Interview). 
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What Paul is uncovering here is the way in which a deep tradition can be used 
to hold others to account. This idea of transparency for accountability directly 
challenges a Habermasian notion of the formal public sphere as operating on 
the basis of a neutral language. For Paul, all political positions are derived 
from beliefs. As Dinham has said, ‘nobody starts from nowhere’ (Dinham et al. 
2009). It is impossible to leave one’s beliefs at the door. Thus the only 
solution is to be open about those beliefs, to link them to wider traditions, and 
to bring them to the table where they can be challenged. 
 
This idea of transparency for accountability can also be seen as a strategy for 
building solidarity and the courage of conviction amongst members. For Dave, 
the important thing about being open about one’s beliefs, and creating a 
sense of community around those beliefs, is that it provides members with the 
courage of their conviction: 
 
or whether it's just saying, you know, you're not alone...there are plenty 
of Christians around here..um...and we're happy to, kinda help you 
speak and stuff and and I know you've previously heard me say it, 
"putting steel into their spines" a little bit and just giving them a little bit of 
that extra kind of strength and encouragement and confidence to stand 
up and say I'm an MP, and I'm a Christian, and this is what I believe 
(Interview). 
 
This idea of providing MPs with the courage of their conviction is so important 
to Paul and Dave because in British society, especially at the political level, 
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MPs seem to imbibe what Dan DeHanas has called “vicarious secularity”, 
whereby they feel the need to be secular on behalf of the wider population 
(DeHanas 2014). This disparity is problematic since there are times when 
Christian values come into direct conflict with secular values.  
 
Yet Dave’s position here is extremely controversial, since it suggests that 
people from a faith background have a legitimate role in using faith to 
influence politicians to vote in certain ways. In the case of this group it seems 
benign because all of their causes are to do with social justice. But it is not too 
far of a stretch to ask whether abortion might not be an issue of social justice, 
at which point we are entering into the territory where controversy over 
religious influence in politics is at its most visceral. 
 
Democratic framing 
 
I was most struck by the idea of simultaneously broadening the base and 
“being upfront and saying that’s where you’re coming from” when I was asked 
to be involved in administering questionnaires for the organisation’s change of 
name from the Christian Socialist Movement to Christians on the Left. Dave 
put the reason for this name change quite simply: “we are the Christian 
Socialist Movement and [the people we talk to] don’t see themselves as 
socialists” (Field notes). On the one hand, this point indicates that the name 
no longer reflects the wide array of people in the organisation, and so the 
name must be broadened, but it also demonstrates a desire to have the 
organisation be honest with itself about its position. 
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The name change involved a mass campaign, using an open question survey 
format, asking individual members to explain whether they wanted the name 
changed, why, and if so, what to. Hundreds of letters poured into the office. 
Again, Dave says: 
 
the part I’ve found most fruitful has been the actual, the conversations 
around we…do we want our name to reflect our values and if so what 
are our values? 
 
…it’s actually been really fruitful because it’s making people think what is 
CSM, what do we stand for, what do we do? (Interview) 
 
The idea is clearly not to simply “rebrand”, offering a broader base that 
captures the identity of more people, but also to make members critically 
question their membership. As one member put it: “we’re Christian, but are we 
socialist? Are we a movement?” (Field notes). This member, both in terms of 
the sarcastic tone, and in terms of the critical questioning, was broadly 
representative of the kind of responses received from a number of participants 
on a number of campaigns. The members wanted to be engaged as part of a 
movement. Often members felt an inclusive element was lacking, despite the 
efforts of the management. On another campaign, called the Parallel Policy 
Review, the group decided to include the wider membership in reviewing 
Labour Party Policy. We decided that the best way to do this was to have 
open strategy meetings in London, followed up by interactive online 
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discussions, both of which I administered. Upon sending out email invitations 
to these events, a number of responses were from disgruntled members with 
accusations of everything from my being “Londoncentric” for hosting the 
meetings in London, to my using “bad grammar”.  
 
While the name change demonstrates a belief that common agency, in terms 
of who the organisation is and how it perceives itself, transcends and informs 
common action, just what the constituting factor of common agency is and 
how it is to be constructed is hard to define in the face of the diversity of 
religion and ideology in the UK. We see here a complexification of the 
narrative put forward by Charles Taylor: rather than moving simply from ideas 
of common agency to common actions, this organisation engages in value-
generalisation, rendering its common agency more widely applicable. But 
more than a mere top-down reinvention of common agency, there is an 
attempt, with limited success, to inspire members themselves to be engaged 
in the negotiation of common agency. We thus see evidence of what might be 
called inclusive meaning formation or framing: a democratic and deliberative 
process. Since we are talking about the way that the name embodies the 
ideals of the group, we might describe this as socially constructing the sacred. 
With this notion of social construction in mind, we can develop Berger’s idea 
of alienation (Berger 1967). Berger observes a kind of alienation when people 
fail to recognise that their framing is socially constructed. The sarcasm of 
members here suggests another type of alienation occurs when members do 
not feel involved in social construction. 
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I don’t want to get boxed as a Christian 
 
I explained in the first subsection that the theology does not merely play out 
discursively, but also in the values and habits that define ones lifestyle. I 
suggested that this made it difficult to know whether one was being inspired 
by the discourse or by the actions, and indeed whether there could be a clear 
difference between the two. What I did not mention there is the extent to 
which this lived evangelism might be emblematic of Taylor’s immanent frame. 
People are aware that their ideas are falling into a market place of ideas. And 
CTL members may be especially aware of the potential toxicity of the 
Christian message. As Simon, a CTL member and prospective MP put it, 
even though his faith is integral to his identity… 
 
I don't want to get boxed as a Christian because if I do, that's useless. 
For that to be my primary badge would make me an irrelevance because 
it worries people. I've had lots of people who turn off as soon as they 
hear I'm Christian. Also, if your primary polling card is "I'm a Christian", 
they've got to ask what does that even mean? It could mean anything. 
People might hear "fundamentalist" or "you hate gay people" or "abusing 
boys". Or they remember at school how boring the vicar was. Or being 
told they can't do certain things because God will hate them for it 
(Interview) 
 
What is more, Simon is painting the worst-case scenario. For some, they 
simply do not want to talk about theory. Paul feels that endlessly deliberating 
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about what the constituting factor of common agency should be can get in the 
way of cultivating a sense of common agency, which is often far better done 
through common action: 
 
If you look at these interfaith forums where you get people of different 
faiths, Christians, Jews, Muslims sat down in a room together to agree 
on…trying to get them to agree on what God wants…you can take hours 
deliberating and of course they will never agree because they’re different 
faiths…but if you get them working together on a project, digging up a 
garden, that’s where they become friends…it’s the same thing, the same 
thing when you try and get young people together…if you ask young 
people want they want to do with their evening, do they want to get 
together in a church and deliberate about God or Marx, or do they want 
to dig up a garden…its always the garden they go for (Interview). 
 
In this discussion, Paul is suggesting that common agency is located in 
common action. And his anecdotal evidence suggests that getting together 
with a common project in mind is far more powerful than deliberating about 
ideas and trying to find shared ideals.  
 
It seems Paul’s point is that while common agency is important, the detail of 
what they mean often has to be put to one side in order to act. And indeed 
rather than a sense of common agency, it is often recognition of the virtue of 
particular acts that brings people together quite incidentally. This act may be 
as simple as digging up a garden.  
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Conclusion 
 
Observations of CTL’s strategies for negotiating solidarity present a challenge 
to the post-liberal idea that a transcendentally derived common agency is 
crucial to common action. CTL has a sense of common agency that 
transcends and informs common action, in prayer, in meetings, and in 
mission.  
 
Ideas of the sacred did not arise as useful tools for framing what was being 
said. Instead, Bloch proved useful in explaining how an imaginary is 
constructed that negates and therefore transforms our relationship with the 
everyday world. This construction provides belonging with a purpose, and one 
sees its impact in the lived evangelism or role-modelling of CTL members. 
 
It was suggested that CTL members construct the idea that all have faith, and 
that this is an inversion of the immanent frame, instead showing that people of 
faith may tend to construct a transcendent frame in which all have faith and 
thus all are on an equal footing in the public sphere.  
 
It was suggested that when common agency broadens too much, it 
undermines the predictability for common action. This points to a gap in 
discussions of social movement literature, which tends to suggest somewhat 
simplistically that the wider the appeal of the organisation, the greater its 
ability to motivate action.  
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Yet not only was I, without accepting the propositional belief in God, able to 
feel included, but also CTL members accept that many different faiths can 
lead to the same outlook as theirs. This begins to point to the possibility that 
one can be reflexively religious: holding faith with the transformative power of 
narratives without unreflectively believing in propositions. It also demonstrates 
the more obvious point that some people of faith are capable of performing 
this kind of reflexivity themselves.  
 
The name change moreover suggests that rather than simply broadening to 
seek the lowest common denominator such as “faith”, the constituting factor of 
common agency can be democratically opened up. The process of social 
construction itself is empowering.  
 
On top of this, CTL often finds itself putting theology to one side in order to 
focus on common goals that can be achieved. Contrary to my idea of the 
transcendent frame, this pragmatism seems to place my practitioners firmly 
within the immanent frame. These three points taken together, of reflexivity, of 
democratic social construction, and of putting theology to one side, suggest 
that CTL operate in a dialectical cycle between transcendent and immanent 
frames: at one moment constructing temples, at the next breaking down walls 
to let new people in, and subsequently rebuilding. 
 
Postliberal ideas are thus supported, complicated and challenged by these 
seeming contradictions in the way CTL lives out its vision. In the next section I 
	 203	
explore how this approach interacts with CTL’s attitude towards political 
structures and their influence on common agency.  
 
Political structures and common agency 
 
The last section suggested that a shared theology of action was extremely 
important to members of CTL, but that the organisation had undergone a 
process of value generalisation, such that the particular theology and action 
involved was very hard to decipher. This section suggest that this vagueness 
sits uneasily with CTL’s approach towards political structures, but that the 
apparent contradiction leads to innovative practices. 
 
I begin by explaining the emphasis CTL places on conventional politics, or 
what I call positional power. I then suggest that this stress may be at odds 
with CTL’s influence, and I seek to understand why.  
 
We can get meetings with fairly senior people in the Labour Party 
 
In the first section I suggested that despite being housed in Labour 
Headquarters, with all the associated glamour, CTL manages to carve out a 
distinctive voice, deliberately juxtaposing itself against the competitive world in 
which it is situated, negating that world and thereby transforming it. This point 
notwithstanding, there are also ways in which CTL make use of the power of 
Westminster.  
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we can get meetings with fairly senior people in the Labour Party, we're 
sat in the Leader of the Labour Party's office at the moment 
 
Tim 
 
Right 
 
Dave 
 
So...as you can imagine, it's fairly easy for us to phone his staff up and 
get a meeting with him and, you know, talk to him, talk to his advisors, 
and we do that ummm...we try and...engage in kind of measured 
conversations around...whatever Christian issues happen to be at the 
time, I mean they change from...you know, year to year...and, and but 
also what we do is we spend a lot of time working with Christian MPs, 
ummm and Christian councillors and Christian magistrates and and try 
and you know, encourage them and support them in their work...and you 
know, whether that's just, providing briefing documents and stuff so that 
they've kind of got, you know, a level of knowledge on on on a given 
issue...or whether it's just saying, you know, you're not alone...there are 
plenty of Christians around here..um...and we're happy to, kinda help 
you speak and stuff and and I know you've previously heard me say it, 
"putting steel into their spines" a little bit and just giving them a little bit of 
that extra kind of strength and encouragement and confidence to stand 
up and say I'm an MP, and I'm a Christian, and this is what I believe 
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CTL places a lot of emphasis on positional power. It is deemed important to 
be in Labour Party Headquarters, since it is possible to “get meetings with 
fairly senior people”, and thereby influence policy making. This power can be 
seen in its ongoing ability to draw senior MPS and peers, not only to meetings 
but to public events, from conferences to get-togethers.  
 
This kind of soft power is made most obvious when CTL holds public events 
in auspicious venues. I have already mentioned that they hold prayer 
meetings in Portcullis House. Similarly, CTL policy events are often held in 
Labour Party Headquarters, while public talks are held in key Westminster 
venues, usually Methodist Central Hall. Holding meetings and events in these 
locations give CSM an aura of positional power.   
 
This power to meet people and to book exclusive venues, however, does not 
always translate into power of influence, as has already been indicated in the 
case of the invasion of Iraq. Similarly, in my time at the organisation, there 
was a campaign against the proposed suspension of the Sunday Trading Act 
for the duration of the London Olympic Games.  As of the Sunday Trading Act 
of 1994, while small shops are allowed to open without restriction, stores over 
280m2 are restricted to opening for six hours between the hours of 10am and 
6pm. The coalition government intended to suspend this restriction for the 
period covering the London Olympic Games. In its campaign against the 
suspension, CTL put together a briefing document and as part of it, I made 
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personal phone calls to its forty-four MPs, explaining the CTL position and 
asking for information on which way they would vote. The campaign failed.  
 
The Sunday Trading campaign demonstrates the important role CTL places 
on legislation in restricting the market so as to ensure common agency. It is 
assumed that in an entirely free market, people themselves will not be free. 
Employer pressure and financial pressure will push employees to choose 
work over leisure.   
 
But perhaps more significantly, the Sunday Trading campaign shows that 
despite its emphasis on being in Labour Party Headquarters, CTL cannot 
influence voting even on relatively insignificant issues. As suggested in the 
previous section, this lack of influence might be related to the value-
generalisation the organisation has undergone, leaving it with a membership 
of people vaguely described as “Christians on the Left”, rather than having a 
clearly defined purpose. It is not clear what is meant by either “Christian” or 
“on the Left”, and the voting intentions of MPs are entirely unpredictable. 
 
An odd contradiction seems to be emerging. The last section explored the 
desire to reconcile all things to the creator; a clear vision around which a 
strong sense of belonging was created. This vision demanded an orientation 
towards political engagement. In both cases however, it was accepted that all 
people have faiths, and that it was plausible for one’s faith to lead in an 
entirely different political direction. It was moreover suggested that often faith 
has to be put to one side in order to develop pragmatic relationships. When 
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we move into an analysis of political structures, a similar contradiction 
emerges: legislation plays an important role in shaping common agency, but 
there is no pressure on member MPs to vote for particular legislative 
agendas.  
 
There are perhaps three ways of understanding these difficulties, one of 
which can be briefly explored now, the other two of which will be explored in 
the following subsections. The first is that we must recall the political 
juxtaposition that CTL embody. They role-model a different kind of politics. As 
suggested in the previous section, rather than “a club” or “a political party”, 
they aim to be “a movement” that acts as “a support and a resource for 
Christians…involved in the political process”. 
 
This politics is inherently contradictory: it is about living out an idea of politics 
that deliberately negates the everyday world of rational choice. The 
contradiction is the point. Again, drawing from Bloch, the idea is that living out 
an imagined community that contradicts the everyday world, it is hoped that 
the latter will be transformed.  
 
CTL appears to take on what David Graeber calls a “prefigurative” approach, 
being the change it wants to see. It follows that members are regarded as part 
of a shared movement, and cannot be treated as instruments in the delivery of 
policy.  Yet it is also worth questioning the extent to which the organisation 
manages to be a movement, as pointed about by the critical member I 
referred to in the previous section. Sat at my desk in Labour Party 
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Headquarters, I certainly felt powerful and influential, but I also felt distant 
from the kind of politics we were promoting, and the kind of people were 
supposed to be engaging. As negative conversations between CTL members 
outside of London and me referred to in the previous section suggest, the 
location within the centre of traditional power could be counterproductive for 
engaging people on the ground. 
 
As Christians we find it quite easy to be the good Samaritan, the harder thing 
is to go back to the Jericho road to stop anybody else getting mugged 
 
The second way of understanding the contradiction of prioritising positional 
power without utilising it is that CTL works to get likeminded people politically 
engaged, transforming the system from within. Getting Christians involved in 
politics is perhaps the main drive of CTL. Even when all else is missed, it is 
this clear aim that interns pick up on (Field notes): 
 
I think a big part of our campaigning is encouraging Christians to think 
politically and act politically…er…there’s a great tradition in the church, 
there are two things in the church there are probably a great tradition of I 
think there’s a tradition of charity and a great tradition of protest. Umm 
you look down through the centuries and there’s just so many…I won’t 
go into them now for ease of…for speed but you know there’s a great 
tradition of both things. And so I think that sort of DNA is picked up by 
people in 2012. And we’re encouraging people to I guess take the next 
step beyond charity and beyond protest to actual positive engagement 
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being involved in making a case and being involved in campaigning 
within the structures and the systems that actually do form the fabric of 
the nation…rather than throwing stones, doing the protest thing – much 
as we’re, you know, affirming and advocating the need for protest, we’re 
saying there’s an awful of people doing that and an awful lot of people 
doing the charity thing but as Desmond Tutu famously says we need to 
not just be pulling the bodies out of the river we need to be going up 
stream to see who’s pushing them in and then once we find out who’s 
putting them in not just to shout about it but to actually be involved in 
seeing change happen to be part of…to be those who are making law as 
well as those who are critiquing… 
  
…this…and all of these things…you can bet your life all of these things 
are going to be decided by people sat around very dull committee room 
tables and it’s going to be far less exciting than actually helping 
somebody up-close at the grassroots and so there’s a…there’s a kind of 
a need to kind of say look, let’s affirm the fantastic stuff that people are 
involved in but say surely for some of you there’s a call, there is a 
possibility that you could be involved a little bit…you know…a little bit 
back further down the river…to use Tutu’s example again (Interview). 
 
This stress on getting Christians involved in politics is not limited to getting 
them politically engaged.  
 
Tim  
	 210	
 
Okay so in a way it’s about trying to build connections between people 
who are passionate about social justice and the actual people making 
the laws – would that be fair to say? 
 
Paul 
 
Well…it does create that connection…ummm…but I think it’s an 
encouragement for folks to themselves as having the potential to be the 
people that could be making those laws... 
 
Tim  
 
Right..oh okay 
 
Paul 
 
…rather than this glass ceiling that people imagine. I don’t think it’s true 
just for Christians in the church I think it’s true for most of the populace 
that they do see the political class as a different class… 
 
Tim  
 
Yeah  
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Paul 
 
…that our job is to comment, to critique, to read the newspapers, to 
know who to complain, to vote… 
 
Tim 
 
And so when… 
 
Paul 
 
…and so that’s the kind of glass ceiling of our citizenship rather than 
thinking there could be either involvement in any kind of intermediary 
institution or that there could be an involvement in the political 
process…that they could, they could stand, they could join a political 
party, they could get involved in research they could, you know…all the 
different ways they could actually be involved in the in that in the political 
process…often, either number one don’t occur to people or number two 
they don’t feel they’ve got the tools or the access… 
 
Paul is actively criticising the understanding of the public sphere as merely a 
place where we engage by reading and thinking about politics. He wants 
people to consider the many ways in which they can actively engage in the 
political process. 
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…so partly what we’re trying to do is to give people access, to help 
people build relationships to do that, to do that relationally and well, and 
in a way that’s hopefully not, not just I guess constrained and…the other 
‘con’ word that I’m trying to think of…eh……..conformed to the main 
methodology which kind of eh…the political orthodoxy that says you 
have to do this, you have to do it this way, join the think-tank you know 
that…I guess that relationship we have in politics now comes from 
coming through being involved in think-tanks being involved in getting 
the right jobs the right, in the right places working for MPs being involved 
in the kind of, in the…the metropolitan bubble. And we’re trying to 
encourage folks who are actually folks who are involved in grassroots 
working in community and saying to them you are actually best placed to 
be representing the people you are working with, you have seen 
problems at first hand, folks who are involved in youth work, community 
work, work with drug rehabilitation, work with debt counselling, you know 
 
Paul was trying to push that ordinary people could become the elites, and that 
they would naturally maintain their connections on the ground.  Paul clearly 
sees this process as creating ripples and ruptures in the “dirty game” of 
professionalised politics.  
 
This idea is epitomised in the Future Candidates scheme, which develops 
prospective MPs. What Paul’s method actually involves, in this and other 
schemes, is networking with socially active Christians, building relationships 
with those he feels particularly inspired by, and encouraging them over a 
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series of meetings to take the next step. A number of Christians active in 
political campaigning that I met during and after my time with the group, as 
critical as they may have been about the group’s lack of effectiveness 
elsewhere, nonetheless told me that the group provided their first taste of self-
belief (Field notes). Often this was by allowing ordinary people to see that 
those in power are no more intelligent or talented than they are: getting 
socially active Christians to recognise that they are up to the task. As Simon, 
the prospective MP put it, Gary introduced him to MPs and helped him to 
recognise “I could do that”. In my time at the organisation I experienced this 
same transition. I suggested earlier that when I first visited, I felt like I was 
awaiting a job interview, such was the lofty professionalism of those 
surrounding me. My blood pressure rose every time I encountered an MP or 
special advisor, and I avoided speaking to more senior MPs. But over time, 
being up-close and personal, thinking about the experience, education, 
prospects, intelligence and charisma of these MPs and advisors, being privy 
to negative conversation about them, and being involved in conversations and 
public meetings with them, I slowly realised that they were human beings, and 
that I was just as capable of some things as they were. I heard this same 
story reflected back to me by other CTL members time and again.  
 
Yet despite CTL’s best efforts, there remain a number of reasons the people 
he works with “don’t want to be involved politically”. Perhaps the strongest 
deterrent is in the direct sense of fulfilment people derive from living out their 
theology at the grassroots level: 
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often the folks who are drawn in that direction are also the folks 
who…eh…passionately don’t wanna stop doing the grassroots work that 
they’re doing…eh…because they see it being fruitful and effective… 
 
Tim 
 
Right 
 
Paul 
 
…it’s, it’s, it’s, it’s you know it’s the Good Samaritan example you know I 
often quote this story, what Martin Luther King said about the story of the 
Good Samaritan, whereby he said, look, actually, ummm often as 
Christians we find it quite easy to be the Good Samaritan, there’s a kind 
of, kind of an innate, you hope there’s kind of an innate compassion, 
ummm and there is actually a real buzz from helping somebody in a kind 
of a hand to hand, face to face kind of way, that immediate connection 
you have with people…ummm…it…ummm…there’s a…ummm….there’s 
a buzz out of that there’s a kind of sense, you know, there’s a…it’s a 
fulfilling thing…to do, to see somebody be helped out, whether it’s just 
for a day or whether you see somebody actually take steps towards you 
know more sustainable long-term transformation in their lives, that’s a 
very powerful thing to see and be involved in and by motivating you 
continue doing it, but he says that the harder thing a lot of the time for 
Christians and other nonbelievers is to go back to the Jericho Road to 
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work out how to stop anybody else getting mugged….you know…you 
might need more cctv cameras, you might need more policing, you might 
need more security, you know, might be better lighting 
 
Because people are so inspired by the face-to-face work that they do, they do 
not want to get involved in politics, which inevitably involves bureaucratic 
work. But there are also more negative views of politics that deter people from 
getting involved: 
 
…whether that’s that they don’t agree with everything the party stands 
for…politics is just a dirty game they’re all in it to make…I don’t want to 
be part of that pantomime where I have to check in my brain at the 
door…like at prime minister’s questions. The fact that actually the way 
that I’m seeing change happen at grassroots level is actually far faster 
and more effective than anything I could do from a centralised position, a 
legislative position… 
 
There are a number of facets at work here: whereas individuals may be 
passionate about single issues, parties are broad and made up of multiple 
opinions on various issues. Signing up to a party may involve compromising 
one’s integrity. Related to this, politics is seen as a “dirty game” where focus 
is on personality and power rather than service. Politics is perceived as a 
place corrupted by the desire to save face in front of the public, as a result of 
which far too little time is spent making “change happen” on the ground. The 
final point is about seeing “change happen”: not only is politics less effective 
	 216	
than it could be, but one does not get to see the impact of one’s work in a 
relational way; one does not see individual lives improve.  On top of this, even 
people who do want to get involved in politics are often excluded financially, 
as will be picked up further in the next section.  
 
Inwards and outwards 
 
The final, and perhaps most important point about being in a position of power 
without utlising it, alongside practising the politics they wish to see and getting 
more Christians involved in conventional politics, was the notion of facing 
simultaneously inwards and outwards: inwards by building a sense of 
missional community within Westminster that can create pressure for change, 
but also outwards to the wider membership and wider public, seeking to 
create a similar sense of belonging that can spread across the country, both 
virtually by using online platforms, and physically by engaging with likeminded 
people on the ground.  
 
A campaign which illustrates the way they wanted to change the party was 
Labour Neighbours, which sought to simultaneously reform local parties by 
turning them from being election winning machines to social action 
galvanising machines; and to encourage more people to get involved in local 
party politics. Local party organisers were to change their activity, becoming 
more like community organisers. Rather than taking centrally devised policies 
and selling them to constituents, organisers would ask constituents what were 
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the biggest problems they faced, and encourage them to be involved in 
formulating a solution. Dave explained: 
 
[The party is] organising more...um...around communities...rather than 
just being an election winning machine. I mean, it was a very good 
election winning machine. But people have kind of moved on from that, I 
think the general population want a bit more than that, we've had the 
kind of recent loss of trust in politics because politics has become 
more...professional… 
 
...rather than actually looking at addressing real concerns and problems 
and issues...ummm, and the party's now moving towards a more issue-
based model of not just wanting loads of people to deliver more leaflets 
because there's an election in May...it's more about kind of year-round 
campaigning and year-round problem solving 
 
What emerges here is an idea of service irrespective of power, with parties 
working for local populations, whether or not they are winning elections: ‘We 
need to show that we want to serve people whether or not we are in power’ 
(Field notes). This way of looking at conventional politics, reforming it from 
within, turning it inside out both by bringing outsiders in, and by shifting the 
culture of those within to make them focused on collectively solving problems, 
demonstrates the ways in which critiques of the power of the state and 
recognition of its necessity might be reconciled. MacIntyre’s critique of the 
power of the state in terms of its tendency to co-opt is dissolved because here 
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the party behaves more like a community organisation empowering local 
people and institutions (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 103). Milbank’s fear that the 
state is founded on an ontology of evil is further resolved, because the state 
becomes a key mechanism for placing public trust in local groups and people.  
 
Labour Neighbours also provides an excellent example of how, 
notwithstanding internal reform being the main objective, alongside this 
inward reform, the group also sought to change the behaviour of ordinary 
people. As a piece of campaign literature explained: 
 
Our nation has seen too much of those who espouse certain policies but 
whose lifestyles look no different to anyone else. There are also plenty 
of us who studiously model a different way of living that springs from a 
different set of values, yet step back from arguing to see those values 
fleshed out in public policy. Both are required, and to be a movement, 
you need both (Flannagan 2012). 
 
A good example of this dual model, facing simultaneously inwards to 
Wesminster and outwards to the wider public was their “Put Your Money 
Where Your Mouth Is” campaign, which simultaneously pressured 
Westminster to separate retail and investment banking, and to tax bankers’ 
bonuses; and encouraged ordinary people to change their pensions, 
investments and bank accounts to more ethical companies.   
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Ostensibly CTL demonstrates how states can change to simultaneously meet 
and challenge the shift from citizenship to consumerism, opening up the 
hierarchichal structures to draw new people in, and yet in so doing, 
encouraging those people to behave like citizens. Yet notwithstanding this 
optimistic possibility, in reality the Christian social movement was far too small 
and geographically bound an organisation to bring about any real change. 
This is a flaw CTL members recognise themselves: 
 
I think government would be very different if it worked in a more 
relational way but I don't know...it's difficult to do it, because we can do 
that on a one-to-one basis, whereas the government has to do that for 
70 million people...it's a difficult thing to do...you'd have to have a hell of 
a lot of civil servants (Interview) 
 
Only by creating networks with other actors on the ground can CTL hope to 
bring about the kind of changes it wishes to see. And yet, as indicated in the 
previous section, what stands in the way is CTLs Christianity. In a long 
discussion with the leader of a major organisation on the ground, it was 
suggested that they could not work with this movement specifically because of 
its Christian branding, not because they had any aversion to Christianity, but 
because it was perceived as a precarious association amongst the wider 
public, which might make it difficult to galvanise action amongst non-
Christians (Field notes).  
 
Conclusion 
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Chapter 2 explains that MacIntyre criticises Tawney’s support of a welfare 
state on the basis that it is in the support of managers, not workers. Yet CTL 
demonstrates it is possible to simultaneously work with the state while 
intending to reform it from within. It should be stressed, however, that the 
ability to reform positional power from within appears questionable given the 
limited campaign success of CTL, and the lack of direct change which 
activists crave.  
 
CTL also shows a way of turning power inside out, not only by bringing critics 
of power into a position of power, themselves developing the leadership 
potential of socially active people, but also by encouraging those in positions 
of power to change their political practice, working to empower ordinary 
people and develop leadership.  
 
Yet this section closes by pointing out that the base is not yet broad enough to 
galvanise support amongst the wider public. The constituting factor of 
common agency is in this way deeply implicated in the kind of politics that is 
viable.  
 
Economic context and common agency 
 
The first section noted a paradox in CTL’s underpinning: while it offered a 
strong theological sense of belonging with a clear call to social action, it was 
nonetheless open to the place of other theologies and political practices. In 
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the next section, this paradox is seen to cause problems, since despite its 
stress on positional power, CTL does not lobby its members. Although 
potential solutions can be seen in its engagement of Christians, its criteria for 
membership remains so open that even a very large membership would 
remain unpredictable in its voting. Finally, it is suggested that these 
paradoxes can be reconciled in CTL’s attempt to turn power inside out, but 
that even this approach would meet difficulties, since its branding as Christian 
instantly switches off some.  
 
This section explores how the theological and political interplay with attitudes 
towards economic structures. It has already been suggested that CTL sees an 
important role for the state in restricting certain business practices in order to 
protect certain ideas of community and the family. A brief discussion has also 
been offered of how the inwards and outwards model is reflected in the Put 
Your Money Where Your Mouth Is campaign, whereby CTL simultaneously 
lobbied for the legally enforced separation of retail and investment banking 
and encouraged individuals to move their savings to more ethical investors. 
Here I suggest that notwithstanding a negative attitude towards structural 
issues associated with capitalism, CTL can be seen to work pragmatically 
within a capitalist market.  
 
The focus has been on how much inequality and injustice there is in the way 
the current economic system works 
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Structural issues associated with capitalism act as a key inspiration for those 
involved in CTL. Fighting against structural issues was perhaps the chief 
motivation for Dave: 
 
What problems do you see the organisation as responding to?  
 
Dave 
 
Ummm…I think inequality is something that we notice quite a lot. It’s 
finding ways to address that inequality. So it might well be 
um…um…inequality of class, inequality in economic state, the kind of, 
the most recent stuff, the last couple of years has been, a lot of the focus 
has been on how much inequality and injustice there is in the way the 
current economic system works and…how…that focus on greed and the 
lack of focus on the common good and community has driven…driven 
us to the way we ended up in 2008 with the banks crashing and people 
up to their eyes in debt and all that kind of stuff that um…that happened 
over a number of years and happened because [it is a] fundamentally 
unfair system and I think that that’s the main thing we address, inequality 
 
Similarly for Simon, structural causes of inequality is the reason he entered 
into politics: 
 
My first choice was working for NGOs on the ground. And then at some 
point, I worked out where poverty comes from, and that it was largely to 
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do with the global economic system, which makes some countries rich 
and some poor, just as the UK makes some places rich and some 
places poor. So I saw myself as dealing with the consequences of that 
system. Instead I wanted to get into politics and change that system 
(Interview). 
 
This structural analysis feeds into a critique of the political system, which is 
perceived as being at the behest of big money: 
 
you can hide behind the word freedom and actually sometimes freedom 
means the people with the most money get to say the most 
 
Tim  
 
Mmmm 
 
Paul 
 
That’s actually what it means. Without structures and frameworks…that 
are designed for the common good, which inevitably involves some sort 
of regulation which inevitably involves some sort of legislation  
 
Tim  
 
Right 
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Paul 
 
Actually those with the most cash and those with the most clout and 
those with the most power, tend to win most debates and most, you 
know, most scenarios. 
 
What is more, this influence of money in politics is hard to fight, since it is 
usually those with some sort of money in the first place that are able to run for 
public office: 
 
A lot of those folks do not feel they have the finances or the resources to 
be involved in politics … 
 
… it’s a kind of very precarious place to be…you don’t know if you’re 
going to get a job at the end of the job application process…quite a long 
job application process. And it’s a process that requires a lot of money 
and a lot of funding to fight a campaign. And it would also potentially 
mean taking quite a lot of time off work so people would have to work 
part-time. It’s a precarious place and so…and a lot of the folks who are 
involved in that grassroots work are not being paid in sums that allow 
them that freedom (Interview).  
 
This financial issue was particularly evident with Simon. Having decided he 
was called to be an MP, Simon had left his job and fought a number of 
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elections. Simon, in his forties, had moved out of is home in London and was 
living with his parents in Sheffield. When not campaigning, he would oscillate 
between Sheffield and London, one week living with his parents, the next 
week sleeping on a friend’s sofa. And Simon himself was only able to make 
these sacrifices because he had substantial savings to rely on. 
 
It is worth noticing how CTL’s attitude towards positional power directly feeds 
into and is inspired by their critique of the spread of capitalism. CTL members 
see a direct link between structural inequality, and the influence of big 
business at the centre of political power. This power is not only direct, but also 
indirect in that those who tend to have gained from the economic status quo 
are also those with the money and time to be politically engaged. The attempt 
to make Christian social activists politically engaged then, should be read in 
the context of garnering a shared spirit of association against the spread of 
capitalist ideology.  
 
CTL’s chief campaign against structural inequality is Put your Money Where 
Your Mouth Is: 
 
we had the campaigning last year called the Put Your Money Where 
Your Mouth Is campaign where, which was in and around encouraging 
folks to campaign on macro-economic issues in terms of shareholder 
liability in terms of financial transaction tax, in terms of you know ummm 
ethical finance in general but also look at what they’re doing with their 
own finances so asking folks to look into credit unions asking folks to the 
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look into the ethics of the banks they’re working with asking folks to look 
at their own shareholdings to say look are you happy with how your 
money is being spent. Like one of the strap lines for the campaign was 
that look quite happy to talk about money being our money when we’re 
giving it to help build new wells in a village in you know in the centre of 
Africa but then when our money goes to a multinational in Africa to be 
involved in some exploitative mining practice by a multinational quite 
suddenly it’s not our money anymore…I just give my money to my 
investment advisor, my financial advisor and you know he does what he 
thinks is best and it’s not my moral responsibility. It’s fascinating I think 
how we create that disconnect between us and our ethics and our 
money and so we’re just trying to recreate that connection and draw the 
lines between the macroeconomic policy and the micro (Interview). 
 
Campaigning on shareholder liability means seeking to restore the right of 
consumers to sue shareholders if, by going bust, a company leaves 
consumers out of pocket. This move is recognised by campaigners as being 
anti-capitalist, since they admit that limited liability leads to rapid economic 
growth. Their criticism is to do with how limited liability undermines 
responsibility, stewardship, and relationships. The organisation thus 
campaigns to recognise in law the priority of virtue over profit. The financial 
transaction tax campaign aims to place a tax on the trade of financial products 
such as stocks and bonds, in order to provide greater funds for social services 
and international development.   
 
	 227	
These campaigns are read as being against capitalism in that they prioritise 
virtue and the common good over profit. People are encouraged to unite and 
campaign on the basis of Christian or ethical beliefs. The campaigns 
regarding shareholder liability and the financial transaction tax draw on 
Biblical arguments about debt and stewardship.  
 
Working within the capitalist system 
 
Notwithstanding this stress on structural change, as made clear in the 
previous section, Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is is not only a 
structural campaign but a grassroots one too, encouraging people to move 
their savings to more ethical investors. In this sense, the organisation is 
working with the capitalist system, seeking to develop ethical consumerism. 
Facing outwards to the wider population, people are encouraged to alter their 
lifestyles to prioritise virtue over profit, moving their money from unethical 
investors and towards more ethical investors. What is striking here is that it 
demonstrates the connection between the ethics of companies we deplore, 
and our own ethics: consumers can only force companies to prioritise virtue 
over profit if they themselves prioritise virtue over profit, moving their money 
to more ethical companies which may offer a lower rate of return. As one CTL 
member put it, the campaign to make individuals move their money draws on 
the idea in the gospel of Matthew that where one’s treasure is, one’s heart is 
(Field notes).  
 
Conclusion  
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CTL are aware of the importance of “regulation which inevitably leads to some 
sort of legislation” in order to have as wide an impact as possible. Alongside 
this focus on legislation, there is an equal focus on ethical consumerism, 
encouraging more ethical behaviour from both above and below. 
 
All facets of CTL’s campaigns draw on biblical messages to inspire shared 
action. What emerges here is the importance of drawing on what Durkheim 
would call mechanic forms of solidarity, based on shared values and 
traditions, in order to inculcate a sense of organic solidarity, that is solidarity 
based on reciprocity within a capitalist system. 
 
Yet the failing of this organisation is in its lack of take up, and in the 
impossibility of knowing what impact they have had: how many of its 
legislative agendas have in fact been taken up, and how many people have 
they encouraged to move their money to more ethical banks? Again, this 
points to issues arising out of the section on politics, namely, the lack of a 
connection between the beliefs and actions of those at the centre, and the 
beliefs and actions of those on the ground.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the way that CTL lives out its politics in a 
paradoxical way: it simultaneously creates a strong sense of community 
around a broad base of Christianity on the political left, while being open to 
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the idea that one need not be Christian to land on the left, nor to be on the left 
to be Christian. One result is a culture of shared becoming, with pressure 
arriving from the desire to role model a particular way of life, rather than, 
contra Milbank, from fear of retribution. Yet another result is that the actions of 
members are largely unpredictable, and one is left questioning what it means 
to be a member of CTL. Despite Paul’s desire to be a movement, rather than 
a club, the organisation can appear reminiscent of a group whose sole aim is 
to gather in mutual solidarity. 
 
This unpredictability causes problems for CTL in light of their stress on the 
importance of legislation for bringing about their worldview. Since a successful 
legislative agenda depends on galvanising widespread support, amongst not 
only member MPs, but also the wider membership and the wider public, a 
clear, united voice seems important. The CTL leadership does not necessarily 
agree. Yet the second section explains that for CTL leaders, the idea of a 
united movement, inculcating uniformity to promote a clear legislative agenda 
is alien from a movement, and closer to the idea of a political party. As a 
movement, CTL hopes to transcend “the dirty game”, instead working for a 
prefigurative politics, in which a sense of belonging for its own sake is at the 
centre of political action at all levels. To put this in Blochian terms, there is a 
transcendent practice of politics to which the transactions involved in political 
life ought to conform. This inclusive politics similarly influences CTL’s facing 
outwards to the wider public. Rather than rejecting traditional power, CTL 
seeks to turn traditional power inside out. All of CTL’s actions involve not only 
encouraging those in power to develop leadership skills in ordinary people, 
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but also encouraging ordinary people to think more politically about their own 
lifestyles. Yet here it was suggested that CTL suffered an opposite problem to 
that of having a clearly defined aim; instead, it needed to broaden its appeal 
beyond Christianity, if not drop “Christian” from its name altogether, in order to 
galvanise public support.  
 
The final section turns to economic structures. It suggests that the strong 
focus on the state is largely based on the need for legislation to protect 
traditional institutions such as the family in the face of big business. It also 
shows how CTL works with the market, drawing on mechanic solidarity in the 
guise of biblical narrative to inspire organic solidarity, encouraging consumers 
to behave more ethically. 
 
CTL demonstrates how a Christian theology can still play a dynamic role in 
cultivating a spirit of association in a religiously and ideologically diverse 
world. Around transcendent ideas such as “the reconciliation of all things in 
creation to the creator”, CTL manages to create a strong sense of belonging, 
while being open to, and in some cases welcoming of different theological 
perspectives. More than just including different perspectives, they seek to 
include people in the process of developing a theology. This point 
notwithstanding, there are times in which this open theological position, with 
its strong stress on political action encourages CTL to drop theology 
altogether in order to work towards the common good, such as “digging up a 
garden”. I suggested that CTL were enveloped in an ongoing dialectic 
between transcendent and immanent frames. 
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It might moreover be suggested that when theology is put to one side, 
common actions still differ from social contracts, since the inspiration to act is 
theologically derived, rather than reflecting rational choice. This transcendent 
ideal offers a context for CTL to show a different practice of politics, even at 
the very centre of traditional power. This transcendent ideal, drawing on a 
strong biblical tradition, also helps them to inspire political engagement and 
lifestyle changes, inspiring ordinary people to role model a different way of 
living.  
 
Unfortunately, no matter how broad the theological message gets, the 
organisation continues to alienate both some of its own members, and the 
wider public. Part of the issue is organisational: there is a failure to fully 
engage all members, to give them a sense of being engaged in the 
construction of the meanings that shape the organisation and thereby their 
own lives. But part of the problem is theological: the Christian label itself is 
alienating. The following chapters will show how difficult it is to frame the 
constituting factor of common agency without alienating members. 
Organisations that do not pay any reference to transcendent ideals struggle to 
create any sense of association. But those organisations that loosely talk 
about faith, seeking to hold onto what they perceive as a unique take on how 
to inhabit the world, while hoping that the concept can be loosened to the 
point of having universal resonance, find themselves facing both problems 
simultaneously: still not elastic enough to have universal appeal, and too 
loose to galvanise any substantial support.  
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Chapter 8: Case Study II: Hackney Council of 
Voluntary Service 
 
Hackney Council of Voluntary Service became an important organisation in 
my study because I was frustrated by my inability to find an organisation that 
was representative of unreflective unbelief. Much interesting work has been 
done recently demonstrating how ostensibly secular organisations, such as 
the National Secular Society or the British Humanist Association, in fact take 
on very similar formats and focal points to the religions they are rejecting, 
hence they become defined as “non-religions”, being defined against either a 
particular religion, or all religions. The result is that it becomes difficult to claim 
that such organisations, and their methods for developing a spirit of 
association, are representative of people for whom religion is of no 
significance: unreflective unbelievers. What I wanted instead was an 
organisation that simply did not make reference to religion in its activities. I 
found this characteristic in HCVS during my exploratory sampling. 
 
HCVS is unreligious in that it makes no reference to religion in its founding 
principles, in its stated aims, or in the vocalised objectives of members of 
staff. This point notwithstanding, as will be seen in the next section, HCVS is 
nonetheless founded in and strives for ideals similar to those put forward by 
postliberals: empowered, virtuous and political communities.  
 
As in the previous chapter, I begin with a brief context of the organisation, 
before discussing the constituting factor of common agency. I then move on to 
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explore the perceived relationship between political structures and common 
agency, and economic context and common agency.  
 
Context 
 
Colin Rochester has explained that CVSs originated out of the pioneering 
work of Thomas Hancock Nunn, a Christian social reformer. Hancock's aim 
was to establish a "broadly based body that would combine the resources of 
‘all the churches, all the municipal bodies and all the voluntary associations in 
a given local government area’" (Rochester 2012: 103). CVSs thus spring 
from the period of Christian associationism lauded by Prochaska, and 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4 (Prochaska 2006). From their outset 
CVSs can be regarded as combining the resources of multiple institutions, 
without prioritising any one in particular. By 1945, Bourdillon suggests, the 
role was more clearly defined, and additionally had a distinct ideological 
agenda: 
 
to survey the social needs of the area as a whole, and, where it 
perceives a gap, to initiate action. Only if no other body can suitably 
meet the new need should the Council itself take direct action, and 
where it does so it will be on the understanding that the new activity is 
to be floated off as an independent organization, or passed over to 
some other body at the earliest possible moment (Bourdillon in 
Rochester 2012: 103) 
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CVSs would act directly where necessary, but prioritised the grassroots action 
of organisations established in the community, since these encouraged 
participation amongst ordinary people.  
 
In the decades following the war, however, Prochaska suggests social policy 
was characterised by secular ideals, wherein redistribution and material 
equality took priority over  "personal service or participatory citizenship" 
(Prochaska 2006: 152). Prochaska observes a "tendency of post-war prime 
ministers, sometimes consciously, sometimes not, to undermine the 
independence of voluntary institutions" (Prochaska 2006: 163). This ideology 
was imbibed by the wider public, for whom "the payment of taxes had become 
the primary civic duty" and who, when they do volunteer, do so for reasons of 
"altruism, filling spare time, or the need for a more imposing CV" (Prochaska 
2006: 150; 160). This criticism can be extended to policy discussions relevant 
to CVSs. Wolfenden, a path-defining report for CVSs in the post-war period, 
was said to have "little to contribute to the debates about participation or the 
alienation of so many citizens from the power structures which control them" 
(Rowe 1978: 491). As a result, CVSs have often risked appearing as the 
"Council's poodle" (Zammer in Rochester 2012: 108). Moreover, when they 
have managed to distance themselves from the state, CVSs often fall into a 
market logic, which emphasises the CVS's "role as a provider of services and 
reduces its relationship with its members to that of seller and customer" 
(Rochester 2012: 109). 
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Without himself showing a distinct research interest in cultivating a spirit of 
association, Rochester has called for... 
 
recovering some of the original values underlying the work of CVSs 
and replacing the culture of the market with traditional voluntary sector 
behaviours...Return to the roots...would involve a greater emphasis on 
voluntary effort rather than the employment of paid staff...The central 
thrust of its work would be to facilitate mutual aid and shared learning 
across the local voluntary and community sector (Rochester 2012: 
109). 
 
Unfortunately, there is a neglect of the role of this elusive spirit of association 
in Rochester's account. In the absence of this spirit, the tendency to drift 
between the state and the market seems inevitable, unless the organisation 
itself can frame an imagined community with an associated appeal for 
volunteers.  
 
The constituting factor of common agency 
 
The last section suggested that in a context of a declining spirit of association, 
CVSs tend to find themselves swaying between the state and the market, 
neglecting to develop their own sense of community. This section explores the 
need for and capacity of HCVS to do this. 
 
I saw the difference it made in their lives 
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At first glance, HCVS has no explicit or implicit religious identity. On my first 
day in the organisation, when he heard me mention religion, one member told 
me, with a smile “don’t ask me about religion, I don’t want anything to do with 
it”, and, when pressed, suggested that religion causes conflict (Field notes). In 
the absence of any obvious narrative, HCVS seems to epitomise Prochaska’s 
lament of the loss of religious motivation, and his suggestion that today 
volunteering is motivated by "altruism, filling spare time, or the need for a 
more imposing CV" (Prochaska  2006: 171).  
 
All of those working at HCVS were employed staff. Altruism of sorts certainly 
played a role in some employees’ motivation, although it could not be 
described as altruism in the strictest sense, since it was embroiled with 
personal stories of suffering, and the chance of this job coming along rather 
than another. John, who is of Indian descent, offers a clear picture of how 
personal suffering could lead to action: 
 
I faced so much discrimination, and so much abuse, on a daily basis, but 
I didn't know that this was going to happen – it was just a shock. Umm 
and slowly, over the years, I was there over 26 years, so I became their 
white, though not so white, but one of their brothers and all this. But 
what happened was, slowly people that were from minority communities 
came in, and started talking to me, you know, and I had links to the 
Commission for Race Equality, the CRE, at that time, because I have 
members of my family who work for them, so I sort of like started helping 
	 238	
people, whilst I had all these different shops I had a private business and 
stuff, and I really liked that kind of work because I saw the difference it 
made in their lives (Interview). 
 
John’s personal suffering created a capacity for sympathy that inspired him to 
help others in his position. His voice noticeably shook when he spoke of being 
discriminated against. There was a clear sense that he felt he did not belong. 
So even in this self-referential framing, it is still belonging that is significant. 
His experience also touches on another aspect that was common to almost all 
participants, namely, that once one engages in social action, seeing the 
difference it makes in people’s lives becomes its own motivation. In this 
sense, it seems that social action can be generated through what Aristotle 
called hexis: through the experience of doing good, and of its feeling good, 
one learns to do good on a regular basis. One becomes trained to derive 
satisfaction from right action (Aristotle 350 BCE/2009: Book II).  Sarah’s 
experience corroborates this idea. As with many participants, my presence in 
the organisation led to months of reflection for Sarah. Here she reflects on a 
conversation she had engaged in, inspired earlier conversations: 
 
I said you know "why do you do that? What do you get out of it? 
Because its days and days and weeks of work, and you're not getting 
anything out of it." And he said "Because it feels good to do that". He 
said "because it feels good to give this to people and give them one less 
thing they need to do." And then we talked about his philosophy and 
about how everybody does everything because in some way it makes 
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them feel good about themselves…And I could see that; I think my 
motivations work along that line. But I also think there's something more 
to it than just "yeah, it makes me feel good about myself".  
 
Tim 
 
I mean aren't there other shorter fixes, easier fixes to making yourself 
feel good? Like buying clothes and getting drunk?  
 
Sarah 
 
[Laughing] Yeah but I think also what Gavin and I were talking about is 
that it's almost more of a long-term...it's like a better fix. Because it's a 
long-term, you can see long-term consequences and continue to feel 
good about what you did.  
 
Tim 
 
So does this just mean that there are some people who are better at 
delayed gratification than others? You know, is it the equivalent of 
somebody who sleeps around and somebody who sees the advantage 
of a long-term meaningful relationship? Is that the only difference?  
 
Sarah 
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No. I think that some people learn somehow, whether that be through 
religion, or whether it be like with me with my family, ummm from as far 
back as I can remember my family has been active in our community, 
has done community work and has placed an emphasis on, you know, 
community action and doing things like volunteering ummm and so I 
think some people learn to do that, and I remember when I was little I 
hated doing voluntary work. Like "we're gunna go lay mulch at your 
school and plant trees" and "No! It's so stupid; it's Saturday, and I don't 
wanna do this shit and God!" But then, as I got older, you get a certain 
satisfaction out of that. Like you see, it's some legacy so that you can go 
and say "Wow, I planted that tree, and now it's a big tree, and it provides 
shade in the playground, and that's really"...like I can go back to my 
elementary school and see that ummm and so I think it's a perspective 
that comes with age. As you get older you realise that the 
satisfaction...you realise the benefit in long-term work, because you gain 
enough perspective, you've understood the power of perspective, to look 
back and say "yes, I did something worthwhile with myself". Some 
people learn that early on like I did, some people don't learn it for a very 
long time, or never learn it, and I think that the people that decide to 
make a career out of voluntary work, are the peple who learn that very 
early on, and who get a strong sense of satisfaction at being able to look 
back at something there, and that's "somethign I can be proud of and 
something people can benefit from". But I think it is, yeah it's definitely 
long-term making-yourself-feel-good. You can look back for the rest of 
your life and say "I did that thing, I did a good thing, and look at what I've 
	 241	
done with my life, I at least did that...I was able to make those people 
happy for at least that instant that they were sititng under that tree" 
 
Tim 
 
So it's almost like seeing a difference in other people; seeing the change 
you've made, demonstrates there's an impact, you know, that your life 
makes a difference. That phrase has really come to interest me, this 
idea of "making a difference". It's not so much an ethical calling as...you 
know you could hit a car into another car and say "that bump's made a 
difference".                        
 
Sarah 
 
But that phrase has come to mean making a positive difference. When 
someone says "I made a difference", you assume they mean they made 
a positive difference, because no one is going to brag about how they 
made a negative difference. Like "I feel that I made a difference in 
people's lives", your mind automatically goes "oh you committed 
genocide, yeah" [laughing], everyone's always like "oh yeah, you maybe 
sat their kids for a little bit". I don't know why that assumption started. It 
might just be because it was used so many times in that context. 
 
Tim 
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So how do we make more people do good?  
 
Sarah 
 
Prove to them that it will make them feel good. That's the easiest way, is 
to prove to them that it will help them in some way. As much as I want to 
believe that there is an unselfish motivation for it, the most obvious 
motivation is that it'll make people feel good about their lives - to do 
voluntary work. And so the easiest way to make kids, I've done lots of 
these projects, and the easiest way to make kids do these things, is to 
make sure they have fun doing it. So if you make a song about them 
cleaning up their room, then they'll enjoy cleaning their room. If you give 
them candy because they clean their room, they're going to go and clean 
their room because they want the candy. Or when you get older and you 
don't want any candy but you don't want ants in your room, you're going 
to go and clean your room. That's the easiest way to get people to do 
something; to give them a reward. And the cheapest reward is just 
making them feel good about themselves. I really want to believe that 
there's like a pure, unselfish motive for it. You know, the grace of God or 
something, but I'm really leaning towards, people want to feel good 
about themselves. I don't know how selfish, it is selfish but that's another 
word that's come to mean bad, but I don't think it's a bad kind of selfish. 
It's not a bad thing for that to be your motivation, because it causes good 
things. 
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Sarah demonstrates the complex way in which one may learn that doing good 
makes one feel good. She says that one’s upbringing and environment play 
an important role in learning this connection, and she says that if we want 
more people to do good, it is important to cultivate such an environment. 
Sarah’s experience also demonstrates the place of parental guidance in 
seeing the gratification involved in serving others. It is important to question 
why a person should feel good from serving others. There appears to be an 
intrinsic satisfaction derived from this service, and the learning is based on the 
learner picking up on this intrinsic satisfaction. So there does appear to be 
some pre-contractual grounds for this contractual behaviour; the happiness is 
indicative of solidaristic sentiments. But this is only to put the question back a 
level: why should such behaviour make this person feel good? Is it because 
the individual harbours an ideal of how one ought to behave, or is it because 
the behaviour is rewarded or praised? 
 
John and Sarah provide us with a self-referential idea of social action derived 
from personal suffering, experiential learning and guidance. While there is no 
imagined community being invoked, nor is the service undertaken as part of a 
social contract. While these self-referential ideals may have underlying 
aspects of solidarity, what seems problematic here is that serendipity plays a 
key role in producing social actors. We are still left to question what kinds of 
ideas, what kind of culture and what kinds of institutions provide the 
necessary background for people to feel good as a result of doing good. It is 
also questionable whether motivating people to serve others on the basis that 
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“it will make them feel good” is as valuable, from a postliberal perspective, as 
serving others because it is right.  
 
Wanting to work towards a more equal society 
 
Although HCVS seemed void of religion, and staff motivation seemed self-
referential, one broad idea provided a point of reference, and permeated a 
number of areas. Although the notion was not lingering on the tongues of 
participants, equality slowly emerged as a key inspiration. “Addressing local 
inequalities” is part of the organisations vision. The HCVS offices are just off 
of Dalston Kingsland High Street, where the relatively recently arrived, mainly 
white wealthy digital media “creatives” and university students rub shoulders 
with far longer-term residents of Turkish and African-Carribean origin, many 
for whom English is a second or third language. These subcultures in such 
close proximity seem to display a microcosmic example of parallel lives: living 
side by side but separately. The first two groups are of the most privileged in 
the country, the latter two the most deprived. The employees of HCVS seem 
to straddle all of these subcultures: a walk through the offices sees white and 
black, media savvy and computer illiterate, educated to doctoral level and 
barely to high school level, privileged and deprived all working in a single 
organisation. Their mere presence is juxtaposition that invokes an imagined 
world in which all of these subcultures have equal access to the country’s 
resources. As a local resident, I was struck that HCVS provided my first 
opportunity in a year of living in the area to speak for an extended period with 
people of different backgrounds to me. Equality clearly provides a backdrop 
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for HCVS’s activities and, as with CTL’s Christianity, its being lived out 
becomes a source of inspiration. It forms an imagined world towards which 
the group is striving, by which the present world is held to account, and by 
which causes are selected.  
 
James told me that “wanting to work towards a more equal society” underpins 
all of his work, and that “in general it's about doing a job where you hope that 
you're doing something to make society fairer or equal” (Interview). There is 
also a correlative frustration with the failure of the world to live up to this 
equality, so that James sees  
 
lots of examples where it's frustrating that perhaps the progress isn't 
what you would hope for if you look back to previous decades, you know 
to decades when I wasn't working in the sector. Or in general, when 
you're looking at society (Interview). 
 
This idea of equality was not only an abstract inspiration, but also a criteria by 
which to choose one cause over another in the face of limited resources: 
 
We've…got this quite new Equality and Diversity Working Group…We've 
had two meetings so far so it's a number of staff here and umm it's now 
chaired by our board of trustees. So, so far what we've done is we've 
looked at things we're good at and things we're not so good at, and what 
we think we can develop. Umm so in terms of what we thought we were 
good at, I think we were good at working with Bayma communities, we 
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were good at working with young people, we noticed things such as that 
our staff, including the board of trustees, is quite diverse without having 
to make a huge effort to be so, I think generally comitted to 
equality...ummm in terms of what we thought we could do better, we 
thought we should probably work more with young, white, working class 
males, because of their very low levels of educational attainment. We 
should do more around domestic violence, more to support young 
women, more with LGBT communities, more with disability. What we did 
is we actually made a list of the areas that we'd like to develop, that will 
take about 10 years to work through. 
 
Yet if the sense of equality pervades the atmosphere, and occurs to staff 
when questioned, the meetings in which it plays out are not exactly instances 
of Bougle’s “‘fiery furnace’”, forging “new identities and transformed 
relationships in the sacred fires of collective effervesence” (Mellor and 
Schilling 1997: 53). Rather, these meetings are procedural endeavours. 
Equality emerges as a clear and practical tool for assessing the viability of the 
work being done.  
 
As with CTL’s construction of the kingdom of heaven, the interest in equality 
and its outworking displays aspects of Bloch’s transcendental social. The idea 
of equality forms an imagined ideal, which negates the everyday world and 
inspires action to transform the latter. Members are inspired by the lack of 
equality they see in the world. The fact that equality is promoted through an 
equality and diversity working group also shows the way in which equality as 
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ritual-cognition is connected to a reified culture. HCVS uses this culture as a 
reference point for identifying areas for improvement. A culture of equality not 
only acts as a way of framing inspiration for action, but also provides a 
reference point for improving actions. Yet these meetings are not 
opportunities for creatively reflecting on, constructing, consolidating and 
internalising the organisations’ ideals. Instead they are dry and practical 
affairs. 
 
While the idea of equality has not formed an imagined community in the strict 
sense of providing a concept through which “in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion”, nonetheless the participants share an idea of 
equality, and find themselves critically constructing the idea and working 
towards it together (Anderson 1983/2006: 7). Equality forms an accepted 
discourse and there appears to be potential for a shared mission. 
 
Unreflective equality 
 
Notwithstanding the clear potential of the idea of equality, there are 
nonetheless pitfalls. As the discussion of the equality and diversity working 
group demonstrates, some of these pitfalls are to do with the fact that equality 
is not recognised as a mode of the transcendental social; indeed, how could 
they be, without having such a term available in their lexicon. Because the 
transcendental social operates without being understood as such, it cannot be 
reflexively harnessed to motivate solidarity. Other pitfalls are to do with the 
idea of equality itself.  
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Because equality is not recognised as a mode of the transcendental social, no 
practices of belonging are established around it. Attempts are made to flesh 
out the meaning of equality, and to ensure that it impacts on the choice of 
campaigns. But a couple of problems are worth noting. The first, already 
discussed, is that the Equality and Diversity meetings are not taken as 
opportunities for cultivating a spirit of association. It is a predominantly 
bureaucratic procedure. Second, further reinforcing its bureaucratic nature, 
the working group involves only trustees and management. The Equality and 
Diversity procedure itself undermines the equality of all staff. One can observe 
a level of alienation in that whereas those in the upper echelons of the 
organisation are involved in questioning the key notion around which the 
group is organised, and using it to critically choose, develop and assess 
actions, while the rest of the group is expected to simply follow.  
 
This alienation becomes evident, occasionally distressingly so, when working 
with those on the frontline. Staff often suggested their roles were not properly 
appreciated and that they were not being listened to. One staff member in 
particular would frequently plead with me: “tell them…tell the management 
how important this work is” (Field notes).  
 
This alienation also impinges on processes of becoming, since it means there 
is a lack of clarity when it comes to frontline policy. When I questioned 
frontline staff about the criteria by which they accept and reject groups, the 
first answer was always, proudly, “we don’t reject anybody” (Field notes). On 
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the one hand, this insistence on acceptance once again points to how 
embedded equality is, but it also demonstrates how vague the idea is. When I 
suggested that they could not offer help to everybody, since they had limited 
resources, they could only offer me anecdotal evidence of where a particular 
group’s aims seemed to conflict with best practice.  
 
I was privy to one such case involving a woman who wanted to help African 
Francophones integrate by teaching their children French. When I discussed 
this with John afterwards he was flustered: “all the evidence says it’s better to 
teach the first generation English” (Field notes).  At the next meeting, the 
woman convinced John that African Francophones were struggling with 
English, and that the only way to bridge an emerging generation gap was to 
teach their children French. It was not clear what principles were being 
applied to either accept or reject this proposal. 
 
Although equality serves as a source of inspiration, and although it has 
processes through which it is realised, relatively little time is spent critically 
reflecting on this idea, thinking about what it means to various members of 
staff, and cultivating practices that realise these meanings. 
 
The lack of awareness and coherence also manifests in missed opportunities 
for development. There is little or no attempt to spread the idea of equality to 
other groups and people, such as to progress and develop the culture: 
 
Tim 
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When you're learning to be a teacher you have to learn how to embed 
equality and diversity in your lessons. And that doesn't just mean making 
people aware of it, it means challenging the way people think about it. 
Does Hackney CVS do any of that kind of equality and diversity 
awareness or training? In charity organisations or anything like that... 
 
James 
 
Ummm I'm sure [some of our staff] do work around umm...even though 
it's, I don't think it's stand alone training but they will do equalities and 
diversity and the legislation in terms of making sure that organisations 
have that awareness and they have those policies and they have those 
good practices. And they then know how to explain it in funding 
applications.  
 
What comes across here is that the only way in which equality is spread to 
external groups is as a means of meeting statutory requirements or applying 
for funding. Having sat in on sessions with the staff James refers to, I was 
able to see first hand that staff did not perform as he was “sure” they would. 
The idea of equality was not treated as a fundamental principle to be 
discussed and critically explored, but as a bureaucratic procedure to be 
navigated. People were told to think inclusively, since this was more likely to 
achieve funding. This procedure undermines the idea of equality, since it 
suggests that it is good enough to inspire the staff, but need not be passed on 
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to the groups it works with. It also suggests a discrepancy between the 
equality that inspires staff and the procedures and practices around equality 
and diversity derived from legislation. If there are differences here, it would be 
useful for these to be brought to light and critically explored. As an 
intermediary between state and grassroots action, HCVS finds itself 
implementing procedure without fully reflecting on it. Finally, this lack of 
reflection also means there are no criteria for deciding whether there is 
correspondence between the values of the organisation and the values and 
practices of those it seeks to help. 
 
This alienation spills over into a lack of transparency. If the principles on 
which a group is working are not discussed, they are not thereby rendered 
neutral, but are simply less accountable. As the discussion with James and 
work with his junior colleagues indicates, this lack of accountability could 
easily create real issues when causes are chosen or groups accepted or 
rejected without clear information as to why. 
 
This lack of transparency was particularly evident when focusing on which 
group received the most attention, which was often less to do with clear 
standards, and more to do with the whim of the individual employee, their 
interests, their knowledge, as well as to the ability of the group to demonstrate 
need. The result is that, even though all the causes were good causes, ideals 
and standards give way to arbitrariness and power. The lack of transparency 
meant that there were really no criteria for exclusion, so notwithstanding the 
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comments above, in theory at least, HCVS was willing to include groups and 
people of any kind.  
 
Conclusion 
 
At first, HCVS seemed entirely unreligious, and void of any frameworks 
reminiscent of religious groups. Staff seemed motivated by personal 
grievances which inspired a sense of sympathy for others, or because serving 
others makes them feel good. This created complex issues for the postliberal 
thesis. On the one hand, there was a clear absence of a shared spirit of 
association, and motivation was entirely self-referential and therefore 
precarious. On the other, this shared spirit seemed unnecessary, since 
individuals were devoting themselves to the common good anyway. 
Considered from this angle, the only plausible response from post-liberals 
would be that this new conception of the common good is of a different 
quality, being based on self-interest. 
 
But considered from a different angle, it became possible to see that the 
personal suffering of staff was about a feeling of not belonging, and a 
recognition of the importance of this feeling. Similarly, that offering solidarity to 
others made members feel good, despite sounding contractual, itself draws 
on ideas of effervesence and solidarity. It is the feeling of offering one’s 
personal resources to the common good that makes people feel good; there is 
a bodily response to solidarity.  
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These factors coalesce around a discourse of equality. This tendency to 
operate around the idea of equality demonstrates that those that pay no 
attention to religion may nonetheless act within a frame of values that, 
unreflectively take on similar functions. Equality showed signs of taking on a 
ritual cognitive function, having the potential to inspire and organise the group, 
and to challenge the way they carried out their practices. At the upper levels 
of the organisation, the idea was critically explored and a kind of missional 
community formed. On these grounds, it seems inaccurate to suggest we are 
living in an immanent frame wherein politics is legitimised not by transcendent 
ideas but by social contracts. It might be more accurate to suggest, as 
Schillng and Mellor have, that behind seemingly self-referential, contractual 
behaviour, there are underlying pre-contractual ideas (Mellor & Schilling 1997: 
58). Perhaps then, when the old gods die, new ones emerge to replace them.  
 
Yet despite the potential of equality to take on a ritual cognitive function, there 
were many elements in which the ritual cognitive function had not been 
realised, and possible contradictions emerged in the way staff carried out their 
work, selected groups to work with, and developed the capacity of those 
groups. These points will be explored in more detail in the next section. 
 
If ritual cognitive processes emerge irrespective of our attention to them, it is 
better that they are out in the open where they can fully inspire belonging and 
becoming in those inspired, and be challenged by those otherwise inclined. 
One might take this point further, and suggest that the adage that where old 
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gods die, new ones emerge to replace them, needs amending. Instead, where 
old gods die, new gods emerge half-formed and require critical cultivation. 
 
Political structures and common agency 
 
The last section suggested that although HCVS staff displayed a number of 
motivations for action that apparently made no reference to religion, still their 
motivations displayed elements of solidarity. It was further suggested that the 
idea of equality, and the way in which staff were motivated by it, took on a 
ritual cognitive function, forming an imagined future which negated the 
present and motivated staff to transform themselves and the world around 
them. Notwithstanding the potential of equality as a mode of the 
transcendental social however, it was noted that the idea had not been 
reflexively treated as such, and so did not create the strong elements of 
belonging, becoming and participating observed in religious groups by Baker. 
This section explores whether the absence of a reflexive awareness of the 
transcendental social impacts on the perceived relationship between political 
structures and common agency.  
 
Local people to help themselves, literally help themselves 
 
Employees of HCVS rarely criticised conventional politics or politicians. A 
strong critique did emerge, however, regarding the cynical use of language 
associated with community empowerment as an excuse for cuts in funding. In 
my short time at the organisation, unused desk space, old computers, and 
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part-time staff made it quite obvious they had experienced setbacks from 
these cuts. Talk of declining public spaces was a theme of casual 
conversation. I was told how everything from health services to luncheon 
clubs were being forced to merge. Institutions that used to serve as hubs of 
community within walking distance of residents, had now become mere 
services for delivering needs, to which people had to travel by public transport 
(Field notes). Governments were perceived as being out of touch with the kind 
of help and support community groups require. John explains: 
 
 a couple of years ago when Big Society happened, and and the whole 
ethos around that from what I understood was to enable local people to 
take local action. Okay? To help small number of people helping each 
other. That was one of the angles of Big Society, okay? Localism. 
Localism helped to arrive...with a direction. These are government 
strategies that came out, okay? Perfect because that would give, you 
know, legitimacy to our work. We will help those groups to sort of sustain 
services and everything. But no not really: it was like, "yes local people 
to help themselves, literally help themselves" and not really...get any 
help from us. If they need help from us then...we'd have to charge them. 
But then they didn't have any money in the first place (Interview). 
 
John is critical of the way the state uses localism initiatives to remove funding 
from the infrastructure organisations that provide support to local people. John 
feels that the situation has been exasperated by the rise of the internet, which 
he feels is perceived as nullifying the place of infrastructure organisations. 
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… it's come together with the progression of the IT world and the 
internet. And, you know, and the misconception of a lot of huge funding 
bodies that, do we need infrastructure? Because actually community 
groups, what they need they can get it for themselves...through the 
internet. Why is there a need for human contact? And they really are 
questioning whether there's a need for human contact; whether people 
can just work on, solo, on their own, and just get what they need and get 
on with it. But obviously communities are...you know obviously the focus 
for us is a lot of communities whose language is, English is not their first 
language and they're struggling to sort of actually adapt to this life, and 
what we do is provide them with the comfort of discussing, negotiating, 
for me directing them, to specific areas of evidence of why what they're 
trying to do makes a difference (Interview). 
 
For John, greater localism actually requires funding to develop and sustain 
people on the ground. From his perspective, infrastructure organisations are 
not the enemy but the facilitators of local empowerment. Removing 
infrastructure organisations would proliferate the inequality that already exists, 
since those with the most advantages already, in terms of IT, administrative, 
financial and language skills, will be those that are most likely to receive 
funding. In a number of workshops with John I discovered that the majority of 
those he met with were extremely passionate about the way they might 
contribute to their community, but unable to effectively fill in an application 
form, let alone run a business.  
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Becoming an arm of the Council 
 
Notwithstanding this critique of government cynicism regarding empowering 
local communities, John and colleagues also found themselves creatively 
thinking about how the work of grassroots groups can be presented as fitting 
in with government frameworks.  Sat in surgeries with grassroots community 
groups, I observed as staff analysed and filtered groups’ aims to fit with 
government frameworks. As both insider and outsider, I felt the frustration of 
both sides: for the groups, the frustration of having their aims manipulated; for 
the staff, the frustration of convincing often stubborn activists to change the 
framing of their actions so as to make them appealing to funders. On the one 
hand, the changing of a grassroots groups’ aims to fit a policy agenda might 
be regarded as a response to government cynicism, matching this with an 
equally cynical “camouflage” to fit the policy agenda. On the other hand, the 
change might be seen as disempowering grassroots groups. This perspective 
seems to be corroborated when one considers the criteria for acceptance and 
rejection. Previously I suggested that the criteria were unclear. But in relation 
to funding, these suddenly became far clearer: 
 
Tim 
 
Are there any other reasons that you haven't worked with groups?  
 
John 
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…if It didn't have ummm a clear public benefit... 
 
Tim 
 
Okay, and what's the test for that? 
 
John 
 
Once again it holds hands with evidence: about how it's a public benefit. 
Ummm the Charity Commission has a clear outline of what public benefit 
means: you know, if you're going to help someone, progress or develop 
their life,  
 
Tim 
 
And they're the guidelines you use? 
 
John 
 
Yeah, well yeah they're one of the guidelines that I use 
 
The criteria for exclusion appears to be primarily influenced by funding 
guidelines set out by the Charity Commission, a non-ministerial government 
department. 
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It is worth noting an absence of coherent work going in the opposite direction: 
critically feeding back up the chain of command to shape the vision being 
constructed, the problems being defined, and the policies being developed. 
As an intermediary organisation, HCVS seems to spend far more time 
mediating government policies downwards than it does mediating local 
concerns upwards. The only direct mentions of government were to do with 
how best to serve government, to provide them with the most useful 
information in relation to the voluntary sector. James explained: 
 
we might have various MPs or people particularly interested from the 
charity sector so we make sure we produce something that will be useful 
for them so they can take back to government (Interview) 
 
There is a clear link between the absence of reflection on the kind of 
community HCVS is seeking to bring about, and the absence of criticism of 
government policy agendas. The only clear reason offered for this absence by 
James was “we're afraid to bite the hands that feed us, and play that game in 
terms of how we're accessing funding” (Interview). This absence of critique 
might appear to make sense when read in the context that the majority of the 
organisation’s projects were derived from central or local government 
schemes. In this situation, the organisation becomes susceptible to cooption 
by the ideology of others. Why a government funds something, what a 
government funds, who it funds, and the language it uses to shape the 
context are all ideologically shaped.  
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Alongside the absence of a clear idea of a community HCVS is seeking to 
bring about, it was difficult to decipher a bottom line for the organisation; a 
point beyond which it would not go. The result is the potential to slide into 
cooption. One example of this is the way that HCVS is slowly taking on more 
and more the direct delivery of services, an action at odds with the founding 
principle of CVSs. When I put this to James he entirely disagreed  
 
I don't think that's becoming an arm of the council because it was 
something that they put out to tender which we bid for against other 
[organisations] (Interview). 
 
James’s response suggests that the organisation avoids becoming an arm of 
the state by virtue of the fact that the state opens up bids to a market, 
meaning both that there is an element of choice in that the organisation does 
not have to bid for the contract, and that there is competition and variety. In 
terms of the first idea, it must be remembered that choice is being taken within 
a context of decreasing funds, and so organisations feel forced to apply to 
deliver projects that are not of their choosing. In terms of competition and 
variety, this variety is only available to the council, who, by awarding the 
contract to one organisation, chooses the parameters by which a project is 
delivered. Yet both of these are minor issues in relation to the larger point that 
James has missed: the organisation becomes an arm of the state by virtue of 
its not being involved at the design level: at the level of defining the world it 
wants to create, the problems it sees, and the solutions required. 
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Oddly, James recognised this issue later in our discussion, when I asked him 
about the greatest obstacles the organisation faces, only he saw it as more of 
an issue with private funders: 
 
I think what frustrates me is a lack of politics in the charity sector; the 
charity sector is afraid of having a political voice. Sometimes because 
we're afraid to bite the hands that feed us, and play that game in terms 
of how we're accessing funding. Funders might be quite mainstream. 
There was an example from a while ago, someone came up from 
Birmingham who was, you know, a charity was talking about 
empowering women. And the funder doesn't want to hear that kind of 
empowering women language because it's a bit feminist (Interview). 
 
It is worth noting here that there is not only a discrepancy between staff, with 
some being less equipped to offer a critical stance to funders than others, but 
also in the statements of one member of staff from one moment to the next. 
Both of these discrepancies are indicative of the lack of a clear idea of the 
kind of community HCVS is seeking to create.  
 
The lack of a critical stance and the resultant slide into cooption supports the 
postliberal idea that in the absence of hierarchies of value, hierarchies of 
power emerge. It also develops it. In the absence of a clearly worked out 
vision, we end up being susceptible to the values and whims of others, 
because it is not clear when our own values are being compromised. It is not 
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that the lack of value makes the cooptive tendency of the state necessary, but 
that it makes people susceptible to those that wish to coopt their activity. 
Clearly defined values provide a buffer against cooption.  
 
Collaborating in the building of the iron cage – the tower-block matriarch  
 
This lack of a critical stance towards the state and other funders creates a 
kind of iron cage within which the organisation operates. But this can also 
have a more unfortunate impact when the organisation itself imbibes the 
processes and imposes them on other, smaller community groups, thus 
collaborating in the building (though still not the design!) of the iron cage. This 
point was most glaring in a project responding to a case in which a paedophile 
had taken advantage of his position of authority in a Tenants and Residents 
Association (TRA). The result was that Hackney Homes commissioned HCVS 
to list every TRA in the area, and, taking six TRAs every three months, to 
meet with the board of directors and check that they were following the proper 
health and safety procedures.  
 
When I went on a walk-along for one of these meetings, I was struck by a 
sense of deprivation, made the more alarming by its being so close to where I 
lived. As is often the case in London, in Hackney, within a minute’s walk, one 
can encounter great wealth, great poverty, and everything in-between. Stood 
outside a community hall beneath a high-rise estate, waiting for the Chair of 
the TRA, my colleague Kirsten and I were chatting when suddenly small rocks 
began to hit the ground around us. Although the conversation was slowly 
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interrupted by tense pauses, we continued, pretending nothing was 
happening. Then I was hit in the head by a small rock. More shocking than 
painful, we decided to take shelter under a canopy. When eventually the Chair 
arrived, an awkward, middle-aged, 5ft 4, 15 stone, tired African-Carribean 
woman, Kirsten explained why we were waiting under the canopy. The Chair 
knew immediately what was going on. She swiftly went round the back of the 
building, up a flight of external stairs and onto the roof of the community hall 
and began telling off what turned out to be 10-year old children. These were 
not her children, but it was clear that she had authority over them - the tower-
block matriarch.   
 
By this time, our senior colleague John had arrived. Returning from the roof, 
the tower-block matriarch introduced herself as Elizabeth as she welcomed 
the three of us into the community hall. John asked if we could have a quick 
look around before things were discussed. He noticed there was no health 
and safety poster on the wall. “We never had one”, Elizabeth explained. John 
looked concerned, and asked if we could get out a table for the meeting. 
Together we put up a collapsible table, and placed some chairs around it. 
“We’d better wait for the treasurer to arrive before starting”, said John politely, 
as he sat himself down by the side of Elizabeth. “It’s just me”, she replied, 
shrugging. The point was made wryly, suggesting that it was always just her, 
running the show, and that she was aware others ought to be involved. One 
sensed a confrontational atmosphere brewing. John asked if it would be 
possible to arrange another meeting when the treasurer could be present. 
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Learning that this would be difficult, again, he furrowed his brow, and decided 
to move on.  
 
John took out a list of procedures that TRAs were supposed to follow for 
hosting community events. He began by asking Elizabeth if she had a list of 
attendees for past events. She shifted in her chair and her eyes seemed to 
ask “are you serious?” But it was clear John would not be capitulating by 
relaxing his matter-of-fact gaze. In a sense he was stuck in a bind. These 
were the rules that Hackney Homes had listed. There had been no negotiation 
process regarding what the rules should be. But if the point of this process 
was to empower community activists such as Elizabeth, it was not having the 
desired effect. Rather, she looked increasingly like a child who had not done 
her homework.  
 
“When you have events, who’s at the door?”, asked John kindly.  
“What do you mean?” 
“Well, when you have events, is there someone at the door with a list of 
who’s invited  
and checking names of people who come in?” 
“No”, chuckled Elizabeth. 
“Well in the future, you will need someone to be at the door at events”, 
said John with a tone that was friendly, but almost patronising.  
“But if we manage to get other adults to come down, they’re going to 
want to come into the party – not stand at the door” (Field notes). 
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The conversation continued in this way as John progressed through his list, 
through the absence or presence of first aid kits, a petty cash float, a safe, 
criminal record checks and more. On about two thirds of the list, Elizabeth 
was found to be lacking, and was asked to confirm that she would have these 
items and procedures in place by the next time John visited. After about 30 
minutes, we folded up the table and left a demoralised Elizabeth to lock the 
hall. 
 
As we walked out, I asked if this was a common experience. John said that it 
was, and explained that in almost every TRA he visited, responsibility for 
maintaining community activities was the burden of just one, usually female, 
enthusiast. He did not mention that his work might be overburdening the one 
person in the community willing to give what little time she had. Again, there 
appeared to be a lack of appreciation for the implications of equality. This 
whole experience was so striking because John himself experienced 
alienation when managers imposed views upon him. Now he was unwittingly 
stifling local activists in the same way. 
 
When I interviewed her after a number of other such trips, Kirsten said:  
 
I don't think it's useful, that's the thing. First of all, it's almost an 
impossible task. And that's an issue because it means it's just never 
gunna get done. And I just think that, yeah it makes sense to have them, 
in case something is happening. You know, if God forbid a child is hurt 
at a community event, you know these policies would be in place to refer 
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to. But the question is, how seriously really do you think the 
management committee is going to take these policies? You know, I 
think, just from talking to them, that they're all earnest people that want 
to help, but they're all working fourty hours a week, plus kids, plus their 
own lives, and so more likely than that these policies are going to be 
filed away somewhere and never looked at again. 
 
I saw one of the TRAs, I don't know what the word is for it but basically 
ummm okay you're not implementing these policies, you're not 
cooperating…we're going to take your community hall, and shut down 
your TRA - and they did (Interview). 
 
The response to a crisis was to implement a heavily bureaucratic project that 
residents had not the time or energy to follow, with the result that some simply 
gave up and consequently were closed down. This process demonstrates the 
way in which statism can emerge as a self-fulfilling prophecy. As soon as the 
state takes on any level of responsibility, it becomes accountable. This 
accountability then becomes in itself an impetus for greater state control, 
since if the state is accountable for issues that arise, it must do all that it can 
to ensure that issues do not arise.  
 
What is most striking is that no effort was made by the organisation to take on 
the commission to audit TRAs in a critical way, perhaps using the commission 
to both deliver what the council wanted and develop the capacity of TRAs. 
These projects indicate the unwitting construction of an iron cage, which 
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places parameters around some activities, and obstacles in the way of others. 
The organisation enables the construction of this iron cage, since it is able to 
reach communities that the state otherwise could not.  
 
It is worth mentioning that despite the absence of critique, a number of other 
activities provided clear channels for grassroots groups to shape the way 
problems were understood, policies devised, and solutions offered, even if 
they were not recognised by the staff as playing this role. One program aiming 
to improve the opportunities of young black men involved fresh analysis and 
policy design in conjunction with the local council. The second related to Stop 
and Search, the authority given to UK place to stop and search citizens on the 
basis of suspicion. Stop and Search is widely believed to disproportionately 
target black young men. In response the organisation worked with young 
black men in the locale to develop awareness of this disproportionate 
targeting. In particular, the group developed a DVD to be used in the training 
of new officers. This program involves local residents in the design and 
delivery of policy. This is a good example of the real localism employees 
hoped for, as distinct from both the cooptive approach, and the “literally help 
themselves” approach. 
 
Yet without a clear idea of the kind of community HCVS is seeking to create, 
and the kind of political practices it associates with such a community, some 
campaigns are entirely defined by the state, while others demonstrate an 
inspiring combination of cooperation, critique and empowerment, and how 
many campaigns fit each profile is somewhat arbitrary.   
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So far it seems clear that a number of issues derive from the way in which this 
infrastructure organisation is funded. Because it is beholden to the state for its 
funds, it becomes an arm of the state. With respect to this, it is worth pointing 
out that in fact a number of other funding avenues were available and being 
explored. James mused:  
 
...I dunno I mean it's kind of interesting how well the charity sector's 
positioned I think is quite interesting in comparison to where local 
authorities are positioned now and where they're going to be positioned 
in the future as they experience more and more cuts. I think actually the 
charity sector in many ways is in a better position than local authorities. 
Right because you're going to receive central funding rather than via the 
local authority, is that...when can get local authority funding, central 
funding, lottery funding, you know we can apply for funding from lots of 
different pots (Interview). 
 
The idea is that by being available to multiple funders, the organisation is free 
to pick and choose from those that fit with its vision. But another way of 
looking at this is that the organisation is pulled in a lot of different directions, 
each with its own ideological agenda, and so it becomes harder and harder 
for the organisation to give a clear message about its vision without losing 
money.   
 
Conclusion 
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Set up to empower local communities, HCVS is limited by its inability to draw 
on or cultivate its own spirit of association. Without its own sources of 
revenue, and without volunteers, it becomes an agent of the state. As the 
ideology of the state shifts, so do the practices of the organisation. This is not 
to say that the shift is easy for staff. For managers, there was a strong sense 
of responsibility to keep staff in work. And for staff themselves, there was an 
ongoing struggle for motivation, with one staff member in particular constantly 
threatening to leave the organisation (Field notes).  
 
Equally, without a clearly worked out vision with obvious implications for 
practice, and without opportunities for developing such a vision, there is little 
reflection on how the organisation’s structural position can be used to sustain 
its own vision, how its vision can be used to challenge and ask awkward 
questions to authority, and what kind of work to take on, and what kind of 
work to reject. HCVS thus not only does not develop its own spirit of 
association, either externally or internally, but also finds itself susceptible to 
cooption by others’ ideologies.  Without a clear idea of what is sacred, what is 
of fundamental importance, what counts as a red line, it becomes very hard to 
decipher when a line has been crossed.  
 
Economic context and common agency 
 
The first section explained that while HCVS staff showed a number of secular 
motivations for action, the idea of equality held preambles of a transcendental 
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social basis for action whereby an imagined future is used to negate and 
transform the present. Notwithstanding this potential however, the ritual-
cognitive mode had not been recognised or fleshed out, and its potential was 
not exploited. The next section explained that in the absence of a clear and 
fleshed out vision, HCVS found itself not only susceptible to cooption by the 
state, thus becoming imprisoned in an iron cage of bureaucracy, but also itself 
participating in the construction of this cage, placing parameters around 
grassroots groups without seeking to empower them. While this trend by no 
means defined all of the organisation’s activities, that it had made its way in to 
certain areas relatively unchallenged suggests that the scope of its influence 
is arbitrary and no clear line is being drawn as to what constitutes a 
compromise of HCVS’s values. 
 
This section continues the exploration of HCVS’s vision and how it impacts on 
its understanding of the economic context of common agency. The postliberal 
position would be that just as it has descended into cooption by the state, 
HCVS should be equally vulnerable to coercion by the market. I seek to 
question this assumption.   
 
I'd prefer a more equal society where professionals are rewarded perhaps 
according to how they contribute to society 
 
HCVS’s existence from the outset being based primarily on government 
grants demonstrates that its function is not considered to be naturally 
occurring in a capitalist system. This point is confirmed by the fact that as 
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funding dries up, and the organisation is forced to get money from private 
funders, from commissioned service delivery, and from selling services, the 
function changes. Organisational practice shifts from that of the state to that of 
the market. 
 
Yet whereas I observed an absence of critique regarding the state, HCVS 
staff were quite comfortable critiquing and critically assessing their place 
within a capitalist system, and the way that this impacted on a spirit of 
association.  
 
None of the staff have salaries in the highest tax bracket. And living in the 
same area as I do, I am well aware of the difficulties of getting by. The 
majority of salary goes on mortgage, if one is lucky enough to own a home, or 
rent if not, and bills. If one has children, the cost of living can be more difficult 
still. James, who had formerly worked in the private sector, suggests that the 
system itself is unfair: 
 
Tim 
 
So why are you okay to take the kind of pay-cut to work in a charity? 
 
James 
 
Well I don't know if I'd even say that I am okay with the fact that in 
general the charity sector earns less...I'd prefer a more equal society 
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where professionals are rewarded perhaps according to how they 
contribute to society, whether it's teachers or medics or nurses or the 
charity sector in comparison to people in the corporate sector, ummm 
but in terms of the reality of how society is, I'd prefer to work in the not-
for-profit sector as it's something I'm motivated by in terms of the fact 
that it ties in with the kind of belief systems I have, rather than take the 
higher salary and be less motivated 
 
James envisages a society of each according to her contribution to society, 
conceived in terms of helping people, rather than each according to the price 
allocated by a market. Capitalism clearly has a strong impact on the charity 
sector; the low wages associated with the sector put a number of people off 
working in it. Even for those that do work in the sector, it is often the case that 
they have worked in business beforehand, seeking to make enough money to 
live on before joining the charity sector. This was most obvious in John, who 
drove a 20-year-old Mercedes, which had clearly once been top of the range, 
but for which now only the faded hood ornament indicated its former glory. 
John told me: 
 
I had a private business for 26 years, and umm, and I did fairly well. I 
could afford to work in the voluntary sector and get paid very little. But 
that's fine, and actually some years ago when I worked for umm a 
London wide organisation like an infrastructure of infrastructure, so how 
we are infrastructure for small community groups who then have direct 
links with grassroots or residents, there is another level above us that we 
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can go for help, and I used to work for them. And we found, we did a 
piece of research because there was a huge turnover of people in my 
position. So we did an analysis of all the people across the 33 London 
boroughs, and where they came from, and they were all about my age, 
and they had previous careers that they'd, they'd done for like 20 years 
or something, and then came into the voluntary sector. And one of the 
questions was why they didn't come into the sector in the first place and 
they said they have to pursue a career ummm and it's only after finding 
out that it actually didn't work, you know? And they couldn't afford to 
come into the voluntary sector because the voluntary sector is so less 
that umm you have to experience life and what's more worthy, money or 
the knowledge and the ability to sort of work to make change (Interview).  
 
There appear to be two factors at work here. On the one hand, having worked 
in the private sector previously creates a financial buffer, allowing people to 
live a comfortable life with a relatively low income. On the other hand, people 
awaken to the idea of a more worthy life lived working to make a change, and 
then make the transition into social engaged work. Sarah, who had been 
working in the organisation for just a few months to gain experience, similarly 
felt she would probably have to work somewhere else first: 
 
Like realistically when I'm done with my masters, I'm going to be in debt, 
and student loans and I'm going to need to be in a job that's paying me 
enough to kind of establish myself and get out of...I don't wanna be in 
debt for years and years and years, so I'll need to have an eye on salary, 
	 274	
uuuh and if that means taking a job that I'm not all that interested in for 
the first few years, just to establish myself, then...idealistically thinking, 
I'd like to hop straight into something like HCVS, but I don't know how 
realistic that is. Because if I did that I would not be able to support 
myself; with the kind of money I'd be making from that, I would have to 
move back in with my parents, and kind of work to pay off my loans from 
there. It would take a lot longer (Interview). 
 
A number of the staff at HCVS find themselves playing the capitalist system: 
they need to earn enough money from jobs they are less interested in before 
they can afford to take jobs in the charity sector. As James suggested, for the 
most part they get by with the energy provided by the knowledge they are 
working in something they believe in.  
 
Rolling back the tide 
 
Despite staff criticism of capitalism, HCVS does not represent an attempt to 
alter structural conditions. James wondered if the present structural 
arrangements would ever change. He felt that inequality worked for those in 
power 
 
I see society as being so unfair globally, and so unequal globally, and I 
think for example about the arms trade or the amount of money invested 
in the arms trade, in war, and I think about what the charity sector can 
do in response. I suppose what I'm saying is that if you look at global 
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capitalism, and what that entails in terms of inequality, then I suppose I 
don't really see the impetus for the government to change that; I think 
they like the status quo, I think they like the global North being powerful, 
I think they want to protect the unreachable American dream, I don't 
think they want equality for developing countries (Interview). 
 
There is an air of resignation in James’s tone: “I don’t really see the impetus 
for the government to change that”. This resignation is perhaps linked to 
HCVS’ relationship to capitalism; it does not campaign to change structural 
conditions, but rather deals with the impact of those conditions. The main 
work of HCVS is to assist social enterprises in getting off the ground. The 
result of this neglect of structural conditions is a King Midas effect, whereby 
the organisation is forever rolling back the tide: they are working with the 
effects of inequality, while structural conditions continue to produce new 
problems. They are seeking to gain as wide as possible an opportunity in a 
society that remains unequal and divided in outcome.  
 
Rolling with the tide 
 
Since HCVS is not tackling structural arrangements, when those 
arrangements shift, so to do the practices of the organisation itself. In the 
context of my time at the organisation, there was a shift towards neoliberal 
governance, as a result, I observed the slow adoption of capitalist practices. 
The most obvious creep towards the adoption of capitalist practices is the 
move towards selling services that had previously been free. These services 
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were regarded as fundamental to the HCVS’s role in empowering grassroots 
groups. The kinds of groups and people that came into the offices were 
obviously disadvantaged themselves: often poorly dressed, under or 
overweight, lacking in sufficient language skills, lacking in the kind of flare and 
discourse associated with success: they were the most motivated members of 
the most disadvantaged groups, seeking help to establish enterprises that 
could serve those groups. And they needed a lot of help, often more than 
John himself appeared capable of offering. When money from public funds 
failed to materialise, these individuals often gave up their own money. The 
suggestion then, that these individuals could afford to pay for training, was an 
anathema to John. 
 
Tim 
 
Are there services you've provided before that you are now providing for 
money? That would have been for free... 
 
John 
 
Not yet. We're about to.  
 
Tim 
 
What, what are they? 
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John 
 
Ummm this kind of surgery, type, direct-access. And we're gunna start 
charging for all the training courses that we do.  
 
Tim 
 
How do you feel about that? 
 
John 
 
I don't like it. Ummm. I don't like it because it's going to already cause 
problems that can't afford anything anyway. And the community groups 
that are...or the number of people coming together to deliver services, 
they're already working...a lot of them already work and this is something 
that they do on the side. Okay? So now they're going to have to find the 
money to do this effectively, whereas...the way this country's going or 
anywhere at the moment, you know how, people are just, they're not 
even talking to each other, you know leading these isolated...isolation is 
massive, you know? Statistics show that so many people are living on 
their own and they’re not communicating and they're not living within a 
support structure. And this is just gunna get worse. So it's fuelling that I 
fear. You know, and really when these people, these individuals who 
work anyway, and then come together, and make things, areas where 
they live, their work, a little bit better, that could be supported by funding, 
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you know? Then they can gladly forget about it. Ummm and concentrate 
on what they're doing. And like what's happened here is that our 
concentration’s gone on to generating income, to sustain some of the 
work that's needed. And the level of time that's devoted to generating 
income that enables us to do the work is getting greater, and the time 
that's spent working with community groups, and the concentration on 
actually enabling change, is, is lessening, because we have to 
sustain...and then they say "well why don't you just stop, and don't do 
it?” Because of the time you're using to generate your income, maybe 
it's not even needed, and they'll find a way. I dunno. Obviously the 
results won't be immediate. It'll be a number of years (Interview).    
 
John demonstrates a deep emotional struggle with the shift towards capitalist 
practices. In the face of his failure to convince senior management that this 
shift will compromise the principles of the organisation, John is “always 
thinking that I'm gunna leave”. I have already referred to how staff get by with 
low incomes on the energy provided by the knowledge they are working in 
something they believe in. But, as explained in the previous section, when 
political climates change so to do the practices on the ground. In these 
moments, the belief system is shaken, and staff become far more conscious 
of their sacrifices, as if the black and white romance suddenly turns to colour, 
and the inadequacy of the material objects surrounding them becomes clear. 
In moments such as these John would suggest that he simply could not 
“afford to go on like this” (Field notes). The room would feel uncomfortable, as 
we each began to notice signs of deprivation. I would remember in these 
	 279	
moments that , like those he is helping, John too is a motivated individual from 
a disadvantaged group. Despite this discomfort however, John was not 
leaving. He still felt tied to his initial motivations for joining HCVS, especially 
as these were recalled with each new service user, even if he knew these 
motivations were being compromised in practice. 
 
Yet managers see good reasons for operating more like a business. James 
tells me: 
 
I think some people think...my gut feeling is that some people think we 
need to be a bit more business savvy, and maybe it's not necessarily a 
bad thing because it will maybe improve quality… 
 
…It's always been a bit of a difficult thing so sometimes with free training 
for example, people don't always appreciate that… when there was free 
[training], people might, you might get 20 people who book onto the 
training but then only 10 people show up on the day because it's not any 
financial loss to them, so it's a bit of shame: the finance becomes so 
dominant in the relationship (Interview).  
 
Organisations can feel like they are wasting money if those they are trying to 
help choose not to show up. They figure that by charging money they will be 
tying their beneficiaries into a contract and incentivising them to show up. 
Having this capitalist logic at work on the front line ensures that services are 
not wasted.  
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This difference between frontline staff and managers suggests that face to 
face contact with deprivation creates an awareness of the negative 
consequences of charging for services.   
 
Conclusion 
 
A number of HCVS staff are critical of capitalist inequality, yet rather than 
directly challenging the system, they think of ways of working with it. This may 
mean accumulating a little private wealth before coming to work in charity, it 
may mean focusing on the symptoms of inequality, or it may mean changing 
the practices of the organisation itself so that rather than being provided for 
free, services are sold. While some staff were extremely critical and 
uncomfortable with this change, even threatening to leave, the management 
itself seemed comfortable with the shift, even suggesting that the introduction 
of charges would ensure greater responsibility on the part of those that 
register. There is a lack of recognition here that the nature of the community 
being created changes with the economic context. What was a gift becomes a 
supply for a demand. In this context, community is something that develops in 
a contractual, supply and demand relationship. 
 
Yet as in the previous section, it needs to be remembered that there are pre-
contractual grounds for these contractual behaviours. Frontline staff are not 
primarily motivated by holding onto a job, even if this need has come to shape 
their practice. Managers do not offer services because these make money, 
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but rather feel forced to charge for them on account of limited funds. Frontline 
staff and managers alike are motivated by personal grievances, sympathy, 
their own happiness derived from serving others; they are motivated by 
equality and by practices associated with this. What is more, they appear for 
the most part aware of how their motivations are undermined by the adoption 
of capitalist logic. The problem lies in the fact that even as they are aware of 
these influences, they are not challenging them. This leads to a much broader 
question about why it is that we can be fully conscious of our values being 
undermined and yet allow it to happen. Is it the feeling that there is no 
alternative?  
 
Conclusion 
 
Ostensibly the reflection on the history of CVSs place them as near 
representatives of the materialisation and secularisation of social service 
provision, and of the motivation of volunteers. CVSs are rooted in the work of 
Christian social reformer Thomas Hancock Nunn in the early years of the 20th 
century. But in their role as intermediary institutions, CVSs have appeared as 
products of changes from both above and below. Prochaska characterises 
postwar social policy as "egalitarian and materialistic", with a tendency to 
coopt (Prochaska 2006: 160). This was a period in which "an unwitting public 
was swimming ‘into the Great Leviathan’s mouth’" (Prochaska 2006: 156). By 
the 70s "charities were increasingly ‘secular and materialist in outlook rather 
than inspired by the desire to rescue or evangelise’", and more recently 
"British volunteers cite altruism, filling spare time, or the need for a more 
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imposing CV as reasons for participation". CVSs have evolved to recognise 
and harness this change (Prochaska 2006: 170; 171). According to 
Prochaska, the result is that today "the use of charities to do the government’s 
bidding may be seen as the elusive ‘Third Way’, a devolved form of 
government control that turns the intermediary institutions of civil society into 
agencies of the state through contracts and financial control" (Prochaska 
2006: 166).  
 
Ostensibly, HCVS seems to reflect this shift, adopting very similar practices. 
Motivations were often to do with personal fulfilment or improving a CV. Yet 
Prochaska’s crude depiction of these motivations does not take into account 
the pre-contractual sources from which they draw. The importance of personal 
grievances in motivating action sounds self-referential, but this grievance 
inspires sympathy for others’ misfortune, without any obvious narrative 
underpinning this solidaristic sentiment. Similarly the idea that serving others 
makes people happy sounds an entirely self-serving motivation, but again this 
is to ignore that this happiness is derived from solidaristic sentiments. Ignoring 
these pre-contractual sources is unhelpful, because it distracts us from 
questioning what kind of moral culture inspires the solidaristic sentiments. 
Perhaps a Christian spirit of association is indeed declining, but this is not to 
say that other cultures are not lurking under the surface. In the case of HCVS, 
this spectre is the idea of equality. It was seen that equality acts as a mode of 
the transcendental social, providing an imagined future that creates the 
possibility of critically relating to the material world, working its way into 
practices.  
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It is equally worth questioning whether the inability to recognise the generative 
potential of its own ideational motivations is down to a lack of religious 
literacy. It was suggested at the beginning of the chapter that members were 
either hostile to or ignorant of religion. It is possible that this illiteracy shuts 
down imaginative engagement with the social and political outworkings of 
religion and ideology. At any rate, if policy is to engage groups like HCVS on 
the grounds of these outworkings, it seems best to leave loaded words like 
religion to one side. 
 
Still, there is no obvious awareness of the notion of equality forming an 
imagined community that can be self-motivating, carving out a life of service 
irrespective of the state or market. Yet this absence may only be the result of 
an unawareness of the possibility of conceptualising their own ideas in this 
way, inclusively constructing them and developing rituals around them. This 
very real yet underutilised presence of equality suggests that the difference 
between CTL and HCVS is not necessarily one of category but of potency and 
reflexivity. 
 
HCVS seemed equally susceptible to becoming an arm of the state or a 
product of the market. Not only was HCVS taking on government contracts, 
but also uncritically adopting government policy, as well as in one case 
imposing local government bureaucracy on other organisations. Very little was 
seen by way of leadership development. Where skills training was observed, it 
was treated as a service which would soon be purchased by clients. HCVS 
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was similarly prone to being shaped from the ground up, with no clear policy 
as to the kinds of organisations it sought to develop, and operating on a first 
come, first served basis. 
 
The case of HCVS does not fit neatly with the postliberal critique of the loss of 
shared transcendent values leading to instrumentalisation, and the assumed 
necessity of either state or market. While there appeared to be an absence of 
shared ideas of the good, solidaristic sentiments remained. It did appear that 
these sentiments drew on the idea of equality, and that the limited way in 
which this had been drawn out undermined its potency and consistency. But 
no causal link between HCVS's secularity and its adoption of these 
tendencies is observed. Perhaps their drifting between state and market was 
down to a lack of resilience amongst members. But equally, perhaps they 
lacked creativity, skills of governance, or inspiration. Perhaps their own 
structural position had become a self-fulfilling prophecy, stifling imagination 
concerning radical community practice. Of course, the question then emerges 
as to whether the structural position itself is symptomatic of a secular 
worldview in which only the state or market can be conceived as constitutive 
of common agency. Certainly Andrew Rowe argued as long ago as 1978 that 
CVSs should develop their own ideologies of empowerment, and should rely 
less on paid staff and more on volunteers, so the need for change is not 
unprecedented. Why HCVS has not gone this way is uncertain.  
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Chapter 9: Case study III: Faith-based Regeneration 
Network 
 
I became interested in the Department for Communities and Local 
Government funded Faith-based Regeneration Network because, after a long 
period of secularisation in policy-making, it represented a renewed interest in 
the role of religion in the public sphere.   
 
This seemed an interesting case study, since it appeared to offer a measured 
response to postliberalism in a diverse landscape: it recognised the important 
role of religion in the public sphere, but saw that simply reviving the old 
religious landscape was neither practical nor desirable. Instead, FbRN 
followed the multi-faith paradigm, seeking to include all faiths and none in 
developing a socially active society. 
 
Once again, this section opens with a short context for the establishing of 
FbRN. It then seeks to unravel the constituting factor of common agency. And 
finally, it explores common agency in terms of political structures and 
economic context.  
 
Context 
 
Adam Dinham explains that the multi-faith paradigm emerges out of a dual 
context: on the one hand, a neoliberal context in which faith groups are seen 
as “repositries of resources – staff, buildings, volunteers, networks, money – 
which could be deployed to the social good”; on the other, in a post 9/11 and 
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7/7 context, as potential sources of cohesion or division, depending on how 
they are engaged (Dinham 2012b: 577).  
 
While it is important to keep these influences in mind, Face to Face, Side by 
Side: A framework for partnership in our multi-faith society, the founding 
document associated with the multi-faith paradigm, demonstrates an 
awareness of the potential of faith to revive a shared spirit of association, 
whilst recognising that religion has significantly changed since we last paid 
attention to its role. Faith groups are seen as providing “leadership in 
organising their communities to be active” by “linking the development of 
citizenship to the beliefs and teachings of faith traditions” (DCLG 2008: 2014). 
Alongside this, the document suggests that “English society is now more 
diverse than ever before” and acknowledges “diverse stories about the 
different role of religion and belief in individuals’ every day lives” (ibid 2008: 
2013). 
 
Following Face to Face, Side by Side, DCLG provided funding to Regional 
Development Agencies to develop multi-faith networks, as well as to FbRN, 
which regarded itself as intermediary infrastructure organisation for numerous 
other bodies.  
 
Dinham questions whether multi-faith organisations are really equipped to 
play the role of reviving a shared spirit of association, since their tendency is 
to draw on the good will of faith actors that are already in existence, drawing 
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especially on those with “openness and readiness already to engage with 
people different to themselves” (Dinham 2012b: 579). Dinham adds: 
 
In the end, the multifaith paradigm…has no religious creed, buildings, 
explicit practices, or formal leaders…Multi-faith practices risk constituting 
a parallel world running alongside ‘real’ faith communities, seeming to 
respond to policy hopes but unable to bring constituencies of faith with 
them. To this extent the multi-faith paradigm remains a construct of 
policy hopefulness. In terms of hope for what, the fit between the vision 
for a multi-faith society and being a multi-faith body is one in which the 
New Labour government turns out to have been unambitious anyway – 
largely limiting its hopes to making efforts to accept there is plurality and 
preventing people from falling out with each other; and harnessing faith 
groups to provide services.  (Dinham 2012b: 586).  
 
This idea of a lack of a “creed” and “explicit practices”, and the associated 
inability to “bring constituencies of faith with them” provides a fitting context for 
the purposes of my research, and a useful place to begin the exploration of 
FbRN. 
 
Constituting factor of common agency 
 
As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, the Christian and unreligious 
social movements act as bookends for a spectrum that includes a number of 
nuanced positions. This section explores the perspectives provided by 
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employees in a multifaith social movement, which provides greater 
opportunity to complicate the ideas.  
 
Faith as the last bastion of association, bringing constituencies with them 
 
FbRN’s stated aim is to have all faith communities participating fully in civic 
life. They drew on this goodwill of such communities for their own survival too. 
When I joined the organisation, they were freely using office space in a 
converted rectory in Vauxhall. Faith groups are regarded as a last resource of 
social solidarity in the face of declining institutional affiliation: 
 
…One of the great gaps in our society is the absence of the trade union 
movement, which, in the 70s, was still very strong. Ummm and which 
was still a force which could inspire people. It's hard, now, to talk about 
the Labour movement, the trade union movement, as something that 
would inspire people. Now, if it exists at all, it's just about protecting 
certain rights. But not about inspiring people to do, humm, to take action 
in the world... 
 
...And, you know, an organisation that is imploding at the moment - the 
cooperative movement. Yeah the cooperative movement inspired people 
for, what, 200 years? (Interview) 
 
Although the past role of Christianity in developing a shared spirit of 
association is not acknowledged, like Prochaska, Gary is working out of the 
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context of a lost impetus for social action, and believes that faith has a role in 
rediscovering this impetus. This is especially interesting in terms of mechanic-
organic solidarity distinction made by Durkheim. For Gary, one must draw on 
mechanic ideas to develop the organic solidarity associated with trade unions. 
Gary also thinks policy makers recognise this role. Explaining why DCLG was 
interested in funding organisations like FbRN, he said: 
 
...I think uuu disenchantment ummm with err other voices in the 
public...um square, disenchantment with politicians, journalists, with 
others, and you're looking for, you know, who is there who is talking 
about public ethics and it...seems to be, well faith communities 
(Interview)  
 
In a manner reminiscent of Campbell and Putnam’s research (2010), faith is 
regarded as the last bastion of social capital, and as having an important role 
to play in rebuilding it. Faith is also regarded as having the ability to restore 
public trust in institutions more generally. 
 
Notwithstanding this stress on the importance of faith, the majority of FbRN 
literature is written from a secular perspective. Faith sounds like a resource, 
rather than an idea of the good to be explored. Unlike at CTL, where a clear 
idea of the good was discussed and cultivated amongst members through 
various activities, developing a sense of belonging, becoming and 
participation, at FbRN, there was an almost secular separation between ideas 
of the good, and the actions that needed to be taken. In my time at the 
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organisation, it was always quite uncomfortable asking how the organisation 
wanted to transform society, since such an agenda seemed to be perceived 
as antithetical to the only limited answer that could be given: “all faith 
communities participating fully in civic life”. I found it constantly surprising that 
despite being creative, intelligent and critical as individuals, as employees of 
FbRN, there was a collective failure of imagination about what it was they 
were trying to achieve. For the most part the secular bracketing of ideas of the 
good and pluralism are perceived as going hand in hand. This begins to feel 
like a paradox: the role of ideas of the good in cultivating a spirit of belonging, 
becoming and participation is considered vital to developing a shared spirit of 
association, even as its role within the organisation itself, in defining its 
agenda, developing belonging, transforming the public sphere, is relatively 
neglected.  
 
Just as multi-faith ideas seemed to be absent from literature and practices, so 
multi-faith ideas may have been on the minds of those at the top, but did not 
seem to inspire lower level staff. Amongst lower level staff, a number of 
mono-faith and instrumental motivations can be observed for working with 
FbRN. Sometimes these monofaith motivations coincide with the mutlifaith 
ideal, other times they are instrumental and correspond to the structural 
position of FbRN, but at other times  they are entirely at odds with FbRN, and 
cause problems in terms of staff motivation and loyalty.  
  
Dominic was strongly motivated by his Zoroastrian faith. He claimed that this 
faith could not be separated from mutlifaith action, since the former demanded 
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the latter: “it’s not one or the other; it’s part of the whole” (Interview). Yet 
despite a lot of questioning, Dominic failed to acknowledge a distinction 
between working with fellow Zoroastrians to engage in multifaith work, and 
working with a multifaith organisation. As FbRN had lost funding, Dominic 
would soon be leaving.  
 
The desire to improve the connections between his own faith and government 
was also an important motivation for Dominic’s joining FbRN.  
 
It was a step up from working in a monofaith community, to branch out 
into interfaith, to share good practices, to learn, to disseminate 
knowledge, it's a two-way process, and another attractive aspect was it 
was about communicating with government. So that also was a learning 
curve: not only supplying evidence-based information to government to 
inform policy, but also learning what government policy was about on 
this subject (Interview). 
 
From this perspective, the idea of multifaith does not appear to have traditions 
or narratives of its own that draw members in; rather, multifaith seems to be 
primarily recognised as a policy paradigm, and an opportunity to develop skills 
and contacts. This same motivation was reflected in FbRN members, who 
tended to see the organisation less as a movement than as a resource that 
might help them acquire skills or funding (Field notes). 
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Rather than being put down entirely to a shortcoming in the multi-faith idea 
generally speaking, in part the lack of motivation around multi-faith needs to 
be put down to a lack of opportunities for developing the concept. Dominic 
adds:  
 
FbRN has been inspired by people of faith so those values I've 
mentioned, the people working in it, have already brought, it's not that 
clearly defined, but the idea of social action is defined because it's 
there. So it's not that difficult for the trustees. In the end, we're paid 
staff, so we don't have to be people of faith, and you're implementing 
the policies set by trustees, or the directors. If you don't like it, you 
leave. But that is the role of your bosses (Interview). 
 
Dominic’s description suggests that the faith component of FbRN is limited to 
the values formulated by the trustees. Outside of this arena, very little space 
or time is devoted to the inclusion of others in the development of theology, 
and no obvious sense of belonging emerges. From my limited time at the 
organisation, no such opportunities arose, except where these were created 
by me. By discussing individual’s faith motivations, and how these connected 
up with those of colleagues, and by poking at various ways in which this may 
or may not create a sense of belonging, I was myself indulging, and drawing 
participants into, the very processes of meaning and belonging making that I 
was there to explore.  
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The absence of these opportunities for meaning and belonging making is 
especially pronounced when one hears Claire’s attitude towards FbRN. For 
Claire, although she is motivated by her faith to undertake social action, her 
work in FbRN is not part of that: 
 
I personally have a faith comittment, but I do quite a lot of other things in 
relation to that, and FbRN is primarily work rather than a faith 
expression, but there are a lot of other things I do that are a faith 
expression (Interview). 
 
Yet despite the absence of any clear allegiance to multi-faith theology, Claire 
does appear to be inspired by the practices associated with multi-faith action: 
 
it has been really interesting for me because a lot of the stuff I've done 
has been quite monofaith. So it's been interesting to go into an 
organisation that is resolutely, almost egalitarian faith-wise. There's no 
sense of priority in terms of faith… 
 
…I really like the way the trustees are really collaborative and 
cooperative. I think I've learned a lot from that perspective. (Interview). 
 
Although she was not with the organisation for faith reasons, Claire was 
inspired by certain practices that seemed to represent cooperation across 
difference. 
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Despite being inspired to engage in multi-faith work, in the case of Dominic, or 
mono-faith social action, in the case of Claire, both appeared to be engaged 
with FbRN on a primarily instrumental level, whether to serve the calling of 
their own faith, to address the skills deficit of that faith, or simply for the 
money. This point is underscored by the fact that both were leaving the 
organisation as funding ran out.  
 
Opportunities for cultivating a sense of belonging were further restricted by 
the way the organisation worked. Despite having fixed office space, FbRN 
staff worked primarily remotely. The result was that very little time was spent 
face-to-face discussing the organisation’s values and its shortcomings, as one 
might expect in an ordinary office environment.   
 
It’s the social change that’s the driver for me; not the interfaith encounter 
 
Gary perceives an important role for faith in restoring a shared spirit of 
association. While this sentiment is reflected in his colleagues, multifaith 
generally, and FbRN’s ethos specifically, does not appear to inspire that spirit 
of association. In fact, it is not obvious that developing a multifaith theology is 
part of FbRN’s aim. Like CTL, Gary shows an awareness of the tendency of 
faith, especially interfaith dialogue, to become focused on discourse and lose 
sight of action. This perhaps provides a second explanation for the 
aforementioned absence of faith discourse in FbRN literature. Distinguishing 
between interfaith and multi-faith, Gary suggests that it is typical for those 
involved in interfaith to say… 
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…"no we don't do social action...we do the kind of engagement style 
theological stuff but we don't do social action" (Interview). 
 
For Gary on the other hand… 
 
…it's the social change that's the driver for me; not the interfaith 
encounter...it's not necessarily at all for me, that the driver is umm I 
wanna get to know my Christian neighbour...ummm buuut if we are all 
passionate about making some kind of change together, then yes I 
wanna do that with them, but with others as well (Interview). 
 
The stress on social change over any kind of interfaith encounter does not 
mean that faith does not play a role in the world that FbRN is trying to create; 
rather, what it highlights is this same social boundary construction exhibited 
by the CTL against faith as escapology. Again, a post-Marxist analysis has 
been imbibed whereby those that “don't do social action” are belittled and 
othered as doing “the kind of engagement style theological stuff”. As already 
suggested in the previous subsection, however, potentially this distancing 
from interfaith dialogue creates problems of its own, since creating shared 
narratives might form a basis for shared action. Gary himself demonstrates an 
awareness of this point further down.  
 
Finally, it is also worth noting that in my time at the organisation very little by 
way of “doing” social action was observable. I often felt a sense of 
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awkwardness that as a participant there was very little for my to participate in. 
When I was offered work, this tended to represent a development made 
possible by my presence as a skilled researcher. I was no longer exploring 
FbRN but rather what FbRN might do with a researcher like me.  
 
Monofaith, multifaith and secular motivation 
 
Thus far FbRN has appeared to frame its actions in a manner similar to CTL. 
Yet it has been suggested that FbRN’s avoidance of ideas of the good limits 
its capacity to generate a spirit of association. Notwithstanding this point, 
FbRN does display a number of creative and interesting strategies for 
cultivating a spirit of association across difference.  
 
My observations suggest that FbRN staff tended to be simultaneously inspired 
by their own faith, by multifaith discourses, by what might be called secular 
sacreds like ideas of social inclusion or equality, and by instrumental motives.  
 
As part of a multifaith organisation, clearly one’s individual faith cannot play 
the same role as it might in a monofaith organisaiton in calling people to 
action. This does not, however, rule out the telling of stories particular to one’s 
personal faith; rather it makes the process far more complicated.  
 
when I go into a room full of people uhum, I can talk religion and I can 
talk, you know, from my own experience, you know, whatever kind of 
room full of...an organisation, mixed bunch of representatives, you know, 
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I can talk from a position of someone who's actively involved in a 
religious [tradition] (Interview). 
 
I asked Gary whether he appealed to stories of his own faith, or tried to find 
common experiences: 
 
Both. I think it's both. I think, um that's only me so...as I have in this 
conversation, I talk about specifics, I, my experience, because it's my 
experience, but I also do have a broader experience, which huum has 
been through working with people from other faith traditions and people 
from no faith tradition. Umm and I suppose it's kind of the previous 
answers in the previous conversations, I reflect my experience that 
 
Tim 
 
And is it more helpful, you know, working with people of other faiths or of 
no faith, to put your faith to one side? 
 
Gary 
 
I don't know. You know, what I do, I'm very upfront, I'm very out as a 
Jew. Even years ago uhuum, when I think the interfaith world was much 
lower profile, you know I would be, and where, I suppose partly it's 
forced upon you, when, during the 80s, in the antiapartheid movement, 
and shelter the homeless charity, had mutlifaith committees, my 
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recollection of both of those organisations is that what they call their 
multifaith comittee was by and large a dozen Christians and me. And I'm 
very confident in saying "I'm a Jew" [laughing] so...but that's my way, 
other people do it in different ways (Interview). 
 
Gary clearly sees his faith as important as a way of starting conversations. It 
provides him with a narrative context. He draws on his experience “because 
it’s my experience”, rather than because it is deemed more worthy than 
anybody else’s.  Gary also feels it is important to talk from his own faith 
position because it is one of the many that has often been excluded in a 
predominantly Christian culture. Speaking from one’s faith position thus both 
provides a narrative device, a way of explaining one’s context, and also gives 
that faith a stake in the conversation. In some sense, Gary is placing faith in 
others to understand him from his context, and to translate into their own 
context those ideas that make sense. 
 
This same translation process can also be seen the other way around. When I 
spoke to Dominic about different modes of inspiration I had encountered at 
CTL, I happened to mention bringing about the Kingdom of God on earth as 
an example: 
 
Yeah I wouldn't say bringing the Kingdom of God on earth but it is 
parallel ideas to improve the world because in Zoroastrianism, it is in 
essence that idea, because the idea of Kingdom of God, or as we say 
heaven, which is light, which is the realm of God where everything's 
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meant to be perfect, and our idea of God is perfect otherwise we 
wouldn't be in the business that we are, we're trying to replicate this in 
the world, so the Zoroastrian world outlook is this: that the physical and 
spiritual world was created by God, and then it was polluted by evil, and 
in Zoroastrianism evil is an independent entity; it's not part of God, and 
the creation was created to assist God to improve the world. So there's 
an interdependence between the creator which is God, and the creation, 
especially the human being, to bring together - that's the covenant, it's a 
partnership, a togetherness, to bring about the change. Without the 
active participation of human beings, namely by doing good thoughts, 
good works and good deeds, that wouldn't happen. So the kingdom of 
God, or in another way the battle between good and evil would not be 
won by God and by the forces of good if it wasn't for the active 
participation of human beings doing good (Interview). 
 
This lengthy tract demonstrates the complex way in which Dominic, who 
believes in multi-faith social action, is capable of hearing language from other 
faiths and translating them into his own language.  This was also the most 
enthusiastic and animated part of my lengthy interview with Dominic. He 
enjoyed the translation process, since it provided an opportunity to discuss his 
beliefs at length. I noticed similar enjoyment in work from an interfaith group 
that FbRN provided meeting rooms for. For many of those involved, the 
interfaith process was not simply their first opportunity to share their faith with 
someone of a different faith or none; more than this, it was their first 
opportunity to explore their own faith and its implications for the way a public 
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life should be lived. In this sense, the act of translation might not be perceived 
as an act of oppression. Rather than forcing ideas into a language in which 
they no longer make sense, it is a creative experience. Perhaps what is 
important in this regard is not so much the stipulation to translate, but the 
power relations involved in the translation process. Oppression arises when 
one feels the need to translate one’s faith into a language that undermines 
that faith, simply in order to received funding or approval.  
 
It must be acknowledged that this encounter between Dominic and myself 
was contrived. I was a participant, but also an observer. I was asking 
questions not as a co-worker but as a researcher. It is thus worth noting again 
that it is this opportunity to discuss and inclusively develop a shared theology 
that seems to be lacking. Yet to interpret this as lack is a critically realist 
claim, since it suggests there are processes at work, or failing to work, of 
which Dominic himself is either unaware or deliberately dismissive: while 
Dominic admits there is “very seldom” an opportunity to discuss one’s faith, 
nor does he see FbRN “as an arena for this” (Interview).   
 
The potential for developing a shared spirit of association can be further 
ascertained by exploring the ability of FbRN employees to make their work 
relevant to a multi-faith context, one which in reality is intended to include 
people of all faiths and none. This task is especially difficult because in some 
sense the umbrella, the multi-faith paradigm, has been developed by 
policymakers, rather than emerging from the grassroots.   
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In order to make their individual faith experience more widely relevant, FbRN 
adopted a number of strategies for constructing imagined communities, or 
umbrellas, under which a number of people could sit. I identified at least four. 
The first was value-generalisation. The second was looking for overlapping 
narratives, like hospitality. The third was secular agendas such as social 
inclusion. And fourth was the notion of putting a metanarrative to one side in 
favour of working together practically towards common ends.  
 
The strategy for value-generalisation involved the adoption of a term with a 
wide appeal, and seeking to broaden this appeal further; namely, faith. Gary 
tried to open up a wide umbrella around the idea of faith. This meant both 
being open to minority faiths, and broadening the concept of faith.   
 
For Gary, “who’s a faith, who’s not a faith, who’s allowed in, who’s not allowed 
to be in…we  just don’t get involved with things like that” (Interview). Gary’s 
approach appears to contradict the Schmittian idea championed by Mouffe 
that outsiders must be created in order for a political identity to be formed 
(Schmitt 1922/2006; Mouffe 2007). Instead, the political process is one of 
bringing the other into the fold. Dominic goes a step further, suggesting that 
“the interfaith idea is taken for granted” (Interview).  
 
FbRN is very open to and engaged with minority faiths in a way that it 
acknowledges others are not. Speaking of one group in particular which had a 
very formal structure of governance, I was told: 
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Part of it is stuff that we would never get involved with like, who's a faith 
who's not a faith, who's allowed in, who's not allowed to be in, you know, 
they’ve been heavily, over the years, internally lobbied huum that they 
should accept Pagans, huuum Rastafarians, Ahmadiyya Muslims, 
Humanists, hummm and they have resisted it very strongly. So like, the 
Ahmadiyya they have...they have resisted because...other voices within 
the Muslim community say "well if they're in, we're out...and you've gotta 
choose, either them or us" which is...I mean we just don't get involved 
with things like that so ummm conversations…I had with Mormons 
recently...precious little doubt Mormons but they're interested in 
engaging…But I don't have to worry, you know, are they in are they not 
in? Because we're not, don't have that, kind of representative 
constitution. If they're interested in doing social action from a faith-based 
perspective huuum or a belief-based perspective and they're not 
proselytising or huum denigrating any other group then, you know, 
there's a space for them here (Interview). 
 
While FbRN sees faiths as a last bastion of social solidarity, it nonetheless 
takes a deliberately ambiguous stance on what faith is. It is clear that being 
open to all faiths and none is never as easy as it sounds because there are a 
number of complications and disagreements between and within faith 
communities, based on theology and power. The mention of forms of 
governance moreover indicates that liberality is not a mere choice: it has to be 
written into the way an organisation runs, and often involves ignoring the 
authority of formal faith representatives in favour of building networks “on a 
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personal basis”. Yet, as will be discussed more in the next section, ignoring 
the authority of formal faith representatives is precarious, since they tend to 
be the ones governments are interested in talking to.  
 
In terms of broadening the concept of faith, Gary summarised for me the kind 
of message he has been trying to give at public events in which faith is not a 
key element: 
 
it's not just faith people who have a belief system, we all do, you know,  
sometimes it's explicit, sometimes it might be driven by a faith tradition, 
sometimes it might be driven by a political understanding of the world, 
but we all, if we're community workers, trying to do some good, or trying 
to do something, nearly all of us, either consciously or less consciously, 
we are motivated by some kind of worldview, ideology or belief-system, 
and...at the very least we should be honest to ourselves and try and 
understand what it is for ourselves but much more, to use that in a 
positive way in the work that we're doing. You know I'm a very proud 
[laughing] I'm a very "out" Jew (Interview). 
 
In his generalisation of the idea of faith, Gary was also suggesting that 
honesty about one’s faith, and acting upon it were intimately linked. FbRN 
sees enabling faith and non-faith actors to reflect on their deep commitments 
as fundamental to being critically aware. Reflecting on one’s deep 
commitments is also part of being socially responsible. In a reflective practice 
tool they developed, the organisation suggests that “most people operate on a 
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day-to-day basis” with a “theory-in-use”, which may be “unconscious” and 
“quite distinct” from our “espoused theory”, that is, “the conscious answer we 
give when someone asks us what beliefs or ideas shape our work”. They go 
on to suggest that “without beliefs and ideas our work is groundless” (FbRN 
2012). So reflecting on core beliefs is a means of developing what Chris 
Baker calls belonging and becoming (Baker 2013). Yet, as suggested before, 
the particular theory on which FbRN bases its actions lacks critical and 
inclusive engagement. 
 
On top of this lack of reflection, what remains problematic about this value-
generalisation around the idea of faith, considered universally, is that, as was 
evident in the discussion of HCVS, there remains significant hostility towards 
the idea of faith. While perhaps this hostility can be overcome through 
education, and the improvement of literacy, the question remains whether it is 
not more productive to begin in a place that is less contested, and less 
evocative of prejudicial sentiments. Despite being broad in its interpretation of 
faith, FbRN is nonetheless seeking to impose an umbrella, rather than 
inclusively develop shared ideals. 
 
With the umbrella around faith communities constructed, it becomes possible 
for Gary to draw on his own tradition, and to extrapolate this out to others, and 
hence a network of overlapping narratives begins to flourish: 
 
And...if you've been saying, so I'm writing, you know, I'm writing this 
flyer… And one of the concepts, one of the simple things we want to 
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encourage people to do, is to open their doors, and offer hospitality. Now 
if I say that to people of a religious tradition, they get that immediately. 
So there's a kind of code 
 
Tim 
 
What will they get specifically sorry?  
 
Gary 
 
They get that if you use the word hospitality, it's about engaging with the 
other, humm, possibly taking risks, humm, doing something that is more 
than inviting a couple of your mates round for a couple, for a cup of tea. 
So, you know, within the Jewish tradition, the image that we have, it's a, 
it's a code or shorthand. When I say the word hospitality to any Jew, or 
any knowledgeable Jew, their brain will immediately go to the story of 
Abraham, and the tradition that his tent was open on all sides so that he 
could welcome strangers coming from all directions. So all I need to do 
is write the word hospitality and immediately they're going into a mode of 
thought...it's about strangers, it's about people coming from different 
directions; it means all other kinds of things more than just the word 
hospitality. So I think because religious traditions have been used to 
talking about ideas like this, for hundreds and thousands of years, then 
there's a certain comfort. Now, I suppose the flip side is that the comfort, 
when I say comfort what I mean is, a comfort talking about difficult 
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things...big ideas...so, the flip side is that those big ideas might become 
ummm fixed. Now some people say that's a good thing, some people 
might say it's not. I think it's possibly not a good thing if it becomes, 
uheem rigid. That's my personal take on my tradition and other 
traditions. And that's where the critique of faith traditions, one of the 
critiques, is about how rigid they are, how stuck they are in past 
centuries, umm, how they are unable to take on board contemporary big 
ideas, like equality (Interview). 
 
For Gary, the word hospitality acts as a repository of memories, ideologies 
and obligations that can inspire people of certain traditions to act. Hospitality 
is a common denominator, an overlapping consensus that provides a space 
for talking about the common good. Looking at this strategy from a universal 
perspective again, the problem here is that it is questionable just how many 
words, memories, ideologies and obligations are already shared. Although 
language is being treated as fluid and constructive, the dedication to a 
particular word such as faith is equally suggestive of that word as 
corresponding to a reality to which some are unable or unwilling to assent. 
Equally, one must question whether those logics that are already shared in 
the public sphere as it is are not simply replicating that sphere rather than 
transforming it, amplifying the good and the bad alike.  
 
The third umbrella used at FbRN is the idea of social justice.  For Gary, not 
only was social justice his initial inspiration for being involved, but it served as 
the only grounds on which he excluded other organisations and people. A 
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group could only be excluded from FbRN if it itself excluded other groups and 
people.  
 
On top of these creative strategies for broadening the metanarrative, finding 
overlapping consensuses, and using secular cognates, sits another strategy 
which eschews metanarrative altogether. This position can be explained by 
returning to Dominic’s intervention regarding FbRN’s not being an arena for 
discussing faith. He continues along similar lines: 
 
That interfaith idea is taken for granted. What you're doing is you are 
using your faith initiative, but at the same time, like all organisations, 
there is a structure, an ethos that you're following. Faith or no faith, you 
are working for an organisation and therefore you are automatically 
accepting the values of the organisation… 
 
And frankly I don't agree that in interfaith work you should be promoting 
your faith. Frankly what you're doing is going down the road of 
proselytising. And that's dangerous because interfaith is based on trust, 
bonding, bridging and linking. You're initially bonding, and then you're 
developing trust, and you're coming together to do some work for the 
common good. But if at the same time you're, let's say you and I are 
people of two different faiths, or no faith, and let's say I happen to belong 
to a faith like Zoroastrianism which is one of the world's eight oldest 
religions going, and you happen to be of another faith and proselytising, 
frankly to me it's a waste of time: a) I don't need that, I'm quite happy, 
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and stable in my faith, and part of the interfaith world is about being 
confident in your own faith so you don't need someone else to tell you 
why don't you switch over? (Interview) 
 
Multi-faith is not a creed in itself, but rather is taken for granted, and used as a 
stepping-stone for facilitating the good work of people of faith. Moreover, the 
multi-faith environment is not an appropriate place to be talking about faith, 
since to do so risks creating friction within the group. As already stated, what 
emerges is a paradox whereby those most interested in faith as a last bastion 
of social solidarity nonetheless fail to find creative ways for faith to reimagine 
the public sphere.  
 
Conclusion 
 
FbRN has developed a number of strategies for creating an imagined 
community through which shared action can be taken. Yet it is questionable 
how strong any of these pull factors could be relative to the strength of one’s 
own tradition. As funding began to run out for Gary, it seemed that his staff 
slowly left him. They did not give up voluntary work altogether, but returned to 
their own communities. This seems to reflect a wider trend amongst multi-faith 
organisations (Dinham 2012b). As I watched this happen, it became apparent 
that multifaith was not a social movement, a shared theological experiment 
driving a social change, but a funded project that had run its course. This 
observation links well with Dinham’s (2012b) point that there is no multi-faith 
religious creed. I would perhaps be less pessimistic, and suggest that while 
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there is no multifaith religious creed, given the umbrellas constructed by Gary, 
just one person, it is not inconceivable that a concerted effort from like-minded 
individuals could drive a movement. Each of Gary’s strategies had the 
potential to be fleshed out and given a greater opportunity to flourish. 
However, each also requires critical scrutiny. The process of value-
generalisation around the concept of faith remains limited, since faith as a 
term, no matter how broadly conceived in the abstract, can inspire hostility, as 
reflections from HCVS demonstrated. Similarly, the overlapping consensus 
sought in ideas like hospitality is limited to terms already agreed upon. It 
arguably fails to see metanarrative and indeed language itself as a creative 
process for transforiming the world we inhabit.  Similarly, using already 
existing secular narratives like social justice may simply be falling back on 
words and ideas that already fail to capture the public imagination, and that 
are anyway contested. Finally, and most strikingly, dropping metanarrative 
altogether denies the place of ontology and its refiication in creative language 
in reimagining who we are and why we are here. If social actors drop 
metanarrative, it is worth asking whether they are dropping language too, and 
again, rather than reimaging the public sphere and its problems, end up 
seeking to solve problems that have already been defined for them by 
somebody else. Taken together, all of these potential pitfalls seem to be 
indicative of an organisation operating within a secular, liberal frame. Where 
there is difference, it must be put to one side rather than creatively overcome. 
The organisation draws from traditions that are already present as if they are 
immutable resources, rather than creatively and inclusively building new 
narratives. What seems to be lacking from FbRN, ironically, was a creative 
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process of inclusive ideational construction reified through transformative 
action.  
 
Political structures and common agency 
 
Thus far it has been suggested that although FbRN arises out of a context in 
which faith is regarded as a last bastion of association, its staff draw on 
monofaith, multifaith and secular ideologies both for their own motivation, and 
to cultivate interest outside of the organisation. I suggest that the multi-faith 
vision has not been fully realised, and so its ability to cultivate a spirit of 
association is limited, as can be seen clearly in its inability to retain staff as it 
loses funding. And I suggest that the multilayered shortcomings are best 
encapsulated as a focus on tradition as an immutable well to draw from, 
rather than as a socially constructive process. 
 
In this section, I explore how the multi-faith vision interacts with participants’ 
perceptions of political structures, and the role of these structures in 
developing common agency. It must be taken into account that FbRN arises 
out of an agenda of community empowerment, but was funded primarily by 
regional and national government. This can create an ambivalence on the part 
of participants that is difficult to navigate.  
 
The politics of faith-based action in a secular public sphere 
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Despite having been government funded, FbRN managed to maintain a faith 
structure that is entirely at odds with the instinct of secular governments; 
namely, at odds with the instinct to deal with faiths through designated faith 
leaders deemed representative of functional constituencies (Dinham 2011). 
This position has proved useful in maintaining flexibility, but detrimental to 
maintaining influence.  
 
Referring to another multifaith organisation, Gary explained to me that 
 
…it's got, it’s gone more...of the…route of...complicated 
representational governance, whereas we have stuck with a loose 
humm form of governance in…all of our trustees are there on a 
personal basis only. We write into our constitution that there will be 
trustees from 9 faith traditions...but apart from that they can be 
anybody, they're not representative of anybody, they're not elected or 
appointed by their faith traditions in any way which is ummm, which, 
when we need to lobby ministers, we've discovered is quite a 
weakness  
 
Tim 
 
Because you want to say "this person represents..." 
 
Gary 
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Yeah...or we want to be able to ring up the archbishop and say "come 
on"...this is what the [other multi-faith organisation] did...and have done 
in the last few weeks, you know they’ve rung up the senior members of 
each…community and said..."look, umm you’ve now gotta come 
through for us", but we don't have that direct line so...there's a 
weakness, but the strength is...we are a flexible organisation that 
can...pretty much choose to do...what we want to do, within the realms 
of funding (Interview). 
 
Gary’s account demonstrates how establishment prejudice in favour of faith 
leaders, deemed representative of functional constituencies, can undermine 
organisations that, rightly according to the literature, reject such structures on 
the grounds that much of faith is horizontal, and that no single leader can be 
deemed representative of any given faith (Dinham 2011). In particular, the 
absence of this relationship with so-called leaders means that it is difficult to 
lobby government when and where necessary.  
 
Gary’s account regarding Ahmadiyya Muslims and Mormons also offers 
implications for policy making more broadly, in that when organisations begin 
to operate at regional or national levels, the question of who represents a 
faith, and which faiths to represent, and how to do this without offending other 
faiths, actually stifles grassroots innovation for the common good.  
 
The account also offers wider implications still when we extend faith more 
broadly, as Gary does, to include belief, or perhaps further still, as Gary has 
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elsewhere in meetings with unreligious groups, to include ideology or values. 
On the one hand, it seems unfair to those without faith that faith groups 
should have a privileged place at the table. But if representing a designated 
faith is organisationally difficult given the fluid nature of belief, then 
establishing representatives of certain values seems almost unimaginable.  
 
For FbRN, this complication regarding how to represent faith leads to a 
complex relationship to the state. On the one hand, staff are complicit in 
accepting and indeed reifying at the grassroots level an idea of the state as 
secular. On the other hand, a primary function of the organisation is the 
feeding up to the level of policy the grassroots experiences and struggles of 
faith-based action in a predominantly secular public sphere.    
 
Gary’s attitude towards the state was especially confused. On the one hand, 
like CTL, he could be seen to regard the state as having an important role in 
embodying and administering a process of national gift exchange, filtered 
through the prism of secular equality. 
 
I don't think there's one truth. You know, I'm not - there are some 
religious people for who that's a very important, central core to their 
religious belief, and I don't think there is just one truth 
 
Tim 
So do you think there's some people who can't do interfaith, because of 
what they believe? 
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Gary 
Yeah 
 
Tim 
But it's just something, what, that the state can't fund? Or, or, or do you 
think they can?  
 
Gary 
I think the state funds things that...I mean this is a secularist 
argument...any organisation that gets funding by the state has to...meet 
the same criteria...and, if for example, any organisation allows 
exclusion, and if that organisation is therefore not able to meet that 
criteria...(Interview). 
 
One can read in Gary’s attitude not only the assertion of the state as being the 
most appropriate arbitrator of which groups should and should not receive 
funding, but also the expectation of secularity on the part of the state in the 
way it makes its decisions. A similar perspective was offered by Dominic. 
When I asked him if it was important for government to cultivate “some sort of 
faith or values” in order to promote the public good, Dominic replied that “no 
single faith has a monopoly on good or evil. So the government promoting 
one faith does get the government into trouble” (Interview). Although 
numerous discussions saw both came round to the idea of cultivating some 
sort of faith or values towards the public good, this was not their natural 
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position. Instead, interest in the multi-faith paradigm seemed to be more to do 
with social inclusion within a predominantly secular public sphere: 
 
People of faith are human beings, taxpayers, so what is wrong with 
using a faith based organisation to further civic projects, which is what 
faith-based action is. Why is it only "secular" bodies can do that? 
(Interview). 
 
This positioning again points to how FbRN staff, despite having a strong 
regard for how their individual faith challenges contemporary society, which is 
regarded as capitalist and individualist, nonetheless are unable or unwilling to 
see a multi-faith body as collectively challenging these ideas. Here it appears 
that this is related to the perceived role of the state, and the importance of 
secularity for the equal treatment of all faiths. The adoption of this principled 
position with respect to the state and secularity seems precarious, since 
although the state could embody certain principles, those principles could also 
act as a prism, misshaping the way that the social landscape is understood. 
FbRN is itself dependent on state funding, and staff thinking is in line with the 
current ideology, perhaps lacking a critical and creative voice. Instead, it 
simply seeks the inclusion of faith groups within this relatively uncritically 
understood public sphere.  
 
Staff also admired the way the state was able to avoid questions as to the 
good by deferring such discussions, and the arguments these entail, to the 
local level. As Claire explained: 
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When the government was funding FbRN, the idea that they wouldn't 
fund certain projects unless they were multi-faith, so it was almost about 
removing any issues about a dominant faith group in a community by 
saying “sort it out amongst yourselves and then we'll give you the 
money” (Interview).   
 
By holding money to communities as an incentive, the government is deemed 
capable of shaping diverse communities towards the discovery of a common 
good. Yet on this level also, there is no data to suggest that the link between 
government money and multi-faith cooperation is causal, and it may be that 
the money attracts groups that are already working within, or at least 
comfortable with the idea of, a multi-faith framework. It is moreover worth 
asking, from a post-liberal perspective, whether a community created through 
financial incentive is indeed a community after all. For Milbank, such a 
community would constitute a pseudo-sittlichkeit (Milbank 1990/2006: 167). 
Here a distinction has to be drawn between a common good and common 
interest. Yet perhaps a further distinction needs to be drawn between money 
offered for the direct benefit of the recipients, and money offered to facilitate 
actions for the public good.  
 
This apparent interpolation and cultivation of secularity from the top 
downwards is nonetheless tempered by an attempt to feed the experiences of 
faith communities upwards. Prior to my time at the organisation, much work 
had been done in collaboration with academics to produce documents that 
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simultaneously challenge policy narratives while providing groups with the 
opportunity to better understand and work with these narratives. This role was 
not merely perfunctory. Documents such as Faith as social capital: connecting 
or dividing? (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) and Faith based social 
action and the Inter Faith Framework (Dinham et al. 2008), developed in 
conjunction with FbRN, played an integral role in shaping Face to Face Side 
by Side (DCLG 2008), the key policy document for government collaboration 
with faith groups in community development.  
 
In my time at the organization, this work continued, with Gary asking me to 
put together case studies of various faith organisations. I was asked to 
telephone these organisations and ask them what they were trying to achieve, 
the main challenges they faced and the kinds of resources they needed. Yet 
part of this work seemed to rely on my own research expertise and 
communication skills. I was not working with already existing members but 
rather found myself trying to build relationships with other faith networks.  This 
research also relied heavily on communicating with faith groups that were 
already visible, and discoverable via the internet. The result was that Christian 
groups were disproportionately represented.  
 
Placed as it was as an intermediary institution, between state and grassroots, 
FbRN was able to work with a secular ideology to nonetheless slowly realise 
the full contribution of faith groups. By collaborating with the academy, it was 
able to challenge policy narratives by using valid research methods to feed 
information from the grassroots back to the centre. Far more than HCVS, 
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FbRN not only made policy accessible to the grassroots, but found ways of 
feeding the feelings of the grassroots back up the chain of command. Yet it 
also must be acknowledge that the key role I was asked to take on learning 
from and developing these networks suggests a lack of attention to this work 
of feeding information upwards. Another way of putting this point is to ask, 
who would be doing this job in my absence? 
 
Becoming an outsider 
 
I was unfortunate enough as an emotionally involved participant, and lucky 
enough as a researcher, to see what happened when this complex 
relationship with the state reached crisis, as state funding stopped and 
resources slowly depleted.  
 
It has already been stated that FbRN was seen by staff as responding to a 
general disenchantment with traditional authority in the public sphere. In part 
due to the loss of funding, this disenchantment was to some extent shared by 
staff. Gary himself seemed to have adopted a healthy cynicism in relation to 
conventional politics, understanding how dependent funding was on the 
whims of particular governments. He claimed that changes in funding and 
priorities were almost always derived either from ideology or from religiously 
illiterate reactions to security threats. He would laugh at how arbitrary the 
process was for choosing groups and people to work with: it was a question of 
who knew who, and what kind of taste a particular politician or civil servant 
had (Field notes).  
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As already mentioned, these negative remarks towards conventional politics 
have to be read in the context of Gary’s organisation losing its funding. In my 
time with the organisation, it was losing two of its three staff due to the 
withdrawal of funding.  
 
These changes brought big challenges to the findings already produced in the 
previous section. What look like appealing strategies for developing a multi-
faith spirit of association, are actually heavily dependent on funding. As the 
state withdrew funding, rather than a movement which happened to have 
money, FbRN seemed more like money in search of a movement. As staff 
left, it was key that as a researcher I explored why there was no impetus to 
keep pushing forwards in hope of further funds in the future. But this was an 
uncomfortable process. Discussions, which between staff and myself were 
usually good-natured and reflective, became short and defensive. Moreover, 
as a participant observer, this situation was putting a lot of pressure on me to 
take on work for the organisation. With tremendous feelings of guilt, I had to 
take a step back and remind myself I was there as a researcher. 
 
Beyond the state 
 
Despite an understandable bitterness at the withdrawal of funding by a new 
government, Gary also saw the loss of funding as an opportunity:  
 
Tim 
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Were there things that you couldn't do when you were getting er [state] 
money? That you felt you couldn't do 
 
Gary 
 
No I don't think so, I mean kind of, in theory it's kind of, idea that you 
have to be more diplomatic in your critique of government, when you're 
getting government money. I think...you might be, you know, we can 
probably be more experimental...so that's to do with policy issues to do 
with what we can and can't say for example but...if we're not using 
government money...then we can do whatever we want, we can do 
things that may or may not work. Ummm if they don't work then...at the 
moment at least it's only our own money.  
 
Tim 
 
Yeah - okay 
 
Gary 
 
And you know there's always a relationship with funders, you know all 
charities have relationships with funders hum and, so I think there are 
possibly opportunities and a certain degree of freedom if you're not tied 
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to one significant funder, whether it's government or it's a charitable trust 
or… (Interview).  
 
While Gary saw an important role for the state, he nonetheless had 
discovered the hard way how linked up the state is with the whims of 
politicians and political parties, who often cease successful programmes 
simply because they were set up under a predecessor. Gary also thought that 
the influence of the state may have imposed a kind of iron cage without the 
organisation realising it, and was therefore optimistic about the freedom of the 
future. He especially reflected on the ability of the organisation to be more 
critical of the state, and having a “degree of freedom” in not being solely 
reliant on the state for funds.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The first section suggested that although multi-faith in intention, a number of 
staff had distinctly monofaith or even instrumental reasons for working with 
FbRN. It stated that while FbRN had a number of effective multi-faith 
strategies for social solidarity, these were always drawing on already existing 
theologies and practices as resources, without attempting to develop new 
theologies and practices as a community.  
 
This section has suggested that FbRN had an interesting and innovative 
relationship with the state, on the one hand sharing in a secular ideology, but 
on the other seeking to feed up the policy ladder those challenges presented 
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by faith-based action. Yet on the one hand, this work was reliant on me as a 
researcher, and drew on work by faith groups that were already visible; and 
on the other, the organisation itself was so dependent on state funding, that 
this innovative relationship was also extremely precarious. The loss of state 
funding was equally revealing of the lack of a spirit of association in the 
organisation, since, as already stated, when funding was lost, so too were 
staff.  
  
Economic context and common agency 
 
Like HCVS, FbRN initially came into being at the behest of the state. As with 
HCVS, this may be taken to reflect the absence of a naturally occurring multi-
faith infrastructure organisation within a market society. Yet while FbRN is 
perhaps not a “naturally occurring” entity in a market society, the removal of 
state funding has precipitated a shift in language and self-perception that 
actually better reflects market logic.  
 
Everything is going to contract, even in areas you might imagine would be 
better served by nonprofit 
 
Gary is heavily critical of the way in which government policy has shifted to 
create a capitalist environment whereby grants, shaped largely by the 
applicant, are replaced with contracts, shaped largely by the commissioner, 
and where organisations are forced to compete with one another:  
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everything goes, everything is going to contracts, often private sector 
contracts, even in areas that you might imagine would be better served 
by nonprofit: a social entrprise or a charity. Err and that is clearly 
ideologically driven, and umm from my perspective, very worrying. Even 
taking out the kind of party political aspects of it, to put the running of 
public services into the hands of three or four very large corporations 
seems to me, a kind of worrying trend… 
 
… I'm very unhappy with the state of play because...what's, I mean, our 
relationships with central government have been distorted over the last 
two years by the changing funding relationship. So instead, although 
they still talk the language of collaboration, that faith communities and 
faith community organisations collaborate, actually by their kind of drip 
feeding, and holding out little bits of money here, little bits of money 
there, what they're creating is a quite small market place, quite a 
competitive market place, where we are competing against each other. 
And so organisations that would naturally work together are even quite 
suspicious of each other, because we're not sure what they're doing in 
relation to bits of money (Interview). 
 
Before it was suggested that the state positively distorts the market, providing 
services that otherwise would not occur. Here it is suggested that the state 
has imbibed a competitive logic, adopting structures of governance that 
encourage organisations that might otherwise cooperate, to compete. The 
only policy that has worked in the organisation’s favour is the Social Value 
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Act, which requires that when commissioning contracts, public bodies 
consider social value as a criteria of selection. Charities hope that this will 
improve their chances against private companies.  
 
It was not only Gary’s faith inspiring him here: 
 
Tim 
 
Does that challenge you in your faith? 
 
Gary 
 
Well, you see I'm still a bit of both. I'm still a bit of the old fashioned 
socialist which is not necessarily to do with my faith, and a politically 
active Jew, uhuum so it's inevitable that I'm looking at a...quite a 
reactionary government through both lenses so that would be...I'm not 
saying it's just about how my faith, would make me respond to the 
current policy climate because I'm not 
 
Tim 
 
Just a person of faith 
 
Gary 
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Yeah. You look around at what is happening and you respond...I 
suppose I respond now, if I look at social...social issues, social problems 
of poverty, polarisation, injustice, human rights, migration, you know, any 
number of issues, I suppose my default now, when I think about how I 
respond to it is through a faith lens. That's my, the way that I respond in 
practise but my perspective is informed from a whole range of other 
things as well.       
 
For Gary a socialist ideology played an important role in providing him with a 
critical position against increasingly capitalist policies. It was this legacy of 
socialism that Gary drew on – not his own faith, and certainly not any multi-
faith theology. Dominic is similarly critical of capitalism. Again, the narrative he 
uses for explaining what has gone wrong is socialist rather than religious, but 
he sees an important role for faith. At the end of our interview, just as I was 
about to turn off the recording device, Dominic was provoked by something to 
discuss how rampant individualism had become in society: 
 
Tim 
So how do we overcome individualism? 
 
Dominic 
That's the challenge. And the challenge is partly to do with the direct 
relationship between the downfall of the Soviet Union and communism, 
and the rampant capitalism that's gone. When the Berlin wall came 
down, and the Soviet Union capitulated, communism was...for the 
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social democratic governments of Europe...they were mindful that if 
they gloated their wealth, the masses would have a different option, to 
go to. Of course, the capitulation of the Soviet Union very clearly 
indicated not only that these governments who were showing the 
utopian alternative were actually not only bankrupt but also had done 
gross evil, and they were discredited. Democracy was the alternative. 
And although democracy has got a long way to go, it's still in my book 
the better alternative. But in the process, and here I'd link it to the US 
ethos, with individualism, materialism and capitalism, which is now a 
universal value. That has created rampant disregard of the have-nots. 
That the reason people have not is because they're lazy, incompetent, 
whatever. It's your fault. to a degree it's a shared responsibility. Think 
of it with something as simple as a phone. It started off as a good thing. 
A mode of communication. But now you've got the ipad. But you don't 
need to be shouting down your damn phone in public space, on a bus.  
 
Similarly to Gary, we see a clear discourse around the loss of a socialist 
alternative, not of faith, as precipitating individualism. I went on to press 
Dominic directly on the role of faith in overcoming individualism: 
 
Tim 
So what role does faith play? 
 
Dominic 
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Social responsibility. On a micro level it's a battle between good and 
evil, or bad, or naughty. What you're doing is naughty. People just don't 
care, because we all want to live in our space. And it's partly a 
symptom of the internet, social media, whereby...there's a good side 
and a negative side. The good side is it offers tremendous 
communication. But there's a negative in that people are just in their 
own bubble. By beginning to tackle the symptoms, we're beginning to 
tackle the wider issues. Things like housing. It used to be a roof over 
your head rather than an investment. And faith has something to do 
with it. But the faith leaders today have to speak out. But the risk is 
they'll be perceived as petty and be ridiculed. 
 
While it is a socialist narrative, specifically the decline of that narrative, that 
provides the context for the rise of individualism, in a society without a 
socialist alternative, faiths are seen as playing an interventionist educational 
role to remind people of public responsibility. Faith groups are deemed well 
equipped to make such interventions because of their clear distinction 
between good and evil, not simply as an abstract device, but as a distinction 
with practical implications for how a life should be lived on a daily basis.  
 
Adopting a capitalist logic 
 
Although Gary is extremely critical of cuts, his attitude towards state funding is 
ambivalent. As indicated in the previous section, Gary anticipates an 
interesting future, and suggests the organisation could potentially “become 
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more of a front line involved directly in or with community organisations rather 
than the sort of behind the scenes resource that we have been” (Interview). 
Moreover, Gary suggests that there are some things the organisation can do 
without money. When setting up the organisation in the first place, there 
was…   
 
…a strong view amongst most of the people round the table that...until 
we got funding, there was a limit to what we could do. And I was the 
minority there...I will take...all the credit uhuuuh for saying we got kick 
back from a particular government fund and you know "oh we'll have to 
wait another year" and I said "we don't, we can just do stuff...huum we're 
all connected with our own organisations, we've all got resources even 
though we're currently not paying anybody, ummm and so we organised 
a conference...(Interview). 
 
From this perspective, developing a network of people with ideas is more 
important than receiving state funding, which is regarded as an added bonus. 
Yet the discussion of undertaking activities to get the organisation off the 
ground in expectation of funding is one thing, while what to do in the absence 
of any obvious sources of funding is quite different.  When discussing the 
future, Gary began to sound more like a social entrepreneur.  
 
Inevitably it's worrying. It is worrying because you know, specifically for 
us, but also for other organisations, faith organisations, and other 
nonfaith infrastructure, specialist agencies like us, that had some say 
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with some kind of government agency, these are more or less drying up. 
Then the question becomes, do any of these organisations, do we, fill a 
niche, and I think we do, so if one source of funding has come to an end, 
of course it's worrying...but at the same time there are of course 
interesting opportunities. The question is, could we become more of a 
front line involved directly in or with community organisations rather than 
the sort of behind the scenes resource that we have been. And yes we 
could, and so could other organisations in a similar sort of boat, but 
there is an issue about whether we have enough time to actually keep 
us going through a kind of transition (Interview). 
 
As with HCVS, when state funding dries up, Gary turns towards the language 
of the market. He suggests that the organisation needs to “fill a niche” which 
funders will be attracted to. In this context, community becomes an answer to 
a need that has been identified in society. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Even where they are extremely critical of capitalism and the spread of 
capitalist logic into all areas of government policy, organisations have to be 
willing to negotiate a capitalist system if they wish to be successful in 
contemporary society. FbRN demonstrates that even those with a strong 
socialist background can find some area of agreement with an agenda of 
government cuts, whether this is found in the simple point that community 
work does not necessarily require money, or in the turn to capitalist logic in 
	 330	
thinking about the organisation’s survival. Strikingly, it is this socialist narrative 
that is key – not a mono-faith or multi-faith narrative. Faiths do, however, play 
a role in defending public values in a context in which socialism does not exist 
as an alternative. In his turn towards capitalist language, Gary demonstrates 
an ability to step outside of state dependency, and begin work on his own 
terms, but also perhaps demonstrates the absence of a multi-faith theology 
that is able to offer a clear vision of what the public sphere ought to be like, to 
draw in members around that vision, and to inspire association. Without 
funding, there are no internal resources to draw from. 
 
Conclusion 
 
FbRN emerges out of the triple context of wanting to reduce the state and 
empower communities; of recognising the role of faith in activating 
communities; and of understanding that since we last paid attention, the 
religious landscape has changed. FbRN staff find themselves simultaneously 
motivated by multifaith, monofaith, secular sacred and instrumental principles. 
Ultimately, however, the connection between the multi-faith and the mono-
faith appears to be precarious, and the ability to retain members is dependent 
on funding.  
 
When it came to political and economic structures, the absence of a clearly 
worked out religious creed left the organisation reliant on the charisma of 
Gary to retain and employ new volunteers. The result of this was a heavy 
dependence on the state and, when the state began to withdraw, the market. 
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Although FbRN is yet to draw in private funding, Gary is already adopting the 
language of the market, referring to the kind of gap that the organisation might 
fill.   
 
Considering the ease with which the organisation turned to this language of 
social entrepreneurship, it becomes questionable whether there is any 
significant difference between a secular organisation like HCVS, and a multi-
faith organisation like FbRN. This point is all the more significant given that it 
was socialist narratives rather than faith narratives that were employed to 
criticise capitalism. Whereas an organisation like CTL has a relatively clear 
vision that inspires a fee-paying membership, both HCVS and FbRN are 
lacking in a reflexive awareness of the ideas that drive them, have fairly 
limited ways in which those ideas are reified in practices that cultivate 
belonging, have no fee-paying members, and easily sway between different 
structural logics.  
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Chapter 10: Case study IV: London Citizens 
 
I was interested to work with London Citizens because without being read in 
post-liberal political theology, and without any particular religious creed, they 
nonetheless seemed to fit with the post-liberal ideals of developing a shared 
spirit of association outside of the state, and working creatively against both 
government and big business, within the marketplace. I knew that working 
with London Citizens would present interesting tensions between the post-
liberal critique and the lived experience of activists.  
 
Once again, I begin with a context, and then reflect on the constituting factor 
of common agency. I then explore how these factors feed into the 
understanding of political structures and economic context.  
 
Context 
 
In the 1930s, as a student at the University of Chicago, Saul Alinsky became 
angered by the poverty of certain districts surrounding the university. He 
became instrumental in organising the multiple conflicting groups into a 
community organisation, collectively struggling against the institutions that 
were the structural cause of their oppression. The organisations he 
established were broad-based and dues-based. Being broad-based means 
that they were made up of a combination of religious and secular community 
leaders, while being dues-based means that all funding for the organisations 
comes from members themselves. It is believed that being broad-based 
recognises the multiplicity of interests in a given community, and allows for 
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maximum relational power. Being dues-based helps to guarantee 
independence, as well as give each dues-paying member both a stake and an 
interest, which together combine to provide an impetus for action.   
 
By working with any organisation with relational power in the community, from 
churches and mosques to schools and trade unions, community organisations 
can be seen as very early adopters of a post-secular orientation to the world. 
From this perspective, London Citizens provides a good case study for 
critically exploring the notion of the post-secular as discussed in chapter 3. 
This orientation was carried over to the UK in 1996 when London Citizens 
was formed. Today, London Citizens is often criticised for its excessive 
favouring of faith groups. Secular organisations feel themselves to be left out.  
 
Since 1996, London Citizens has worked to reweave the fabric of civil society, 
by which they mean that 
 
if you want to look at society in three sectors, or three cultures, private, 
public and civil society, it's the civil society which is under-organised, 
less powerful, missed out in terms of big decisions, so our primary 
purpose is to organise in the civil society sector, especially in areas that 
are disengaged and disadvantaged from political and economic success, 
and to allow that sector to have greater political influence as the other 
sectors (Interview). 
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Ostensibly LC’s aim is to coextensive with that of rebuilding a shared spirit of 
association. Yet LC is very adept at working “with the world as it is” (Field 
notes). The employees and volunteers are trained to understand that without 
power, they cannot act, and to see themselves, in the absence of positional or 
financial power, as building relational power. 
 
In 2010, however, London Citizens bid for a large state contract to roll-out 
community organising across the country, suggesting that its independence 
from the state is negotiable. Similarly, London Citizens perceives itself as 
distinct from the market, although it often takes grants from big business.  
 
Constituting factor of common agency 
 
This section explores how LC aims to reweave the fabric of civil society, and 
the different factors this involves. It reflects both on the personal motivation of 
staff, and the methods used for recruiting volunteers. 
 
I’ve never been one for values 
 
Similarly to HCVS, LC staff tended to draw on much more secular, personal 
reasons for social action. Partly this was shaped by the way the organisation 
itself trained employees and volunteers to reveal their stories: not in terms of 
beliefs about the way the world should be, but in terms of a personal struggle. 
Staff are trained through what is known as a “one to one”; a 15 minute 
conversation in which organisers reveal a great deal about their own 
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motivation in order to induce their conversational partner to do the same. It is 
hoped that this process will reveal the partner’s self-interests, reconnecting 
them with their own motivation, as well as opening them to persuasion.   
 
When I asked Chris about what kind of values inspired him to do his work, he 
deliberately challenged the idea that speaking of “values” was useful, and 
turned the conversation back to some moving one-to-one style reflections: 
 
I've never been one for values as they exist in particular words. I'm not 
someone who has the five values that they live with. The experiences 
I've had which are meaningful to me, and connect to what I understand 
of London Citizens, are experiences that, you know, growing up err...the 
massive gulf between the environments, the chances and the choices, 
the quality of life that different friends of mine had from different sides of 
the divide. So some of those friends were growing up in a council estate 
in Clapham Junction, on the 15th floor, with a single parent Mum who 
worked all the time, and a younger sister that they cared for. And they 
went to a school where sometimes the classes were so disrupted that 
you couldn't really learn. But they really wanted to learn, you know, he 
was a conscientious student, good footballer, but, you know, for him to 
make a success of himself in academia was taking a super-human effort 
on his part, to balance all the things that he had to balance. And then, I 
think of other friends I had, who were growing up in a 2 million pound 
mansion house in Dulwich village, and they went to a private school, and 
when they turned 17 they got bought a car, and if they were selling weed 
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they were doing it out of that car to kids with very little risk to 
themselves. They didn't really care about school that much, but they did 
well because school was always set up for them to do very well in. And 
their parents were very supportive, and that's...and that's just life. And 
that's just the way things are, that's the way things are everywhere, you 
know, you look from one school to another and that massive gap that 
people have in their opportunities, you know, you want everyone to have 
all the opportunities, you know, it's not that it's bad for somebody to have 
all these opportunities, but it's a lie if you say that success in your life is 
all about how hard you work and how clever you are. And that's a lie, 
and there's a massive gap in the way that someone like Adam, and then 
someone like Elliot, the two people I knew, had the chances they had 
ahead of them. But that's what, so I guess you could say, yeah that's 
equality, I believe in equality, I believe in equality of opportunity, you 
know, those things. But those words aren't particularly...I don't hold them 
up, it's more the experiences (Interview). 
  
Emily similarly drew on personal stories, yet drew on religion as a reference 
point to explain her position: 
 
I didn't grow up Christian, but my parents both did. And they both as kids 
went to Sunday school. My parents grew up in the 60s, when you did go 
to Sunday school because it was much more common. So my parents 
have a very strong set of values, but they don't praise or credit them as 
Christian values, but you can see a strong Christian ethos in both of 
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them. My Dad grew up working class in Ealing and became an 
academic. He's strong Labour; really believes in justice and equality and 
both my parents would shout at the TV whenever Margaret Thatcher 
came on or John Major. The politics where Britain has an opportunity for 
all, and your background doesn't determine your future, and where the 
rich pay their taxes and the poor should be supported. It was also a kind 
of pull yourselves up by your bootstraps; my Mum is very much in the 
kind of newer vein of people who are fed up with the welfare state, that 
think people should be given the opportunity to just get on and do things, 
it's certain taxes and bureaucracy that stops them, the right of individuals 
to go out and do stuff but that they still need to enable that. That's the 
kind of background I have, and I still feel those things very strongly, but I 
don't have a manifesto of my ideas (Interview). 
 
Whereas Chris’s inspiration appears to be derived from seeing injustice 
amongst his friends, Emily was very much inspired by her parents and a 
couple of teachers. In both cases one feels a sense of the precariousness or 
arbitrariness of the inspiration: if it weren’t for seeing injustice first hand, or for 
having these role models, Chris and Emily might not have become involved in 
social action. Without a strong value-based culture, it seems one has to 
experience injustice or else be strongly influenced by role models in order to 
be involved in social action. There is a deficit at the societal level, even if this 
is not experienced at the level of the passionate and engaged individual. This 
does not mean that the culture has to be religious. As has already been 
mentioned above, whereas some unreligious actors have found themselves 
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inspired by the notion of doing good for the sake of doing good, others 
generalise concepts such as “equality” or “faith” to include people of all faiths 
and none. 
 
As well as drawing on these personal stories, perhaps partly as a result of 
imbibing the idea of working with the world as it is, LC staff displayed a 
readiness to discuss their inspiration in terms of power and prestige: 
 
My Dad is a really great mathematician, so he could have gone into 
actuarial work, banking work, but he chose to stick with academia 
because he saw that as more rewarding. So we had a crap car and went 
on holidays in Cornwall, and growing up, values weren't placed on 
money; value was placed on performance and status, but not 
necessarily on financial reward for your status and I think the interesting 
thing [with LC] is you have the opportunity to have a lot of status: so I 
have the opportunity tonight to be going to dinner with Andy Burnham 
because of the work I've been doing [with LC], and I'm not sure if I was 
working in the city, if I would be invited to dinner with someone as 
significant as the Shadow Minister. And actually I do have those 
opportunities [with LC], and so we have the opportunity with a lot of high-
level people and with people who are struggling. 
 
Again, having the kind of parents that encourage status over financial reward 
proves important. Yet what is significant here is the willingness to talk about 
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status at all. Status derived from good work acts as a genuine inspiration to 
keep going in the job. 
 
In a sense, it seems there is a willingness to talk about what MacIntyre would 
call external rewards, and as a result, clear ways of motivating actors in the 
world as it is emerge. Yet these factors cannot be considered entirely 
instrumentally. The substitution of performance and status within a community 
over financial reward is not merely the swapping of one external reward for 
another, since the value and status are derived from aspects that are intrinsic 
to the practice of organising itself. To put this simply, the work itself is 
rewarding. 
 
Taking the world as it is, to the world as it should be 
 
Despite being very open about their this-worldly motivations, like HCVS, LC 
organisers had ideas and practices that could be interpreted, if not as a kind 
of theology, as a mode of the transcendental social. Unlike HCVS, however, 
indeed perhaps more so than FbRN also, LC organisers had a clear 
understanding of how the transcendental social was employed; namely, both 
as an ideal, deeply held, and as a tool, used in a manner that is deliberate 
and instrumental. This can be observed in the way that LC trains its 
volunteers. LC organisers spoke inspiringly of “taking the world as it is to the 
world as it should be” (Field notes). This worked as a core concept for 
bringing various people together. Thus far it has been suggested comparing 
CTL with HCVS and FbRN, that the richer the umbrella, the better it serves as 
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inspiration. Yet both in terms of the particularly diverse communities LC 
serves, and in terms of generating “small, winnable goals” it is deemed 
important that the vision of the world as it could be is undefined. I asked Chris: 
 
this idea of taking the world as it is, to the world as it should be, but what 
does that mean, what is that world that could be, and are we all thinking 
about the same world? 
 
Chris 
 
Definitely not. We're not all thinking about the same world. I don't know if 
we're even thinking about a world. Because we've not experienced that 
world. I mean it's the way I think about it. I mean what we do, on the 
training, is to say, everyone think about the way you think the world 
should be, and some words that are associated with that world. And they 
tell you some words and they tend to say things like peace, justice, love, 
equality, happiness - those kind of things.    
 
And sometimes they say "argument" or a few other things you're not 
expecting. But we've run that course a hundred or more times and those 
are the same words that come up. So you can get some commonality in 
terms of some words, but I think it's probably easier to agree when 
something's just wrong, than it is to paint a picture of the world as it 
should be. You know to paint that picture with any kind of texture or 
detail becomes quite hard in the context [of LC]. Because beyond those 
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statements of "people wouldn't be killing each other", or "there wouldn't 
be huge discrepancies of wealth", or "people would be happy", "families 
would be together"…But I think if you were to paint with any kind of 
detail or texture it would become quite difficult because their reference 
point, they tend to be using certain religions, certain texts, certain 
ideologies perhaps, that they subscribe to, and they're lifting those 
words, lifting some of those abstractions I suppose, to offer something 
towards the common idea of what the world should be. And so [at LC], 
while we do talk about the world as it is and the world as it should be, 
the way we actually move people towards action together, is to find 
stories that are clearly unjust. And those stories as they're told by the 
one who's suffering them, everyone feels them in their gut. And they 
respond in a way to say "that's unjust" and "we'll do something about 
that together with you". So we often find ourselves motivating around 
challenging injustice, and then we come up with a reasonable, winnable, 
statement or goal. We come up with a reasonable goal which is a good 
thing, a step in the right direction, a step towards the world as it should 
be. But it's not the world as it should be. We don't, after hearing the 
injustice go, “right that's the injustice, now, what's the world as it should 
be, we're gunna fight for that”. Because the idea is a pragmatic, 
winnable change. So you think: that's the story of injustice, that's not the 
way the world should be, but what we're going to come up with together, 
is better than that. And that's what we're going to fight for and win. I 
wonder if we did try and...[fight towards the world as it should be], it'd be 
a bit of a barrier to progress. If we heard the world of injustice and 
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thought "what's the way the world really should be"? If poverty wages is 
the problem, what's the way the world really should be? Well, everyone 
should earn enough to do whatever they want. What do you mean 
whatever they want? You know, it'd become difficult. But if you just say 
they should have enough to live…that's good. So that concept, the world 
as it should be, in organising, we use it in a kind of complex way. And 
we don't organise around it: we ask people to consider it, and we ask 
people to articulate it a bit, and we kind of use it to show this diverse 
group of people that there's enough in common in the way the world 
should be that they can act together (Interview).   
 
For LC, the idea of the world as it should be is used as a creative first step to 
encourage a diverse group of people to recognise that they share broad ideas 
in common. But within this broad framework, this loose concept of the world 
as it should be, the majority of their work is closer to Gary’s notion of dropping 
the metanarrative in favour of jointly recognising clear moments of injustice.  
 
Chris also offers us insight into how the transcendental social operates. The 
idea is not to imagine a perfect world, see blockages that inhibit that world 
from becoming, and then simply step from the imperfect world to the perfect 
one. More than this, to fully define the world as it should be, would be 
counterproductive, leading to interminable discussions and to an overinflated 
sense of the task ahead. Rather, the vision of the world as it should be acts as 
a device for taking small steps away from unjust situations and towards 
slightly more just situations.  
	 343	
 
Even as an outsider, I found myself drawn in, and giving far more time to 
London Citizens than was required as a researcher. I was drawn in by the 
sense of working towards the world as it should be through small winnable 
goals, and of having a positive presence in the community. I became so 
embroiled in the activities of the organisation that I would forget my role as 
researcher. Partly, this was because I simply had neither time nor energy, 
after what could be a fourteen-hour working day, trudging the streets, walking 
or running, motivating new volunteers, analysing data, pressuring those in 
power, to also go home and write up what I was doing. Yet to explain my 
behaviour in this way is only to put the question one step back: why was I 
putting in so much more time than I needed to? Reflecting back now, I was 
taken up in a whirlwind. As an atheist, I had found my religion, and it was 
called LC, its theology - “taking the world as it is, to the world as it could be”. 
As an outsider, it instantly embedded me in a community, both the immediate 
missional community of my fellow organisers, and that of North London. Like 
others I took pride in the difficulty the work created for relationships and for 
normal modern life. There was not time for dinner with family; there was not 
time to take in a show. A strong sense of us and them was created, but “they” 
were not the enemy; they were the unfortunate ones who had not yet felt the 
zest for organising. I felt absorbed in Aristotle’s idea of humans as zoon 
politikon, the political animal, and that a life without politics, broadly 
understood, was a life half lived.  
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Today, looking back, I cannot imagine where that person has gone. I have 
not, like the anthropologists of yesteryear, had the separation of continents 
and a great voyage to separate me from this other world. Only a mask I had 
always worn: that of the researcher. And yet there is a great sense of loss as 
though I have been torn away. I justify the absence by telling myself that I was 
never an organiser but a researcher. Those closest to me derive most 
satisfaction from the very “me-time” that London Citizens seeks to challenge. 
Being involved would require letting go of these people.  
 
So what drew me in so strongly? Perhaps to some extent I wanted a job. 
More pressing was the event. The London riots played a big part in 
awakening me to the duty to be involved in the community. But most 
important was the search for religion implicit in this entire research project. I 
was sucked in by the idea of taking the world as it is to the world as it could 
be.  
 
This desire for meaningful engagement with the world seemed to be shared 
by all of those working at LC. This desire had been captured at early enough 
an age, usually at around twenty-one, towards the end of university, when 
people were stepping into the wider world in hope of finding a meaningful 
career path.  
 
Being clear about beliefs and holding to account 
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London Citizens saw building the capacity to talk about beliefs as core to 
building the resources necessary for shared action. Moreover, having others 
open up about their core beliefs and the personal struggles, their “self-
interest” as they would put it, giving away just how ready they are to work with 
the world as it is, is perceived as fundamental to creating shared 
responsibility, since it provides a bargaining chip - something personal that 
can be used to hold an organisation or individual to account. Rather than 
putting our values to one side in order to achieve a universally agreeable 
language, as Habermas would advocate, LC treat values as the means by 
which people hold each other to account, as fits neatly with MacIntyre’s 
analysis (MacIntyre 1981/2007: 217-218).  
 
This holding to account is seen most effectively when in any particular 
campaign, the key powerbroker is identified. The group will identify that 
person and draw a stickman. They then write around the stickman all of the 
interests they perceive that person as having, and begin bouncing ideas about 
which interest they can use to their advantage. In one case, when trying to 
persuade a major educational institution to increase the pay of its cleaners, 
they went back to the founding articles of the institution and found that, 
unbeknownst to the current leaders, there was a principle of being the change 
it wished to see in the country by raising the living standards of all employees. 
This founding article was used to hold the current leaders to account (Field 
notes). 
 
The mythology of individuals 
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 This stress on taking the world as it is to the world as it should be is reified 
through a practice of hero worship and storytelling. In my time at LC, a 
number of key individuals were given hero status, from self-identifying 
community organisers like Saul Alinsky, Ed Chambers and Barack Obama, to 
great people of history such as Mahatma Ghandi or Martin Luther King.  Hero 
status was cultivated through discussion of these figures, of their many 
sacrifices or their meteoric rise to positions of status or power. These figures 
and their deeds would be discussed on journeys to and from meetings, and 
sometimes their biographies would handed from one member of staff to 
another, as a prize for hard work, as a birthday or Christmas present, or 
simply as a gesture of goodwill.    
 
This recognition of hero status attributed became reflexive when organisers 
sought to recruit Jews, Christians or Muslims as dues-paying members. 
Organisers would mention Jesus Christ or the Prophet Muhammad as heroic 
organisers, thereby helping people of faith to understand the similarities 
between LC’s work and their own.  
 
Heroic status was also cultivated by, and attributed to, people working at 
present. Organisers would tell stories of their prowess, with one telling me 
how he managed to recruit four dues-paying members in one afternoon, 
having recently completed a pub lunch (Field notes). More frequently, 
organisers would talk of their sacrifice: their inability to see friends, the many 
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hours they had worked without pay, the fact that they were giving up their 
weekends.  
 
The attribution of hero status to heroic figures demonstrates the way in which 
the organising ideal is reified into excitement regarding particular individuals. 
Awareness of this process is demonstrated in the organisation’s ability to 
construct great religious figures as similarly heroic community organisers. The 
cultivation of hero status amongst present staff demonstrates the ability of the 
process to transform behaviour in the present. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Like HCVS, LC draws on a range of secular motivations, including the 
satisfaction of the work itself. But this motivation is enhanced by reference to 
“taking the world as it is, to the world as it could be”, which acts as a mode of 
the transcendental social, transforming organisers and thereby the world they 
work in. Without explicitly drawing on any particular tradition, LC is 
nonetheless able to create a strong sense of missional community. Part of the 
strength came from the recognition that drawing out the detail of the world 
they are trying to create is not only difficult in a diverse context, but also 
counterproductive anyway, since the world they are trying to create is so 
different from the world as it is that organisers fear people will lose focus on 
small, winnable goals. A religion without dogma, LC’s manner of operating is 
perhaps better suited to the world as it is, at least as detailed by Linda 
Woodhead, in which people may be interested in a sense of purpose, but do 
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not want guidance (Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Woodhead 2012). Being 
open about one’s beliefs is valued insofar as it facilitates understanding and 
the ability to work together towards a common good. Without needing to draw 
on the narratives of any particular religion, LC displays all the strengths of 
Baker’s ideas of belonging and becoming, even drawing in members of 
particular and varied religious traditions (2013). It is not just that organisers 
are aware of the socially constructed nature of the transcendental social, but 
that they deliberately and reflexively engage in the construction of the 
transcendental social to create a sense of shared mission.  
 
Political structures and common agency 
 
The last section suggested that without drawing on any particular religious 
tradition, LC is able to reflexively draw on the idea of “taking the world as it is 
to the world as it should be”, to motivate organisers and volunteers alike. This 
concept is deliberately open, both because it can thereby draw in people of 
very diverse beliefs, and because giving it too much detail creates a false 
sense of hope that the world as it should be is achievable, inevitably leading 
to disappointment.  
 
Yet while the concept of the world as it should be is not clearly fleshed out, LC 
has a strong idea of how it should be achieved. As this section will show, in 
terms of political structures, LC is critical of the state, which tends to draw 
power to a few positions and people. Instead, it sees itself as developing 
association outside of the state. LC often regards the state as one of its 
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greatest opponents. Still, without betraying this position, LC does often find 
itself working with the state for particular campaigns. 
 
What I thought being involved with politics was about: community, people, 
making an impact. 
 
Perhaps the single idea all organisers share in common as to the world as it 
should be is that of a world in which all are engaged in a purer practice of 
politics. Employees often stress how disillusioned they are with conventional 
politics, which includes local and university politics, and how they have found 
a home at LC for the politics they grew up imagining. Emily explains: 
 
I went along to one meeting and the group of people there were just so 
off-putting. They were interested in talking about all the MPs that they 
knew, and how they were all related to an MP, and their Dad was an 
MP, and I'd never even met an MP before, you know, I'd read about it in 
a text book at school, I didn't have any connections. I just found the 
whole thing not what I was expecting and not really about people or 
change, it was about elite stuff, and I just couldn't really get involved. I 
then set thinking about "well what do I enjoy and do I want to be involved 
with?" And an opportunity came up that was about going to Uganda to 
do voluntary work over the summer holiday. You had to raise your own 
money, and then do a three-month placement. I decided that that 
sounded so much more in line with what I thought being involved with 
politics was about: community, people, making an impact. I applied for a 
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place, I raised some money and I went to Uganda and I was really sold 
on international development. Now I look back, the particular 
organisation I worked with was very good. They had a sustainable model 
of development, focused on putting the community first, so the project 
was led by the community in which we were living; they devised the 
project because the idea was the best way to sustain a project was if 
they had ownership: really good things I see now in terms of organising 
models. I then came back certain that I wanted to do International 
Development. I did a Masters at SOAS in International Development and 
Economics, and I thought "how do I get a job, do I want to work for the 
UN, do I want to work for the civil service?" And at the time my Mum was 
banging on and on about how there's no need for me to go to Africa, 
what a waste of money and air miles: I grew up in South Wales and my 
Mum was a journalist, and when I was a kid we'd be driving our little 
Nissan Micra up into the valleys and she was reporting on the impact of 
closing the mines on families, where people were ripping up the 
floorboards to burn firewood because it was so cold, they couldn't afford 
heating, and she was telling me to understand you didn't need to go 
away. And genuinely to shut her up, I went "fine I will volunteer in 
London" (Interview). 
 
Eventually this story led to joining LC. Emily had always been politically 
engaged, but was turned off by what conventional politics turned out to be 
like. Emily was seeking to start from what she perceived as a purer form of 
politics, involving “community, people, making an impact”.  
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It just felt right; it was politics as it should be done 
 
This aversion to conventional politics does not mean LC ignores conventional 
politics altogether. In fact, some of the organisations biggest and most 
inspiring campaigns deliberately involve and challenge politicians.  
 
The experience that comes to mind is of the 2004 mayoral assembly, 
where there were a couple of thousand people from London Citizens 
there, and Ken Livingstone and Steven Norris were contesting the 
election, and I was just blown away because it just felt right; it was 
politics as it should be done, it was people whose voices that you don't 
normally hear in public political life speaking out meaningfully about the 
things that they cared about, and decision makers, the mayoral 
candidates, the professional politicians were responding to them with 
some kind of balance of power, giving them yes or no answers. And it 
was whooping and cheering, and it was a very diverse hall, and it felt like 
London, felt like the way things ought to be (Interview). 
 
These meetings are often cited as the events that draw people in. Why these 
events have such an impact is complicated, but worth exploring since it 
reflects the wider reason the organisation as a whole has such a strong 
impact. The first point is clearly a matter of power: people are very 
disillusioned with conventional politics and politicians, and see them as 
dodging questions and out of touch with ordinary people. Having the power to 
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bring politicians into a room and force them to answer difficult questions “with 
some kind of balance of power” imbues those present with an aura of power: 
more so than journalists, more so even than leaders of opposite parties, these 
ordinary people have created the pressure that is inducing a politician to give 
a straight answer. Whereas CTL sees its role as opening up conventional 
power, the LC sees its role as challenging power. This attitude can cause 
difficulties. Emily recalls… 
 
…we could not get a relationship with [a particular] council…and 
basically ended up, someone that used to work on the council, got her to 
find out what's the blockage, and she basically came back and said 
there's been a real problem with the way they felt we'd conducted 
[ourselves]…  
 
…We'd been treading on a lot of people’s toes, we got a lot more press 
coverage than other people, they didn't like it, and they felt like we were 
these new dogs in town and we were barking too loud (Interview). 
 
The adversarial and strategic way in which the organisation operates creates 
a lot of blockages, but they insist that a temporary blockage is far better than 
being shut out altogether due to the lack of respect that comes with a more 
convivial approach. 
 
There is perhaps a wider theoretical point here about the use of an agonistic, 
Schmittian approach to politics. The previous section demonstrated how the 
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transcendental social is employed as a tool for creating an imagined 
community. In a similarly instrumental manner, the organisation creates a 
strong idea of insiders and outsiders, frequently using the phrase “no 
permanent enemies, no permanent friends”. While this phrase clearly has 
some positive, pragmatic implications, it also invokes the notion of enmity, 
suggesting that their method will always involve the construction of an enemy 
to overcome, as opposed to a stakeholder with which to reach a consensus. 
In my time with LC, what the strong friend enemy distinction served to do was 
to create a black and white device for understanding where people stood in 
relation to causes, helping groups to analyse who needed persuading and 
who did not, and creating a sense of peer pressure against dissent. What was 
more problematic was the way in which it cast those that did not feel 
comfortable challenging the status quo, or even those that see a different 
approach to the same problem, as outsiders, creating resentment on the part 
of the in-group, and loneliness on the part of the out-group. A “Lord of the 
Flies” atmosphere could easily be inculcated, with a culture of fear around 
dissent. Moreover, the impermanence of the friend/enemy distinction meant 
one had to be ready at any time to turn against a friend who was causing a 
blockage. In my time at the organisation there was a constant feeling of 
adrenaline at the prospect of having to betray a friend, or else of being 
betrayed or undermined – a feeling confirmed by numerous colleagues, one 
of whom said of another “she’s all smiles, but she’d kill her grandmother if it 
meant getting ahead” (Field notes). One might also suggest that if the means 
is agonistic, the end cannot reflect a community of love. Given the 
organisation’s stress on the prefigurative principle of being the change it 
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wants to see, this agonism has precarious implications when extrapolated to 
wider society.  
 
Yet the other side of the phrase “no permanent enemies, no permanent 
friends” is that nobody is ever truly a permanent outsider or enemy. So long 
as one is eventually willing to cooperate, they will be brought into the fold. 
While LC is often confronting the state, demonstrating its power, once a 
particular government, local or national, comes round to and commits to 
implementing an idea or policy, then they must work together as friends.  
 
LC has often worked with local and national government to implement its 
campaigns. On top of this, LC had gone through a period of potentially being 
adopted into the state. On coming into power in 2010, the coalition 
government recognised the important role of community organising by putting 
together a commission to have community organisations set up in difficult 
areas across the country. According to the LC, the bid had been “designed for 
us”, but was later given to a different organisation that “were less 
controversial”. With hindsight, a senior member of LC suggested, it was 
probably for the better, since its principles might have been subsumed by and 
unduly influenced by those of the state.  
 
The second point regarding the strength of these assemblies is to do with 
seeing difference happen. After listening campaigns that can take a number of 
months, whereby organisers meet local people and ask them to tell their 
stories, the people with the most heart-wrenching stories are asked to tell 
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those stories at these major events. This is what the organisation calls 
testimony: 
 
The moments where it actually hits is where you see the low-paid worker 
or the undocumented migrant or the mum who's lost her son to knife 
crime. You see people that are so close to the pain…to powerlessness. 
And you see them tell that story to someone right at the top of the 
hierarchy of power, change. And that just feels good and feels right 
(Interview). 
 
The point of testimony is twofold. On the one hand, it invokes sympathy in all 
of those listening, and pressures those in power to respond, thus enabling the 
next step, which is to make specific demands of those in power. Those in 
power feel compelled to respond both because of sympathy, and peer 
pressure. One MP explained in reference to these moments: “the one thing 
that will get a politician’s attention is suffering” (Field notes). Peer pressure is 
involved because one risks having heard the story of suffering, to turn down 
subsequent demands would be to risk looking heartless in front of a large and 
rowdy public audience.  
 
Testimony also develops local leaders. Those that offer testimony are often 
powerless, oppressed and very meek when they first meet an organiser. 
Providing testimony is often the culmination of weeks, months, or even years 
of discussion and confidence building, whereby individuals are invited to 
campaigns and slowly given a greater sense of responsibility. One such case 
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was when I convinced a young man at a local mosque to come and speak of 
his experience of being young and Muslim in a deprived area of London. It 
took numerous meetings, numerous cups of tea in his local café, to eventually 
persuade him to give testimony. When finally he agreed, he was so nervous 
that we decided to write out his statement together (Field notes). 
 
 Methods in leadership development are varied. One method is rounds. After 
each action or event, all those involved in organising the action or event will 
sit in a circle and take it in turns to say what went well, and what didn’t go 
well. Every member of the circle is given as much time and respect as the 
next, creating an atmosphere of equality.  
 
The use of rounds links to the third point about what makes these events 
particularly and organising generally so effective: they are great moments of 
effervescence, and involve ritual and play. All actions and events involve the 
incorporation of mass crowds, music and street theatre. The election events 
are produced to incorporate a vast array of songs or instruments drawing from 
various religious and cultural traditions. These rituals invoke a sense of unity 
across diversity. Street events also involve ritual. One project called CitySafe 
encouraged high street shops and businesses to open their doors to children 
who felt under threat at any time, to give them a safe place to hide while the 
police were called. Shops and businesses indicated their support by putting a 
CitySafe sticker on their window. To celebrate the success of encouraging 
every shop and business on one street to be involved, the organisation put 
together an event whereby the high street was closed off to traffic, and 
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children from the local secondary school held hands in a chain along and 
across both sides of the high street, forming a circle. Once the circle was 
created, everyone began to chant “CitySafe” until the sound became 
deafening, at which point they were ushered towards a podium, where one of 
the lead organisers and a student that had played an increasingly important 
role, each gave a short speech telling the story of the struggle. The 
atmosphere was electric, and one felt a sense of the effervesence, of being 
lifted out of oneself into the larger group, and of one’s concerns and interests 
becoming those of the group. Organisers and students alike, with diluted 
pupils, confirmed this sense of effervescence, describing moments as “sick”, a 
colloquialism meaning exciting. Events like these are the lifeblood of an 
organiser, the culmination of weeks, months, even years of work, where they 
get to see the impact of their struggle. They are the sensual representation of 
the community she sees herself as organising. 
 
As well as these rituals and performances of equality and unity, there is a 
strong trickster element in community organising, whereby theatre is used to 
embarrass and disrupt. This is a form of civil disobedience within the confines 
of the law. Organisers go outside of political convention to disrupt and create 
pressure. Amidst one campaign in which the group was failing to get a 
meeting with the local council, after a series of letters and phone calls, they 
decided to show up outside the council offices with a desk, one hundred 
people, and members of the local press. The organiser and the local leaders 
sat together at the desk an explained that after a number of attempts to 
arrange a meeting with the council, they assumed the only problem must be a 
	 358	
lack of space; hence they had brought their own desk. Within five minutes 
they were invited in for a meeting (Field notes). 
 
One final point that underpins all of the others is the idea of people power. 
The LC offers the following analysis: for those without either positional or 
financial power, the only answer is people power. Bringing large groups of 
people together for actions and events is vital to creating peer-pressure, to 
inspiring new leaders, and to creating a sense of effervesence. This latter 
point is especially important, since it is indicative of why grassroots organising 
is so important: only by bringing people together in physical proximity do they 
feel the pressure and inspiration to take action.   
 
Thus far working within the state, as demonstrated by CTL, seems to have 
been entirely overshadowed by grassroots work displayed by LC. But a 
couple of things are worth remembering. The first is that legislative change 
can never be entirely replaced by grassroots organising. Rather, it is better to 
think of both as working at once, sometimes side by side, sometimes in 
opposition. The second issue is that community organising too fails to provide 
for those that slip through the net. It builds its power by creating relationships 
with already existing institutions that are able to bring people to actions and 
events en masse. What it fails to do is create new institutions that bring in new 
people, expanding the shared spirit of association. To put this another way, 
community organising does not necessarily provide an answer to the slow 
decline of institutional affiliation, from parties to trade unions to faith groups, 
except that through its actions to increase the impact of these institutions, it 
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may once again galvanise interest in them. The result is that we are still left 
asking how to engage the disengaged. Chris explains: 
 
Yeah, well the church to grow, rather than shrink, would do well to be a 
bit more focused on relationships, an maybe a little less focused on 
hierarchical leadership structures, buildings, insurance policies and so 
on. Most importantly it should focus on people, relationships, their 
interests, leadership, extending leadership, control, creativity to a large 
number of people. And those are tools and those are recommendations 
that we make to members: whether it’s a church or mosque or school or 
anything else, you need to. So we hope that membership of CUK will 
help the churches, trade unions, etc. be more relational, and also be 
more relevant. Because if they listen to their members more, and 
operate with a greater sense of orientation towards action and 
leadership development, then that will help them grow and win. 
 
Tim 
 
So in some sense you're saying it's not your job to bring in people who 
have slipped through institutional nets; but to teach institutions to be 
better at doing that?  
 
Chris 
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It's not my job to find people who've slipped through institutional nets - 
no. While it would be good for somebody to do that, it's not my job. But it 
is my job to think creatively about the kinds of institutions we work with 
(Interview). 
 
Chris suggests that by behaving more like a community organisation, focusing 
less on positional power and more on relational power, turning power inside 
out, traditional organisations can begin to grow their membership once again, 
and thereby catch those that slip through the net. In this sense building a 
shared spirit of association is not necessarily a matter of building new ideals, 
or of reforming political structures, but of reforming the focus of those in 
positions of power.  
 
Conclusion 
 
LC members show themselves to be extremely suspicious of the positional 
power associated with conventional politics, which may lead to the self-
serving manner of politics that alienates the public. Yet rather than turning 
away from conventional politics altogether, LC recognises the state as a force 
for change that must be recognised, sometimes to be confronted as an 
enemy, at others to be cooperated with as a friend. The analysis reflects the 
idea used ubiquitously amongst organisers, that “power respects power” 
(Field notes). With this in mind, one must wonder what kind of a relationship 
would have formed if the organisation had allowed itself to be co-opted by the 
government in 2010.  
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Sustaining the grassroots manner of operating ensures that LC continues to 
perform “politics as it should be”, focused on “community, people, making an 
impact”. I especially stressed how this grassroots level of organising, 
culminating in big events is what draws a lot of people in, and acts as a 
memory that they constantly return to, relived in each subsequent event. The 
kind of effervesence cultivated at these events draws people in. I also 
stressed how the grassroots level of organising provides the opportunity for 
rituals such as rounds that create a sense of unit and equality. Finally, I 
explained how the build up to these events, and opportunities to perform at 
them, is a way of developing local leaders. In these ways, the kind of politics 
that drew in the staff in the first place may continue to draw in others.  
 
I finished on a cautionary note, explaining that working within the state 
remained important, and that LC itself is limited in its ability to create a shared 
spirit of association, since it only works with ideas and organisations that 
already exist and have some power. Still, its method of reforming this power, 
developing it to focus less on position and more on relationships, might allow 
this power to turn inside out, becoming unrecognisable from the politics that 
alienates the public at present. 
 
Economic context and common agency 
 
Thus far it has been suggested that without drawing on any particular 
tradition, LC is able to cultivate the idea of “taking the world as it is to the 
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world as it should be” as a mode of the transcendental social which negates 
the everyday world, and thereby empowers actors to transform it (Field 
notes). This mode of the transcendental social, very thin in content, is so 
powerful in a diverse society because it is able to draw in people of very 
different religious and ideological backgrounds. It is also sensible, since rather 
than setting up members for disappointment, it allows them to focus on small, 
winnable goals.  
 
The last section explained how the idea of the world as it should be is 
reflected in the search amongst LC members for a purer idea of politics, 
devoid of the self-serving attitudes and bureaucracy associated with 
conventional politics. While stressing that LC’s relationship with the state was 
actually quite pragmatic and often convivial, I explained how important it was 
to maintain a distance, and keep activity at grassroots level, thereby ensuring 
the kind of effervesence, ritual and leadership development that drew people 
in initially. I also explained that while they did not work within the state, rather 
than always antagonising the state, they recognised its power and, like other 
traditional institutions, hoped to make that power less positional and more 
relational. 
 
In this section I explore how LC’s ideas interplay with the relationship with the 
market. I will show that as with the state, LC is heavily critical of the market, 
and often regards itself as working against big businesses. But again, this 
oppositional relationship will often give way to behaviours that are more 
pragmatic and convivial.  
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It's a lie if you say that success in your life is all about how hard you work and 
how clever you are. 
 
The inequalities of a market society are what inspired Chris to become 
politically active in the first place:  
 
The experiences I've had which are meaningful to me, and connect to 
what I understand of this organisation, are experiences that, you know, 
growing up err...the massive gulf between the environments, the 
chances and the choices, the quality of life that different friends of mine 
hand from different sides of the divide. So some of those friends were 
growing up in a council estate in Clapham Junction, on the 15th floor, 
with a single parent Mum who worked all the time, and a younger sister 
that they cared for. And they went to a school where sometimes the 
classes were so disrupted that you couldn't really learn. But they really 
wanted to learn, you know, he was a conscientious student, good 
footballer, but, you know, for him to make a success of himself in 
academia was taking a super-human effort on his part, to balance all the 
things that he had to balance. And then, I think of other friends I had, 
who were growing up in a 2 million pound mansion house in Dulwich 
village, and they went to a private school, and when they turned 17 they 
got bought a car, and if they were selling weed they were doing it out of 
that car to kids with very little risk to themselves. They didn't really care 
about school that much, but they did well because school was always 
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set up for them to do very well in. And their parents were very 
supportive, and that's...and that's just life. And that's just the way things 
are, that's the way things are everywhere, you know, you look from one 
school to another and that massive gap that people have in their 
opportunities, you know, you want everyone to have all the 
opportunities, you know, it's not that it's bad for somebody to have all 
these opportunities, but it's a lie if you say that success in your life is all 
about how hard you work and how clever you are. And that's a lie, and 
there's a massive gap in the way that someone like Adam, and then 
someone like Elliot, the two people I knew, had the chances they had 
ahead of them (Interview). 
 
Seeing this “lie” first hand inspired Chris to be involved in politics. He was and 
continues to be struck by the injustice that a person’s circumstances play 
defining role in the kind of path one is able to take. Aaron made a similar point 
to me. Where Aaron organises in deprived areas of East London, it is possible 
from numerous areas to see the skyscrapers of the Canary Wharf, London’s 
key banking district, towering overhead. Drawing directly on a story of Saul 
Alinsky, Aaron told me how he had once taken a group of local people and, 
pointing at the tallest building in Canary Wharf, had said: “See that? That’s 
our target”. This marked the beginning of a campaign to encourage the 
wealthiest companies in Canary Wharf to employ people from deprived areas 
of East London on a Living Wage (Field notes).   
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Could be a banker, could be a lawyer, could be earning three times what he 
earns at Citizens 
 
As well as being inspired by the injustice of a capitalist system, LC staff see 
first hand how this same injustice undermines the ability of people to act 
against it. Like HCVS staff, LC staff recognise that a market society devalues 
social action in terms of the wage a person can receive for her labour. The 
result is that social action is by and large a middle class pursuit, since young 
people from poorer backgrounds have to earn enough money to support their 
extended family.  
 
We have one member of staff from East London and he's got a lot of 
family pressure to be a high earner because he's the eldest his son, his 
mother relies on him, she doesn't work, he needs to give some of his 
salary to her, so he took a massive risk by coming to work with Citizens 
because he's a kid from East London kid, could be, you know, could be 
a banker, could be a lawyer, could be earning three times what he earns 
at Citizens (Interview). 
 
While middle class activists may find their earnings supplemented by parents, 
those from poorer backgrounds not only have to make do without this luxury, 
but also need to earn enough to support other family members. 
 
I was calling up bankers 
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While LC staff could be extremely critical of the capitalist system, they were 
very pragmatic about working with the world as it is. LC does not aim to wipe 
out the market; “they’re not saying we’re going to get rid of them”, as one 
organiser put it (Interview). Nor was the organisation always fighting against 
corporations; it often received help from alliances such as Business in the 
Community (BIC) and the East London Business Alliance (ELBA).  On top of 
this, with its mantra “no permanent friends, no permanent enemies”, the 
organisation could be fighting against a company one week, and alongside it 
in a larger campaign on the next week.  
 
I was calling up my friends who were working in banks and persuading 
them to give these random Zimbabweans work placements so they 
could keep their skills up. And doing that just made me think this was 
real, this was politics, this was fun, enjoyable. I had this amazing 
position where one day I was calling up bankers and the next I was 
working with refugee and asylum seekers and I thought, this is so joyful 
(Interview). 
 
This possibility of a strong working relationship with business is demonstrative 
of the way that capitalist societies can produce cooperative alliances with the 
interests of the disadvantaged at heart. It requires a lot of pressure, but the 
point is that it is not impossible.  
 
LC’s methods also appealed to the capitalist world. People power was used to 
get the attention of corporates, but it was financial arguments that often won 
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them over. Theo told me that in a campaign for the Living Wage, whereby 
businesses are encouraged to pay their staff enough to live on that job alone, 
corporations were told that “the Living Wage is great for business too. It 
makes employees more productive, makes them spend less time off sick” 
(Interview). It is moreover worth noting that the LC itself, was funded in part by 
grants from large businesses 
 
A market of their own 
 
Alongside this pragmatic relationship with business, it is important to note that 
a large source of LC’s funding comes from “dues”; that is, annual payments 
from member institutions (Field notes). LC thus operates within a market of its 
own: they rely on institutions “buying” their services, which they encourage to 
do using sales tactics that appeal to self-interest. The discourse used to 
strategise about bringing on members can be described as either cynical, 
realistic, or rationalised, depending on how one wishes to look at it.  The focus 
is on pitching their work to institutions in terms of that institutions “self-
interest”. Theo explains: 
 
It’s quite, I wouldn’t say manipulative, but it’s quite down in the world as 
it is. To say that is not to say that we are not social animals and we’re 
not social animals and cannot be altruistic; it’s just that people’s actions 
are determined by what their own interests are. So sometimes being 
altruistic is in a person’s self-interest. And that’s not to say if you’re self-
interested, that’s a bad thing, because it’s a matter of survival. It sounds 
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Darwinistic, and if people don’t get the context, it seems rather sharp 
and rather dramatic (Interview). 
 
In one sense it looks as though they are taking the Smithian anthropology for 
granted, understanding that to operate in the world as it is, they need to start 
with people’s self-interest. Yet two things are worth pointing out. The first point 
is that the idea of self-interest is extremely broad, and could even include 
altruism itself. When an indignant vicar in a training session challenged, “well 
what is my self-interest?”, an organiser who knew him and had invited him 
responded “bringing about the kingdom of God on earth”. The vicar sat 
content (Field notes). The second point is that the invisible hand of Smith 
suggests that people will fall into relationships of mutual self-interest almost 
harmoniously, instinctively. But the LC method involves deep reflexive 
practice, understanding the place of self-interest, analysing “what makes that 
person tick”. The organisation is not necessarily saying that self-interest is the 
only motivation; they are saying that it is a strong motivation that can be used 
to bring about change. 
 
Still, one might question whether this creates the kind of pseudo-sittlichkeit 
already discussed: a community held together only by the self-interest of its 
individual members. Three questions emerge. First, is this the kind of 
community we are seeking? Second, what happens when a given individual 
or institution feels its self-interest is no longer served. Does it occasionally 
sacrifice its needs for the greater good?  Third, what if a small group can 
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create a community of self-interest that serves them but no one else? In terms 
of the individuals within the organisation, Theo suggested that: 
 
There was a lot of tension. I don’t know if it was because of being run by 
the idea of self-interest. It might have been the competitive nature of all 
the people at a young age trying to do well.   So there was a competitive 
aspect to it which sometimes was unhealthy. But at the same time it 
framed some great leaders within the organisation (Interview).  
 
As an insider, drawn in by the ideas and actions of the organisation, I equally 
found myself drawn in by the negative aspects, especially competitiveness, 
and arguments over pay. Theo also suggests that the tension is healthy, since 
it encourages competitiveness. Theo would tell me about monthly meetings in 
which organisers would account for the work they had done: 
 
The nature of the competition was: monthly meeting, 20 organisers, 
you want to be the one to come in with the most institutions, the most 
one-to-ones, and it’s a very, almost harsh culture. Where…it’s almost 
as tough as banking where you’re like “these are my numbers”. You 
want to prove to everyone else that you’re the best organiser. And the 
way it was done through monthly meetings, you had to show up and 
you had to deliver. It wasn’t turf-wars but competition to say “I’m the 
biggest, I’m the best” (Interview).  
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For Theo at least, the competitive nature of these meetings is exhilarating; it 
leads to harder work on the part of all of the organisers. 
 
Working with the world as it is, towards the world as it could be 
 
Despite these potential shortcomings, the ability of the organisation to 
recognise the world, in their words, “as it is”, or perhaps, the ability to 
recognise and work with a particularly powerful component of the way people 
are motivated, makes the organisation quite successful in brining about 
change. 
 
Picking up the very injustices organisers are most critical of, it is possible to 
see how mutual self-interest is found to bring about change. Emily explained 
how the enormous inequality one observes in London, especially in North 
London where she worked, can cause real difficulties for the way the 
organisation operates. The organisation’s chief strategy is to bring people in 
various institutions together to fight for a common good, a common cause. But 
in areas of enormous inequality, she found it extremely difficult to find issues 
of parity between the rich and the poor. This did not mean that the rich were 
not sympathetic to the plight of the poor, just that it was hard to find issues of 
shared interest, issues that aggrieved people from all income strata to a 
similar degree.   
 
In North London you have a much higher concentration of middle-class 
peopel and it's a real challenge for us to identify issues that are about 
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empathy, not just about sympathy. You know, "oh I'll support the living 
wage because I think you're poor and I feel sorry for you". And we want 
to find issues where "I feel burned by this issue and you feel burned by 
this issue and we can work on it together and we may be from different 
income groups but this issue affects us the same". And that's really 
difficult because those issues aren't as common. A lot of our kids aren't 
really worried about street safety. at some of our institutions in North 
London because they get picked up from school and dropped off in a 
car. So we just had in Haringey, Highgate school joined a year ago, a 
private school, not just a private school but one of the top private 
schools in the country. You know, I don't know what the annual fees are, 
like 20 grand a year type thing, per kid. The teachers even joke: we said 
"we're going to do a listening campaign", and the teachers said "well if 
you do a listening campaign, the only thing you're going to get back is 
"my Addison lee cab's late in the morning"". Actually that's probably not 
true and there's lots and lots of assumptions about each other. So what 
we've found with a social care campaign, social care for the elderly, is 
we've been able to bring together care workers, so a lot of migrant 
women working really hard jobs, really long hours, lots of middle class 
families who are unable to afford private care, and even if they can 
afford private care, they still end up with low-paid care workers; families 
are really struggling to find good quality services for their loved ones. 
And initially there's a bit of a blame culture around "the staff they don't 
speak English, they're not trained properly". And actually bringing those 
people together has been amazing because what we've been able to 
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hear from both sides is how difficult it is to be a care worker, how much 
pressure they're under, and also how much they want to provide good 
care for the families, and how difficulty it is, and why. And that's enabled 
us to build this really interesting coalition between families of the cared 
for, and care workers, and now we're starting to relate to care providers 
and care commissioners, and the campaign is completely across the 
income spectrum, the class spectrum, the ethnicity spectrum and the 
religious spectrum (Interview). 
 
LC were also able to use self-interest to encourage those from poorer 
backgrounds to be involved. One of the triumphs of the organisation is that it 
convinces young and talented people to forego great worldly pleasures in the 
name of a higher calling. One organiser explained: 
 
Growing up in East London, knowing people who got done for robbery, 
fraud, having a mate who got done for murder. Seeing all of those 
problems and thinking, “I’ve got an opportunity having gone to a good 
university to do something about it” (Interview). 
 
As explained in the first section, other motivations act as substitutes for the 
allure of money. I asked: 
 
Is there something when you got into Citizens that gave you any sense 
of status? A sense of, in banking you can wear a nice suit cos you’ve got 
	 373	
lots of money, is there any equivalent to that in organising in terms of 
power and status? 
 
Theo 
 
Definitely. Particularly as a young person, community organising is in 
vogue, everybody wants to call themselves a community organiser. To 
call yourself one for a group that’s been doing it the longest, the best 
and has actually achieved stuff, definitely proud to call myself a 
community organiser. Even without the financial gains. But you could 
wear a suit if you wanted! Not Boss, but yeah. And the second point is, 
as a young person, at one point I was leading eight institutions, 
representing 10,000 people, working with leaders who’d done it for 
decades, and working in a team where each one of us had a borough, 
you felt quite powerful. You could work with these people, they could 
bring tens of people hundreds of people, and you could go up to 
someone and say, “we want to do work on the living wages, there’s eight 
leaders representing eight institutions in your borough, representing ten 
thousand people” (Interview).  
 
Of course, if this is to work, then people really do need to receive status and 
influence through good work. By recognising the self-interest in status, LC is 
able to draw dynamic and intelligent individuals like Chris, Emily and Theo 
away from a place where they could be earning three-times the salary. 
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Conclusion 
 
LC demonstrates that it is possible to be heavily critical of capitalism, and the 
inequalities that it leads to, whilst nonetheless recognising that one must work 
with the structures that be and people as they are in order to bring about 
change. Its strategies of developing a sense of people power, of using this 
people power to pressure companies to change, and of helping disparate 
communities to discover a shared self-interest offer a kind of reflexive 
Hegelianism or organic solidarity. These community structures perhaps do not 
naturally form in a diverse capitalist society, but with the conscious-raising 
activities of devoted organisers, they can be brought into being and thrive.  
 
Yet what is deeply interesting here is that mechanic forms of solidarity are 
also drawn from in order to reinforce the organic solidarity. Drawing on the 
first chapter, it becomes possible to see that transcendence, shared values 
and shared aims are being cultivated, a general and undefined imagined 
community formed, such as can provide the social imaginary or shared 
background necessary for agreement on particular issues.   
 
Notwithstanding the successes of this organisation, it is important to take a 
step back from the grassroots successes of the organisation, and to recognise 
that this work is only one part of the jigsaw. What the organisation fails to 
provide is a structural account of inequality.  
 
	 375	
If one considers that the organisation does not operate in every part of the 
country, then it very quickly becomes clear how limited will be the change that 
they bring about. If one next considers that the organisation is working with 
companies on the basis of a single campaign, again the limitations become 
glaringly clear. Just because a particular bank is now paying all of its UK staff 
a living wage, says nothing about what it is paying its staff elsewhere in the 
world, to say nothing of its wider business ethics, its payment of taxes, and its 
payment of middle earners in relation to those at the top. Taking an even 
wider view, pressuring a company to change its behaviour on a particular 
issue does nothing to reshape the economy so that more money is available 
for the welfare state, or to restructure the economy to ensure more jobs are 
available to low-skilled workers.    
 
These multiple issues, too many and varied to explore here, might best be 
summarised in a metaphor: a drop in the ocean. A campaign on a single issue 
against the wider trends of a capitalist economy makes very little overall 
impact.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter began by suggesting that while on the surface LC staff had no 
religious affiliation, nonetheless their overarching activity could be identified 
as having ritual cognitive status. An ideal future is deliberately constructed to 
negate and transform the world as it is. This ideal is important to construct 
inclusively so as to offer people of very different backgrounds a reason to 
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recognise that they share something in common. But to flesh this ideal future 
out would be to undermine its potential – not only because a number of 
people would disagree as to what this ideal future looks like, but also because 
focusing on ideals is to diminish and distract from small, winnable goals.  
 
The ideal of working towards the world as it should be is offered support by 
the veneration of heroic community organisers of the past and present. This 
veneration creates links between community organisers and people of faith, 
with their own gods, prophets and great leaders. Veneration also finds its way 
into competitive discussion of current organisers, thereby not only inspiring 
transformation, but also holding to account those that do not appear to work 
hard enough.  
 
It was suggested that the strength of LC to deliberate, discursively and 
inclusively develop a strong ideal that is nonetheless very much open to 
individual interpretation, is suggestive of a kind of consciously socially 
constructed transcendental social that is nonetheless potentially just as 
powerful as any religion.  
 
This reflexive outlook neatly ties up with LC’s inclusive approach to politics. 
LC staff had a strong ideal of how politics should be done: not at as a 
national, bureaucratic level, involving showing off, networking and jostling for 
status, but disempowering local groups. Rather, politics is a responsibility of 
all citizens. Politics involves working hard to make a difference in a community 
in such a way as to empower that community. Politics involves demonstrating 
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that real change can take place if only they act. It involves huge celebrations 
of collective effort to bring about change. It is very hard to fulfil these goals at 
the level of government. On the other hand, LC are willing to work with both 
national and local government on the basis that it is best to have “no 
permanent friends, no permanent enemies”. 
 
LC staff were particularly critical of capitalism and its implication that those 
who are intelligent and who work hard will be successful. They feel that this 
narrative ignores the structural causes of disadvantage. They are equally 
critical of the use of material gain to inspire hard work, preferring ideas of 
power, respect and status. It is worth noting that LC staff are particular good 
at ignoring the former because they are provided with so many opportunities 
to experience the latter.  
 
Again, on the basis of “no permanent, friends, no permanent enemies”, LC 
staff find themselves working with numerous businesses and ethical business 
alliances. They can also be seen to operate in terms of a capitalist logic of 
their own: selling their activities on the basis of the self-interest of dues-paying 
members. It was questioned whether this appeal to self-interest potentially 
undermines the idea of community at the heart of LC’s work. It was further 
suggested that internally the organisation was highly competitive, with 
members showing off about the number of organisations they represented.   
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Chapter 11: Discussion 
 
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 introduced a theoretical framework for understanding 
ideas of solidarity that might have been lost with the rise of liberalism. It 
provided numerous theoretical questions. In light of these questions, chapters 
8, 9, 10 and 11 have detailed the way that four separate organisations 
develop a sense of common agency and action through complex political and 
economic structures and self-understandings. The aim of this chapter is to 
answer the earlier questions posed by drawing all of the findings into a 
theoretical discussion. The first section, on the constituting factor of common 
agency, provides a far lengthier discussion, reflecting the importance of this 
theme throughout, while the next two sections provide briefer reflections on 
the state and the market. 
 
The constituting factor of common agency in a pluralist society 
 
Chapter 2 introduces post-liberal theory, the main lens of this thesis, which 
suggests that the loss of an idea of the good for framing politics, policy and 
practice results in a hierarchy of power, in which material factors are 
dominant. Only a Christian narrative could restore a sense of public duty. In 
chapter 3, this idea was problematised in relation to theory in the sociology of 
religion, which suggests that while some sense of shared narrative is useful in 
developing belonging, becoming, and shared action, not only is Christianity in 
decline, but, to the extent that it retains its potency, it is far more spiritual and 
materialistic than before. By working with various groups Christian and 
otherwise, all of which were devoted to restoring a sense of public virtue in 
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some form, I was able to critically assess whether ideas of the good needed 
to be restored to develop a shared spirit of association, and if so, how this 
could be achieved in a pluralist context. 
 
Religion lost? From ideas of the good to inclusively imagined futures 
 
The data indicate that a number of conclusions can be drawn which suggest a 
tension between the post-liberal critique and the lived experience discovered 
in the case studies. While structures of belonging, becoming and participation 
were important, these not only did not have to be Christian, but also were 
often best left ideologically undefined, instead being inclusively developed 
through discussion and practice. In the following, I will draw on the findings to 
systematically answer questions raised in chapters 2 and 3. 
 
Charles Taylor’s suggestion that we are living in an immanent frame appears 
to be challenged by the use of transcendent ideas by groups across the 
spectrum from Christian to unreligious: “bringing about the kingdom of God on 
earth”, “equality”, “faith” and “the world as it is to the world as it should be”. 
Occupying the centre of the immanent frame, late modernity in the UK, these 
social movements nonetheless find themselves reaching for ideals that form 
the context for shared action. Certainly these groups are aware that their 
particular perspective is just one option amongst many. But the recurring 
theme that “we all have faiths” suggests that faith is not perceived as one 
option amongst many but a way of understanding the ontological and 
epistemological frameworks shared by everybody – people of all faiths and 
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none. This would imply that to the extent that faith does not have a valid 
epistemic place in the public sphere, this is because a secular hegemony has 
distorted our understanding of how convictions are arrived at – not through 
faith but through reason.  
 
What can be observed amongst these faith-based social actors, however, is a 
pragmatic turn towards practical, achievable, shared goals. But this step does 
not indicate a simplistic turning away from transcendence and towards social 
contracts. Rather it suggests that the common good must be tackled from 
multiple angles simultaneously: value-generalisation, overlapping narratives, 
ideas of equality and practical common action.  
 
John Milbank’s position too is highly suspect. It is clearly correct to suggest 
the importance of an ontology of peace, of mutual trust for social action. But 
again, the very fact that this can be observed across all settings despite 
religious and ideological differences, suggests not only that the attitude is not 
uniquely Christian, but also that citizens in a liberal society are quite capable 
of expressing a natural desire to reconcile with people who are different, most 
clearly through framings of “equality”, “inclusion” and socialist narratives.  
 
In the process of relaying the research findings, I began to find Maurice 
Bloch’s term “transcendental social” particularly useful for describing the way 
that actors conceived of a future which was constructed through the deliberate 
negation of the world as it is. Yet for three reasons this term seems unhelpful. 
The first reason is pragmatic. Just as the term religion has proved to be toxic 
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both in academic discourse and amongst my participants, so too might the 
notion of transcendence be anathema to some, and so the idea of 
transcendence having resonance for policy makers seems naïve. The second 
reason derives from this but is categorical. Transcendence is a culturally 
specific category that implies a clear binary between the other world and this 
one, whereas the participants with which I worked may well have been 
adopting structures similar to transcendence, but which they conceived as 
purely immanent and achievable in this world, given the right circumstances.  
 
The third reason is analytic.  Repeatedly it was observed that the structure of 
the imagined communities was not static but procedural: the world that actors 
were working towards was in the future if only people are willing to work 
towards it. CTL staff lamented theologies that treated heaven as another 
world, instead stressing that it could be imagined and brought about in this 
world. HCVS staff were angered by the fact that some elements of equality 
had not already been achieved. FbRN staff spoke of a heaven that required 
the work of people. LC staff talked of taking the world as it is to the world as it 
could be. From this perspective, the notion of imagined communities appears 
to be reliant on what might be called imagined futures. The term imagined 
futures is also useful because it implies an active imagining, thus stressing the 
importance of the social construction process. This notion of imagined futures 
seems to vindicate MacIntyre’s framework of a telos which contemplates the 
ultimate but which nonetheless has a tangible impact on the way a life is lived, 
making life a process of ethical development. But the very point that these 
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structures can be seen to exist, at least to some extent, in unreligious 
organisations, suggests that there is no need to lament.  
 
What was particularly effective about LC was that it overcame the tendency to 
treat religion as a special category. Rather, it conceived a clear way of 
imagining the future, taking the world as it is to the world as it should be, and 
allowed that faith groups were one very significant subset well-versed in such 
questions, even if not so well-versed in how to work with the world as it is. 
 
As well as being procedural, it is important to observe that imagined futures 
are discursive rather than propositional. This resonates with MacIntyre’s 
critique of the loss of story-telling and tradition in ethics as it gives way to an 
ethics with pretensions to universality – an ethics confirmed by appeals to 
logic or empiricism. As I have discussed at much greater length elsewhere, 
what seemed to create the capability for moral action was having the 
opportunity to construct a moral self through story-telling: for CTL, the telling 
of Biblical stories, as well as personal journeys; for FbRN and LC, the stories 
of many faiths, as well as of personal journeys (Stacey forthcoming). It is 
particularly worth noting in this context that not only was it possible to 
participate in story-telling without affirming the propositions associated with 
those stories, but also a propositional morality without associated stories is 
difficult to live out. In my time at CTL, I was able to participate in story-telling 
around the prophets and Jesus, and in so doing to cultivate moral aspirations 
in myself, without believing in God. While at HCVS, despite a clear sense of 
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equality, the absence of story-telling led to disempowered staff and difficulty in 
inspiring volunteers. 
 
The prevalence of imagined futures equally demonstrates that contemporary 
communities are not merely self-interested, or at least not in a short-term, 
instrumental way. Instead, at least in the few settings I have observed, people 
continue to organise around ideals of how the world ought to be. This manner 
of organising is particularly worthy of note in the unreligious organisations. In 
the absence of religion, people continue to push for ideal worlds and to gather 
around shared values. In the case of LC especially, its complex techniques for 
incorporating value deliberation. It is thus not the absence of religion that 
undermines ideas of the good, but the deliberate avoidance of addressing 
these ideas on the grounds that doing so is divisive.  
 
Yet LC proves an important case for the opposite argument. The groups 
depicted here may be considered as consisting of exceptional individuals; that 
is to say, people who are predisposed to public virtue. We therefore cannot be 
sure that what applies to these few individuals may equally be applied to 
society at large; that is to say, those that may not be as predisposed to public 
virtue. To put this in a somewhat unsophisticated way, just because we know 
what works for the best, does not mean we know what to do with the rest. It 
may still be valid to suggest that we need to rediscover a shared narrative 
such as can inspire public duty. But equally, LC found that in a pluralist 
society, it was often more effective to organise ordinary people around self-
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interest. In this case, people were only engaged insofar as LC’s activities 
helped their cause.  
 
Who’s doing the imagining? 
 
If discussing ideas of the good proves important, it nonetheless remains the 
case that doing so effectively and inclusively is difficult in a pluralist setting, as 
attested by the tendency found in all of the case studies discussed, to avoid 
discussing ideas of the good at least some of the time.  
 
Taylor put forward a twofold approach to deliberating about ideas of the good 
in pluralist settings: adopting a position of weak ontology so as to discover an 
overlapping consensus between different values. This idea of a weak ontology 
was clearly important in CTL, where Christian Socialism was explicitly stated 
to be one option amongst many. At HCVS, staff rarely, if ever, discussed 
ontology, but to call this weak ontology would be an overstatement, and it 
might better be described as unreflective ontology. At FbRN, weak ontology 
again proved important, with staff explicitly stating that their individual faith 
position was one amongst many, as well as placing themselves within a broad 
category of faith that they felt could be applied equally to any value position. 
LC were certainly reliant on the weak ontology of their members, and sought 
to show them that all people had very similar ideas of how the world should 
be.  
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As to seeking an overlapping consensus, this idea seems important but 
insufficient for cultivating solidarity. It was seen that the broader CTL made its 
message, the less predictable were its members’ interests and voting 
patterns. At HCVS, it could be suggested that there was an implicit consensus 
around the idea of equality. Yet limited discourses around this idea rendered 
the cultivation of a duty to act difficult. FbRN created an overlapping 
consensus around the idea of hospitality, which was believed to be a virtue 
shared by a number of faiths. Here it was suggested that this consensus was 
effective, since each individual faith actor was able to draw on her own 
tradition for inspiration. The limiting factor here was that the range of shared 
virtues was itself limited. LC perhaps overcame these difficulties by finding an 
overlapping consensus of self-interest. But here the question arose as to 
whether this consensus could ever be taken beyond self interest to public 
duty, as well as whether the shared self-interest of multifarious groups was 
not nonetheless always against the interest of some other groups.  
 
Adopting Taylor’s weak ontology is perhaps a prerquisite of MacIntyre’s 
multilingualism, which proved an effective tool for cultivating solidarity across 
difference. At CTL, it was Paul and Dave’s ability to understand where I was 
coming from, a position of disbelief, having themselves been on a journey 
towards faith, that allowed them to speak to me from my position.  Yet 
perhaps this fully fluent multilingualism is unnecessary. For MacIntyre the 
suggestion is that one must be able to fully understand a tradition internally 
before one can engage in dialogue regarding problems inherent to that 
tradition. Certainly levels of ignorance regarding certain cultures, made it 
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difficult to engage with those cultures at HCVS. But both FbRN and LC staff 
demonstrated that one can with good intention and limited multi-lingualism, 
engage in discussions regarding political and social problems with people of 
very different backgrounds.   
 
For Milbank, one ultimately cannot make a rational choice between two 
traditions, but only choose through conversion, through inspiration. Social 
actors that embraced this idea proved particularly capable of holding liberal 
attitudes regarding others faith. There system was not necessarily internally 
coherent, was not the only or even necessarily the best path, but it was the 
one they held faith with.  
 
What kind of future? 
 
The previous subsections have focused on establishing the importance of 
imagined futures, and understanding the kind of character traits associated 
with navigating different imaginings. In this subsection, I draw on the findings 
to understand the way the future must be imagined in pluralist settings. I do 
this using Chris Baker’s lens, seeking to understand which groups are most 
effective in cultivating belonging, becoming and participation.  
 
The groups that appeared to be most effective in developing belonging 
recognised that the building of an imagined future is a socially constructive 
project in its very nature. CTL struggled with this idea, because it already had 
such a clear and fleshed out vision of the world it was trying to create, the 
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result being that they often failed to be inclusive in their practice. HCVS had 
not grasped the concept of building an imagined future, and while 
transcendent ideas seemed to be at work in the form of equality, they similarly 
failed to engage in a socially constructive project. FbRN deliberately shied 
away from this idea, being far more interested in action, with the potential 
result that when funding ran out, the individual members returned to their own 
personal faiths. LC on the other hand, saw social construction as integral to 
creating social solidarity across difference. While sharing with FbRN an 
aversion to getting bogged down in theological debate, they nonetheless saw 
the importance of developing shared ideas of how the world should be before 
moving to act together.   
 
Peter Berger famously suggested that alienation occurs when people fail to 
recognise that religious ideas about how we should live are not universal laws 
of the cosmos, but socially constructed. The data here suggests that a much 
more profound alienation is at work when people are not included in the social 
construction. The failure of CTL was in its strategic generalisation of the 
“Christian” and “socialist”, while FbRN focused on generalising “faith” and 
“hospitality”. These were strategies implemented from the top down. CTL was 
far more effective at mobilising its membership when it consulted on what its 
name should be. Similarly, LC finds that work-shopping the world as it should 
be facilitates a sense of unity across religious and ideological divides. This is 
a problem when leaders either fail to include or deliberately exclude certain 
groups and people, but it is equally problematic when groups, like HCVS, 
themselves fail to recognise that they are operating out of a belief system, and 
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find themselves in a muddle about the kind of world they are trying to create, 
who will be included in the discussion, how this can be reified through 
particular practices, and what kinds of ideas and practices they will not 
tolerate.  
 
Transparency about belief turned out to be important across the spectrum, 
suggesting that a Habermasian approach to the public sphere is not only 
unworkable, but less liberal, less accountable and less forceful than a public 
sphere that is open and literate about its beliefs. Neutrality is not only 
impracticable but less desirable than literacy and inclusion. CTL and FbRN 
staff insisted that we all have faiths, implying that there can be no epistemic 
hierarchy. 
 
Perhaps the most striking point observed is that whereas a strong single faith 
tradition provides a far richer narrative in which to operate, this narrative 
cannot be made to appeal to everybody in a diverse world. But rather than 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater, it is important to adopt multiple 
framings, from being open about one’s own faith position, to creating a broad 
umbrella, to draw on elements of numerous traditions, and, most importantly, 
to being inclusive and open in the construction of all of these. LC especially 
gives life to the possibility of socially constructing imagined futures in diverse 
communities. What emerges from the foregoing then, is the question of how 
to develop social solidarity in a context in which it is very difficult to find 
agreement over the kind of narrative that should be used.    
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Turning to this question specifically, my findings suggest that while a shared 
idea of the good is important in developing belonging, becoming and 
participation, it is not very practical to draw on a preconceived narrative, such 
as Christian, socialist, or even faith-based, in a pluralist setting. Partly, this is 
because words like “Christian”, “socialist” and “faith” were all seen to be 
problematic for some people. And analysis of FbRN showed that seeking 
lowest common denominator concepts such as hospitality can only get so far, 
meaning that the nature of the public sphere is left challenged. Yet when 
these concepts were broadened to suit as may people as possible, 
organisations became far less powerful in their ability to galvanise members: 
what one Christian believes in and is willing to do will inevitably be very 
different from that of another, let alone what one socialist or one person of 
faith is willing to do. This presents a challenge to current social movement 
literature, which seems focused on an idea of the broader, the better.  
 
The broader a narrative becomes, the less it is able to retain what is 
distinctive. What this means for organisations devoted to public virtue is that 
they lose their distinctive take on what public virtue is. This dilution of ideals is 
most obvious when an ideal has become so thin that it cannot motivate 
volunteers, leaving the organisation dependant on the state or the market. 
This problem is seen in CTL, where members were unpredictable, and in 
HCVS and FbRN, where members could not be galvanised in the absence of 
a payslip. In this context, organisations can be seen to change their focus 
based on the priorities of public or private funders. This vulnerability to 
external influence was more pronounced in HCVS, which had no clear guiding 
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ideal or set of ideals, and which is relatively comfortable with taking on 
whatever projects it can find funding for, but could also be seen in FbRN, 
whose staff had strong mono-faith traditions, but which lacked in a unifying 
narrative of its own. 
 
What emerges then, are two extremes: on the one side are the old traditions, 
unappealing to the public, but struggling to broaden their criteria of inclusion 
without losing their identity altogether. On the other side sits a secular 
approach with no particular interest in developing an ideology with a rallying 
point, and which leaves itself dependent on the powers that be, with their own 
ideological agendas. 
 
This idea of two extremes also relates to the Habermasian notion of ensuring 
that only rational-critical debate, or arguments that are “in principle acceptable 
to anyone”, are included in the public sphere. While religious ideologies 
clearly influence the behaviour of certain actors, staff at CTL and FbRN also 
imbibe and reproduce secular ideals of inclusion and tolerance. Having a 
religious or ideological position is not mutually exclusive with having an 
inclusive and tolerant position. This is lucky since, as Dinham points out, 
“nobody starts from nowhere”; that is, there is no such thing as acting outside 
of any ideological lens. The question is what kinds of ideology are acceptable. 
Moreover, HCVS shows that a lack of clear ideological positions can equally 
lead to influence by others with their own ideological agendas.  
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This point seems to confirm the idea common amongst neo-Durkheimian 
sociologists of religion that where old gods die, new ones form to take their 
place. In this context, it is important to question what kinds of thing we want to 
hold sacred, and how to cultivate them inclusively. Yet a third key finding that I 
wish to draw attention to is the point that rather than new gods emerging fully 
formed, these gods form half-formed with covert and complicated influences. 
New gods require critical development, both to uncover and avoid undesired 
aspects, and to inclusively develop desired aspects.  
 
The fourth and final point is that one does not need to be religious to embrace 
these ideas, as I have tried to demonstrate in my increasing use of the term 
imagined futures to reflect how an imagined world can create a space for a 
devoted community beyond the differences that separate people in the 
everyday world, and which negates and thereby transforms that everyday 
world.  
 
Political structures and common agency in a pluralist society 
 
The last section concluded by putting forward the idea of imagined futures, as 
a way of simultaneously recognising plurality, and the power of a shared 
vision for cultivating solidarity. Chapter 4 explained the post-liberal analysis 
that the loss of ideas of the good in favour of social contracts concerned with 
material wellbeing had legitimised the state as the neutral arbiter of that social 
contract. It further explained that the state displayed co-optive tendencies, 
since it is rooted in a pessimism as to human nature, our ability to stand in 
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solidarity with one another. The state thus seeks to bureaucratically manage 
all political activity from the centre. These arguments were critically explored 
in relation to literature in social policy, which suggests the reality is far more 
mixed than this: much literature has been written to suggest that the state can 
embody principles of solidarity and empowerment. Numerous attempts have 
been made by governments to empower citizens, and it has been suggested 
that only where the state is financially and institutionally supportive can 
communities flourish. These points notwithstanding, it was suggested that 
even with the best will in the world, the state can display co-optive tendencies 
in interactions with grassroots community work. This section draws on 
findings to offer reflections on these ideas.  
  
The first point to note from the findings is that there is no reason to believe 
that the state is inherently cooptive, nor that its use is indicative of pessimism 
regarding human nature. Rather, the varied examples of each organisation 
explored here suggest that it is entirely conceivable to have a synthesis of 
Tawney’s state as embodying and administering a process of national gift 
exchange, and MacIntyre’s vision of empowering pockets of virtuous 
community. Yet in order to live out this paradox, it is important that there is an 
ideal for which the state is a mechanism. The state itself cannot become the 
end, but only the means.  
 
CTL sees the state and the legislative process as playing a key role in the 
embodying and administering of gift exchange. CTL’s Put Your Money Where 
Your Mouth Is and Sunday Trading campaigns emphasised the role of law in 
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protecting vulnerable people from the market. Yet by working very closely with 
the state, CTL also demonstrated a tendency to replicate its elitism. This 
elitism was perhaps assuaged by its dedication to working both inwards and 
outwards, influencing both politicians and the wider public. Yet CTL’s narrative 
and methods meant its influence over its own membership was questionable, 
let alone the wider public.  
 
HCVS had a particularly difficult experience with the state: not only being co-
opted by it but adopting this co-optive tendency into its own practice. While 
the state is not necessarily inherently co-optive, in the case of HCVS, local 
government did prove capable of using money as leverage to shape 
organisations as it sees fit, and was very quick to do this in response to crises 
for which it may be held responsible. It was equally observed that HCVS was 
particularly vulnerable to this pressure due to the lack of an independent 
vision, and associated membership. 
 
The co-optive power of the state was seen more positively with FbRN. The 
state played an important role in embodying the collective narrative and 
associated principles that the wider population expects to be upheld in the 
public sphere: intolerance towards intolerance and collaboration across 
difference. Putting aside debates as to whether the state is a carrier of 
vicarious religion or of vicarious secularity, as the state it may be seen as an 
important carrier of whatever imaginings of the future we so choose, enforcing 
this negatively through law, as well positively through funding. This function 
may prove to be more, not less important as people begin to reject 
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hierarchies. But with the wider populace turning away from traditional 
authority in droves, the state will also have to be opened up to work with 
groups on the ground. The most effective organisations were those able to 
maintain their own agenda. The state may embody a shared narrative, but it 
has not the people power to cultivate that narrative. It must therefore enable 
groups on the ground, whose cultivation of independent teleological structures 
and practices should be encouraged.    
 
LC demonstrated perhaps the most empowered way of working with national 
and local politicians and governments: always very clear that its aim was to 
move from the world as it is to the world as it should by empowering civil 
society, it had varied relationships with the state, from managing contracts, to 
pragmatically working towards a shared end, to deliberately antagonising and 
undermining. The strength of LC in relation to the state is in its mantra of 
having “no permanent friends, no permanent enemies”. LC works against the 
state when it appears to threaten community initiatives, and with it when it 
appears to support those initiatives. 
 
Economic context and common agency in a pluralist society 
 
The first section of the chapter constructed the idea of imagined futures as a 
way of framing solidarity in pluralist settings. The previous section explored 
briefly explored this idea in relation to politics. This section aims to do the 
same in relation to economics.  Chapter 5 introduced the post-liberal 
argument that with the loss of ideas of the good and stress on material 
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wellbeing, capitalist logic arises as the best means of increasing that 
wellbeing. It does so through cultivating self-interested behaviour which 
undermines public duty. It then introduced research that gave a more 
nuanced answer: although capitalist logic had spread to infiltrate a number of 
inappropriate settings, capitalism was simply a free market, a blank canvas, 
which could be used for creating cooperative or self-interested behaviours. 
Based on this theory, I was particularly interested to ask whether instead of 
imposing economic changes from above, it was possible to change culture 
and thereby economic practice from below.  
 
The first point worth making is that we clearly see a spread of capitalist logic 
into the sphere of civic engagement. One can also see capitalist logic in the 
way that CTL broadened its frame through the name change in order to suit a 
changing context on the ground. Partly, this is seen in the notion of 
competitive tendering, whereby organisations like HCVS and FbRN are forced 
to bid against other organisations for public and private funding in a 
marketplace. Both HCVS and FbRN were working towards turning some of 
their most valued services to grassroots organisations into profit-making 
enterprises, thereby undermining their availability for the most needy activists. 
And one can equally see capitalist logic in LC’s appeal to the self-interest of 
institutions in seeking to gain their membership fees. To summarise, capitalist 
logic impacts on framing, funding and fees. 
 
In each case the impact is ambiguous. In framing, following a market logic can 
increase membership and therefore engagement. But to achieve this success, 
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ideology is both diluted and fragmented. The message is broadened, say, 
from Christian socialist, with its deep history and strong policy implications, to 
Christians on the left. The ability to mobilise action is hampered.  The 
message is fragmented, in that mobilisation around an agenda and strategy 
give way to mobilisation around issues as they arise. 
 
Competitive tendering can make organisations more dynamic, but it also 
seems to create either disillusionment, or else an unhealthy lack of critical 
awareness in relation to ideological agendas being replaced by funding 
agendas. FbRN felt undermined by this competition, and felt partners turn into 
rivals. LC staff became more dynamic through competition, but they equally 
showed signs of anxiety and a willingness ot betray one another in order to 
hold on to their job.  
 
Turning services into profit-making enterprises obviously makes them 
exclusive. But equally introducing payment was seen as a way of protecting 
the organisation’s funding, as well as acting as an incentive to the 
beneficiaries, ensuring that they will keep to agreed meeting times. 
 
Marketing around membership fees and the self-interest of institutions or 
individuals can equally only go so far. At some point organisations have to 
work critically to develop consensus around shared ideas and shared actions. 
With this in mind, the following section suggests a possible way of developing 
social solidarity in capitalist contexts. 
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Chapter 12: Conclusions and Implications  
 
This writing was initially inspired by post-liberal critiques of modernity, which 
claimed that we had given up on ideas of the good. In the face of plurality, it 
had been decided that politics must become the management and 
accommodation of difference, and the facilitation of material wellbeing. The 
state and the market arose as monolithic mechanisms for generating these 
secure and wealthy societies. Policy concerning the social sphere adopted 
discourses of cohesion and capital. Public duty was in decline as political and 
social responsibility seemed limited to paying one’s taxes and not directly 
hurting other people. Yet these critiques were faced with a problem, since it 
was not obvious how to start talking about the good in an increasingly plural 
society. 
 
My naive hope was to cultivate or else stumble upon a new meta-narrative for 
solidarity that appealed to people of all faiths and none, left and right. What 
instead I have stumbled upon is a deliberative method for establishing such a 
narrative. This I have been calling imagined futures. 
 
The aim of this conclusion is to refocus a thesis that has been engaged in 
observing lived realities back towards the activist inspiration: given all that has 
been discussed, what is to be done, and who is going to be doing it? As well 
as asking these questions theoretically, I speculate as to areas of possible 
impact. 
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Imagined futures 
 
The notion of imagined futures encapsulates a number of ideas developed in 
the discussion: In terms of religious groups, the importance of embracing a 
more reflexive approach, asking, how has the future we imagine changed 
over time, and what factors have influenced it? The inevitability of influence 
from some religious or ideological position, and the importance of openly and 
inclusively constructing that position, asking, who is doing the imagining? 
God? Priests? Laity? In terms of both religious and unreligious groups, the 
importance of recognising that one does not need to be religious to creatively 
imagine the future in ways that galvanise solidarity. In the next few 
subsections, I will begin to flesh out the theory involved in imagined futures. 
This will inevitably impinge on the kinds of political structures and economic 
contexts that are favoured, though I shall try to save discussion of these for 
the next two sections. 
 
I will explore imagined futures in relation to each idea discussed above. I will 
first look at how religious groups can be more reflexively aware, both making 
use of what their theological positions can contribute to transform society, and 
understanding the limits of their theology and recognising the role that other’s 
ideas might play in achieving desired ends. I will then look to how unreligious 
groups can themselves employ the idea of imagined futures to develop their 
own core ideals. It was already clear how HCVS staff were instinctively using 
a discourse of equality that acted as a way of imagining the future. Showing a 
greater awareness of this tendency, and inclusively and critically developing it, 
could help the production of a sense of common agency applicable to people 
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of all faiths and none. I draw on the work of LC to suggest that this model of 
the transcendental social can be developed without reference to any particular 
tradition. Finally, I will explore how, adopting this model, diverse traditions can 
easily be drawn into a metanarrative of belonging and becoming that 
simultaneously expresses certain core values, whilst nonetheless being less 
concerned with content than with how that content is developed.  
 
Understanding how imagined futures change with lived presents and vice 
versa 
 
This subsection explores the role of reflexivity in the development of 
religiously inspired social action to suit a pluralist setting. It begins by 
discussing the manner in which religiously inspired actors have managed to 
simultaneously draw on their own tradition, while nonetheless recognising that 
theirs is one amongst many. It will suggest that a kind of neo-Thomist 
theology is implicit in their thinking; there is an unknowability about 
transcendence that makes it acceptable to have numerous approaches to it. It 
will then explore how this reflexive approach allows religiously inspired actors 
to expand their imagined community 
, broadening their appeal to other people. These actors strip back their 
baggage, providing a back-to-basics idea of religion that accepts multiple 
approaches and ideals.  
 
CTL staff hold the notion of reconciling all things to the creator as crucial to 
their motivation for action. This idea has a specific meaning in that it aims to 
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direct political action towards issues of social justice. One member is 
particularly clear, suggesting that he “personally couldn’t be a Christian and a 
Tory”. Staff wear their faith on their sleeves, suggesting they “unashamedly” 
use “biblical reason”. They seek to influence people through living a 
distinctively Christian way of life. They travel to other Christian organisations 
and seek to inspire a socialist mode of operating. Yet they are very quick to 
suggest that these are only their personal opinions, that Christianity is not the 
only creator of this vision. They also make clear that Christianity forms an 
imagined community beyond political differences, and that it is not their place 
to speculate as to another individual’s duty.   
 
Here we have a Christian socialist practice that is simultaneously and 
paradoxically deeply motivating in a particular religious and political direction 
and involves inspiring others to follow the same direction; but that does not lay 
sole claim to that direction, that is beyond any particular political direction, and 
that is unique to each individual. Christian socialism is acting as a mode of 
direction which negates the world as it is, transforms individuals who in turn 
seek to transform the world as it is, and yet which is not regarded as a 
prerequisite for involvement. To put this simply, Christian socialists seek to 
bring about a Christian socialist future without requiring people to be either 
Christian or socialist! 
 
Three possible explanations for this paradox emerge, which do not have to be 
mutually exclusive. The first idea is that the kingdom of God, transcendence, 
is ultimately unknowable, even if “little bits of it” can be seen on earth. The 
	 401	
transcendent is equally unknowable to all, and so castigating others for 
imperfectly living it out does not make sense. This idea can be seen in the 
insistence that “we all have faith”. This discourse not only insists that we are 
all equally flawed, but also invokes the possibility that we form an imagined 
community of those that do not know but believe; a community of the faithful. 
The second idea, related to the first is that if transcendence cannot be fully 
known, and can never be fully brought about, there is little point in insisting on 
conversion. The final idea, perhaps the most important, is the priority of love: 
implicit in the demonstration of the kingdom is that it must be cultivated 
inclusively. The means must match the ends. The importance of this final idea 
can be seen in CTL’s stress on prefigurative politics. The world CTL wants to 
bring about is a world in which all are involved in the construction of that 
world; to bring it about through castigating, dominating or imposing would be 
to undermine the ends. Revolution cannot be imposed from the top down. 
Instead, it must be inspired from the bottom up.  
 
The work of CTL perhaps provides some quite ground-breaking revelations as 
far as social movement theory is concerned, even if perhaps not for the 
anthropology of religion. Since the cultural turn in sociology, research is 
beginning to demonstrate the determinative role of culture and religion in 
social grievances (Wald et al 2005). What the literature has not observed 
however, is how deeply religious groups may engage in flexible social 
construction of their theology to suit the situation on the ground. Wald et al 
rightly point out that religious groups may act in ways that are not “utility-
maximising”, but they treat religion as determinative and immutable. They do 
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not observe how the process works the other way too, with theologies being 
related to reflexively to allow for elasticity, and thereby inclusion of more 
members (Wald et al. 2005: 126). In this way, theology and utility are in 
constant dialogue.  
 
The work of CTL also contributes to broader social movement theory 
regarding master frames. Benford and Snow suggest in their comprehensive 
review of the literature that “the more inclusive and flexible collective action 
frames are, the more likely they are to function as or evolve into ‘master 
frames’” that can include people from a diverse range of imagined 
communities (Benford and Snow 2000: 618). Yet the idea that emerges here 
is that a frame can only become so elastic. Stretch it too far and it snaps, as 
could be seen with the notion of Christian socialism stretched so far that the 
actions of members became entirely unpredictable: members became more 
nominal than active, and there was little movement left. Moreover, for some 
frames, no amount of stretching will do. The idea of being either Christian, or 
on the left, is anathema to some.    
 
Perhaps what CTL lacked here was the willingness to let their ideals dilute 
into a broader master frame, perhaps of “faith”, as reports of their private 
meeting on the name change suggest. This kind of flexibility was 
demonstrated in the work of FbRN, where Gary demonstrated the ability to 
simultaneously strongly advocate his own faith, while insisting on a broader 
idea of faith that included people of all faiths and none.  
 
	 403	
Becoming imaginative about the future 
 
This subsection explores how the reflexive attitude towards religion can be 
carried through the prism of imagined futures to apply to unreligious actors. 
Imagining the future is a mode of critical reflection, analysis and development 
to aid organisations in recognising the things they already believe, working out 
the aspects that are subversive and positive, including members in this 
process of construction, and developing rituals that create a strong sense of 
belonging, becoming and action.  
 
Following Bloch, it is clear that the notion “religious” cannot be universally 
applied. As a concept it can only be applied to a particular type of activity. The 
term is moreover alienating, divisive and controversial. It has proved useful, 
however, to use the term imagined futures, since this was evident even at 
HCVS, where staff were either hostile or indifferent to religion, or else 
displayed low levels of religious literacy. HCVS staff frequently used 
discourses relating to equality. The concept of equality acts as an imagined 
future which negates and inspires the transformation of the world as it is.  
 
Yet while HCVS staff all displayed evidence of this discourse around equality, 
the mode did not effectively manifest in belonging, becoming or participation, 
either amongst those within the organisation, or externally.  
 
There was no formal recognition of equality as a way of imagining the future 
and transforming the present. The staff did not discuss what they intended by 
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equality, and had little by way of tradition to draw on. Discussion was around 
personal experience or the law. The only designated opportunity for 
discussing equality was in a senior working group on Equality and Diversity. 
This managerial meeting provided no obvious sense of belonging. One might 
suggest that the meeting provided a sense of becoming, since it provides an 
opportunity to identify areas of improvement. Yet lower level staff who felt 
their ideals were being compromised had no obvious way of addressing this. 
There was no forum for inclusively exploring equality, what it meant and how it 
variously inspired and frustrated staff. 
 
There were not attempts to educate in ideas of equality or to develop a spirit 
of association around the notion of equality. Developing a shared spirit of 
association was not recognised by staff as a core task. Instead, the focus was 
on maintaining the stability of the organisation in changing political and 
economic contexts.  
 
The way that HCVS staff have picked up the ideal of equality demonstrates 
the way in which, as old gods die, rather than new gods emerging fully 
formed, new gods arrive half-formed with covert and complicated influences. 
New gods require critical development, both to uncover and avoid undesired 
aspects, and to inclusively develop desired aspects.  
 
Imagining the future as a way of imagining the community 
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The absence of a degree of reflexivity and of certain rituals in some groups 
provides a perspective on what might be required to develop and sustain 
imagined futures. In this subsection, I reflect on how FbRN and LC provide 
relatively successful models for imagining the future in a pluralist context. I 
then provide a concise outline of what I think imagining the future consists of. 
 
FbRN offers positive ways of imagining the future. Gary’s ability to 
simultaneously hold dear his Jewish identity and accept that this is not the 
path for everybody demonstrates an awareness of the importance of 
reflexivity. And his attempts to build an umbrella around the idea of having 
faith shows he is aware of the importance of developing master frames that 
can include people of all faiths and none in a shared project. Yet this focus on 
master frames, what I call “transcending transcendence” was difficult in the 
face of very different ideas of transcendence.  
 
Moreover, as referring to chapter 10 will attest, what I found frustrating when 
discussing with FbRN the notion of cultivating a shared narrative of public 
virtue was the way the conversation always turned back to how to 
accommodate various different faiths. Partly, this fixation on accommodation 
is down to a liberal desire to be inclusive. But partly there is a lack of 
imagination regarding the ideas and practices to move forwards with shared 
ideas of how the world should be and what a human community should like 
amidst a great diversity of different ways of living. It is in this realm that the 
idea of imagined futures becomes key: it is a way of simultaneously being 
open to multiple ideas, recognising either theologically, through notions of 
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doubt, or sociologically, that social construction always plays a role in shaping 
the ideas we live by; and recognising the inevitability, the dangers and the 
advantages, of holding something sacred, fundamental, that prevents a slide 
into instrumental ways of understanding human community. The notion of 
imagined futures is thus a method and a recognition. It is a way of inclusively 
and critically exploring the question of the ideals we live by, both through 
discourse and action.  
 
LC provides a much more advanced example of imagined futures, despite, or 
perhaps in spite of the fact that many of its staff are not religious at all. The 
difference within the organisation forces reflexivity. LC uses the phrase “taking 
the world as it is to the world as it should be” to indicate its collective work 
towards an imagined future. The phrase is used to construct an imagined 
community around the world as it could be, helping those with very different 
backgrounds to recognise that they are similar enough to work together. The 
notion of the world as it could be was a device for creating an imagined 
community around a shared imagined future. The idea was extremely 
powerful, even as it was recognised that it had been socially constructed.  
 
Yet the world as it could be was very rarely fleshed out. Partly, this was 
because to do so would be to descend into arguments about minutiae before 
any kind of collective action could be undertaken. Partly, it was because 
placing too much emphasis on the world as it should be could be a distraction 
from small, winnable goals. The world as it should be negated the world as it 
is, and was developed through practical observations of the world as it should 
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not be: divided and disempowered communities, financial disadvantage. 
Rather than responding to instances of injustice by theorising about a better 
future, LC took instances of injustice and thought of small, winnable ways in 
which they could improve on these injustices.  
 
LC creates a number of rituals around their ideals that create a sense of 
belonging and becoming. Major events, in which LC challenge public 
representatives of the world as it should not be, or in which new campaigns 
are kick-started or successful campaigns celebrated, provide a sense of 
effervescence and empowerment.  
 
LC provides its staff with a strong sense of becoming, of a character that is 
improving over time, by increasing responsibility, and offering recognition to 
those that perform well in events or actions. It also widens the net, allowing 
members of the public to be involved in this becoming, by making them an 
integral part of actions and events.  
 
Imagined futures can thus be summed up in the following way: 
 
• Socially constructed imagined future that can never be fully achieved, 
and that negates the world as it is 
• Inclusively developed to include people of different backgrounds 
• Never fully fleshed out to avoid descent into argument 
• Very rarely discussed to avoid distraction from small, winnable goals. 
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• Supported through rituals of empowerment, equality and leadership 
development, designed to change the lifestyle of activists, and thereby 
the world.  
 
It is worth exploring why imagining the future should come more naturally to 
some groups than to others. It can be observed, for instance, that whereas 
CTL and HCVS had predominantly Christian and nonreligious or unreligious 
staff respectively, FbRN and LC had a mixture of people of different faiths, 
with LC also having people of no faith. While CTL and HCVS did not 
discriminate, showing an awareness of operating in a pluralist setting, FbRN 
and LC experienced pluralism within their organisations, and were far more 
likely to be reflexively aware of what they believed and how it might impact on 
their actions, as well as understanding how others may believe different things 
and still exhibit the same actions. For this reason, imagined futures might call 
for policy that is directed towards encouraging not only equality of provision 
but also diversity and inclusivity within an organisation. This idea has strong 
implications for numerous policy areas, from welfare service delivery to faith 
schools. 
 
Imagined futures is an important concept for religious groups, since it helps 
them to accommodate people of different religious and nonreligious 
perspectives. It provides an accessible way of transforming religious activity in 
the public sphere, since rather than broadening framing to the point of losing 
identity, organisations can develop practices that make their work more 
inclusive and not just also but thereby more dynamic. 
	 409	
 
Imagined futures is so powerful for unreligious groups because it retains the 
powerful traits heretofore uniquely associated with religion or nonreligion in 
the public sphere, such as belonging, becoming and spiritual capital, without 
the less accommodating aspects such as a strong sense of in-group and out-
group, or a need to proselytise. The importance of this flexibility within 
religious organisations perhaps points the way to impact through providing 
religious literacy training for religious social actors. Not only would this 
potentially make those actors more inclusive, better serving a pluralist setting, 
but it might also make them more dynamic in a changing world. 
 
Imagined futures is also a useful concept for increasing understanding 
between the religious and the unreligious since it allows them to see that 
there is parity between them, given that they both hold something 
fundamental. Again a clear case for impact emerges here, with the possibility 
of developing training in these methods of imagining the future, allowing 
organisations to become more aware of their core beliefs, more inclusive in 
their construction, and more inspiring in their ability to cultivate a spirit of 
solidarity in the community as a whole. 
 
The concept of imagined futures should also be useful for policy makers, who 
can distinguish between groups that do and do not develop ways of imagining 
the future, without having to treat religion as a special category at the expense 
of nonreligous or unreligious groups. 
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Finally, this ability to recognise the advantages of imagined futures without 
descending into the treatment of religion as a special category assists in 
overcoming the post-secular paradox, and transitioning towards a truly post-
secular outlook. In chapter 2 I explained the existence of a post-secular 
paradox, whereby the inherent issues with a secular politics, such as the 
descent into material measures of success, are not addressed, while religions 
are recognised for their unique role in developing cohesion and in delivering 
public services cheaply. The result is that not only are the inherent issues with 
secularism not addressed, but they begin to colonise religions, killing the 
goose that lays the golden egg. Moreover, nonreligious organisations become 
increasingly defensive and the unhelpful religious/secular binary is reinforced. 
By showing that the strength of religions is in their ability to name something 
as sacred, a bottom line which they will not give up on, and by showing that 
this mechanism is socially constructed and can be developed in nonreligious 
and unreligious organisations, and is more effective when developed 
inclusively, imagined futures can simultaneously provide a framework for 
politicians and policymakers to explore their own ideals and baselines, but 
also assist them in developing this capacity in other organisations – or at least 
not undermining this capacity.  
 
Imagining the future as political process: Turning traditional power 
inside-out 
 
By treating imagining the future as political process, a clear idea emerges for 
the reform of political structures: the idea is to simultaneously turn traditional 
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power inside out, and to encourage grassroots power to recognise and work 
with traditional power. 
 
The idea of turning power inside out first emerged when I was working with 
CTL. At first, there appeared to be a contradiction in their work. On the one 
hand, they were deeply committed to the idea, strongly in the roots of 
Christian Socialism, that people and communities must be engaged in service 
to one another. Hence CTL seemed to sit so comfortably with the post-liberal 
agenda. But on the other hand, CTL sees the state as key in implementing 
social change.  
 
This confusion cleared up when I realised CTL see the state as engaging 
existing institutions in the process of social change. This includes but is also 
more than the Hegelian notion of the state using carrot and stick to make 
institutions and people more civil. CTL are critical of the Fabian notion of 
state-implemented social change because it creates a disconnect between 
lifestyle and policy. They encourage politicians and the wider public to live out 
socialism. As a politician, voting on left wing agendas does not abrogate the 
responsibility to live a socialist life. This includes empowering the wider public. 
CTL reimagines what it means to be a politician: not just manipulating the 
levers of positional and institutional power, but also empowering and inspiring 
others to act. Likewise, as members of the public, it is hoped that we will 
respond to this call.  
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The idea of turning power inside out then, is of recognising the power of 
positions and institutions, and of working from these positions and within 
these institutions to develop new leaders such as will empower more people 
to become politically engaged. The perfect example of this is CTL's Labour 
Neighbours campaign, which encouraged Labour MPs and organisers to 
regard themselves more as community organisers, encouraging local people 
to become more involved in their local issues, and thereby conforming to the 
London Citizens definition of leaders as people who have followers.  
 
We can see clear examples of when power has not been turned inside out in 
this way at HCVS, where not only was the organisation executing the 
demands of funders, living within this kind of iron cage, but also staff were 
imposing demands upon community minded individuals at the grassroots, 
playing its part in the construction of the iron cage. Here we see a model of 
power traditionally understood: an order is made at the top, which forms into 
policy, which is imposed through incentives and sanctions on those at the 
bottom.  
 
This process was not entirely unsuccessful for imagining the future. A clear 
example of top-down policy is the development and implementation of 
equality and diversity frameworks. Equality and diversity frameworks have 
often been imposed on organisations, which in turn implement procedures in 
perfunctory ways. But HCVS has utilised this top-down framework to inspire 
its Equality and Diversity Working Group, helping them to reflect on and 
improve their practice. Chris specifically referred to this working group when 
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explaining how his personal faith in equality was lived out in his work. From 
this perspective it would seem that so long as policy adequately matches up, 
perhaps using social scientific research, with the ideological disposition of 
those on the ground, far from a burden, it can actually be a tool for framing, 
reflecting on and implementing their aspirations.  
 
The idea of turning traditional power inside out might equally be considered as 
working within conventional political structures but adopting nonconventional 
political strategies: focusing on campaigns, mass-mobilisation and leadership 
development. 
In one sense this idea of turning power inside-out is nothing new, sounding as 
it does very similar to the Freirean notion of conscientisation (1996). What 
differs here, however, is that turning power inside-out follows from, and 
implicitly recognises, the role of ideas of the good in developing the solidarity 
necessary for collective action. In this model, ideas of the good become the 
lens through which empowerment is understood: if people are not involved in 
the construction of the narratives that shape their actions, then they only ever 
labour under the illusion of power: they have the power to execute a destiny 
written for them by somebody else. This latter framing is ideal for the 
hegemonic: leaders define people’s destiny for them, while all the energy for 
its execution is provided by the people themselves. Using ideas of the good 
for framing empowerment is thus what separates real revolution from the kind 
envisioned by David Cameron’s Big Society. 
 
Bringing activists from outside in 
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Just as it is important for traditional authority to focus less on positional power 
and more on relational power or empowerment, so it is important for 
grassroots groups to recognise the importance of working with traditional 
authority. 
 
While CTL sought to turn power inside out, they nonetheless put a lot of focus 
on bringing people from the outside in, seeking to engage the civically active 
but politically disillusioned. CTL thus recognised that part of the process of 
reforming traditional power involves bringing in different kinds of people. Yet 
persuading those on the outside, the disillusioned, remains difficult. CTL staff 
spend a large portion of their time cajoling people to become more involved in 
conventional politics. They make clear that a number of decisions inevitably 
do get made in “smoke-filled” rooms resulting in legislation, and suggest that 
they are not trying to change the room, but the people in it. 
 
HCVS similarly recognised the importance of keeping close relationships with 
politicians and policy makers, ensuring that they put together reports which 
summarised the impact of their work. And my time at FbRN demonstrated 
how important it is to focus on who you know in order to maintain influence. 
While policy makers might seek to ground their work in evidence, still they 
often already know the organisations and people that are commissioned, from 
the research stage to implementation. Gary explained that once government 
had decided religion might play a role in the regeneration of communities, and 
that multi-faith was the most appropriate model, still their first step was to start 
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with “a guy” of faith that they knew. Even when the selection of who to work 
with is not entirely random, still the tendency to treat religious leaders as 
representatives of their faith is precarious. 
 
Keeping a strong working relationship with politicians and policy makers is not 
just a matter of survival. Even an influential organisation such as LC has been 
tempted by entering into large-scale, long-term state commissions. This is 
because LC is always having issues with scalability. By building a strong 
working relationship with the state, organisations are able to share best 
practice, and either expand their organisation, or expand their model of work. 
LC also demonstrated the importance of fluidity between protestor and co-
designer and co-producer. While the first phase of a campaign might be to 
embarrass local or national government, the second phase involves 
negotiating a deal and producing a response.  
 
Inside-out and outside-in 
 
Just as the state needs to open up, indeed be turned inside-out, moving its 
focus from positional power to relational power or empowerment, in order to 
engage people on the conventional political process, so do grassroots groups 
need to recognise the importance of engaging positional power through 
networking and bidding to ensure their survival and to enable them to flourish. 
 
The state still plays an important role in incentivising public virtue and 
sanctioning vice. It plays a key role in embodying and delivering the 
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ideological frames of the public, and can even be seen to empower grassroots 
activism through these framings. Rather than giving up on politics, that is, 
suggesting that traditional authority has no place in capturing the diverse and 
fleeting desires of the contemporary public, it is better to demand that 
conventional politics needs to adopt the practices of nonconventional political 
movements that have engaged so much public support.  
 
Adopting these practices includes placing a greater emphasis on inclusive 
construction of purpose and developing rituals of belonging, especially the 
development of new leaders. It is also to in part confer legitimacy through the 
ability to energise mass support. These methods include. 
 
• A prefigurative approach whereby internal politics mimics external 
politics, that is, where the lived present aspires to the imagined future 
• Shifting focus from positional to relational power. 
• Shifting method from incentive and sanction to leadership development 
• Designing and delivering policy through processes of listening and 
consensus. 
• Making civic engagement the means and the ends of political change.  
 
To adopt the practices of nonconventional political movements is only one 
step. Alongside this, conventional politics needs to engage with already 
existing movements with claims to legitimacy through mass mobilisation. 
Partly, this means encouraging activists to partake on conventional politics. 
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Partly it means involving new political movements in the design and delivery 
of solutions.  
 
Engagement is a two-way process. Conventional politics opening itself to new 
political movements can only work insofar as these movements understand 
the power of conventional politics and commit to constructive engagement 
with it.  
 
Imagining the future as economic reform: cooperation in 
capitalism 
 
Findings suggest that although capitalism and its associated practices can 
undermine public virtue, by creating unhealthy competition, by producing 
wages too low to bring talented people into the charity sector, and by 
cultivating a culture of service delivery rather than community empowerment, 
there are nonetheless effective ways of working within the capitalist system to 
bring about change. Cooperation can happen in capitalism, just not as simply 
as has been suggested by Durkheim or Zak.  
 
It was observed that what Durkheim calls mechanic solidarity, observed in 
primitive societies that invoke shared ideas and rituals to inculcate social 
solidarity, and organic solidarity, the kind of cooperation that is supposed to 
naturally occur in capitalist societies, might be of such a different quality that it 
is flawed to suggest that the former can be replaced by the latter in any 
meaningful way. The kind of relationship post-liberals would qualify as being 
important for a fully human life, namely, a relationship directed towards 
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contemplation of the ultimate good, and through which each member is 
transformed into a more ethical organisation or person, is patently not the 
same kind of solidarity that does appear to be naturally occurring, such as that 
between service providers to bid for a contract. The relationship, for example, 
between LC staff, or between LC staff and dues-paying members, was one of 
a community of shared interest, which was acknowledged as only being as 
strong as those interests, and often for the benefit of only the immediate 
community. Yet the occurrence of organisations like BIC and ELBA 
demonstrate a community of shared action somewhat closer to the post-
liberal ideal, and their impetus for formation and ongoing action are worth 
further research. 
 
Secondly, it was noticed that organic solidarity is flawed, since far from 
naturally occurring, the cooperation delivered by CTL and LC demonstrates a 
significant degree of consciousness-raising on the part of dedicated 
organisers. Ordinary citizens need to be conscientised to recognise where 
their interests converge, and motivated to act. 
 
What is more, this process of conscientisation actually might depend on 
mechanic solidarity to create a context for action. Naturally, this could be 
observed in CTL, who draw on Biblical ideas to inspire campaigning efforts 
towards an organic solidarity, especially with campaigns such as Put Your 
Money Where Your Mouth Is. But it also applies to LC, as observed through 
the invocation of moving from “the world as it is”, to “the world as it should be”, 
and through the invocation of Jesus and Muhammad as community 
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organisers when seeking to recruit Christian and Muslim members. So the 
structures of mechanic solidarity, and the production of a shared framework of 
becoming remain important. Recognising the role of mechanic or 
transcendent forms of solidarity seems especially important in a time in which 
trade unions are rapidly losing membership as members decide the 
organisation is no longer serving their self-interest.  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of drawing on mechanic to establish 
cooperation in capitalism, it is also worth recalling the way that solidarity does 
operate within a market. CTL draws the majority of its funds directly from 
membership fees and public events. HCVS and FbRN are sheltered from this 
only by drawing funds from the state or from private funders. LC relies on a 
combination of all three sources. This suggests that religious solidarity can 
quite easily be dissolved in capitalist logics. 
 
It is important to ask what it means that people are drawing on mechanic 
solidarity to cultivate cooperation in capitalism. Simplistically, it means that 
shared ideas of the good, and the rituals around these, provide a pool of 
resonance that can be tapped into to alter economic behaviour in a capitalist 
society. Yet these ideas are equally vulnerable to dilution and fragmentation.  
 
From political theology to imagined futures 
 
Could it really be that divinely ordained ideas of the good, interpreted by great 
people, interpreted into grand political theologies by greater people still, and 
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bestowed from upon high by still greater people, may only be as powerful, 
perhaps less so, than imagined futures, deliberatively socially constructed by 
ordinary men and women as they live out their lives? Of course it remains 
deeply important that great thinkers continue to ask ultimate questions about 
what a good life consists of. Wisdom can often be neglected in a society 
focused on equality. But wisdom is of no value if it does not speak to the way 
lives are lived by real people. I have sought to demonstrate through my 
discussion that the reality of how people act in solidaristic ways is much more 
complicated. The point then, is not to ignore ancient wisdom, but to open it up 
to interact with real people as they live their lives: the question of what the 
good life consists of is important – too important to be left to just a few people. 
This nuanced approach can be applied to politics and economics at all levels. 
The point is not to do away with old institutions, but to reform them to be 
focused on inclusive practices for imagining the future.  The only question left 
to ask is can anyone really imagine such a future? 
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Appendix 1  		
The table below represents time spent with each organisation, as well as how 
many participants were involved: length of time, frequency of visits, size of 
each organisation, key participants and interviewees. 
  
 
 Length Frequenc
y 
Organisation 
size 
Key 
participant
s 
Interviewee
s 
Christians on 
the Left 
6 
month
s 
1-2 
days/wee
k  
10 staff 
1000 
members 
8 4 
Faith-based 
Regeneratio
n Network 
4 
month
s 
1-2 
days/wee
k 
4 staff 
Large 
network of 
informal 
affiliates 
4 4 
Hackney 
CVS 
4 
month
s 
1-2 
days/wee
k 
28 staff 
Numerous 
dependent 
grassroots 
organisation
s 
10 4 
London 
Citizens 
6 
month
s 
3 
days/wee
k initially, 
then 1 
day/week 
22 staff 
Large 
network of 
informal 
participants 
12 4 
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